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ONE 
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
At very few times in the past has Australian planning law been the subject of such 
concerted review by the Commonwealth and State governments and by increasingly 
active stakeholders from the environmental and development communities. Out of 
this review has emerged a climate of expectations about assessment systems and 
approval systems generally, which reflect an increasingly complex interplay between 
often-conflicting public and private aspirations. The desire, often expressed at 
Commonwealth and State levels, for the economy to become globally competitive,^ 
for growth rates to be maintained, for the external trade deficit to be in balance, for 
employment to be maintained at high levels requires, as a precondition, that an 
assessment and approval system^ be established and maintained which is transparent, 
flexible, and simple and which is based, conceptually, on notions of equity and 
efficiency. 
In turn, these, essentially economic, expectations must increasingly be set against a 
strengtiiened perception that environmental factors must occupy centre-stage in any 
such system. These two sets of expectations, which often reflect quite differing 
' Which is the central purpose of National Competition Policy [NCP] and the Productivity 
Council. 
^ Throughout this work the Integrated Planning Act, 1997 (Qld) [PA] designation IDAS or 
Integrated Development and Assessment System has been used as a short-form expression. It 
comprises 4 discreet stages; appUcation, information, pubUc notiJBcation and decision. These 
have their NSW equivalents in Pt four, of The Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 
1979, [EPAA] 
philosophical, ethical and cognitive perceptions concerning the role of the state, the 
rights of various underprivileged groups, the debate over specificity or holism, the 
relative value to be placed on public consultation and participation and many other 
issues which will be considered subsequently, come into play in the development 
control portion of the overall planning process. In social and legal terms then, 
development control is often at the crossroads of competing principles such as the 
private right to use land, the public right to mitigate the consequences of that private 
right, mediation, negotiation and outright regulatory and statutory prescription.^ The 
intention of this work is examine two sophisticated IDAS systems'^ in the context of 
thek relative equity or fairness to all participants and their relative efficiency in 
procedural and economic terms. ^  
To achieve this the following hierarchical framework, which moves from general 
statements of principle (Hilmer) to greater degrees of specificity, is proposed. The 
overall intention is to contribute towards a micro economic, social and legal 
comparison, which contributes towards the dynamic of national and State policy 
development and research. Accordingly, in Chapter One after outlining the framework 
of National Competition Policy, the following issues will be examined: 
• National Competition Policy and the Public Interest 
3 It is appropriate, at this early poiat, to acknowledge that underlying intellectual position 
adopted in this work is the protection of private rights wherever possible. See McAuslan, P 
The Ideologists of Planning Law, (London, Pergamon Press, 198Q) and Note 17, Chapter 4. 
McAuslan supports public participation. 
In this work, IDAS is used inter-changeably with "development control system". 
For a structural comparison of the two IDAS systems see, Pickles, Ian "IDAS: Queensland 
and New South Wales Comparisons" Qld Planner, Vol 41 No 2, June 2001. 
• The National Context of Development Control 
Beyond NCP the thesis will provide the basis for a comparative analysis of the two 
IDAS systems with a view towards contributing towards the broader national project 
and, where appropriate, this will be done in the context of a detailed examination of 
the component parts of the two systems against specific benchmarks and best practice 
criteria. 
Consequently, some highly significant issues in planning do not form a part of this 
study not because they lack importance in themselves, but because they do not form 
part of the assessment and approval matrix that is constituted by four discreet 
processes. These issues include, in the case of NSW, the cumulative role of LEPPs, 
REPPs, SEPPs and DCPs, the process of Plan formulation^ and approval and the 
operation of the State planning courts. In the case of Qld, no consideration is given, 
similarly, to transitional IPA provisions, to the "roll-in" of additional concurrence and 
referral agencies or to the compensation or the appeal process. 
On occasion, in the analysis that follows, some consideration is given to the mformal 
processes which underpin any IDAS system and, on occasion, no authority in the 
* An overview of the first two points is given subsequently. It was felt more appropriate to deal 
with the larger issues in the context of the individual chapters dealing with the component 
parts of the IDAS systems. 
' The new IPA consultation draft actually increases this to five with the incorporation of 
"compliance" as an additional factor in the case of self-assessable or exempt 
developments.:IPA, s 3.1.12. 
* Local, Regional and State Environmental Planning Policies respectively. The multiplicity of 
local and other plans is currently being addressed by DUAP in an initiative 
named "Planfirst". On completion NSW will have a) a single local plan for each council area, 
b) a single regional strategy for each region in NSW and c) all state policies in a single 
document. This will represent a quantum leap beyond the situation which still prevails in Qld. 
Details of Planfirst are available at <http://www.duap.nsw.gov.au/planfirst>. 
formal sense, may be given for a proposition being advanced. In this situation 
acknowledgement will be made, as far as professional confidences will permit, of the 
organizational source for that proposition. A genuine attempt has been made to avoid 
the charge of dogmatism in portions of the foUowmg work, however it has, on the 
basis of a 15 year involvement with IDAS systems at Local Government level in Qld, 
(as an applicant or agent representing an applicant) sometimes been difficult not to 
express opinions and sometimes critical ones. It is hoped that, even in these passages, 
it will be apparent that the overall intention is to be constructive and that dogmatism 
in planning, given the changing philosophy and the heightened involvement of the 
Commonwealth, would be fatal to any attempt to propose reform to the systems which 
is attempted at the end of the thesis. 
At various points in the following work comment is made concerning the risks which 
may attend the incorporation of very general statements of principle as core elements 
within IDAS systems, which is to say that development control may be at risk of 
concerning itself with a totally impossible "everything". The work, at these points, 
attempts to suggest how these principles can be converted into operational tools, 
which will assist administrators rather than inhibit them. Equally, consideration has 
had to be given to Commonwealth Government policy which is mediated through 
National Competition Policy [NCP] and the new Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999 [EPBDC] both of which bear down equally on 
both the NSW and Qld systems and which, to some extent, are pulling in different 
directions. For the latter Act to function, assessment and eventually approval 
bilaterals will need to be executed by both States and this, together with a 
corresponding agreement on associated management plans, must have an effect, not 
only on the respective IDAS processes, but also on the structural aspects of both 
systems.^ 
The rate at which the applicable law is changing under these circumstances poses 
challenges in itself. Every attempt has been made to ensure that the law quoted in 
this work is correct and applicable as at 1 March 2002. 
B THE FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY 
The involvement of the state in matters relating to the subdivision of land or the 
private use of land and premises follows from the obvious fact that private land use 
can have broad or specifically deleterious affects on the rights of others. The concept, 
which is used as a justification for state intervention, is the "public interest" and it has 
grown in scope from its origin in the common law doctrine of nuisance, which 
operated to protect fairly limited classes of defined rights, to the position today where, 
as a concept, it can now be said to include a large, and growing, collection of social, 
cultural, envirormiental and economic factors. 
Since land use planning and their associated approval processes are the essential first 
steps in any economic activity and since a high rate of economic activity is taken as a 
positive social value in itself, economic efficiency is an increasingly prominent public 
policy rationale for an oversight role for government at levels higher than the local 
i« 
Because the EPBDC wiU result in structural and other process changes at the State and 
Local Government levels, and will need to be taken account of in the IDAS systems, the Act is 
considered in the following chapter. For confirmation that State planning ministers are aware 
of the potential affects of this Act on their respective development control systems, see 
Property Insider at http://www.propertyoz.com.au/data/info/insider/0006/planmini.html 
Major amendments are proposed to IPA to be enacted by June 2002 and NSW has recently 
carried out a substantial revision of the EPAA regulations. 
one where unmediate development issues arise and historically have been 
adjudicated. 
This process has been accelerated by the actual, or perceived trend towards the 
globalisation of frade and investment and in this new global sense the common 
economic presumptions are: 
• that capital will seek areas of investment which generate the highest 
return 
• that sub-optimal investment returns may be justified on the basis of an 
analysis of competing risk: but that, 
• given sunilar aggregate risks, global investment will flow to areas 
which generate the highest return. 
A decision to invest is thus a function of the highest possible return set against the 
lowest possible risk and one of the factors involved in the assessment of risk can be 
categorised as the "institutional risk factor". Institutional risk may, in land use terms, 
reflects the degree of efficiency and fairness of the approval and assessment regime 
within the jurisdiction and it is one element of the total dynamic of risk which is an 
inevitable complement of most investment. 
Some jurisdictions may be perceived to possess low mstitutional risk at the approval 
level because the risk is underwritten by a pervasive, but nevertheless effective, 
culture of corruption. In such a system, approvals emerge quickly on the basis on 
known inputs and, at least from the applicant's point of view, the process is 
demonsfrably fair and efficient. However the same jurisdiction that can generate 
efficient approvals may possess a constitutional or political structure which 
entrenches social, political or economic divisions which, in the longer term, may be 
exacerbated by the same phenomenon of corruption. This may result in very high 
degrees of political and economic instability which will, in turn, cause a rapid 
decrease in investment as the market begins to appreciate the wider djmamic of risk 
applicable to that particular jurisdiction. 
SiQce it is clearly not open for Ausfralia to adopt the cultural patterns of another 
country, no matter how dubiously efficient their development approval system may 
be, the emphasis can only be to improve institutional practice within the various 
jurisdictions in Ausfralia so that, in terms of efficiency and equity, the total processes 
are acknowledged to be amongst the best in the global marketplace. To use the 
popular parlance, the drive is towards "global best practice". 
In Ausfralia this has resulted in an acknowledgment that regulation is a major cost 
mput in the business cycle and that much of it exists without good and sufficient 
justification. ^^  The Hihner Committee Report of 1993^^ represents, to date, the most 
significant attempt yet in Australia to establish a set of principles in terms of which all 
regulatory inputs should be considered, and re-considered, on a progressive basis. 
" A similar acknowledgment is contained in the policy platform of the American Republican 
party. 
^^  Indepemdent Committee of Enquiry into Competition Policy in Australia, National 
Competition Policy (Canberra, A.G.P.S., 1993). 
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Since all economic activity, at some pomt in time, involves the question of land use 
and since land use regulation has historically been devolved to the lowest 
jurisdictional area viz. Local Governments, which have rarely felt resfrained in their 
regulatory activity, the findings and policy recommendations of this committee are of 
major significance. 
The Hilmer report however, did not arise in an historical vacuum. On the contrary, it 
was the end product of a long period which saw the role of Local Government 
recognised by both State and Commonwealth goverrmients as an essential third tier 
which could, potentially, respond quickly to emerging issues. As Balmer remarks. 
Local Government is the sphere that can be the most responsive; State Government is 
the one best able to perform developmental tasks with efficiency and, as an 
intermediate sphere of government, is best suited to meeting emergent needs. Where 
uniformity and equality (as special cases of a more general equity) throughout the 
action are required, federal government is the appUcable sphere.^ '* 
This recognition has its genesis in 1976 in the establishment of the Australian Council 
of Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) that brought Local Government into the 
formal processes of national govenmient and recognised the importance of its role in 
13 
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The Hilmer recommendations were adopted by all State governments in April, 1995 and were 
underpinned by three intergovernmental agreements; the Competition Principles Agreement, 
the Conduct Code Agreement, and the Agreement to Implement the National Competition 
Policy and Related Reforms (Implementation) Agreement. The adoption process was, no 
doubt, ably assisted by the federal government's commitment to provide AUD$19 billion in 
incentive grants to the States over a nine year period. 
Balmer, C "Criteria for the allocation of responsibilities: an interpretative discussion" in 
Towards Adaptive Federalism 1981.(Information Paper Paper No.9, Canberra, AGPS, 1981) 
pp 218-240. The 2001 Lake Eyre Basin Intergovernmental Agreement is a good example of 
the last category involving, as it did, joint agreement between the Commonwealth, South 
Australian and Queensland governments. 
a national perspective.^^ In subsequent years what was to become known as the 
Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) was established as a peak body 
representmg the interests of this sector on a national basis. With a structural basis now 
in place, the Commonwealth instituted "The Local Approvals Review Program" 
(LARP)^ ^ which channelled federal fimding directly to Local Government most 
notably for the "Building Better Cities Program".^ ^ The assumptions behind the 
establishment of LARP were essentially that the local assessment and approval 
processes were politicised, bureaucratic and multi-layered and accordingly, generated 
1 St. 
inefficiencies which depressed economic development. Building further on this 
basis a series of Special Premiers Conferences^^ resulted in the formation of the 
Council of Ausfralian Governments (COAG), in 1990, with the ultimate view of 
developing a single, integrated approval system that would fimction irrespective of the 
class or nature of the development. Additional portions of this mtergovemmental 
framework were added in 1993, in Queensland, with the signing of the "State and 
Local Government Systems Protocol"; at the national level a similar accord was 
signed between the ALGA and the Commonwealth Government in 1995 and in 1998, 
15 
16 
w 
1* 
Three important publications emerged out of ACIR during this period: "The Nature of 
Intergovernmental Arrangements involving Local Government"; "Options for Local 
Government" and "Recognition of Local Government" (ACIR, 1980). 
See England, P Integrated Planning in Queensland (Sydney, Federation Press, 2001), p 
16. 
The "Better Cities Program" ran between 1991-96. 
The Local Approvals Review Program (Dept of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic 
Affairs, 1990). 
Which began in 1990. 
See Chapman, R "Intergovernmental Relations" in Dollery, B and Marshall, ti Australian 
Local Government: Reform and Renewal(Melho\mie, MacMillan Education Australia, 1997), 
pp 40, 50, 54, 65. 
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the Productivity Commission^^ was established and all States and Territories agreed to 
combine with the Conmionwealth Government in the Development Assessment 
Forum [DAF]. 
In its 1993 review of what it described as "regulatory restrictions on competition" the 
Hilmer committee reconmiended four principles as a basis for a national policy. 
• There should be no regulatory restrictions on competition unless 
clearly demonstrated to be in the public interest. Governments which 
choose to restrict consumers' ability to choose among rival suppliers 
and alternative terms and conditions should demonsfrate why this is 
necessary in the public mterest. 
• Proposals for new regulation that has the potential to restrict 
competition should include evidence that the competitive effects of the 
regulation have been considered, that the benefits of the proposed 
restriction outweigh the likely costs, and that the restriction is no more 
restrictive than necessary in the public interest. Where a significant 
restriction on competition is identified, the relevant regulation should 
be subject to a sunset provision deeming it to lapse within a period of 
no more than five years unless re-enacted after fiirther scrutiny in 
accordance with principle two. 
20 The relationship between the Productivity Commission and the NCC is difBcuh to categorise. 
It is currently reviewing Pt 3 of the Trade Practices Act 191A for the NCC though, in the past, 
it has been preoccupied with cross-media ownership issues. 
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• All existmg regulation that imposes a significant restriction on 
competition should be subject to regular review to determine 
conformity with principle one. The review should be performed by an 
independent body, mvolve a public inquuy process and include a 
public assessment of the costs and benefits of the restriction. If 
retained after initial review the regulation should be subject to the 
same requirements imposed on new regulation under principle two. 
• To the extent practicable and relevant, reviews of regulation 
undertaken pursuant to principles two and three should take an 
economy-wide perspective of the impact of restrictions on 
competition. 
When these broad statements of policy are applied to the planning and approval 
processes of Local Governments the following observations should be made. First, is 
it illusory to suggest that a global competitive principle should, or can, operate at a 
Local Government level? The answer here, in terms of land use approvals, will turn 
on the particular facts driving a given development. It is most unlikely for example 
that a proposal to build a shopping centre m a particular Local Government will be 
driven by any other factors but demographic ones. To such an applicant, an onerous or 
arbifrary regulatory regime of the Local Government is a regrettable fact of life which 
simply has to be tolerated and endured. However it is possible to envisage a situation 
where such a regulatory regime may have a negative effect and this is where the 
development proposal is itself in competition with others in a broader national or 
international perspective. In this situation where two locations are in contention and 
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where the project, such as a resort, could be constructed in Phuket or at Port Douglas, 
the nature of the regulatory regune and the time involved ki obtaining approvals 
could be critical. 
The Hilmer Committee, not incorrectly, assumes that if the second issue is addressed 
by making the indigenous regime more efficient and equitable on an international 
comparative basis then the applicant in the first situation will also benefit. It would 
clearly assist this process however if the Local Government could be made to 
compete with something. This has been attempted in Queensland by stating, in the 
overarching plaiming legislation, the presumption that all development is "exempt 
development" and as such not subject to the regulatory purview of the Local 
Government at all.'^ ^This is an attempt to create a form of notional or perceptual 
competition though, in reality, the presumption is rather empty since both Acts 
proceed to make nearly all development assessable. 
Of more significance in the longer term may be the expansion of "private 
certification" throughout both jurisdictions. Although currently the ability to employ a 
private certifier is only available in designated situations that are considered to lack 
political and emotional volatility, such as the assessment of applications agauist 
standard Building Codes, there are good reasons why the category should be 
encouraged to grow over time. Perhaps more than any other single factor the creation 
of a genuinely competitive environment at the local level may ultimately, after many 
other approaches have been tried, depend on the expansion of private certification into 
areas previously reserved for Local Govenmient departments. Additionally, both 
22 IPA, s 3.1.2(1) 
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NSW and Queensland have provisions m their planning legislation, or in other 
legislation, to enable large or "significant" projects to be exfracted from the local 
approval process and dealt with at the level of the State Government, presumably on 
the basis that the public interest requires such projects to be assessed by an altogether 
more flexible procedure than that enjoined for everyone else. 
The second of the Hilmer principles directly opens up the issue of justification. All 
legislation and regulation is ultimately justified on the basis that it is in the public 
interest and this claim has echoed consistently throughout the relatively short history 
of land use planning. There are reasons why this claim has been so conspicuous in the 
planning area. Although all government may be local. Local Government is more 
local than most. There is immediacy at this level of government that flows from its 
smaller scale and its more parochial concerns, where a citizen's access to their elected 
representative is relatively unimpeded and where grievances can often abound. In this 
highly social but also highly political milieu the tendency of a local politician to 
respond to virtually any sign of organised (or disorganised) complaint by proscribing 
the conduct giving rise to the complaint is often large indeed. When this domestic real 
politik is superimposed over an approval process which is, ui most cases, an 
inescapable first step in a development process which underpins most forms of 
economic activity, the consequences have very often been unsatisfactory. 
It is consequently hard to find fault with a general proposition which merely asks 
Local Govenmients to consider the economic cost of their regulatory activity and to 
^^  IPA, s 3.6.5 and EPAA, s 88A(1). Specialized legislation such as the Local Government 
(Robina Town Centre Planning Agreement) Act 1992 will almost certainly continue to be 
produced. 
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examine whether the benefits of the proposed restriction outweigh the likely costs. In 
reality however, this analysis can be difficult because, unlike the regulation, say, of 
working conditions or road transport, land use issues are multi-dimensional in a 
manner which surpasses most others. For example, a regulation which prohibits the 
use of trucks above a certain axle weight on public roads is readily reducible to an 
economic factor viz. the annual cost per kilomefre of road maintenance. However, a 
planning scheme or planning policy which prohibits the removal of heritage houses or 
which insists that the inclination of roofs in a designated area should not be less than a 
given amount is, on the contrary, not reducible to economics, it is reducible to "value" 
and it is in this attribution of value where many of the difficulties arise. 
Consequently, though some specific criteria, which are relevant to development 
confrol issues and which are reasonably quantifiable, will be examined in this work 
one must always remain cognisant m this area of the risks associated with knowing 
the cost of everything and the value of nothing.'^ '^  
In most instances the word 'value' and the phrase 'public mterest' can be taken as 
S)Tionymous with the latter bemg the political articulation of the former more abstract 
concept. Hilmer does not attempt to remove from govenmient the task of assessing 
value or determiiung what the interest of the public may be in a given situation. This, 
the Committee acknowledges, is at the heart of the political process itself. Hilmer 
does ask however that government at all levels be more attune to the general 
"^^  See F.H. J.M. Coenen et al (eds), Participation and the quality of environmental decision 
making (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1998). Clearly all planning problems cannot be approached on 
the basis of'efficiency' or indeed even 'equity' because assessments and decisions will 
always involve value judgments. 
15 
economic consequences of their actions.^^ With this in mind, in terms of land use, 
there appear to be two questions that should be asked, as it were, on the value side of 
the ledger: 
• what values should be protected; and, 
• who should pay for the protection 
Perhaps the best, or alternatively the most cogent summary, of what values are 
considered by communities as worthy of protection at particular points in time, is now 
contained hi the various definitions of the "Environment" in relevant planning and 
environment legislation. 
Section 4 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act,1979 in New South 
Wales defines "environment" as including: 
All aspects of the surroundings of humans, whether affecting any human as an 
individual or in his or her social groupings. 
By way of comparison, s 2. of the New Zealand Resource Management Act, 1991, 
includes the following elements within the ambit of the environment: 
(a) ecosystems and their constituent parts, including people and communities; and, 
(b) all natural and physical resources; and 
(c) amenity values; and 
25 NCC National Competition Policy: Some Impacts on Society and the Economy (Canberra, 
AGPS, 1998) p 47. The focus of NCP is "to promote the best value for money in delivering 
goods and services which the community values". 
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(d) the social, economic, aesthetic, and cultural conditions which affect the matters 
stated in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this definition or which are affected by those matters. 
The most extensive definition is given in Sch 10 of the Queensland Integrated 
Planning Act, 1997 where the environment is stated to include: 
(a) ecosystems and their constituent parts including people and communities; 
and. 
(b) all natural and physical resources; and, 
(c) those qualities and characteristics of locations, places and areas, however large or 
small, that contribute to their biological diversity and integrity, intrinsic or attributed 
scientific value or mterest, amenity, harmony, and sense of community; and, 
(d) the social, economic, aesthetic and cultural conditions affecting matters in 
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) or affected by those matters. 
The NSW and Queensland definitions will be examined in detail subsequently but at 
this point is it possible to exfract some general statement of principle that would 
mdicate, even in the broadest possible sense, the nature of these community values 
that are considered to be "protection-worthy"? 
Regrettably the answer appears to be "no" if tautology is to be avoided. In fact despite 
their differences in emphasis (though the genesis of the Queensland definition is 
clearly discernible in the New Zealand one) the concepts covered specifically in the 
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Queensland or New Zealand Acts or sparsely alluded to in the New South Wales Act 
are, in total, broad enough to include anything. In short, community values which may 
properly figure as aspects of the regulatory activity of Local Governments, are any 
individual or group concern which is able to be fransmitted through the political 
process to those in authority. The process of accretion by which concerns become 
values and then atttact a constituency is a political one, not a legal one. 
It was noted above that these values are only "givens" at particular points in time and 
it follows that their content or the emphasis given, by the Local Government or 
eventually the courts, to particular issues will change over time as community values 
change. And these changes can occur over fairly short periods of tune. It is, for 
example, almost mconceivable now that a development application which 
necessitated the demolition of sfreetscapes of 19th century buildings would even 
remotely be entertained in Brisbane a mere 30 years after such demolition was 
undertaken as a matter of course. 
The second point which relates to who should pay for the protection of politically 
defined community values is the more interesting one since the Hihner Report does 
not set out to deny the right of local communities to establish their own set of, perhaps 
idiosyncratic, values since this process often leads to the creation of a degree of 
colour and variety throughout a nation which, itself, is now perceived to be a positive 
national value. Equally, if a set of draconian regulatory requirements at the local level 
operate as a positive disincentive to developments which may generate employment 
in the local community, then the appropriate remedy for aggrieved citizens may be 
through the ballot box. Havmg said this, and m the main, most Local Governments 
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see such issues as employment creation as an essential political goal, and the 
value/cost dichotomy is relevant for the reasons given earlier while compensation 
remains a vexed question in many jurisdictions. 
The "cost" portion of this dichotomy can be considered in two senses i.e. 
m terms of: 
• the costs imposed upon individual applicants as conditions of obtaining 
approval and which reflect directly on the "equity" and "efficiency" of 
a particular assessment system: and, 
• the social, economic and other costs which arise and which m the 
normal course of events are passed on by an over-regulated or 
inefficient assessment system as hidden costs to the community at 
large. 
Although the two overlap to some extent, the first element relates more to the 
mdividual applicant and their relationship with the Local Government and the second 
Oft 
to the public interest questions that are broached by National Competition Policy. 
C NCP AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Given that regulation is likely to abound in a process which is capable of legitimising 
virtually any matter that can establish a political constituency, how are the specific 
costs of a process, which franslates these expectations into regulation or restriction. 
26 Competition Principles Agreement, cl 1(3) 
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able to be estimated and how can meaningfiil comparisons be made between different 
assessment regimes? As a first step can the public interest be identified with a Local 
Government policy that has arisen out of local grievances or sectional expectations 
such as a policy on the provision of respite care? What, in short, is the public interest 
anyway?^^ 
It is interesting to compare the NCP "public interest test" which is contained in cl 1(3) 
of the Competition Principles Agreement, April 1995 with the three definitions of 
environment given above. The overlap between what is perceived to constitute the 
public mterest and what is increasingly perceived to be the cenfral issue in 
development confrol and land use planning viz. the environment and envfronmental 
sustamability is immediately obvious. 
In the context of NCP the following matters should be taken as evidencmg the public 
29 
mterest. 
^' See Buchanan, J The Calculus of Consent (Indianapolis. Liberty Fund. 1999) for a discussion 
of the term that he considers "illusory". For the public interest in relation to National 
Competition Policy see, Zumbo, Frank. "Administration and NCP" Trade Practices Law 
Journal (1998) Vol 6 No 4 at p 234. See also a discussion of this topic in Chapter 5. 
28 cl 1(3) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account, where this 
Agreement calls: 
(a) for the benefits of a particular policy or course of action to be 
balanced against the costs of the policy or course of action; or 
(b) for the merits or appropriateness of a particular policy or course 
of action to be determined; or 
(c) for an assessment of the most effective means of achieving a 
policy objective; 
the following matters shall, where relevant, be taken into account: 
(d) government legislation and policies relating to ecologically 
sustainable development; 
29 The list is described as open-ended. So, of course, can be the concept of amenity and 
certainly the environment. 
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• government legislation and policies relating to ecological sustainable 
development 
• social welfare and equity considerations, mcluding community service 
obligations 
• government legislation and policies relating to matters such as 
occupational health and safety, industrial relations and access and 
equity 
• economic and regional development, mcluding employment and 
investment growth 
• the interests of consumers generally or of a class of consumers 
• the competitiveness of Ausfralian business and, 
• the efficient allocation of resources. 
On the basis of this seemingly all-encompassing test, a respite care policy would 
appear to meet the "public interest" test on at least the second ground. 
It is not surprising that both the NCC and Local Governments share these aspfrations 
m common. The same, no doubt, could be said of all levels of government. Where 
they differ is in the NCC's utilisation of these values as a starting point for an 
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attempted cost analysis of the legislative and regulatory means by which governments 
set out to achieve them. 
The framework established by NCP ostensibly enables an analysis of the efficiency 
and equity of a given system to be conducted within a context of a national 
competition policy which, as has been suggested, is, in reality, the measurement of the 
competitive characteristics of the system in terms of cost and benefits which are not 
srniply lunited to economic factors. As such it represents an analysis at a more 
"macro" level than the one which is undertaken here. Nevertheless many of its 
principles and assumptions are directly relevant to a similar analysis of the efficiency 
and equity of the development confrol process since it can be argued that both 
efficiency and equity are inherently implicit in the description of any system as 
"competitive". 
Within the context of NCP how then are regulatory regimes of Local Governments 
assessed against an overarching set of criteria which, taken together, are said to 
constitute the public interest? 
The costs of existing regulation are, according to the NCP, broadly calculable in 
specific instances and include: 
• adminisfrative, enforcement and compliance costs 
• a loss of technical and allocative efficiency across the board, and 
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• the consequent loss to society of the economic growth potential of 
enterprises as they become locked into relatively unproductive 
pursuits (the allocation of excess resources to compliance matters 
instead of expansion, new product development or the development of 
export markets). 
However, even if this assertion is taken at face value,^^how can a framework be 
established which will permit a calculation to be made of the economic consequences 
of suggested modifications to the regulatory system? How, in short, can the benefits 
of change be quantified? 
A review of this issue has been carried out for the NCC by the Cenfre for International 
Economics^^and in general terms the process of analysis proceeds on a "what i f 
basis. In other words, if a set of regulatory requirements were to be removed what 
would be the likely affects in terms of the efficiency of the system? Although this is 
demonstrably not a quantitative methodology or, indeed, necessarily an objective one, 
it is possibly the only approach to the issue. 
Essentially, the analysis of suggested reforms can only proceed on a probability basis 
since the various systems and attendant sub-systems interact in such complex ways 
that the total picture will always, to some extent, remain out of sight. Nevertheless, it 
°^ Hahn, R and Hird, J "The Costs and Benefits of Regulations: review and synthesis" (1990) 
Yale Journal of Regulation, Vol 8, p 233. 
^^  How does one quantify "the loss to society of potential economic growth potential"? 
^ Centre for International Economics. Guidelines for NCP Legislation Reviews (Canberra, 
AGPS, 1999). 
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is argued, the process can be, and is, disciplined by reference to international 
benchmarks and other comparative studies. 
In the final result however the matter lacks a certain rigor. Case by case analyses and 
comparisons of transaction cost between the two planning jurisdictions simply do not 
exist and are imlikely to ever exist.^^ Similarly, any attempt at a definition of "the 
Public Interest" will remained conditioned by the values, the ideology or the plain 
prejudice of those who constitute any one of dozens of segmented and competing 
mterest groups. 
D THE NATIONAL CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT CONTROL. 
Increasingly over the last decade a consensus has emerged within all three levels of 
government that a harmonised or consistent system of development assessment 
procedures will be essential in order to reduce cost impacts on business and the 
community and to facilitate the associated task of planning on a regional basis.^ "^ 
The Prime Minister himself gave support to such an integrated approach in his March, 
1997 report, More Time for Business: 
To achieve the systemic and long-term reform the [existing] concurrence agenda 
needs to be augmented to include urban and regulatory reform of development and 
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Hence the calls for a national, integrated development control system. 
For a discussion of regional integration see: Unfinished Business, a multi-stakeholder industry 
submission to State and Federal planning ministers, on the "Prospects for an 
Intergovernmental agreement on Development Assessment" (Property Council, Sydney, 26 
February, 1998). 
More Time for Business, Statement by the Prime Minister, the Hon. John Howard MP, 24 
March 1997, pp 44-45. 
24 
building approval processes. [...] The National Office of Local Government will 
sponsor a national regulatory reform workshop with a view to reaching consensus 
with State, Territory and Local Governments for a new national regulatory 
framework. 
Shortly after, as previously mentioned, the Development Assessment Forum was 
established. Comprising representatives of all three levels of government, together 
with industry and professional associations. It's task was to: 
• facilitate harmonisation between State, Territory and local 
development assessment systems 
• facilitate integration of approval requirements, and reduction of 
unnecessary refenal and concunence reqmrements 
• develop and exchange information regarding leading practice in 
planning systems between sectors and jurisdictions 
• identify benefits of and priorities for agreed common 
approaches between jurisdictions 
• reduce mmecessary resource duplication in developing 
individual state/territory development assessment systems 
36 In June, 1998. 
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• promote cost savmgs to both the buildmg and development 
industry and all tiers of govemment.^^ 
The problems inherent in a federal structure with numerous Local Governments had 
previously been identified in UnfinishedBusiness^^ and had been listed as: 
• The gradual accretion of incremental adjustments to the various 
assessment systems has led to more approval requirements and 
an unclear delineation of responsibilities. 
• The systems are too complex with a single proposal required to 
be processed through different approval systems. Its complexity 
militates against fransparency and openness. 
• It is too technical and the use of jargon peculiar to planning 
jurisdictions makes meaningfiil public participation difficult to 
achieve.^^ 
• It is too prescriptive. It is too focused on process and not on 
ends, frequently stifling innovation. 
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38 
39 
Development Assessment Forum (DAF)-Charter. On <http://www.dafgov.au/charter.html> 
Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Services, 11 August, 2001. 
Note34atpp8-ll. 
Work is currently being done, through DAF, to prepare a nationally agreed set of core 
definitions . These definitions are contained in the draft Discussion Paper on National 
Development Assessment Definitions. At <http://www.dafgov.au>. Similarly the Department 
of Local Government and Planning is attempting to introduce commonality throughout the 
State in regard to development application fees and charges. Media Release. Property Coimcil 
of Qld. 12 March, 2001. 
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• It is anti-competitive. It reserves to public monopoly the right 
to approve development proposals when the necessary private 
expertise to undertake the same task exists in abundance. 
• There is inadequate cooperation between Local Governments 
and other authorities with some proposals bemg totally 
acceptable m one area and totally unacceptable in another. 
• There is no adequate system of benchmaking which could be 
used to rank the performance of differing development 
assessment systems. 
The last point is of particular significance m this work. In fact, benchmark standards 
do exist, the difficulty however is arriving at an agreed list which is common to all 
systems and which will enable realistic assessment of the performance of each 
system. 
Though related more to plan making than development confrol the benchmarks listed 
in the Property Council report entitled. Planning: A New Way Forward*^ represents a 
very useful analysis of the appropriate performance indicators, as does the Property 
Council of Ausfralia's 1996 report titled. Planning For Change.^^ 
*° JBA Urban Planning Consultants P/L and Phillips Fox, Solicitors, September 1998 
*^  October, 1997 reprint, pp 23-25 
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The most thorough analysis, at an operational level, however is contained in a fiirther 
1996/97 report from the Property Council, States Of Progress.'^^ It is these indicators 
together with the relevance and efficiency criteria applicable to the various 
component parts of the IDAS systems in the two jurisdictions which will be used in 
the analysis. 
These criteria together with relevant equity criteria from Planning: A New Way 
Forward, are used subsequently to provide, in tabular form, a succmct comparison 
and evaluation of the two regimes' IDAS components. 
E AN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FRAMEWORK FOR PLANNING LAW? 
In Chapter 6, the observation is made that administrative law principles have 
fraditionally made a rather easy fransition to planning law. 
The question which follows from this observation is whether planning law can 
properly be considered as merely one aspect of adminisfrative law and accordingly, 
whether adminisfrative law can provide a type of broad, inclusive legal framework 
within which the various categories of decision making within a development confrol 
system can be profitably analysed. 
In order to answer this question, some mitial consideration must be given to the types 
of powers which come mto play in any development confrol structure or process. 
These are: 
"^^ October, 1997 reprint, pp 4-91. 
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1. A legislative power which determines the statutory rights and obligations 
of the participants, including third parties. 
2. An executive power operating within the confines of subordinate 
legislation. 
3. A delegated executive power exercised by Local Authorities and 
Concurrent Agencies. 
4. A judicial power which is able to adjudicate the rights and obligations of 
the various parties as set out by statute and regulations. 
Planning law is distmctive because each of the four jurisdictions are capable of 
rendering decisions "in specific cases". 
I. Legislative Decisions 
Apart from establishing the statutory framework for development control, the 
legislature has a residual right (or an over-riding right) to enact specific legislation to 
enable specific applications. Examples are the Sanctuary Cove Resort Act 1985 and 
the Local Government (Robina Central Planning Agreement) Act 1992. 
Such projects proceed outside the formal development confrol processes and in 
accordance only with the terms of the enabling statute. 
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2. Executive Decisions 
Most jurisdictions permit the 'calling in' of 'state significant' projects for decision by 
the relevant minister. These matters, again, are processed outside the formal structure 
and allow for no right of appeal and no right of judicial review. 
3. Delegated Executive Decisions 
This category constitutes the vast bulk of matters processed within the formal 
structure and such decisions may broadly be categorised as arbitral."^^ 
'Arbitral' however need to be carefiiUy defined and the analysis provided by Isaacs 
and Rich JJ in Alexander's Case (1918) 25 CLR 434 at 463 is apposite: 
[Arbitral power] is essentially different from the judicial power. Both of them rest for 
their ultimate validity and efficacy on the legislative power. Both presuppose a 
dispute, and a hearing or investigation, and a decision. But the essential difference is 
that the judicial power is concerned with the ascertainment, declaration and 
enforcement of the rights and liabilities of the parties as they exist, or are deemed to 
exist, at the moment the proceedings are instituted; whereas the function of the 
[arbitral] power... is to ascertain and declare, but not enforce, what in the opinion of 
the arbitrator ought to be the respective rights and liabilities of the parties in relation 
to each other. 
*^ Mant J, "Development Control Systems: Less Not More", Planning Research Centre, University of 
Sydney, Occasional Paper No 3, August 1980, pp 4-10. 
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After describing the nature of the powers and duty of the industrial arbifrator and of 
the source of the binding force his determination possesses, Isaacs and Rich JJ. 
proceeded: 
The two functions therefore are quite distinct. The arbitral function is ancillary to the 
legislative function, and provides the factum upon which the law operates to create 
the right or duty. The judicial function is an entirely separate branch, and first 
ascertains whether the alleged right or duty exists in law, and, if it binds it, then 
proceeds if necessary to enforce the law. 
In the context of Alexander's case, the decisions which issue from a Local Authority 
are clearly arbifral - they declare what ought to be the respective rights and duties of 
the parties in specific instances. 
Such decisions, however, are not final and determinative of those matters because the 
function is arbifral and is not legislative, executive or judicial. Some serious 
consequences flow from this simple categorisation, however: 
1, Smce a declaration is being made concerning the rights of the parties, as 
perceived by the arbifrator i.e. the assessment manager, the question 
obviously becomes 'who can or should determine the relevant parties to be 
included in the process'? Does not the characterisation of the decision as 
'arbifral' virtually force an open, or inclusive, concept of the thfrd party? 
The view subsequently expressed in this thesis is that it does not, and that the 
category of third party, 'who may be affected by a decision' has been allowed 
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to grow too large for a variety of reasons, though most of them have no 
fundamental relationship with the realities of an arbifral process per se. 
2. Can a representative body subject to transitory political pressures 
consistently make fair and reasonable arbifral decisions? This matter is 
taken up subsequently. In short, however, the answer is again in the 
negative. Local politicians have habitually failed to appreciate the quasi-
judicial (or arbitral) aspect of development control. In this context a 
recommendation is subsequently made for the expansion of private 
certification into the assessment arena. There is no intrinsic (or legal or 
constitutional) difficulty with private arbifrators putting forward 
recommendations to Local Authorities who can adopt or, with the 
reservations outlined in the thesis, reject them. Equally, that criminal; 
sanctions may operate in certain circumstances is not germane if the Local 
authority remains the "approval" as distmct from the "assessment" authority. 
4. Judicial Decisions 
The responsibility of the Court is, in line with. Alexander's case, to define rights inter 
se on the day the matter comes before the Court and at this level acknowledgement 
must be made of the two discrete jurisdictions exercised by planning Courts, namely 
their declaratory and de novo jurisdictions. 
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Only the declaratory jurisdiction has aspects in common with the fraditional judicial 
review process of adminisfrative law. It is concerned with due process and fairness 
and accordingly operates an open system of legal standing. 
The more important merit review jurisdiction has nothing at all ki common with the 
adminisfrative law approach. The issue that arises out of the de novo jurisdiction, 
however, is whether the Court in its exercise assumes iheplanning role of the 
planning authority. All planning courts emphatically reject such a notion and the 
reason behind such judicial unanimity once again goes back to Alexander's case, 
namely that the court is determining rights not exercising planning discretions. 
Accordingly, adminisfrative law does not provide a framework which is of any more 
than marginal utility in describing the operation of a development control system and 
the exigencies which are an inevitable part of it. On the contrary, it may lead to the 
conclusion that since no one can properly determine who may be affected by a given 
decision then open standing and an extravagant degree of public participation is an 
essential part of the system. This thesis sets out inter alia to establish that this 
conclusion is inconect and that can only be maintained in the face of the many 
considered objections outlined in Chapter 3. 
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TWO 
FEDERAL INTERVENTION: POTENTIAL DYSFUNCTIONAL 
EFFECTS ON STATE DEVELOPIMENT CONTROL SYSTEIMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Even 10 years ago few would have thought it necessary, or in any event, certakdy not 
essential, to consider a substantial statutory intervention by the Commonwealth 
government in nation-wide planning matters. Planning, historically, fell clearly within 
the constitutional purview of the States and the Commonwealth government's 
mvolvement would properly be limited to matters that impinged on Commonwealth 
lands. In a short period of time the situation has changed fundamentally. The 
Commonwealth government not only feels inclined to become involved but, without 
necessarily oversfressing the fact, it now feels a moral imperative to take a lead role. 
There are a number of reasons why this has occuned and these will be discussed 
subsequently though the demand by environmental groups for a more reactive and 
prescriptive role to be undertaken by the Commonwealth, together, paradoxically, 
with calls from the development sector for a national, integrated development confrol 
system have certainly combined, in an unlikely synergy, to push the matter forward at 
the federal level. 
The pomt unmediately at issue here is whether this additional thfrd tier of intervention 
and regulation is likely to have a detrimental effect(s) on the equity and efficiency of 
a previously locally based system which was, arguably, afready under sfrain as a 
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result of the gradual incorporation of a raft of new envfronmental considerations into 
the local assessment process. 
The proposition advanced inter alia in this chapter is that despite the "manageable" 
demographic of Ausfralia, (though its huge geographical area and attendant logistical, 
financial and infrastructure consfraints are often under stressed) the prospects for 
confusion, overlapping of responsibilities, duplication of effort and delays caused by 
the use of counter-suit injunctions and other Federal Court mechanisms could, in 
aggregate, result m greater inefficiencies throughout the expanded system and a 
significant increase in the inequity of a system which is now swinging more in favour 
of international agreed norms. 
Accordingly, in this emerging context it is highly appropriate, and indeed essential, to 
examine m some detail the likely pouits of conflict between the existing development 
confrol systems of the States and Territories and the national initiative which is now 
principally mediated through the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act, 1999 (Cth) (EPBC) 
The followuig matters will be considered as part of this analysis: 
• Overview of the legislative background to the EPBC 
• An outiuie of the EPBC 
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Equity and Efflciency within the EPBC envelope 
NSW and Queensland: Assessment Bilaterals. 
Conclusions. 
B OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND TO THE EPBC 
1. Structure and operation of the Environmental Planning (Impact of 
Proposals) Act 1974 (Cth) 
The EPIP arose out of early concern that environmental issues associated with some 
development proposals of potentially broader significance than those which possessed 
purely local dimensions, were not being given adequate weight in an assessment 
matrix which was, at that time, perceived to be slanted m favour of social or economic 
factors. 
At the time of its enactment the then Minister for Envfronment and Conservation, Dr. 
Moss Cass said this of the legislation: 
It will not grant me the exclusive power of veto over proposals or policies. It will not 
force developers to abandon environmentally unsoimd objectives. It will ensure that 
the government makes environmentally sensible decisions. It will not give individual 
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citizens the power to stop bad projects or to set conditions for moderate ones. The 
legislation will, instead, enable me to gather extensive mformation on specific 
proposals. It will force developers to include environmental impact in their plaiming. 
It will present the government with comprehensive information about environmental 
rnipact as an aid to decision making. And it will enable the public to argue a case 
publically, to have their case published, and to force governments to justify their 
decisions.^  
The core oversight element, as indicated by the Minister's remarks was the 
potential to requfre an Envfronmental Impact Assessment in respect of the 
proposal in question and the subsidiary issues, consequently, were the nature 
and validity of the Commonwealth's jurisdictional claim and the triggers 
which would give rise to the exercise of Commonwealth oversight. 
The operative provision in this respect was s 5 of the Act which stated that the 
obj ect of the Act was: 
(1) [t]o ensure, to the greatest extent that is practicable, that matters affecting 
the environment to a significant extent are fiiUy examined and taken into 
account in and in relation to: 
(a) the formulation of proposals; 
(b) the carrying out of works and other projects; 
(c) the negotiation, operation and enforcement of agreements and 
arrangements (including agreements and arrangements with, and with 
authorities of, the States); 
1 Conmionwealth Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 November 1974, p 4082. Quoted in 
Bates, G.M. Environmental Law in Australia., 4"' ed (Sydney, Butterworths, 1995), p 143-
144. 
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(d) the making of, or the participation in the making of, decisions and 
recommendations; and 
(e) the incurring of expenditure; 
by, or on behalf of, the Australian Government and authorities of Australia, 
either alone or in association with any other government, authority, body or 
person. 
(2) The matters referred to in subsection (1) extend to matters of those kinds 
arising in relation to direct financial assistance granted, or proposed_to be 
granted, to the States.^ 
Before the jurisdiction confened by s 5 could be exercised however the development 
proposal was requfred to be assessed as envfronmentally significant by the Minister, 
though his or her action in this regard was cfrcumscribed only by the requfrement that 
the response be not unreasonable. 
The EPIP was essentially an adminisfrative approach to oversight and a reasonably 
light-handed one at that. Munchenberg"^ points out that in 1992-93, 174 matters were 
refened to the then Commonwealth Envfronment Protection Agency (CEPA) but only 
A claim for jurisdiction xrnder s 5 based on the provision of Commonwealth grant or a 
proposal 
for funding was a genuinely novel approach. It should be noted however that such a claim 
could only be supported by a "specific" grant, not a "general" grant to a State or Territory 
government 
3 Australian Postal Commission v Botany Municipal Council (1989) 69 LGRA 86. See also 
Murphyores Inc P/L v The Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1. where the High Court, 
effectively adopting the much earlier EngUsh decision in Sharp v Wakefield [1891] AC 173 at 
179, concluded that the exercise of an expcutive discretion was conditioned "... according to 
the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion." 
Munchenberg, S "Judicial Review and the Commonwealth Environment Protection (Impact of 
Proposals) Act, 1974, Environmental and Planning law Journal, Vol 11, p 460. 
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three EIAs and one PER were ordered to be conducted. ^ In large part proposals which 
came under review were isolated from the glare of public criticism or review since 
although it was open to the department to recommend an EIA, only the Minister could 
actually order one. Equally, Munchenberg suggests, these decisions tended to be 
largely free from court challenge because of cost, the problematic legal status of the 
adminisfrative guidelines and because of the extensive executive discretion afforded 
to the Minister under the Act. 
2. Criticisms of EPIP. 
Apart from what was perceived as a systemic failure to effectively implement the 
principles of ecological sustainability EPIP was criticised from within the government 
and from the external environment lobby on the following bases: 
• The triggering process, as outlined above, could only result in the 
Commonwealth becoming involved m a rather limited class of issues 
and then only if there existed a demonsfrable environmentally 
significant issue. 
• The EPIP was, conversely, not triggered by some proposals with 
attendant matters of genume national environmental significance. 
Lacking the jurisdictional foundation subsequently afforded by the 
5 It is useful to compare this statistic with the performance of Environment Australia between 
1999-2000: of 238 proposals again only 5 were subjected to a full EIS and 3 PERs were 
published. (All these projects were examined under the EPIP not EPBC). For a national 
perspective see: Ramsey, R .and Rowe, C. Environmental Law and Policy in Australia. 
(Sydney, Butterworths, 1995) Ch 14 
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incorporation of international convention within domestic legislation, 
issues such as developments which impinged on Ramsar wetlands or 
world heritage areas could only be addressed indfrectly through foreign 
investment approvals, export licence controls and such like. 
• The reliance on these indirect enforcement procedures, the necessity to 
coordinate such activity across other departments such as Treasury, 
Finance and Trade led to unnecessary delay and duplication. 
• The triggers under the Act were often initiated late in the development 
approval cycle causing unnecessary uncertainty and expense to 
applicants. 
• Applicants for development consent at State and local levels were 
often unable to assess the likelihood of their project being caught by 
what, in reality, amounted to a federal Ministerial "call-in" procedure.^ 
3. The Intergovernmental Agreement (1992)-
7 
Department of the Environment Reform of Commonwealth Environment Legislation.: 
Consultation Paper. (Canberra, Cth of Australia, February 1998). pp 8-9. 
In the same year the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development [NSESD] 
was finaUsed which, in turn, gave rise to 1) The Natural Heritage Trust, 2) the Council of 
Australian Governments and Water Reform, 3) the COAG Salinity and Water Quality Action 
Plan, 4) the National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia's Biological Diversity, 5) the 
National Greenhouse Strategy, 6) the National Oceans PoUcy and 7) the Regional Forest 
Agreements. 
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The largely derivative nature of the concepts in this agreement and which were 
contained m s 3, "Principles of Environmental Policy" is obvious from the following 
summary. 
(a) Ecological Sustainability (ESD) 
The agreement does give a perhaps grudging acknowledgement to a principle that is 
stressed in this work viz. the inherent intenelationship of environmental planning and 
the economic health of the nation. At section 3.3 the parties accept that: 
[sjtrong, growing and diversified economies (committed to the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development) can enhance the capacity for environmental 
protection. In order to achieve sustainable economic development, there is a need for 
a country's mtemational competitiveness to be mamtained and enhanced m an 
environmentally soimd manner. 
Despite the qualifications spread throughout this statement, it nevertheless represents 
a sensible acknowledgement of the fundamental relationship between ecology and 
economics. This pomt, which is misskig in so many articles, has its reflection m other 
areas of human life. For example, though the creation of wealth within a community 
may not guarantee democracy emerging, it is, at least, a precondition for its 
emergence. Likewise, the creation of successful and internationally competitive 
enterprises may not guarantee envfronmentally sound management practices, but it is 
almost certainly ^precondition for such practices to be implemented. The ESD 
principle has now received judicial consideration in Sol Theo v Caboolture Shire 
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Councif. In this mstance, which concerned a proposal to establish an inadiation 
sterilization and de-contamination plant, McLaughlan DCJ while adopting the IPA 
definition of ESD in s.1.3.3, effectively integrated the constituent elements by 
suggesting that the unifying principle should be whether the harm is "reasonably 
foreseeable" which goes part the way towards making this principle an "operational" 
tool. 
A supplementary, but interesting, point is made by Rose^ in his paper which deals 
with the interplay between the environment, environment protection, environmental 
auditing and performance standards. After considering the EPBC definition of ESD hi 
s 3A, he comments: 
It is difficult to imagine how any Commonwealth body's accordance with the ESD 
principle set out... might be demonstrated in the environmental sections of its annual 
reports. No quantified criteria or governance processes are prescribed. 
He goes on to describe the potential reportmg task as either "vastly unmanageable, or trivial 
and superficial. 
(b) The Precautionary Principle 
The definition, which has been carried over into the EPBC, is as follows: 
[2001] QPELR 101 at 108-109. 
Rose, G, "Environmental Performance Auditing of Government" Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal, (2001) Vol 18 No 3 p 293. 
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Where there are threats of serious or ureversible envfronmental damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used to as a reason for postponmg measures to 
prevent envkonmental degradation.^ " 
As can be appreciated from Note 11, the literature already generated by this short 
statement is considerable and shows no signs of abating. Sympathy must go to the 
courts which will be requfred to adjudicate the issue when presented, and invariably in 
the face of conflictmg scientific evidence and also with applicants and developers 
who are now requfred to incorporate this principle into corporate sfrategic planning 
and feasibility studies. At present there is simply no way this can be done but it is they 
who are now requfred to bear a considerable cost in imcertainty and expense while 
academic and legal debate rages as to whether this is a mere statement of political 
will, a genuine scientific proposition, an operational tool, another term for approved 
minimum emission standards or merely "common sense". Smce both NSW and Qld 
will shortly possess the same definition the mequity is shared equally. Few, if any, 
solutions have been proposed for this dilemma though one immediately comes to 
mind which is to permit the planning courts to appomt thefr own independent experts 
10 This is the same definition as the one which appears in the NSW Local Government Act, 
Schedule 9. The current Consultation draft on IPA also proposes (under Commonwealth 
government pressure) to also incorporate it in the Act. The "Precautionary Principle" has been 
extensively treated in many works, though without much consensus emerging as to its efficacy 
as an operational tool. See: Harding, R. and Fisher E, Perspectives on the Precautionary 
Principle (Sydney. The Federation Press, 1999). Also: Steven Dovers. "Adaptive PoUcy, 
Institutions and Management" Grifith University Law Review. 1999 Vol 8(2) at p. 374; J.Peel. 
"Taking a Precautionary Approach in Queensland." Local Government Law Review. 1998, 
Vol 4 at p. 50; Alan Bradbury. "ReaUty or Rhetoric? Ecologically Sustainable Development in 
NSW." Local Government Law Journal, 1998, Vol 3 at p. 86,; Lisa Wyman. "Acceptance of 
the Precautionary Principle" Environmentaland Planning Law Journal 2001, Vol 18(4) at p. 
395; R.Lyster. "Relevance of the Precautionary Principle" Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal, 1997, Vol 14 at p. 390,; W. Gullett. "Environmental Protection and the Precautionary 
Vrmcv^ile" Environmental and Planning Law Journal. 1997, Vol 14, at p. 52 
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and to allow these experts to appraise the relative merits of conflicting scientific 
evidence. This issue is taken up further m Chapter 7. 
(c) Intergenerational Equity 
The Agreement defines this concept as: 
The present generation should ensure that the health, diversity and productivity of the 
envfronment is maintained or enhanced for the benefit of future generations. 
In philosophical terms such sentunents reflect a sense of compassion and of sacrifice 
that is genuinely laudable. In practical terms however what does such a proposition 
mean? Since coal fired power stations emit carbon dioxide should no proposal to 
build one be entertained? Should no new coalmines be allowed to be developed? 
Indeed this debate has afready unfolded in respect of uranium mining in the Northem 
10 
Territory. Conversely, one could well argue that it is well within the range of 
possible expectations that future generations might place a much higher value on 
employment. 
Indeed this is the crux of the matter; the proposition is predicated on a value judgment 
about indefinable and highly unpredictable future human, social, economic and 
envfronmental conditions. Unfortunately these value judgments affect enterprises now 
^^ See generally, Dovers, Steven. "Adaptive PoUcy, Institutions and Management". Griffith 
University Law Review. 1999, Vol 8(2) p.374. 
'^  See McGrath, C. "Uranium Mining, Use and Disposal Law in Australia". Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal (2000) Vol 17, No 6 p 502. 
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and a coal company, frusfrated by regulatory obstacles in Ausfralia, can easily open 
another mine in Brazil. After all, the Rio Convention specifically ensures that 
implementation of its poUcies should reflect the state of development of the 
indigenous economy which suggests that a further implicit proposition may also be 
operating viz. Intragenerational Equity. 
The mequities wrought by huge increases in regulatory and enquiry powers which 
must flow from an attempted application of this principle will be borne, not by 
governments who are, by and large, the beneficiaries, but by corporations and those 
seeking, admittedly for corporate self interest, to expand production, maintain growth 
and create an environment which will generate the very wealth necessary to enable 
envfronmental issues to be addressed. In short, it is logically self-defeating. And 
through the quiet acquiescence of the State governments, this principle has been made 
one of the cenfral pillars of the new planning orthodoxy which is now global (or at 
least global in the sense of the developed economies and rather less "global" in the 
case of the undeveloped nations). 
At a practical, corporate level ^ '^  the results of any given feasibility study often turn on 
the sometunes arbitrary (or "best guess") choice of an appropriate discount rate to 
assess returns on capital over extended time periods. For the intergenerational equity 
concept to be meaningful some method must be found to value so-called "natural 
^^  The North - South Dialogue, and the writing off of third world debt being only two 
expressions of this proposition. Finally, this issue resulted in the collapse of the Kyoto Summit 
talks on Clunate Change. 
*^ The writer confesses to having worked in the Strategic Planning Units of two multi-national 
corporations. 
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capital". And even if this is achievable what discount rate should an envfronmental 
agency choose to refiect a return on this capital over time periods which may be 
measured in generations? Further, if we are dealing with a non-renewable resource 
(eg oil), then presumably at the end of the period nothing of this natural capital will 
remain. Assuming the agency has chosen the conect discount rate and levied the 
appropriate royalties, when and to whom should this money be released ie yearly, by 
decades, by generations of 20, 30,or 70 years? 
Arguably, over tune, the principle will probably merely form part of the ideological 
background noise to specific envfronmental debates and governments will see it 
simply in terms of royalties in the resource sector and as inapplicable, ui practice, to 
matters pertaining to natural heritage which, in any event, will be protected by 
overlapping international conventions. 
The Agreement goes on to highlight "biological diversity and ecological integrity" 
and to insist on "improved valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms" which need 
not be dealt with in detail. 
At two points in Section 3 the Agreement comes close to enfrenching equitable and, if 
hnplemented conectly, economically efficient propositions. First, at 3.4(iii), it 
suggests that envfronmental considerations be integrated into government decision 
making by "ensuring that measures adopted should be cost-effective and not 
disproportionate to the significance of the envfronmental problems bemg addressed" 
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and at, at 3.5.4, that "environmental goals, having been established, should be 
pursued in the most cost effective way, by establishing mcentive structures, including 
market mechanisms, which enable those best placed to maximise benefits and/or 
minimise costs to develop thefr own solutions and responses to environmental 
problems." 
The most that can be said of either proposition is that they acknowledge costs and 
benefits. We still do not know however who will assess the costs or benefits, which 
market mechanisms are contemplated and to what real extent individual corporations 
will be allowed to innovate within an overall framework of national policy. 
Subsequent to the Intergovernmental Agreement, in 1997, the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) agreed in principle to the Heads of Agreements on 
Commonwealth/State Roles and Responsibilities for the Environment^^ and. these 
subsequently became the rubric under which the provisions of the EPBC were 
drafted.^ ^ 
This then was the situation faced by the federal government at the begirimng of 1998. 
In short, the government, under increasing pressure from a variety of sources, 
undertook to comprehensively review federal environmental legislation with a view to 
15 A principle that has found expression in Qld in Harrison v Caboolture Shire Council [1996] 
QPELR 201 where Judge Quirk, in answer to an alleged deficient EIS, remarked that the 
applicant (given the size of the issue) should not be forced to assume the costs of a fiiU 
anthropological examination. 
'* Glindemann, R.."Reform of Commonwealth Environmental Legislation", (1998) 26 
Australian Business Law Review p 224 
" The content of this Act will be considered later in this chapter. 
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mcorporatmg environment protection (including the enforcement provisions), 
international treaty and convention obligations and substantially upgraded procedural 
requirements on issues such as legal standing, in one consolidated Act. The result was 
EPBC which is outiined below. 
C THE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY 
CONSERVATION ACT 1997 (CTH): AN OVERVIEW 
The EPBC establishes a genuine third tier of assessment and approval in many 
instances ie it does not necessarily displace the necessity to obtain approvals through 
the State development control system; it creates a duplicate set of requfrements. As 
Fisher has pointed out, (in reference to Queensland), EIA issues, in a given case, 
may now necessitate that consideration be given to four separate Acts: to EPBC, The 
Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld), the State Development and Public Works 
Organization Act 1971 and the Integrated Planning Act 1997. 
A very useful, tabular summary of the Act has been prepared by Chris McGrath, and 
it is given in a subsequent page. In the context of this overall schematic a short outline 
of the Act together with an examination of its potential impact on State development 
confrol systems is wananted. 
* Fisher, D. "Environmental Impact Assessment in Queensland." (2000) 18/2 EPLJ p 109. 
48 
Structure of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity conservation Act, 1999 
(Cth) 
After, C. McGrath. "An Introduction to the EPBC Act". (2000) 18/6 EPU. p 28. 
OBJECTS (S3) 
|; Protection of the environment, conservation of biodiversity and ESD. 
I Recognises an appropriate role for the Cwth in relation to the environment is involvement 
in matters of national environmental significance. 
Act to bind the Cwth and States (s4) 
Matters of "national environmental 
significance" (ssl2-25) 
• World Heritage Properties 
• Ramsar wetlands 
• Threatened species and ecological 
communities 
• Migratory species 
• Nuclear actions 
• Cwth marine areas 
• Coastal waters 
• Other (by regulation) 
Commonwealth actions and areas 
• Actions on or affecting Cth land which have a 
significant impact on the enviroiraient (s26) 
• Actions by the Cth which have a significant impact on 
the environment 
• Minister's advice on foreign aid, air traffic, and 
airport development with possible significant impact 
on the environment (s 160) 
• Cth decisions (including fimding decisions) are not 
assessable (ss524-524A) 
Environment Protection - Ch2 &4 
Offence provisions (ssl2-28) 
"Controlled Action" (s67; ss552B-524A) 
Assessment of Impacts (Part 8 ss 68-129); Referrals 
.Preliminary information, PERs, EISs, Public enquiries, and 
strategic assessments (si46) 
Approvals and Conditions (Part 9 ssl30-=145B) 
Ministerial declarations & Accredited management plans 
(Part 4 ss 32-36 and 840 
Ministerial exemptions (s 15 8) 
RFA and GBRMPA exemptions (ss38-43) 
Biodiversity Conservation-Ch 5 
Indentification and monitoring (ssl71-175) 
Bioregional Plans (si76) 
Listing: Threatened species and ecological 
communities 
Species offences and permits (ss 195-264) 
Register of critical habitat (ss207A-207C) 
Australian Whale sanctuary (s225) 
Recovery and threat abatement plans (s267) 
Wildlife Conservation Plans (ss304-312) 
Conservation agreements (ss304-312) 
Biosphere and Cwth Reserves (ss337-390A) 
I 
Bilateral Agreements-Ch3 ss 44-65A 
Agreements between the Cwth. and State and Territory governments accrediting State and Territory development control 
processes for the assessment stage ("Assessment bilaterals') or or assessment and approval stages ("Approval Bilaterals") 
under EPBC 
Cwth retains ability to suspend or cancel Bilateral Agreement (s590) 
Administration-Ch 6 ss 391-516B 
Precautionary principle to be applied (s391) 
Wardens, rangers and inspectors; search powers (ss392-462); Conservation orders (ss464-474) 
Injunctions (ss475-4800; Widened standing for litigation (s476; ss487-488) and no undertaking as to damages if applying for 
interim injunction (s478) 
Executive officer liability (s493-5); due diligence (s496); Mse and misleading information. (s489-91) 
Committees (ss502-14); Annual reports (s516A); 5 yearly State of the Environment reports (s516B) 
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1. When is an approval required 
The Act uses the concept of matters of "national environmental significance"^^ to 
trigger the involvement of the Commonwealth government. Apart fi-om the obvious 
example of Commonwealth lands, the Act uses s 51(29) of the Constitution to claim 
jurisdiction over:^° 
i) Wetlands (Ramsar Convention sites) 
ii) Threatened species 
iii) Migratory species 
iv) The Commonwealth Marine zone. 
v) World Heritage properties 
01 
vi) Nuclear actions. 
Reflecting the content of existing, ratified international conventions, this list is fairly 
predictable. What will create a high degree of unpredictability however are the 
extensive powers given to the Minister to make "declarations" in respect of all the 
above categories. Whether this factor enhances or detracts from the achievement of 
21 Which is not defined in the Act, cf. the COAG Agreement (7 November 1997) which contains 
a far more extensive listing of matters of national enviromnental significance in Sch 1. 
20 
21 
22 
A list of World Heritage Areas and International Environmental Conventions ratified by 
Australia is given in Appendices 1,2 & 3. These could form the basis for even fiirther 
expansion of federal jurisdiction. 
An EPBC approval is required if a significant impact is likely to occur in respect of any of 
these categories. See: ss 28, 16, 12 inter alia. 
It is of passing interest that the degree of Ministerial discretion increased between the original 
consultation draft and the Act. SeeJohnstone, F. "Revamp of Commonwealth Enviroimient 
Legislation". (1999) 4 Local Government Law Journal p 12 at p 13. 
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NCP principles and in particular the ecological sustamability component of the public 
interest will remain unclear for some time. 
For example: 
i) Under s 17(2) the Minister can declare "A wetland, or part of a 
wetland, is also a declared Ramsar wetland for the period for which 
a declaration of the wetland as a declared Ramsar wetland is in 
force." This is, quite literally, an extraordinary power to be vested 
in the executive. Conceivably any moderately damp area of land 
anywhere in Australia could be the subject of a declaration which 
effectively imposes all the statutory and regulatory apparatus of the 
Act on an person who proposes to develop the land. 
ii) Under s 34D, the Minister may, subject to few reservations, ^^  list a 
species as threatened or an ecological community as threatened. 
The affect, again, is to establish Conmionwealth jurisdiction.^'* 
iii) Under s 34E, again the Minister may declare a species as 
migratory. In this instance however some genuine constraint is 
placed on his ability to make a declaration. 
23 
24 
Of which he is the final arbiter in any event. 
The bluegrass dominant grasslands of the Brigalow Beltbioregions and the semi-evergree vine 
thickets of the Brigalow Belt and Nandewar Bioregions were listed as threatened ecological 
communities in April 2001. 
^ See EPBC, s 209. 
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iv) In the case of "World Heritage" properties, and contrary to the 
general understanding, such a property need not be submitted to the 
World Heritage Committee under Article 11 of the World Heritage 
Convention. The Minister pursuant to s.l4 (l)(b) may declare a 
property to be a World Heritage property unilaterally. Such a 
declaration does not require the consent of the State in which the 
area is situated though the Minister "must inform the appropriate 
Minister of the State or Territory... and give him or her a 
reasonable opportunity to comment on the proposal", though 
should he fail to comply with this requirement the validity of the 
declaration is not affected. 
By means of such largely unrestrained powers, the Minister has the capacity to bring 
extensive land areas and issues within Commonwealth jurisdiction.^^ 
In concert with the jurisdictional claim outlined above the offence provisions (ss 12-
28) make provision for very large penalties should the Act be breached. In the case, 
for example, of actions which are subsequently held to have had a significant unpact 
on a threatened species, the Act provides for a term of imprisormient of up to 7 years 
and a fine of 450 penalty points, or both. In the case of a body corporate however. 
26 Ministerial discretion is conditioned in the case of a lawful continuation of a use, which does 
not constitute an "action" under s 523, however enlargement, expansion or intensification of a 
use does not constitute a "continuation". 
2' EPBC, s 18A. 
2* For the meanmg of "penalty points" see the Statute Law Revision (Penalties) Act 1998. 
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tile fine can be up to five times that which can be levied agamst an mdividual and m 
all such cases the evidentiary burden of disprovmg the claim rests on the defendant. 
2. What is a matter of national environmental significance 
Given its central importance in the Act it is strange that no attempt is made to actually 
define this term and this will almost certainly create difficulties in the longer term. 
What does exist in the Act is, in reality, a compendium of various elements from other 
Commonwealth legislation. One solution may be to import the definition from the 
COAG Agreement dated 7 November 1997 which contains an extensive listing of 
matters of national envirormiental significance in Sch 1. 
3. What is an "Action" 
The meaning of the term "action", together with "significant unpact" which is dealt 
with subsequently, is central to an understanding of the operational extent of the Act. 
The term is defined across a number of sections and since it is an essential element in 
EPBC it is given in detail below: 
s 523(1) 
Subject to this Subdivision, action mcludes: 
(a) a project; and 
'^ The Act only broadly indicates the content rather than the meaning, of the term and this itself 
must be derived at from quite a large number of section, notably Ch 2, Pt 3, Div 1, ssl2,16, 
18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. 
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(h) a development; and 
(c) an imdertaking; and 
(d) an activity or series of activities; and 
(e) an alteration of any of the things mentioned m 
paragraph (a), (b), (c), or (d). 
The following section defined things which are not actions. 
s 524(1) 
Things that are not actions: 
This section relates to decisions of the following classes 
of persons: 
(a) the Commonwealth 
(b) a Commonwealth agency 
(c) a State 
(d) a Territory 
(e) decisions by a government agency to grant an 
authorisation for another person to take an action is 
not, for the purposes of the Act, an action.^^ 
McGrath is firmly of the opinion that point (e) effectively undermines the ability of 
the Act to deal with cumulative unpacts. 
30 s 524(2). 
^^  McGrath, C. "An introduction to the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act, 1999 (2000) 6 Queensland Environmental practice Reporter ^  102. 
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He remarks: 
By removmg government decisions from the definition of "action" the 
Commonwealth has lowered the operation of the Act to a level where, m many cases, 
the impacts of individual projects may not pass the threshold of beuig a "significant 
impact". However, if viewed collectively at the level of government pohcy these 
actions may well pass the threshold of being a "significant impact". For instance a 
policy decision to fund or allow clearing and drainage of coastal lands for croppmg, 
while potentially having a significant impact on a regional scale, will not trigger 
assessment and approval under the EPBC Act. At the smaller scale of individual 
clearing and drainage works a "significant impact" may not be able to be established. 
Whatever will eventually prove to be the case, in the specific instance of cumulative 
impacts, there does seem little doubt that the incorporation of ss 524(1) and (2) leaves 
a large area of federal government policy discretion effectively isolated from the 
purview of the Act 
.4. What is a "significant impact" 
An additional element of uncertamty is the strange omission from the Act of any 
definition of "significant unpact", a term which is clearly important to any 
understanding of threshold issues which are cenfral, in turn, to triggering 
55 
Commonwealth involvement. Paradoxically, the criteria to be used in assessmg 
"significant unpact" appear m the Adminisfrative Guidelines to the Act. which, of 
course, have no legal weight. Concerning the legal effect of adminisfrative guidelmes 
the fiill bench of the Federal court m Randwick City Council v Minister for the 
Environment concluded: ^^  
The Admmistrative Procedures [so made] are exactly what their name 
suggests - rules which lay down the procedure to be followed by persons seeking, 
considering or taking admmistrative action. They are not declared by the Act to have 
the force of law; on the contrary, they must be 'consistent with relevant laws' (s 6), 
and in this respect they differ from regulations which, according to s 9, 'have effect 
notwithstanding any other law. 
McGrath notes that some 70 terms are used in the guidelines to characterise 
"significant impact" under the various jurisdictional headings, ranging from 
"degraded" to "harmful" and "adverse change". Interestingly, the guidelines 
themselves indicate that the list is "not exhaustive". It would therefore seem then that 
only prolonged examination on a case-by-case basis by the courts will enable some 
degree of certainty, however vestigial, to be exfracted from this list. 
To date the issue of the meaning of "significant impact" has been considered in a 
number of cases which are summarised below: 
^^  Department of Environment and Heritage. Administrative Guidelines for determining whether 
an action has, will have, or is likely to have a significant impact on a matter of national 
environmental significance under the Environment protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act, 1999. (Canberra, DEH, July, 2000) see web site: 
<http://www.ea.gov.au/epbc/assessapprov/referrals/significanceguide.html> 
33 (1999) 106 LGERA 47 
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CASE 
Jarasius v Forestry Commission 
(NSW)^'* 
Drummoyne Municipal Council v Roads 
and Traffic Auth. NSW^. 
Tasmania Conservation Trust v Minister 
^or Resources. 
EPA v Mobil OilAustralia^'^ 
Byron Shire Business for the Future v 
Byron Councif 
DECISION 
Applied the Macquarie dictionary 
meaning: "Important"; "more than 
ordinary" 
"an important or notable effect on the 
enviroranent..." 
"an important or notable effect on the 
environment" 
".. .Giving rise to heightened level [of 
contamination] well beyond accepted 
guidelines" \ 
"a significant effect..." : 
These decisions, even on the most charitable reading, border on tautology but they, at 
least, represent the begiimings of an examination which, as indicated earlier, can only 
proceed incrementally. 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
(1988) 71 LGRA 79 (L &E Court,Hemmings J). 
(1989) 67 LGRA 155(Stein J). 
55FCR516(SackvilleJ). 
(2000) NSWLEC 43 
(1994) NSWLEC 159 
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i» Existing actions 
A lawfiil contmuation of use of land, sea or seabed occurring unmediately before the 
commencement of the Act is not an action. Nevertheless, an enlargement, expansion 
or intensification of use is not a continuation of use and consequently it becomes an 
action sufficient to bring the proposal within the ambit of the Act. 39 
'&*. The assessment and approval process under EPBC 
The fimdamental proposition which imderpins the EPBC assessment and approval 
process is that of a "confrolled action" ie an action which is likely to have significant 
impact on a matter of national envirormiental significance. 40 
For conciseness the alternative assessment models open to the Minister are outlined in 
the following flow chart: 
By State 
under 
Assessment 
bilateral 
Designated 
confrolled 
action.ss 
70,74-79 
Personal 
obligation 
to refer 
.s68 
md 
On preliminary 
documentation 
s 92-95 
The Federal Minister 
Assessment Alternatives 
PER 
ss 96-100 
EIS with 
public 
consultation 
Public 
Enquiry 
ss 106-129 
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In addition, there are a number of areas where the Mmisters assessment is not 
required, viz: 
• where an assessment or approval bilateral exists, (ss 44-65A, 83) 
• in a matter subject to a Ministerial declaration and where an accredited 
management plan exists (ss 32-36) 
• in an area where the Mmister has made a declaration relating to a class 
of actions, (s 84) 
• where an exemption has been granted "in the National Interest" (s 138) 
• where the action is authorised by a Regional Forest Agreement (ss 38-
42) or by the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act, 1975 (Cth) 
On completion of the assessment the Minister can alternatively a) grant an approval, 
b) refuse the application or c) approve it subject to conditions."*^ Such conditions are 
subject to judicial review in terms of sufficiency of nexus, the well-established 
Wednesbury Principle and, perhaps, the growing public law doctrine of 
proportionality. 
In any event the necessity for such conditional approvals to be m accord with the 
imderlying international norms which gave rise to the domestic legislation will create 
many opportunities for creative submissions to the federal court. 
41 SS 130,134. 
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7. EPBC and personal approvals. 
Approvals under EPBC are personal in nature"*^ , unlike State planning jurisdictions 
where the approvals run with the land, and in the case of Queensland, which bind 
successors in title. There is, consequently, an inherent incompatibility between the 
two processes. One consequence of such a personal approval system is that an 
approved activity can lose its approval if the ownership of the land or project changes 
without the Minister's approval which, in fraditional planning terms, must 
fimdamentally call mto question whether the "finality principle" can retain any 
credibility in the midst of such a concerted shift in paradigm. Having said this. State 
enviroimiental approvals are personal in nature as well and major problems in the area 
have, to date, not emerged. 
8. Accreditation of State assessment and approval systems. 
The Commonwealth's expressed intention is not to create a huge assessment or 
development confrol bureaucracy but rather to "accredit" individual State systems 
which comply with Commonwealth management plans, benchmark standards and 
42 EPBC, s 133 
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regulations."*-^  To date only one State, Tasmania has ratified as "assessment bilateral" 
though draft agreements are in place for all States and Territories and Victoria and 
Queensland are close to ratifying. This conceptual or process framework has lead one 
writer to comment that: 
[T]he rationale as to why the federal government would go to the effort of identifying 
matters of national envhonmental significance only to devolve its powers for 
assessment and approval of those issues to a State or Territory government is not 
entirely clear.'*'* 
D. EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY WITHIN THE EPBC ENVELOPE 
As indicated on page 30 of this chapter consideration is given here to equity and 
efficiency within three dimensions: to equity and efficiency within the EPBC itself, to 
the extemal legislative envirorunent ie the relationship between EPBC and State 
development confrol systems and finally to an actual examination of EPBC in 
operation. 
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44 
As a consequence, the EPBC EIS requirements have now been incorporated in Pt 5 of the 
State Development and Public Works Organisation Amendment Regulation. (No 1) 2001 
Ogle, L."Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999: How 
Workable is it?" (2000) 17 EPLI p 473. Laura Hu^es m "Environmental Impact assessment 
in the EPBC" (2000) 16 EPLI p 304 goes further and suggests the accreditation process will 
produce "lowest common denominator effects" Her suggestion is for a standardised EIS 
national procedxire. 
« 
1. EPBC: internal issues affecting equity and efficiency.'*^ 
(a) General criteria of equity and efficiency. 
An attempt to create a riged bifirrcation between efficiency and equity is fraught with 
difficulty and, even if technically accomplished, it may be of minimal usefiikiess for 
the simple reason that equity and efficiency issues are often expressed in economic, 
social and normative contexts and the concepts of equity or fairness, in purely 
economic terms, clearly derive from value judgments associated with the distribution 
of scare resources. As the 1998 Property Council Report suggests:'^^ 
Arguments about fairness are always subjective and cannot be separated from social 
values and expectations. Efficiency and equity mechanisms, together, deal with costs 
and benefits of land use and development in a regulatory framework that necessarily 
involves socially acceptable trade-offs between the two. 
With this reservation m mind then the following analysis concerns itself with the 
nominated criteria on an infra-statute basis. 
*^ The criteria under this heading are derived from the 1998 PCA report titled, "Planning: A 
New 
Way Forward" at p 14. 
^ Atpl4 
(b) Efficiency Criteria. 
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Does the EPBC minimise public and private 
externality costs ie nuisance costs, prevention costs 
and adminisfrative costs? 
(i) Nuisance Costs 47 
The nuisance that the Act seeks to address is the occurrence of significant 
envfromnental damage or degradation. It is not possible to argue against the fact that 
Ausfralia has significant enviromnental problems such as salinity, soil erosion and 
water conservation. There are direct nuisance costs associated with all these, and 
many other issues, which are economic, social and personal and range from the loss of 
productive land, to the future of rural townships or the suicide rate in rural Ausfralia. 
Precise quantification of even the direct economic costs is impossible, though it could 
be taken as a common-sense proposition that they are, m national terms, immense 
and, consequently, attempts to reduce such costs by taking remedial or preventative 
measures now is highly appropriate. In this sense every citizen is, or should be, an 
environmentalist. 
*' EPBC, s 3. 
m 
(ii) Prevention Costs. 
Across the broad spectrum of environmental issues a total estimate of prevention or 
remedial measures in purely dollar terms is, again, impossible though the word 
immense continues to be applicable.'^ ^ It is in the province of individual management 
plans to estimate these costs realistically. 
(iii) Adminisfrative costs. 
To date no one has attempted an estimate of the total dfrect and indirect adminisfrative 
costs that will be a consequence of Cormnonwealth government's intervention, as a 
very active, or to use Fisher's "^ w^ord "purposive" actor, in a broad spectrum of 
envfronmental management issues. The criticisms of the Act that emerge from the 
literature tend to relate more to the need for a national EIA system and similar issues 
than to the dfrect economic costs of the adminisfrative aspects of the Act. If however 
we apply the Commonwealth government's own criteria contained in The Cenfre for 
International Economics' report for the NCP entitled "Guidelines for NCP legislation 
reviews",^" then this legislation is "complex", has "big potential for 
misunderstanding" and there is "much at stake " because : 
48 They could be compared to wagiag war at a high level for generations. Prevention costs, in this 
sense, relate to the actual work done on the ground. Which may force the closure of whole 
industries. 
49 D Fisher. "Considerations, Principles and Objectives in Environmental Management". 2000 
17/6 EPU p 487. 
50 Centre for Internal Economics, Sydney, 1999 at p 19. 
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• the entire economy is affected 
• particular industries will be greatly affected 
• particular regions will be greatly affected 
• major precedents will be established. 
On this basis alone, it is quite valid to ask whether this legislation is justifiable at all 
and whether "the benefits [of the regulation] outweigh the likely costs".^ ^ Another 
criterion applied by the NCP in examining regulatory structures is to consider the 
affects of the abolition of the structure. If this simple test is applied to EPBC then, it 
is at least arguable, that the desired envirormiental outcomes could have been 
achieved by a much more informal understanding with the States. 
(iv) Does the legislation avoid or minimise duplication? 
As has afready been discussed the Act attempts to avoid this consequence by the use 
of bilaterals, however grave doubts must be expressed as to the efficacy of such a 
system given the Commonwealth's reluctance to draft approval bilaterals which has 
already been remarked on, the ability of the federal Minister to oversight State 
assessment procedures and the development, even at this early stage, of a small 
body of case law which uses the Act to attempt federal, judicial intervention in the 
State planning and assessment systems. In reality, it is much more probable that the 
' ' See comment Chapter 1, p 14. 
^^  See also Chapter l,p 22 
^^  See EPBC ss 59, 60. 
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Act will enfrench duplication which will affect proposals in all jurisdictions hi 
Ausfralia. On this basis alone whether the Act will contribute to efficiency is doubtful. 
(v) Will the Act affect fransaction costs and the ease with which property can be 
fraded or developed? 
The infroduction, in many cases, of a duplicate set of assessment requirements will 
have two importance consequences. Ffrst, in frading property potentially affected by 
the Act, but currently protected by the "continuance of use" provision, consideration 
must necessarily be given by purchasers to the future development potential of the 
land. This is, particularly in regard to rural and industrial land uses, an essential part 
of the process by which a monetary value is ascribed to a property and the ability to 
intensify or expand an existing use is often an important portion of the valuer's 
equation (and is also highly relevant to the finance institutions). If any portion of this 
potential is called into question, or is likely to be made problematical, then the value 
of the property will decline and perhaps substantially decline. Secondly, if there is no 
existing use actively being pursued on the property but the proposed use is potentially 
captured under the Act, a similar decline in value will take place that will reflect the 
purchaser's estimate of the additional costs which will be incurred through the 
application of the Commonwealth government's duplicate requirements. Overall, 
however properties affected by the Act will, almost definitely, become more difficult 
to frade. 
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(vi) Will the Act generate the proposed public good? 
Undoubtedly some of the more immediate objectives of the Act will be achieved 
mcluding most, if not all, of the six categories that fiow from international 
conventions. Whether both the Commonwealth's subsidiary objectives, or the broader 
purposes of the Act, which are contained in the s 3 objects clause will be, must remain 
in doubt for a considerable time to come. 
%, EPBC: compatibility with State development control systems and inter-
system issues 
In one sense the EPBC, in its insistence on highly prescriptive rules together with the 
creation of a complex and highly process-driven adminisfrative and approval system, 
refiects the planning ideas of the 1970s. It is certainly, at a cognitive level, lacking ui 
the original thinking which is reflected in the development confrol frameworks 
established by IPA and, increasingly, EPAA. 
In confrast, the Commonwealth seeks to protect the envirorunent by creating elaborate 
assessment processes and an expanded federal adminisfration, rather than through 
specifying desfred outcomes and standards m an informal relationship with States and 
Territories. In addition to suffering from a number of technical flaws, the EPBC poses 
significant difficulties and concems for applicants as well as for State and Local 
government development confrol systems. 
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The following examination canvasses 15 specific criticisms of EPBC. Prior to this 
however one particularly important issue must be dealt with and fri some detail viz. 
the growing possibility of counter-suit actions impingmg directly on State 
development confrol and appeal systems. 
(a) Counter-Suit Actions. 
The discussion in the previous sections clearly demonstrates the extensive discretion 
given by the EPBC to the Minister in many instances and the jurisdictional 
consequences of the exercise of such discretion. Additionally, actions that take place 
outside the boundaries of a matter of "national envfronmental significance" (ie 
constitutionally within the area and jurisdiction of a State or Territory) may be 
brought within the ambit of EPBC if they are likely to have a "significant impact" on 
that "matter of national significance". 
The proposition, which is now advanced, is that the potential extra-territorial 
operation of EPBC now opens up the possibility of anti-suit actions against 
proceedings already underway in the State planning courts. 
Traditionally, the difficulty with commencing such an action arises from the lack of 
legal standing of the party seeking to advance a claim. However, s 487 of EPBC 
allows for a large variety of persons to claim legal standing in the Federal court. The 
basic criterion is that the applicant must be an "aggrieved person" and a party is taken 
to be a person aggrieved by a decision, failure or conduct if: 
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a) "the individual is an Ausfralian citizen or ordfriarily resident in 
Ausfralia or an extemal Territory; and 
b) at any time in the 2 years immediately before the decision, failure or 
conduct, the individual has engaged in a series of activities in Ausfralia 
or an extemal Territory for the protection or conservation of, or 
research into, the environment".^^ 
The wordmg is so vague (indeed even fatuous) that virtually any person could satisfy 
standing requfrements, which has almost certainly been the intention of the 
Commonwealth. The consequences of permitting wholesale access to the Federal 
Court on the basis of a set of expandable jurisdictional claims by the Commonwealth 
could have draconian consequences for the orderly hearing of applications and 
appeals in the State planning courts.^^ 
It is not difficult to imagine an "aggrieved party", who lacks standing in the State 
courts, or who believes the Commonwealth Act is more potentially sensitive to their 
particular claim, attempting to take the matter out of the jurisdiction of the State 
planning court (even if the matter is being heard). This could be accomplished by 
applying to the Commonwealth court for a declaration that the matters properly fall 
^* The following subsection applies the same criteria to corporations or associations. 
55 Raff suggests that the issue of standing has, even now, not gone far enough and that the 
Commonwealth should insist that the States estabhsh the same opportunities for judicial 
review as exist in EPBC and for Tribunal appeals to be permitted during an assessment 
process. Raff, M "Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act". (2000) 17/5 
EPU p 369. 
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within tile purview of EPBC. The kiitial application would be coupled v^th an 
application to mjunct the parties in tiie State proceeding from contfriuing with the 
matter.^^ 
Additionally, there is a considerable body of High Court decisions that effectively 
enlarge the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, once such a declaration is made and an 
injunction has been granted. In Stack v Coast Securities (No.9) P/L,^"^ Gibbs CJ., 
Wilson and Dawson JJ laid down the following proposition: 
In the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred [under a Commonwealth Act of 
CO 
Parliament] the Federal Court of Australia may adjudicate on non Commonwealth 
claims arising in a defence or cross-claim which arise out of the same transaction and 
are closely related to the applicant's claim or which are aspects of a single justifiable 
controversy [of] which the issues raised under [the Commonwealth Act] form an 
integral part... 
This decision enlarges the ambit of the earlier High Court decision in Felton v 
Mulligan^^ and it has been applied in subsequent decisions in Fencott v Muller; 
Basegrove Holdings P/L v Centaur Mining and Exploration Ltd and m Australian 
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Chris McGrath in his article, "Bilateral Agreements- Are they Enforceable?". (2000) 17/6 
EPU p.485, ties the use of counter-suit injunctions to situations where a bilateral is in place. 
A counter argument however is that the existence of a bilateral agreement may be irrelevant. I 
agree, however, with his conclusion that bilaterals are unlikely to be enforceable at law. 
(Unless contained, of course, in subsequent State legislation.) 
(1983) 154 CLR 261. 
In the case of the FCA, the relevant provision is s 39B(lA)(c) of the Judiciary Act, 1903. 
(1971) 124 CLR 367. 
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Solar Mesh Sales P/L v Anderson. ^^ Though these decisions have arisen principally 
out of matters arismg under the Trade Practices Act, 1974 there is no reason why the 
same logic cannot, and will not, eventually be applied to the EPBC. 
The previous discussion concerned counter-suit uijunctions however applications for 
interim injunctions under s 475 of EPBC have afready been made to the courts.^ ^In 
Booth V Bosworth^^ an application was made for an interim injunction under s 475(5) 
of EPBC. The respondent, a lychee grower, had erected a series of electrical grids to 
protect his crop that had some impact on the flying fox population. The applicant to 
be successful, needed to be able to establish that the actions of the respondent 
satisfied the requirements of s 12 of EPBC in that" it has, will have or is likely to 
have a significant impact on the World Heritage values" of the nearby, National Park. 
The scientific evidence presented was, predictably, conflicting and no consensus 
emerged as to the degree of impact this activity was causing. Under these 
cfrcumstances Spender J refused to injunct the activity. In reaching his opinion 
Spender J. quoted with approval two earlier decisions of the High Court: the decision 
of Mason CJ in Castlemaine Tooheys v South Australia^"* where the judge stressed the 
need to strike a balance between public and private interests and that of the same 
judge in Richardson v Forestry Commisssioner ^^ where he rejected the contention 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
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(1983) 152 CIR 570; (2001) FCA 259; and (2000) 101 FCR 1 respectively. 
These have been heard by the AAT and concern principally concern fisheries matters. 
(2000) FCA 1878. 
After an appeal to the federal court a prohibitory injunction has now been granted in this 
matter. See: Booth v Bosworth (2001) FCA 1453. (17 October 2001) 
(1986) 161 CLR 148 at 155. 
(1988) 164 CLR 261 at 275. 
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tiiat an applicant need show that irreparable damage will be done, but rather that it 
was a possibility that irreparable damage may be done 66 
The most recent decision. The Eraser Island Dingoes Case, sunilarly concemed an 
application for an interim injunction to prevent a breach of s 12 of EPBC. Drummond 
J, while accepting that the local dingoes were part of the heritage values of the island, 
nevertheless felt that the culling program was so limited in scope and so close to the 
end of the cull that injunctive relief was not required. Commenting on this case, 
McGrath felt it was truly remarkable that the Federal Court could now mle on the 
actions of a State government in managing State land without the State, in response, 
raising any issues as to constitutionality or jurisdiction. As he further remarked 
CO 
"There are interesting times ahead..." 
The inequity and the potential for the applicant to have to bear a huge increase in legal 
and other costs should be apparent and it must doubted, if the procedures outlined are 
increasingly used (which seems inevitable), whether such a system is rationally 
sustainable even in the short term. 
66 
67 
These are applications for interim injunctions where clearly the potential for irreparable 
damage, even in the short term, is a highly important consideration. 
(2001) FCA 756. 
59 . McGrath, C "Eraser Island Dingoes Case", (2001) 18/3 EPLJ p 269 
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E EPBC: EFFECTS ON STATE DEVELOPMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS 
The following 16 observations, for conciseness, are considered in tabular form on the 
following pages: 
THE ISSUE. THE PROBLEM. 
The definition of ''national The general vagueness of these 
environmental significance" and definitions, which has been commented 
"significant impact" on ui the text, makes it extremely difficult 
for an applicant or a Local Government 
to determine in particular cases whether 
an application should be referred to tihe 
Cormnonwealth. This is exacerbated by 
the positive obligation placed upon an 
applicant to personally refer a matter if 
the applicant believes it may have a 
"significant unpact". 
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Federal Ministerial discretions The Mmister's ability to declare a 
development to be a "controlled action" 
and hence to determine the level of 
assessment required is highly arbitirary 
and will lead to imcertainty m the 
administration of botii EPBC and State 
Planning Acts. 
• Revocations The ability of the Commonwealth to 
revoke a decision previously made as to 
either the need for a federal approval or 
the level of assessment required will 
create contmuing uncertamty in the 
development community. 
EPBC Triggers The potential now exists for uimecessary 
intervention in State assessment systems 
given the highly discretionary and 
arbitrary nature of the triggers under 
EPBC. 
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Counter-suit Actions Potential for huge costs burdens to be 
placed on applicants and for State matters 
to be adjudicated in federal courts 
Ministerial Oversight The Minister can revoke an assessment or 
approval bilateral at his discretion. 
Trigger Thresholds. As discussed m the text, considerable 
uncertainty exists as to the threshold 
levels which will be applied in the 
various management plans. This may 
force applicants to unilaterally refer the 
matter to tiie Commonwealth in the face 
of considerable criminal and financial 
penalties. 
15 
Information Requirements 
placed on applicants 
It is highly likely that applicants will be 
requked to undertake extensive and 
expensive initial investigations prior to a 
determination by tiie Minister as to 
whether the development even triggers 
EPBC mvolvement. 
Duplication The Commonwealth requirements 
effectively duplicate procedures already 
in place in the States. Neither is there any 
consolidated attempt in the Act to 
integrate assessments between respective 
regunes. This, in itself, is contrary to 
nation-wide move towards increasing 
integration. 
Accountability The whole issue of State and Local 
Government accountability and potential 
legal liabilities remains unaddressed. 
• Cost burdens 
Internal, and hence externality costs, will 
mcrease as local systems are forced to 
administer a duplicate set of 
reqmrements. 
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• Inconsistency with DAF There is a fimdamental inconsistency 
between EPBC and the DAF principles 
which has previously been agreed to by 
all stakeholders and which seek to 
integrate development approvals and to 
create a single, transparent assessment 
system. 
• Environmental Assessment State EIA procedures have been 
overhauled in line with NCP and DAF 
principles. These reforms are implicitly 
ignored in EPBC. 
Additional Costs Additional cost to the development 
community, to businesses and Local 
Government are inevitable. EPBC tends 
to negate other micro-economic reforms 
and will place an additional burden on 
economic growth and job creation. 
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Management Plans Uncertainty exists as to the nature and 
status of the associated management 
plans, what standards will be required to 
satisfy EPBC requirements and the 
implications should a plan be disallowed 
by the Minister. 
Transitional Arrangements The EPBC fails to deal with projects in 
train and the hiatus preceding the signing 
of assessment bilaterals. 
1. EPBC: Case study- Keswick Island, the Witsundays' 69 
The following example provided by a property development group is illustrative of 
the unpact or likely impact of the EPBC on major development projects. 
This large scale project involves the constmction of a 3000 person tourist and 
residential community on some 120ha of land. Two marinas and an airstrip extending 
uito the marine park, which is World Heritage listed, were mcluded m the project. By 
agreement between the Commonwealth and State govenunents a joint lAS/EIS was 
® The case studies are extracted from a QELA seminar paper delivered by Greg Long of 
Transtate Ltd, held on 30 July 2001. 
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conducted with the process administered by the then Queensland Department of 
Environment and Heritage. Subsequently, a joint State and federal government 
environmental assessment was issued which recommended the project proceed though 
subject to 63 separate conditions. In general terms the developer found the total 
process to be facilitating and cooperative. 
Long's comments about a similar application under EPBC are however worth 
recording. He feels that an EIS conducted now, under EPBC, could produce a 
different result. This, he suggests, may be the case for two reasons. In his words: 
I believe the thresholds for what is regarded as significant impact on the World 
Heritage listed and Commonwealth Marine areas, is now much higher... That is, the 
burden of proof for potential impacts now is substantially increased, and I cannot 
imagme that, as the developers, we could justify or indeed accommodate the financial 
impost that arises from endeavouring to demonstrate that no "significant impact" will 
be caused by the project, if it is developed according to best practice environmental 
management principles. 
And secondly, 
I believe community and political sentiments would preclude a project like Keswick 
beuig approved now. The EPBC Act provides convenient and forceful mechanisms 
for the Commonwealth Minister to apply the precautionary principle, and refuse to 
approve such a project. That could be very bad for our tourism industry m the future. 
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As an additional point Long refers to the problems associated with the miposition of 
EPBC oversight over projects which are already underway He comments: 
I cannot imaguie that any further assessment or surveys in relation to these issues 
under the EPBC Act will contribute in any way to better achieving the objects of the 
Act. However, a substantial cost to the developers may well be the result of any 
further assessments requhed if the Minister declares it a controlled action, and a 
considerable impact could be had on the valuation of the property because of the 
uncertainty that the Commonwealth's mvolvement creates. This is unacceptable when 
one considers the project has been proceeding according to pre-existing agreements 
which have stood for many years. 
On the face of it these are very worryuig comments indeed coming, as they do, fi-om a 
large national development group with significant financial and technical resources at 
its disposal. Nevertheless, the jury is still out on most of these matters and firm 
conclusions will have to wait on further case by case examples to clarify threshold 
levels and the burden of proof 
F. NSW AND QUEENSLAND: ASSESSMENT BILATERALS 
Currently the most significant of the two bilaterals agreements are assessment 
bilaterals with no substantial process yet evident on proposed approval bilaterals. As 
indicated, to date, only Tasmania has ratified an assessment bilateral, though draft 
agreements are in place for all States and Territories. Since these agreements are 
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central to the operation of the EPBC (at least m the absence of a huge expansion of 
Environment Australia) the draft NSW bilateral is given in Appendix 2. Currently, the 
NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Plannmg (DUAP), believes the 
Commonwealth will accredit the assessment regime already operating under EPAA. 
The process has been slow however because of the time taken for Environment 
Australia to respond to the DUAP proposals and the bilateral is unlikely to be 
hnplemented, by incorporation hi a new SEPP, until mid 2002. The Director of 
Development and Assessment for DUAP, Mr Geoff Noonan, in a conversation with 
the writer, described the entire process as "immensely complex". 
1. The Queensland experience to date. 
Queensland has attempted to comply with EPBC/EIA guidelines and benchmarks by 
undertaking a review of the State Development and Public Works Organisation 
Act, 1971 notably by incorporating "prescribed developments" within an EIA ambit. 
In these instances the Coordinator General is the sole concurrence agency and his or 
her EIS is fed back into the standard IDAS framework of the Integrated Planning Act, 
1997."^ ^ 
Despite Chadwick's opinion that, as a result, impact assessment has moved "from the 
margins to the very centre of development assessment"^^ the Commonwealth has 
70 Defined in s 5 of the Act as having a major economic significance for the State. 
'^  Why the Coordinator General, whose office has traditionally been more concemed with 
economic development, should be given this task, and not the Environmental Protection 
Agency, remains unclear. 
72 Chadwick, J "Environmental Impact assessment under the Integrated Plannmg Act" (2000) 
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remamed unimpressed with this process and this, m turn, has necessitated an 
amendment to the State Development and Public Works Organisation Act, 
1971[SDPWOA]'^ ^ which effectively incorporates the EPBC assessment regune 
within the Queensland Act. In addition, further EIS requirements has been inserted in 
the Environmental Protection Act 1994 to cover mining projects which are not 
"prescribed projects" under SDPWOA and additional EIS requirements are mtended 
to be included in the foreshadowed amendments to IPA. 
2. The NSW experience to date 
Despite the existence of developed and tested EIS procedures which apply to 
designated classes of development under EPAA, discrepancies exist between the 
Commonwealth benchmark criteria and the NSW Statement of Environmental 
Effects."^ "* Nevertheless the draft Bilateral provides m Sch 1, Pt A 2.2, B 2.2, C 2.2 and 
D 3 for guidelines which should provide the federal Minister with enough relevant 
uiformation to make a valid decision in the context of s 47 of EPBC. 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
At the broadest philosophical or perhaps more correctly, ideological level the EPBC 
represents a consolidated attempt to circumscribe private rights and arises out of an 
intellectual milieu where the notion of "public right" has a degree of cogency which 
40(1) Queensland Planner p7. 
'^  SDPWO Amendment Regulation (No 1) 2001. 
'''* Neither EPAA or the regulations prescribe precise requirements for a SEE. 
82 
is, in many instances, not shared by positivist lawyers. Such lawyers remam doubtfiil 
whether the concept of a public right can ever really be defined with the sort of legal 
precision which our judicial system demands. Equally, some members of the judiciary 
may be wary that in the absence of a degree of definitional precision they may be 
increasingly called upon to decide issues on the basis of an overarching judicial 
discretion. 
It is inevitable however that, in the face of national environmental concems, and 
pressure from many quarters for an integrated development control and EIS process 
the EPBC will assume an increasing importance at the State level. 
Despite protests from some conservation groups that the EPBC, potentially, puts too 
much power into the hand of untmstworthy State governments, the mechanisms 
incorporated in the Act such as benchmark standards, approved management plans, 
accreditation procedures and federal Ministerial oversight are unlikely to generate a 
laissez faire response from State governments and they may, over time, result in a 
reasonably integrated national approach. 
There are, of course, serious concems with the Act which have been expressed by 
both sides of the conservation/development argument and many of these have been 
dealt with in the above. One factor, however, should not be overlooked and this is that 
the Act as it stands now v^U change over tune and will be used as a basis to justify an 
further list of federal jurisdictional claims. One need only refer to the list of ratified 
intemational envkonmental agreements in Appendix 1 to appreciate the potential for 
this to occur. 
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The jury, of course, is still out though the unpact of EPBC on State development 
control systems is evident now and matters of integration, duplication and cost are to 
the forefront. That the same result, or indeed a better result, could have been achieved 
by a genuine commitment to cooperative federalism and through DAF and COAG 
may be debatable though it may have been valuable to try such an mformal 
consensual approach initially rather than wholeheartedly adopting the rather 
draconian and prescriptive system which is at the core of EPBC. 
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THREE 
THE APPLICATION STAGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Both Queensland and NSW planning regimes conform to an assessment and approval 
process which, in total, encompasses the making of an application, the provision of 
supporting information by the applicant, the public notification of the proposed 
development and the making of a decision by the Consent Authority in the case of NSW or 
the Assessment Manager in the case of Queensland. In Queensland this four step process 
has formal statutory recognition^ and, taken together, constitutes the "Integrated 
Development and Assessment System" (IDAS), which is one of the central component 
systems created by the Integrated Planning Act 1997. [IPA]. 
All Australian planning regimes share these four processes in common though it is possible 
to conceive of a three-step system which removes the public notification requirement 
entirely in regard to certain categories of otherwise impact assessable developments or 
altematively, as is the case in NSW, to remove the right of appeal in respect of local 
developments. There are few advocates for such a truncated process, which would 
remove notification or appeal rights, though a case, of sorts, could be attempted based 
around the fact that all Local Governments are elected bodies and that ultimately all 
^ IPA, s 3.1.9(1). The same elements are present under EPAA though spread across Pt 4 of the Act. 
Efiectively the various divisions constitute an integrated system as a result of the wholesale review 
and amendment of Pt 4 in 1998. 
^ EPAA, s 98. 
^ See Pardy, Bruce "Planning for Serfdom: Resource Management and the Rule of Law", (Feb 1997) 
New Zealand Law Journal p 72. 
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aggrieved citizens have recourse to the ballot box. One of the contentions in this work is 
that file IDAS process has, m both jurisdictions, become encumbered by too many public 
participation processes and public rights and that the systems need to be rationalised. 
The core material which forms the subject matter of this thesis, is the four-step process 
outiined and which, for the sake of simplicity, is subsequently referred to as IDAS. 
Surprismgly, the IDAS processes in both the jurisdictions under examination here have 
been the subject of little mtensive review. The present preoccupation with guidmg 
principles or statutory purposes, with environmental sustainability or with the mechanisms 
of planning scheme or planning policy creation results in the assignment of IDAS 
generally to the secondary literature.^ 
This is surprising since it is these processes and the law that has developed around them 
which frequently determines whether the total system is fair and efficient from the point of 
view of the applicants and ultimately the wider community who are called upon to bear the 
costs of the development control process m terms of the purchase price of land and rental 
charges. Accordingly, one of the premises of this chapter is that often the perception 
(whether it is efficient and equitable and whether it works) of an entire planning and 
assessment regime is, in reality, not determined by the sophistication of the various 
planning instruments but by the efficiency of the underlying application and assessment 
processes. 
This process is ongomg in Qld and NSW. The IPA Amendment Bill 2001 is currently in 
consultation draft and proposes substantial modification to the existing IDAS system. 
For example: Pickles, Ian "IDAS: Queensland and New South Wales Comparisons" (2001) 41/2 
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The IDAS stages in botii jurisdictions will be examined m detail where eitiier the statutory 
procedures are distmct, where similar planning or policy issues are treated differently or 
where sunilar legal issues have been taken up by the courts and dissimilar legal principles 
have been established. Often both jurisdictions do have sunilar approaches and apply 
similar principles. There is, for example, little essential difference between the jurisdictions 
concerning the amendment, lapsing or withdrawal of applications and consequently these 
issues, and others like them, have been omitted. In other areas however such as the 
question of "related land" or "consent" to applications, the two jurisdictions have differing 
approaches and these areas will be analysed. There are clear stmctural differences also 
between both regimes in respect of the classes of development, the required levels of 
approval and m thek definitions of development^ and these differences do affect the 
manner in which IDAS unfolds in the two jurisdictions. 
With this framework m mind, the following matters will be examined under this, the first 
stage of the IDAS process: 
• Who may make an application 
• What constitutes a valid application 
• The issue of "Owners Consent" and misleading applications 
• Receipt and acknowledgment of applications 
and, 
• Public scmtmy of applications. 
Queensland Planner. p23. 
See Note 5 above. 
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B, WHO MAY MAKE AN APPLICATION 
Section 1.3.8(a) of IPA defines an "applicant" as a "person" which, m tum, is defined as 
including "a body of persons, whether incorporated or unincorporated". EPAA contains a 
similar definition that covers the same ground^ though EPAA takes a further step by means 
of a supplementary definition in the regulations limiting those who can make applications 
to two groups, the owner of the land and any other person, with the consent of the owner. ^ 
In a number of significant areas the approaches in the two jurisdictions differ and once 
again these differences tend to exemplify the differing philosophies which underpin the 
respective legislation. Some debate, for example, has occurred in Queensland as to whether 
consultants or agents on behalf of undisclosed principals can submit applications. 
Two associated issues have arisen under this heading in Queensland: 
• can an application be submitted by an agent for a principal who remams 
undisclosed throughout the approval process? 
and. 
given that an application has been submitted by an agent, can a principal 
subsequently appeal in its own name. 
7 IPA, Sch 10. 
EPAA, s78 (A) "Person" is defined in s 4(1) as including "an unincorporated group of persons or a 
person authorised to represent that group". 
EPAA regs, cl 49. 
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This whole matter appears to have been obviated m NSW °^ by the simple expedient of 
requiring that an agent signing a Form 1 on behalf of a principal must also disclose the 
identity of that principal. The same approach could have been adopted m Queensland." It 
has not and the IPA equivalent forms ^ ^ still do not require disclosure of the principal. As a 
consequence, the case law developed under the previous legislation would appear to be still 
applicable. 
Reference to this case law is appropriate as it points to the policy and equity issue which is 
effectively ignored by administrative fiat under EPAA viz. whether principals, and 
particularly developers, should be able to maintain their anonymity throughout the 
application process in view of the preference in both Acts for openness and disclosure. 
The leading case is Dorrstein v Brisbane City Council where Byth DCJ held that even 
though an application had been signed by an agent there were sufficient letters and other 
documents in the possession of the council to establish that the real applicant was, in fact, 
Dorrstein. The judge however did not refer to any principle which supported his finding 
and this rather cursory approach was followed subsequently in Charles Calthorp P/L v 
Pine Rivers Shire Council^^ and in Bennett v Livingston Shire Council^^. 
10 
.11 
II 
13 
1* 
IS 
"AppUcant" is not defined in EPAA or the EPAA regulations. 
IPA, s 5.8.1. 
Forms 1 and 2. 
(1967) 14 LGRA 97. 
[1980] LGRA 38. 
[1985] QPLR 214. 
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Apart from the decision in Wyndrone P/L v Townsville City Council, ^ ^ which in part, 
tumed on the concem the judge had that the public could be misled by a non-disclosure of 
the principal, the larger issue of potential public prejudice was overlooked until taken up 
by Newton DCJ in Grimley P/L v Gold Coast City Council. Here tiie judge specifically 
based his decision on whether or not anyone had been prejudiced by the non-disclosure of 
the identity of the developer. In this instance, and barkening back to Dorrstein, there was 
sufficient correspondence in existence which clearly identified the principal. 
While Grimley identifies the important issue of prejudice, it does not canvass the whole of 
that issue. It establishes correspondence as an indicia of whether, in fact, the developer's 
identity was known but the two issues, of knowledge and prejudice, do not necessarily 
relate to each other. The issue of prejudice, if it is to be examined at all in these instances, 
should be done so in the context of public disclosure and the existence of essentially 
internal council correspondence which identifies the developer to council is not necessarily 
germane. 
However, in obiter dicta in Young v Gold Coast City Council, ^ ^ the same judge helpfully 
summarised the issue as follows: 
The application is to be considered by the Council and by the Court, where appropriate, in 
terms of the development proposal, and it really does not seem to form part of the scheme 
of the legislation that the identity of the developer is a matter of great importance. 
16 
If 
18 
[1988] QPLR 55. 
[1994] QPLR 252.at 253. 
[1996] QPELR 399. 
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It is hard to disagree with this statement. The scheme of IPA concems the approval and 
management of land use applications/»er se and the identity of the applicant, though it may 
be of great and abiding interest to a commercial competitor, is not relevant to the approval 
process. 
As Homel has pointed out, though m a different context^^: 
IDAS approvals run with the land and have been described as "people blind"- they are 
based on land use, not the personal responsibilities of the person carrying out the use. 
A question has also arisen in Queensland as to whether earlier case law has been rendered 
a nullity because of the differing Sch 10 definitions of "applicant" for the purposes of Ch 3 
and Ch 4 of the Act. 
"Applicant" is defined for the purpose of Ch 3 as "the applicant for the development 
application" but in the immediately following definition with reference to Ch 4 it is defined 
to include "the person in whom the benefit of the application vests". It seems clear, in 
reference to the latter definition, that the intention of the legislature was to confirm that 
subsequent transferees and undisclosed principals could lodge an appeal. 
'^ Homel, B "Just a Process Change: the Impact of IDAS on Environmental Protection in 
Queensland", 16 EPU^ 79. 
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The consequence of the introduction of these additional words has raised the issue as to 
whether "applicant" for the purposes of Ch 3 should be read down on the basis of a stiict 
application of expressio unius, exclusio alterius est 
There seems no merit in this argument. In operation, as a principle of statutory 
interpretation, the words which are excluded from the ambit of one section must be 
expressed in the other. In this instance the expressed words are "the person in whom the 
benefit of the application vests" and certainly, in this category would be the owner of the 
land. The expressio unius argument therefore, correctly framed, would mean, not that 
agents could not submit an application but rather that owners could not, which is unlikely 
to be the case. 
If this mterpretation is correct, then two things are certain. First, that agents who apply on 
behalf of principals need not disclose the name of the principal and secondly, that 
principals can subsequently appeal under Ch 4 of the Act. The developer/ principal, can 
thus, in Queensland, remain anonymous right thoughout the application and indeed appeal 
process. In contrast, under EPAA, the developer/principal must be identified on the initial 
Form 1 application. 
The Queensland approach is preferable. The possibility of the public being prejudiced by 
ignorance of the identity of the developer hardly outweighs the occasional commercial 
need for confidentiality. If a balance is to be established between these two factors it 
should, on the basis of equity, be done so as to not create, on the one hand, a potential 
commercial disadvantage to one party in an attempt to address an illusory need or 
aspiration of another. 
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C. WHAT CONSTITUTES A VALID APPLICATION 
Issues associated with the validity of applications or the requirement for a "proper 
application" provide a contrast between EPAA and IPA. 
In Queensland the formal statutory requirements for a valid application are outlined in s 
3.2.1(1) to (5) and, in sununary, they mean that each application must be "m the approved 
form" viz. that it contains an accurate description of the land, the written consent of the 
owner of the land and the required fee. 
The IPA application is, in one sense, merely a formal request for a development approval 
with the larger question of supporting information not necessarily addressed at this stage. 
Although, in the normal course of events, an application will have attached to it various 
01 
pieces of supporting information the provision of this information at this point in time is 
not a mandatory requirement.'^ '^  
The IPA situation is in sharp contrast to the EPAA requirements where the distinction 
between the application and information processes is unclear. Under EPAA^^ an 
application must be in the approved form and must be accompanied by all the information 
required by Form 1 .^^ 
20 
•21 
22 
28 
24 
These issues, together with the relevant case law, are dealt with subsequently. 
IPA,s3.2.1(3)(b) 
IPA Forms 1 & 2. 
EPAA Regs, cl 50. 
EPAA,PtlofSchl. 
m 
It is at this pomt tiiat again the conttastmg philosophies of the two Acts become apparent. 
The underlying philosophy of IPA reflects a more modem approach to regulation with its 
implicit insistence that those who seek to regulate should themselves carry the burden of 
stating and clarifying the assessment criteria in each instance. Consequently, the onus 
under IPA of determining which advice or concurrence agencies should participate in the 
assessment process, as well as what information will be required to assist the assessment to 
move forward currently rests on the shoulders of the assessment manager or the 
concurrence agency, not on the applicant. 
In contrast, the older EPAA can be said to reflect the more traditional approach in placing 
the burden of correctly determining a range of potential information requirements as well 
as other necessary approvals directly on the applicant. In this sense EPAA is less in 
harmony with the prevailing ideology of National Competition Policy than is IPA. 
The information requirements for an application under EPAA are extensive and are set out 
in Form 1. In addition to title description, owner's consent and the appropriate fee(s) the 
applicant is required to determine: 
25 Though this is aheady being imdercut by the requirement in Form 1 for the applicant to nominate 
the referral agencies as a mandatory requirement. This is certainly contrary to the clear intent of the 
legislature expressed in s 3.2.3(2)(b). The 2001 Consultation Draft however, if carried over into 
amendment to the Act, totally obliterates this requirement by replacing s 3.2.3, "Acknowledgement 
Notices" (which contained the requirement to advise the applicant as to referral and concurrence 
agencies) with a new, "Non-acceptance notice" which does not refer to this obligation. In reality 
the amendments are, in this sense, merely recognising actual practice. The situation shortly under 
IPA should thus parallel that under EPAA though it is an unfortunate tum of events for the reasons 
of principle outlined in the text. 
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a) whether tiie proposed development is an Integrated Development as defined in s.91 
of tiie Act. If so it may require tiie approval of one or more bodies established 
under any of the following Acts; Fisheries Management Act 1994, Heritage Act 
1977, Mine Subsidence Compensation Act 1961, National Parks and Wildlife Act 
1974, Pollution Control Act, 1970, Rivers and Foreshores Improvement Act 1948, 
Roads Act 1993, Waste Minimisation and Management Act 1995, and the Water Act 
1912. 
b) in addition, if the proposal is for a Designated Development^^ then, pursuant to 
s 78 A (8)(a) of the Act, an Environmental Impact Statement must be conducted and 
be attached to the application. 
Even if the proposal is not for a Designated or Integrated Development the application 
must still be accompanied by a statement of environmental effects which must demonsfrate 
that the applicant has considered the proposal's environmental impact and taken steps to 
protect the environment or mitigate the harm. 
While accepting that the EPAA application process does cover some of the same ground as 
the subsequent Information Stage under IPA, the process outlined by IPA is both more 
equitable and potentially more efficient. In terms of equity those who establish and 
maintain regulatory regimes from which approvals must issue should have a responsibility 
to advise the applicant of the relevant assessment requirements. To place this burden on the 
^^  As defined in Schedule 3 of the Regulations. 
" The language of ss 78A(8) & (9) and els 49 & 50 of the regulations, uses various phrases such as 
"must be accompanied by" and "required to be submitted with". Decisions on point relate to the 
now repealed s 77(3). 
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applicant m an increasingly complex regulatory envnonment is unfair and generates an 
unmediate advantage to those mdividuals or corporations who can afford to enlist the 
services of lav^ers or town planning consultants. Equally, the consent authority should be 
m a better position to accurately determine the scope of supportmg mformation and the 
extent to which other bodies will need to be involved in the decision process based on its 
decisional and assessment responsibilities. 
The principal difference between the two Acts lies in the fact that an EPAA application 
inserts a major and mandatory information requirement into the determination of what 
constitutes a valid application. By contrast IPA maintains a simplified application 
procedure where the information aspect is postponed until the next designated stage and 
where the responsibility for determining what information will be required is placed on the 
consent authority rather than the applicant.^ ^ 
The EPAA situation more closely parallels the position under the IPA precursor Act 
where a properly made application was one that satisfied all the statutory or mandatory 
requirements.^ ^ 
28 
29 
30 
31 
The Information and Referral Stage. 
This is a statement ofprinciple based on the intent of the Act. Whether Local 
Government practice accords with these principles will become apparent over time. 
Certainly the potential exists under PA for Local Governments to simply disregard 
salient aspects of the procedure. (There are no penalties contained in the Act apphcable to 
Local Governments who do not conform). 
Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act 1990 (Qld) s 4.1. 
The foreshadowed IPOLAA 2001 amendments to IPA tighten the formal requirements and remove 
the right of the assessment manager to receive an improper application. In future an appUcation will 
need to be properly made, or otherwise it will attract a non-acceptance notice and lapse after 20 
days. 
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That this is still the current EPAA position is illusttated, in part, by Byron Bay Business v 
Byron Shire Council. Here tiie applicant submitted a development application in respect 
of which both an EIS (it was a designated development m terms of s 77) and a Fauna 
Impact Study were required to be submitted with the application. No such studies were 
tendered. It was held that it was a requirement of a valid application that it be accompanied 
by all the required information, (though not necessarily at lodgment). Pearlman J 
summarised the position under EPAA as foUows:^ ^ 
The question is not simply whether a development application in the prescribed form has 
been made. It is, rather, whether a development application which fulfils the statutory 
requhements has been made.. .if they have not been met, then the coimcil has no basis for 
making a determmation to grant or refuse consent. 
The key issue for her Honour was that the development application needed to fulfil the 
statutory requirements at the time the council made its decision in respect of it. This 
decision is inconsistent with the decision of Handley JA in Helman v Byron SC ^"^ who felt 
that the information requirements were more in the nature of condition precedents to a 
proper application and to the decision of the NSW Court of Appeal in Botany Bay Council 
V Remath Investments No 6 P/L where Fitzgerald J stated (at 457): 
Whether or not it is technically correct to say that a development application is "mvalid" 
while the requhements of s 77 [now s 78A] of the unamended Act are not substantially 
32 
33 
34 
35 
(1994) 84 LGERA 434. 
Note 32. 
(1995) 87 LGERA 349. 
(2000) 111 LGERA446. 
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complied with, references to "mvalidity" which can be "cured" are capable of suggestmg 
that a "cure" is retrospective. If a development application m respect of which there has not 
been substantial compliance with the requhements of s 77 is accurately described as 
mcomplete and ineffectual until there is substantial compliance, it becomes obvious that it 
is only then that a development application is completely or effectively "made". 
No doubt had Remath arisen in Queensland under the previous Act it would have been 
decided m the same way and on the same grounds. 
However, the IPA position is likely to be substantially different in view, in part, to the 
discretion now given to an assessment manager by s 3.2.1(8) which is in addition to that 
possessed by the Planning and Environment Court. Under s 3.2.1 (8) the assessment 
manager now has power to receive an application even though it is defective in terms of 
the formal statutory requirements outlined in s 3.2.1. Given the thin statutory requirements 
to support an application, the non-existence of an information component at the application 
stage and the specific exclusion of any such discretion to forgive the non-presentation of an 
owners consent, the assessment manager's discretion would seem to be necessarily 
an 
limited to excusing minor errors in the title description or m the presentation of the fee. 
Question do arise, in both jurisdictions, concerning the validity of an application in two 
other specific situations: 1) where an application, though strictly complying with the 
** See Mayweld v Whitsunday Shire Council [1993] QPLR 248. 
'^ IPA, s 4.1.53(2). 
*^ IPA, s 3.2.1(9) 
^^  Note that the proposed amendments to IPA extinguish this discretionary power. 
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statiitory requkements, is in some other manner defective m the eyes of the relevant appeal 
court, and 2) where a request by an applicant, which did not comply with the statute m 
terms of form, may be converted mto an application by the subsequent behaviour of the 
consent authority. 
The first situation has been approached m a similar manner by the courts in both 
jurisdictions and has, m effect, resulted in the setting of judicial standards at the level of 
the initial application. In the specific instance under review the availability of public 
scmtmy at the application stage"**^  has focussed attention on situations where there is a 
general vagueness or insufficiency in the applicant's description of the proposed 
development even though a description of some t5^e has been provided and therefore there 
exists a strict, though technical, statutory compliance. 
To ensure that the application possesses sufficient content for public scmtiny to be 
meaningful, the courts in NSW (and one suspects also in Queensland when the issue 
arises) have preferred to establish their own judicial minimum standards. Consequently, m 
Rocca V Ryde Municipal Councif^ a "block of professional rooms" was held to be such an 
insufficient description that a valid application could not be said to exist. 
The issue has been summarised by Tadgell J of the Victorian Supreme Court, in Marock 
P/L V Billjoy P/L^^ m two points: 
'^ IPA, s 3.2.8(1). EPAA, R 6 Divs 5, 6, 7. 
^ (1961) 7 LGRA 1. 
42 (1980) 44 LGRA 249. 
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• applicants must clearly inform the planning authority and also inform otiiers 
who may suffer detriment as a consequence of the application, 
and, 
• that the scheme of the planning legislation is to encourage "a plain 
statement of purpose". 
The assessment manager, of course, in this situation could use an information request but 
its ability to do this is consfrained by time limits in Queensland though no time limits are 
stipulated under EPAA.'*'' This has led to a judicial suggestion that the council could msist 
on an adequate description by msertmg this as a condition on the consent."^ However, it is 
difficult to see how a conditional consent of the kind suggested could appropriately address 
the policy issue of ensuring effective public scmtiny at the application stage. 
The approach adopted in both jurisdictions is similar. One important function of the 
application process is to inform and advise the public and an application which, through 
inattention or artfuhiess, fails to do this may be judicially deemed not to be an application 
at all. 
The second area of judicial elaboration concems the effect, if any, of subsequent conduct 
by the consent authority. The situation is illusttated by Morgan v Brisbane City Councif^ 
where an applicant wrote to the council asking for a condition to be relaxed and where 
43 
44 
45 
In general, 10 days under IPA, s 3.3.6(4)(a). See EPAA Regs, cl 54. where the time limits apply to 
the tendering of the information. 
Canyonleigh Environment Protection Society In. v Wingecarribee Shire Council (1997) 95 LGERA 
294 per Bignold J. 
(1968) 16 LGRA 85. 
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council did subsequently formally consider the request. Byth DCJ concluded that council. 
46 by its actions, had converted a request into an application. 
A precondition for such a decision is the ability of the court to exercise a general discretion 
and not to be hamstrung by the obligatory nature of the statutory requirements as existed 
under the P & E Act and as currently exist in NSW. Consequently, though there is a 
respectable history of similar decisions in Queensland prior to the P & E Act"*^  there appear 
to be none (and neither would one expect any) which have arisen in NSW. Given the 
observations made above concerning the current adminisfrative discretion under s 3.2.1(8), 
and particularly in view of the judicial discretion conceded by s 4.1.53(2), it appears likely 
that the approach in these decisions will again be relevant under the IPA. 
The principle that is at issue here however will remain inapplicable imder EPAA so long as 
a valid application is determined strictly as in Remath 49 
D. OWNER'S CONSENT AND MISLEADING APPLICATIONS 
1. Owner's Consents 
46 
47 
48 
A similar, and indeed more extensive debate has occurred on the same lines in the UK. The 
judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Western Fish Products Ltdv Penrith District Council 
[1978] JPL 623, though narrowing the previous 'estoppel' principle, clearly supports Byth DCJ in 
this instance. 
See JeteldP/L v Toowoomba City Council (1995) QPLR 285, Drysdale andRidgway P/L v Pine 
Rivers Shire Council (1970) 26 LGRA 152 and /? v Pine Rivers Shire Council; ex parte Raynbird 
(1967) 14 LGRA 15. 
Though the Queensland approach was adopted in NSW prior to 1979: Hornsby Shire Council v 
Devery (1965) 12 LGRA 34. 
*' Note 35. 
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As already mdicated, a development application can be made by the owner of tiie land or 
by another person, with the owner's consent. "Owner" is sunply defmed imder IPA as "the 
person for tiie tune being entitied to receive the rent for tiie land or would be entitied to 
receive tiie rent for it if it were let to a tenant for rent".^° This definition would seem to 
cover a tmstee, a mortgagee in possession as well as the beneficial owner or the holder of 
the fee simple but certainly does not go as far as the correspondmg definition under 
EPAA.^ ^ Specifically on the issue of owner's consent two pomts of principle have been 
established and a third one remains in contention. 
1) That an application which is submitted without an owner's consent is not a 
properly made application for the purposes of the Act and should not be 
received by council. 
2) That despite the decision of Skoien DCJ in Petrie v Burnett Shire Council 
where the judge used IPA s 4.1.53 to bring the lack of consent within the 
exculpatory powers of the court, the consent of an owner is a mandatory 
requirement.^ "^  
50 
51 
S2 
53 
54 
IPA, Sch 10 Dictionary. 
EPAA, s 4 (1) The complete definition is given in Appendix 3. 
Greatlife P/L v BCC [2001] QPELR 42 per Babarzon DCJ. In NSW, Jeblon P/L v North Sydney MC 
(1982) 48 LGRA 113. 
(unreported, P&E Court, Skoien DCJ, 8 May 2001 at 4) 
This conclusion is supported in Grade v Council of the Shire ofMaroochy [1999] QPELR 80; 
Mirvale P/L v BCC [2001] QPELR 125 at 127and by the decision of tiie Court of Appeal in Rathera 
P/L V Gold Coast City Council [2000] QCA 506. 
102 
3) That clarification is nevertheless required as to whether the court has tiie power 
to cancel a development approval that had proceeded to fmal decision before 
the mistake had been detected. Brabazon DCJ m Greatlife^^, felt tiiat, because 
IPA, s 4.1.22(2) specifically limited this power to circumstances where the 
fraud of the applicant was involved, such an approval may remain standmg as 
valid. Quirk DCJ in the Queensland Investment Corporation^^ case also had 
difficulty with the application of this section. 
"Owner" under EPAA is given the definition which appears in the Local Government Act 
en 
1919. It is an extensive defimtion and deserves to be outlined at length in Appendix 3. 
Although clauses b (i) and b (ii) of the EPAA definition broadly cover the same ground as 
the IPA description it is clear that under EPAA a considerably larger group is accorded 
"consent rights" in the application process. Clause (a)(i) and clause (c) grant these rights to 
Crown lessees. This is not contemplated by the Queensland Act and neither is a similar 
grant to holders of equitable rights in property subject to a conttact of sale. 
The EPAA approach here is to be preferred on both equity and efficiency grounds. A 
purchaser in the interim period between execution of the conttact and completion has not 
only a valid interest in the disposition of the land but also may suffer a potential prejudice 
m 
s« 
57 
Note 52. 
[2001] QPELR 83 at 84. The Draft 2001-02 amendments to IPA have taken up this point. The court 
has now been given power to declare such an approval void, in any appropriate circumstances. This 
is supported by a power to order compensation to innocent parties. See also, Clayton v Miriam Shire 
Council [2000] QPELR 320. 
Followmg its repeal, this now means the Local Government Act 1993, Sch 9. 
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which should support the equitable owner's rejection of an application by the most 
efficacious means, which is by simply withholding consent to the submission of an 
application. Under IPA this interest can, to some extent, be protected through the 
submission process, but the lodging of a submission does not stall the application process 
and the submitter may need to file an appeal in the Planning and Envnonment Court 
should the Local Government approve the application. 
Sunilarly, in regard to Crown lessees, it is the lessee, rather than a portion of the executive 
government, who may be most directly affected by a development proposal and the 
consent of the lessee (particularly if the lease is a long term one which will often be the 
case) should be a pre-condition to the application for similar reasons to those given above. 
In terms of efficiency as well, development applications in isolated local government areas 
are likely to be more effectively processed if the necessity of obtaining Crown consent 
could be dispensed with and replaced by the consent of the lessee. 
The interests of the Crown also deserve protection, however and both Acts provide many 
avenues by which the Crown can subsequently intervene in the process by way of either 
mmisterial "call-in", objection, application to the court under its declaratory jurisdiction or 
by appeal.^« 
Beyond the purely statutory requirements, the courts will become involved in issues which 
are not specifically covered or are insufficiently covered by the statute and judicial 
decisions ui this area appear to uidicate a greater willmgness on the part of the NSW courts 
^ IPA, Pt 6 Div 2. EPAA, ss 92, 117. 
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to mtervene m the mterstices. For example, m part for technical reasons, the NSW courts 
have been prepared to open up the issue of "owner consent" and to elaborate two 
additional principles, at least one of which could have a potential application in 
Queensland. 
The first issue concems the necessity to obtain a consent from a local government where 
the local government is the owner of the land. In this instance the NSW courts have been 
able to make use of s 39 (2) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 to impose a 
consent under (the then) s 77(1 )(b) on a local council. 
The issue arose in Shellharbour Municipal Council v Rovilo P/L.^^. The Court of Appeal 
held that s 39(2) which gave the court "all the powers and functions which the person or 
body whose decision is the subject of the appeal had" could be used to provide a dejure 
consent to an application since one of the "powers and functions" of a Local Government 
is to consent to an application in respect of land owned by them. 
This decision arose shortly after another decision of the Court of Appeal in Sydney City 
Council V Claude Neon Ltd.^^ on a similar issue and where Hope JA made the following 
important comments: 
[T]he council does not have a right arbitrarily to withhold its consent as the ordmary owner 
of private land might do.. .Its failure to do so simply because it wished to frustrate the right 
59 
60 
(1989) 68 LGRA 231. 
(1989) 67 LGRA 181. 
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of the adjoitimg owner to obtam approval to a projecting structure would be a use of its 
power for an improper purpose, that is, it would be a mala fide abuse of power. 
This proposition viz. that m plannmg terms (or as an exercise of planning power) the rights 
which attend public ownership of land are not of the same order as those associated with 
private ownership and that the exercise of those rights is always to be consttained by the 
necessity of the public body to act fairly and properly is significant for both jurisdictions.^^ 
Although the grant of power to the Queensland Planning and Environment Court does not 
contain a provision similar to s 39(2), s 1.2.3(1 )(a)(i) of IPA requires all decision-making 
under the Act to be "accountable, coordinated and efficienf. This, combined with a history 
of judicial decisions relating to "colourable" local government practices , the power to 
refuse, approve or amend an application under s 4.1.54(2) and (perhaps) s 4.1.54(3), 
together with general principles of administtative law, would seem to provide some scope 
for a similar proposition to be argued in Queensland, even in the absence of an equivalent 
to s 39(2). However, if this proposition were not correct, then the power of a Local 
Government in Queensland to preempt a development application by withholding consent 
would appear to be absolute. 
Since a respectable pedigree of decisions now exists in NSW^^ which effectively curtail the 
ability of Local Governments to refuse to grant consent, the question arises as to whether 
61 
62 
63 
The alternative description is that "private rights should not be lightly disturbed". See Judgment of 
Quirk DCJ in Close v Kilcoy Shire Council (unreported, P&E Court, Qld, 7 March 2001). 
See, Jesberg v Hervey Bay City Council (1989) QPLR 190 at 193, Lubrizol Corp. Ltdv Leichhardt 
Municipal Council (I960) 6 LGRA 203 at 210, Chippendale Estates P/L v Sydney City Council 
(1960) 6 LGRA 194 at 201 and Sommerville v Logan City Council [1990] QPLR 264. 
Paino V Woollahra Municipal Council (1990) 71 LGRA 62; McDougall v Warringah Shire Council 
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there exists a principled basis to refuse consent under any of these cfrcumstances. The 
answer, it is suggested, should be no m most cases. It would seem to be very much in the 
mterest of justice and equity for all such applications to proceed on the basis of a Local 
Government consent which, m any event, would not preclude that authority from 
objecting. The overriding consideration, m the court's opinion, remains the propriety of the 
decision making process as a whole and this concem appears to be well founded. There 
appears, as indicated before, no principled reason why the Queensland courts could not 
adopt a similar stand although, to date, no application has been made to the Court to 
address such an issue. 
The second issue which arises from this line of decisions is whether, and if so under what 
circumstances, the same principle could be applied toprivate ownership. Although Clarke 
JA had pointed out in Shellharbour that it was difficult to conceive a situation in which a 
court could require an adjoining landowner to give consent, a number of decisions m NSW 
have indicated that, if there are sufficient statutory or policy reasons, the courts are 
prepared to examine and address the issues raised by such a refusal to give consent. 
In Kirlg'ian v Towers^ the plaintiffs were the owners of an allotment that had a right of 
way over the respondent's block to a nearby public road. The plaintiff applied for approval 
to concrete over this right of way and the respondents refused consent. In granting an order 
requiring the respondents to give consent the judge stated that he was merely applying the 
general law relating to rights of way and property. 
(1993) 30 NSWLR 288 and Primas Group P/L v Maritime Services Board of NSW (1994) 82 
LGERA 205. 
64 (unreported, Waddell CJ in Eq, 6 July 1987.) 
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A subsequent case 111 York Street P/L v Proprietors of Strata Title Plan 16123^^ 
concemed an application to operate a crane in cenfral Sydney to enable constmction to 
commence on a high-rise building. The tail end of the crane would in normal use ttansect 
the airspace of the adjoining residential unit buildmg. The body corporate refused to 
consent to the application. Although the matter concemed an application under s 88K of 
the Conveyancing Act 1919 for a court ordered easement, an EPAA application was still a 
requirement. Hodgson CJ concluded that the court had power under s 88K(3) of the 
Conveyancing Act to order that an implied term of the court ordered easement was that the 
owners of the a(|oining property had consented to the application for consent under the 
tiien EPAA, s 77(l)(b). 
It is significant, as Hodgson CJ in Eq subsequently pointed out m Mulyan P/L v Cowra 
Shire Councif^ in distinguishing Kiekjian and 111 York Street, that the issues in both 
concemed the common law of easements and the ancillary rights which derived from them, 
and not from a specific planning instrument. Consequently, he sounded a note of caution in 
stating that: 
An owner of land over which there are no other property or other enforceable interests is 
entitled to withhold consent. 
65 
66 
(1998) 98 LGERA 171. 
(1999) 105 LGERA 26. 
108 
A further matter arose in Currey v Sutherland Shire Councif \ In this instance a written 
consent was not obtained from an adjoming owner whose property was requfred for access 
pmposes. The NSW Court of Appeal held tiiat the mere inclusion of a lot for access 
purposes and m respect of which no development was proposed did not make the consent 
of that landowner mandatory. A consent under the Act was requfred only if the lots were 
contained in the formal development application.^ ^ 
As can be seen a combination of some statutory facilitation (s 39(2)) combined with a 
greater volume of applications to the courts has seen the emergence in NSW of a more 
elaborate freatment of the "consent" issue. 
From the perspective of the Queensland experience, however. Read v Duncanson and 
Brittain^^ is of equal relevance to the EPAA^°. Here the Full Court held that an application 
to which a consent had been given did not cease to be valid merely because the consent (in 
this case by a Local Government but the nature of the consenter is certainly irrelevant) was 
subsequently withdrawn. 
A principle such as this is clearly essential in any planning jurisdiction if only to promote a 
degree of base-line certainty in adminisfration. If the converse were to be the case and a 
67 
Si 
m 
m 
(1998) 100 LGERA 365. 
This approach would almost certainly invite disaster if used by a developer as a practical guide. 
There would be no point served by gaining a development approval for a project with no permitted 
access to the site. See also, Grace Bros P/L v Willoughby MC (1981) 44 LGRA 422. It is difficult to 
imagine a Qld Court being able to circumvent the definition of "use" in IPA Sch 10 in this 
circumstance. 
(1988) 2 QdR701. 
And the principle has been adopted in NSW. See Stafford Quarries P/L v Kempsey Shire Council 
(1992) 72 LGRA 52. 
109 
subsequent witiidrawal were to have a legal effect the entfre scheme of any planning Act 
would quickly be threatened as objectors, both commercial and otherwise, competed witii 
applicants to offer the largest financial mducement to an owner to preserve or altematively 
withdraw a consent. 
2. Inadequate or misleading applications: the Pioneer principle 
Associated with the issue of consent outlined above is the question of inadequate or 
misleading applications. Broadly, the question which arises here is two-fold: whether the 
proposed project assumes the utilisation of adjoining land to facilitate the new use on the 
block which is the subject of the application, or whether the segmentation of an application 
fails to reflect the tme nature and significance of the total project and consequently where, 
for public policy reasons, some courts have been prepared to rule the application 
"misleading". In general terms the ffrst issue has been more often reflected in the NSW 
courts and the second in Queensland. 
For 20 years the decision of the High Court in Pioneer Concrete (Queensland) P/L v 
Brisbane City Councif^, though studiously distinguished ui both jurisdictions, established 
four principles: 
• when the proposed use is a single mtegrated use, a piecemeal series of 
applications is not permissible 
• the proposed use must be stated m sufficient detail in the application 
71 (1980) 145 CLR 485. 
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• all tiie land to which tiie application relates must be tiie subject of the 
application 
• land devoted only to ancillary uses is as much land to which the application 
relates as land devoted to the principal use.^ ^ 
In Pioneer, the majority were motivated by a concem for full and complete disclosure of 
the proposed use in the notification process, a policy consideration, while the minority 
were cognisant of the fact that m efficiency terms the entire process could often proceed on 
a step-by-step basis without prejudicing the interest of the public right to know, because 
supplementary uses which were essential for the development to proceed (in this instance 
the approval for and subsequent constmction of the road) would themselves necessitate 
additional approvals of various types. 
The issue came up for consideration in Grace Brothers P/L v Willoughby Municipal 
Council which involved, inter alia, the inadvertent inclusion of land within the 
application (the converse oiPioneer). Hutley JA distinguished Pioneer on the basis that 
the definition of "use" in the Queensland Act specifically included incidental uses 
associated with the proposed use, whereas the terms of Interim Development Order No 17, 
under consideration in this case, required only a plan "sufficient to identify the land to 
which the application relates". 
^^  Job, B "Recent Decisions of the Planning and Environment Court" (2000) 40/3 Queensland 
Planner, p 20. 
73 (1981) 44 LGRA 422. 
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This narrow view of Pioneer was subsequently confirmed by the NSW Land and 
Environment Court in two decisions. King v Great Lakes Shire Councif^ and in 
Woolworths V Bathurst City CounciP. In the latter case the Chief Judge reaffirmed the 
Grace Bros principle by stating: 
It has been held that an application is not mcompetent or a consent invalid by reason of the 
circumstance that there is not included in the application land the use of which is 
necessarily involved in the use of land the subject of the application. 
Despite the narrower sense of the NSW legislation there appears to have been no 
insuperable difficulty which would attend their adopting the broad principle of the majority 
m Pioneer and the fact that they have uniformly avoided applyuig it must be taken as 
reflectmg widespread dissatisfaction with it by members of the more specialised planning 
jurisdiction. It is, after all, a decision which generates a profound consequence (the 
nullification of jurisdiction) out of concem, and in the minds of many judges an unjustified 
concem, that the public may not be fully informed in certain instances. 
Until recently Pioneer has atttacted a similar judicial response in Queensland. It has been 
distinguished, with a number of exceptions, on a number of seemingly facile bases. It arose 
mitially for consideration in Brisbane City Council; ex parte Read'^ where in the Full 
Court, de Jersey J distmguished Pioneer on the unpersuasive basis that it had been 
concemed with a consent application not a rezoning application. It was a distinction which 
'^  (1986) 58 LGRA 366. 
^^  (1987) 63 LGRA 55. 
'* (1985) 57 LGRA 1. 
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has never found favour with other courts though the basis used ui the next case, tiie 
decision of the Full Court in Gibway P/L v Caboolture Shire Council did so. 
In this instance private land which was mtended to be subsequently dedicated as a public 
road had not been included in the application. The court noted that Pioneer had been 
concemed with a private road and that there was a considerable difference between this 
and a public road which was open to all. The court appeared to have also been influenced 
by the statement of Byth DCJ at first instance who had said: 
[T]he present application sought rezoning of all the land for which rezoning is 
needed by the applicant. The future road land does not need rezoning. 
In both instances the points raised do not really address the issue raised by Pioneer. In the 
ffrst case the legislative inclusion of related land is intended to ensure that the public can 
be informed of matters such as ttaffic density, dust, pollution and other general amenity 
issues and whether the access to the land is by means of a public or private road is 
irrelevant. Equally, the point is not whether the use of the related land is, or is not, the 
subject of a separate approval process but whether the public should be given notice of its 
proposed use at the time of the original application in respect of the land. 
Whatever the case, if the arguments around the Pioneer principle do not illusfrate logic or 
consistency they do suggest a profound unwillingness on the part of the courts m both 
^^  (1987) 2 Qd R 65. The Gibway pubhc road/private road basis for distmction has 
since had a productive history having been utilised in Queensland Retail Traders and Shopkeepers 
Assoc V Brisbane City Council [1990] QPLR 79, Leda Developments P/L v Pine Rivers Shire 
Council [1996] QPELR 71, and recently in Whitehead v Hervey Bay Shire Council [1998] QPELR 
55. This line of authorities however is now ahnost certainly inapposite under IPA. 
113 
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jurisdictions to apply a general prfriciple which is seen to be too restrictive. The 
preference of the courts has certainly been to adopt any opportunity which would enable 
them to retain the ability to examine each application on an individual basis which reflects 
the altemative view of the minority judges Aicken and Gibbs JJ in Pioneer. 
The same or similar issues arise in a related series of cases dealing with serial applications 
i.e where the subject matter or extent of the total project is alleged not to have been 
disclosed and where the intent of the applicant is, more directly than in the above cases, 
suggested to have been misleading. This is the second facet of Pioneer mentioned on 
pl07. 
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In Burragate P/L v Albert Shire Council it was submitted that since two applications 
were made for the same use the application had been made piecemeal and was 
consequently misleading. After examining the two applications Rowe DCJ was able to 
conclude that they were in fact two separate applications since the proposed use in the first 
application could have been achieved without recourse to the subject matter of the second. 
Similarly in Stubberjield v Redland Shire Council where two applications were submitted 
for a subdivision, which spread across both appropriately and inappropriately zoned land 
the Planning and Environment Court pointed to the obvious logistical advantage conferred 
78 
79 
The Pioneer principle has however been strictly applied in Qld. See the judgment of Robin DCJ in 
Cunningham v Brisbane City Council [2000] QPEC 57. Recent decisions include: Fullbin P/L v 
Gold Coast City Council (unreported, P&E Court, 8 May 2000); Mirvale P/L v Brisbane City 
Council (unreported, P&E Court, 26 October 2000); Ecovale P/L v Gold Coast City Council 
(unreported, P&E Court, 21 November 2000). Note also that the IPOLAA amendments replace the 
definition of "use" and replace it with one which includes any ancillary use of the premises. This, in 
itself, has the potential to revitalise the Pioneer principle once again. 
[1991] QPLR 173. 
[1993] QPLR 214. 
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on the developer by adopting this course of action. (He could proceed rather more quickly 
with tiie development works on the zoned land without waituig for rezonmg of the 
adjoining block.) The public was not disadvantaged by this course of action for two 
reasons; first, the application m respect of the zoned block was an application for 
subdivision in respect of which there was no requfrement for public notification and 
secondly, the public could object to the second "stage" in due course. 
In conttast to NSW where Pioneer has never been applied, the Queensland courts have on 
at least six occasions been prepared to utilise the principle, though the two dimensions of 
Pioneer should always be remembered^ ^  In Kirk v Brisbane City Councif^ an appeal arose 
out of two separate applications over two lots, one zoned Sport and Recreation and the 
other Residential A. In the initial application, approval had been sought to remove several 
tennis courts and to erect 86 town houses. After discussions with council the application 
was amended to omit the second lot and to apply for 22 town houses on Lot 1 only. Six 
months later a second application was made for the remaining 64 town houses on Lot 2. In 
addition, a proposed access to a nearby sfreet had not been disclosed. Under these 
cfrcumstances Brabazon DCJ concluded that the applicant had offended against both 
aspects of the principle in Pioneer; all the land that was the subject of the application had 
not been disclosed and, perhaps more importantly, that splitting the application into two 
made it difficult for the Local Government (and one suspects, in his opinion, the public) to 
deal fairly with it. In overall terms, the decision of Brabazon DCJ ui Kirk is correct, based 
as it is on the suspicion that a deliberate attempt is being made to mislead the public. 
81 They are the questions of related land and prejudicial effect on the public's right to be informed. 
*^  [1998] QPELR 465. See also; Grasso v Mulgrave Shire Council [1993)] QPLR 86 ztnANashvying 
P/Lv 
Mulgrave Shire Council [1994] QPLR 392. 
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In tiiree recent decisions, the ancillary or related land aspect of Pioneer has been brought 
back from near extmction. The three decisions are: Cunningham v Brisbane City Council; 
Lewis V Mareeba Shire Council and Mitchel Ogilvie v Brisbane City Council and they 
deserve to be freated in some detail. 
In Cunningham, a local football club made two applications to council: 
1) to redevelop an adjoining swimming pool which the club had under lease, and 
2) to make certain additions to the club premises. 
The Local Government insisted on provision of additional car parking to which the club 
agreed provided the car parking was attached, as a condition, to the pool redevelopment 
(which was code assessable), rather than to the club redevelopment (which was unpact 
assessable). The PEC concluded that the matter fell withui the piecemeal prohibition of 
Pioneer^"^. A similar situation arose in Lewis where, subsequent to an approval by council 
to the applicant's shopping centte proposal, the applicant made a further application to 
amalgamate land it had recently acqufred and to use this land for additional car parking, 
with a condition to this effect to be attached to the origmal application. The PEC found that 
the Pioneer principle effectively vitiated the approval. 
m 
m 
[2000] QPELR 400; [2000] QPELR 432 and [2000] QPELR 414 respectively. Robin DCJ was the 
judge in all three cases. 
Arguably, this decision was the weakest of the three. It has now been overturned by the Court of 
Appeal, with Thomas JA confessing that he had difficulty with the notion that there was "one 
grandiose scheme". [2001] QCA 294. 
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fri Mitchell Ogilvie, an application was made to carry out a re-development of the 
applicant's retail premises in the CBD of Brisbane. Though it was known at the tune that a 
taxi-rank may need to be re-located underground, no reference to this fact was contained in 
the actual application made. The council responded by attaching two conditions to its 
approval; first, a condition requiring the applicant to address certain factors relating to the 
design and maintenance of taxi-ranks, and secondly, addressing the possibility that the 
underground taxi-rank need not be required if the council were able to locate a suitable 
altemative site. The PEC found the application defective in Pioneer terms and 
consequently the approval mvalid. They also found that the failure to address the relocation 
of the taxi-rank, and its putative relocation to some imdetermined site, were significant 
factors which may have undermined the rights of the public to be informed. 
The common denominator of all three decisions and the decision in Kirk is almost certainly 
the intuition, in the mind of the judge, that the applicant has come to the court with less 
than sparklingly clean hands and that an attempt may have been made to mislead the 
public. Consequently, if the four decisions are reducible to this factor, then other decisions 
such as Watpac P/L v Cairns City Councif^ where it was held that the prospect of 
customers parking on an existing shopping cenfre car park, did not make that land an 
integral part of the development, are easily distinguishable. The effect of these decisions 
however will be to ensure that sufficient care is taken, m the original application, to detail 
the entfre ramifications of the proposal including any ancillary land use implications. 
8$ [2001] QPELR 122. 
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Given the resistance of the NSW courts to applying the Pioneer principle in any event it is 
doubtful whether there will be much change m that jurisdiction and even more so since the 
definition of "use" (and with it, one assumes, the issue of "related land" or "land m the 
locality") in the then s 4(1) of EPAA has been repealed by the 1997 amendment Act. 
In Queensland however the IPA has effectively taken over the extended definition of "use" 
in the previous Act and defines it as: 
In relation to premises, mcludes any use incidental to and necessarily associated with the 
use of the premises. ** 
Consequently, the question of relatedness is, in principle at least, more potentially relevant 
R7 
in Queensland under IPA. 
In summary, though both jurisdictions have managed, in the main, to sail a sound course 
around the shoals which emerged with the Pioneer decision the retention of the concept of 
relatedness in the Queensland legislation will perhaps be regretted since it opens up the 
potential for a continuing dispute along the lines of Kirk v Brisbane City Council and with 
a renewed statutory basis for the dispute. In policy terms, and when the extremely flexible 
reasoning which has been mvolved in distinguishing Pioneer is discounted, the issue 
concems the right of the public to a full and clear description of a development proposal. 
86 
87 
IPA, Sch 10. 
The Consultation draft for the proposed 2001 amendments to IPA takes the matter even further and 
in s 1.3.4 defines "use" as including a) any ancillary use; and b) carrying out any works necessarily 
associated with the use. The intent is to clarify the issues referred to above and, presumably, to limit 
the appUcation of "necessarily associated" to the carrying on of "works". 
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E. RECEIPT AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF APPLICATIONS 
It is at this point when a properly made application has been tendered and received that 
more substantive differences begin to emerge, reflecting the philosophical differences 
referred to earlier. 
On receipt of an application, EPAA Regulation cl 47(3) states that the following procedure 
is to be followed by the consent authority: 
Immediately after it receives a development application, the consent authority: 
(a) must register the application with a distinctive number, and 
(b) must endorse the application with its registered number and the date of its receipt, 
and 
(c) must give written notice to the applicant of its receipt of the application, of the 
registered number of the application and of the date on which the application was 
received. 
In essence, the EPAA procedure provides for the formal issuing of a receipt. This 
particular step is of importance under that Act since much of the information tendering, 
which in Queensland takes place in a separate stage, must in NSW be undertaken prior to 
the lodgment of the application ie as a condition precedent to the issue of the receipt. 
These matters are extensive and indeed in some instances, for example in respect of a 
88 See discussion of "A properly Made Application" above. 
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development which is covered by the Wilderness Act 1987, the application cannot even be 
lodged unless it is accompanied by a copy of tiie approval made under that Act. 
As an indication of the very involved considerations that must exercise the minds of 
applicants under EPAA, the following examination must be undertaken should for example 
the application concem a caravan park. 
Pursuant to regulation^^ any application made under s 78A(3) of the Act (which relates to 
anything requiring approval under s 63 of the Local Government Act 1993 ^ ) , must be 
accompanied by "such matters as would be required under section 81 of the Local 
Government Act, 1993..." 
In tum, s 81 of the Local Government Act 1993 states: 
An application must be accompanied by such matters as may be prescribed by the 
regulations and such matters specified by the council as may be necessary to provide 
sufficient mformation to enable the council to determine the application. 
Even at the end of this convoluted process the applicant, who has the onus of getting it 
right, is no closer to certainty since the local council has the final say as to what the 
requirements are in any particular instance. The entire process is redundantly circular and 
effectively grants the local authority power to delay a decision by requesting further 
*^  EPAA,Reg cl.50(2) and s.78A(7). 
'° EPAA Reg, cl.50(4). 
'^  Listed are 25 applications relating to both "works" and "use", such as "Operating a Caravan 
Park" and "Placing a Waste Storage Container in a Public Place". 
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particulars. Moreover, these requfrements are ui addition to those afready mentioned which 
relate to Sch 3, Designated Developments or Integrated Developments. 
In conttast, under IPA no formal receipt of the application is provided for beyond the 
signature of the "Receiving Officer" provided for in Form 1, a copy of which in the normal 
course of events will be provided to the applicant. 
Clearly, the application stage under IPA is simpler than the equivalent procedure in NSW. 
Though it is possible to imagine a layperson submitting an application in Queensland,^ ^ the 
same procedure under EPAA may frequently requfre the services of consultants. 
In this area the IPA legislation is, in principle, a clear advance on EPAA. Planning law, in 
line with the broad principles contained in NCP, should not be the venue for procedural 
complexity primarily because it impacts so directly and frequently on ordinary citizens. In 
terms of efficiency and equity, any process then which would allow a citizen to conceive of 
submitting thefr own application is to be preferred. The key factors that may allow this to 
happen in Queensland are undoubtedly the obligations imposed on the assessment manager 
under s 3.2.3(2). 
Assuming an application under an IPA compliant scheme, the assessment manager is 
required to give the applicant an acknowledgment notice within 10 business days of its 
QT 
receipt. The 10 day period thus created is known as the acknowledgment period. 
'^  Though other difficulties remain under IPA such as the meaning of "development works" and 
"material change of use" which may (hopefully only initially) add complexity to the process. 
* IPA, s 3.2.3(l)(a) Currently proposed amendments to IPA however foreshadow the extinguishment 
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Under subsequent subsections tiie assessment manager is required to supply the followmg 
information, inter alia; 
• to identify the nature of the development approvals which will be covered 
by the application 
• to advise the names of all the relevant referral agencies together with their 
addresses and whether the referral agency is a "concurrence" or "advice" 
agency as prescribed by regulation "^* 
• which aspects of the development require "code" assessment and to identify 
the applicable codes 
• which aspects require "impact" assessment and to advise the applicant on 
the public notification requirements 
• in the event the proposal requires to be referred to three or more advice 
agencies, whether referral coordination is requfred.^ ^ 
Unfortunately IPA contams no provisions which dfrect the local authority to comply with 
the requfrements of s 3.2.3(2). There is judicial authority now relating to the effect of an 
inaccuracy in the acknowledgment notice. In Powell v Bowen Shire Council the local 
authority had neglected to advise the applicant that referral coordination was requfred. 
Pack DCJ ruled that this non-compliance was of no practical effect and that the lack of 
of acknowledgement notices. See Consultation Draft, at p 36. These are to be replaced by "non-
acceptance notices". 
^ IPA, s 3.2.6(1) 
^ IPA, s 3.2.5(1) 
^ [2000] QPELR 45. See also, Jezreel v Brisbane City Council [2001] QPELR 92 at 93-94. 
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formal compliance with the form was not sufficient to form the opfruon tiiat there was a 
lack of jurisdiction. 
Despite the reservations expressed concerning the enforcement of compliance with 
s 3.2.3(2) the Queensland process is, currently, in advance of the NSW situation where an 
extensive information requfrement is loaded into the process as a pre-condition to the issue 
of a receipt. Under IPA, at least in theory, the assessment manager has an obligation placed 
upon it to correctly outline its broad idea as to how the application will proceed and which 
approval bodies will become involved in the process. The applicant, even at this early stage 
in Queensland should, by now, be able to develop a general conception of the dimensions 
of the task that has been undertaken. 
F. PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF APPLICATIONS 
Development applications become public documents from the time of their receipt in both 
Q7 QH 
jurisdictions and thereupon become available for inspection. In NSW this becomes the 
de facto commencement of the public notification period since the consent authority must 
"as soon as practicable after the development application is made"^^ place the application 
and any supporting information on public display. However imder IPA, a hiatus period 
exists between the date of lodgement of the application and the commencement of public 
notification. Between these two events the following must occur: 
'^  There are limited exceptions to the general principle in Queensland viz. sensitive information 
(IPA,s3.2.8(2)(a)and(b)). 
98 IPA, s 3.2.8(1); EPAA Regs, els 56. 
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1) an acknowledgment notice must be provided to the applicant within 10 business 
daysoflodgement,^°° 
and 
2) within a further 10 days after the giving of the acknowledgment notice, the 
assessment manager may ask the applicant for further information concerning the 
application. This is known formally as an "Information Request". ^ °^  
In total a period of 20 (but more likely 30) days^°^ will elapse between the date of original 
lodgement and the commencement of the public notification period. ^ °^  During this pre-
notification period the application will remain open to public inspection and irrespective of 
the applicant-assessment manager processes outlined above a quite supplementary 
information gathering procedure can be undertaken by the assessment manager or 
concurrence agency. 
Under s 3.2.7 either of these two authorities "may ask any person for advice or comment 
about the application at any stage" and this advice may be requested by publicly notifying 
the application.^ '^^  Unfortunately, consideration is now being given by at least one major 
99 
100 
Iftl 
m 
m 
EPAA, s 79(1). 
IPA, s 3.2.3(l)(a). Such a notice will not be given however if the application requires "code" 
assessment only. 
IPA, s 3.3.6(2). The period can be extended once by a fijrther 10 days by s 3.3.6(6). 
Note 101. 
The entire procedure outlined above will change after the commencement of the IPOLAA 2001 
amendments. The formal notification stage can commence as early as two days after the appUcation 
however, in respect of complex appUcations, it may be postponed till after the end of the 
information request. 
PA, s 3.2.7(3). 
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local government to using this provision to insist on a form of public enquiry into the 
development at the application stage. ^ °^  Although it can be understand why a local 
government would elect to proceed in this manner,^°^ recourse to this procedure has the 
potential to undermine the mtegrity of part of the IDAS framework. Carried to its logical 
extent, local governments may elect as a matter of course, to insist on public 
notification/enquiry as an immediate condition subsequent to the lodgmg of the application 
resulting in two public notification processes, one de facto and the other, under Pt 4, Div 2, 
a dejure one. IPA s 3.2.7 is, potentially, not mere surplusage and, should this problem 
emerge, it may need to be addressed by the legislature. This could be done by simply 
proscribing the use of a public enquiry procedure in subsection 3 and repealing subsection 
4. 
The intention of some local governments in Queensland is almost certainly to bring 
forward submissions to a period prior to the formulation of the information request and 
thereby to overcome a perceived deficiency in the Act. However one of the most onerous 
tasks faced by applicants is the necessity to respond, and sometimes at considerable cost, to 
requests for uiformation. That these requests could be continuous as they were imder the 
previous P & EAct is to be regretted.^°^ 
105 
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'M 
Conversations held between the writer and a legal oflHcer and planning officer in Brisbane City 
Council. 
A fimdamental problem with the scheme of the Act is that the Information stage occurs before the 
PubUc Notification stage and consequently the occasionally vaUd points raised in submissions may 
not be reflected in the once-only Information Request. 
Since the above was written the Brisbane City Council has indeed utiUsed this procedure to 
institute a public enquiry in respect of a proposed code assessable project in Chehner Avenue, 
Graceville. 
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G. CONCLUSIONS 
The scheme of the older NSW Act can be said to reflect the then prevailing assumptions 
concerning the relationship between regulatory bodies and those seeking to gain approvals 
from the regulatory system. These assumptions were that government intervention in 
furtherance of the always vaguely defined public interest or public rights was an 
unqualified public good and little attention was paid to the economic or social dysfunction 
which frequently flowed from such intervention. ^ °^  
There is however a growing understandmg, and the work of the NCC has certainly 
contributed to this, that too much regulation is deleterious to the operation of the free 
market and that significant social consequences such as unemployment and urban decay 
often result from a misguided assumption that centtal planning is able to take account of all 
possible variables. 
Implicit in this approach is a degree of adminisfrative legerdemain that would, as has been 
indicated above, place the onus on the applicant to determine accurately the scope of 
supporting information required to support the application. The operating principle is 
essentially that those who seek access to state approvals should bear the complete 
responsibility for complying with the statutory or regulatory pre-conditions of that 
approval. 
°^* Ratnapala, S "Administrative Regulation in AustraUa." ('1996) 8/1 Institute of Public Affairs 
Backgrounder.. Also generally, Heyek, F The Road to Serfdom. (London, Routledge, 1944) 
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The confrasting philosophy is exemplified by the Queensland Act which, currently, places 
this responsibility firmly on tiie shoulders of those regulatory bodies who are charged with 
the granting of approvals. 
The one common denominator which both systems share however is the internal 
administrative systems which frequently remam unchanged^°^ while the world, reflected in 
legislation or economic philosophy, changes aroimd them. Consequently, the real risk ui 
Queensland would appear to be that the local government administtations, faced with a 
completely different regulatory paradigm, will quite improperly "load" the application 
stage with requirements which are not supported by the specific terms of the Act or which 
are clearly confrary to the underlying spfrit of the legislation. ^ °^ Havuig said this, it is 
conceivable that a fradition of excess in respect of the information requested could lead, on 
occasion, to a beneficial community or developmental result by inadvertently raising an 
issue that had not previously been considered. The risk however is that, in adminisfrative 
terms, the system may end up using a sledge-hammer to crack a nut. In any event neither 
Act provides any system which would enable an applicant to consttain administtative 
discretion in this area. 
As indicated earlier, this has already begun to occur. Taken to an exfreme this would 
produce a situation in Queensland where the regulatory requfrements for a valid 
application could become little different to those under EPAA. 
°^' Pickles notes that the practice of "informally" requesting information right through and into the 
decision remains unchanged. See Note 5 at 82-83. 
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a THE APPLICATION STAGE: COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT USING 
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY CRITERIA 
1) Efficiency and Equity at the Macro Level. 
[Attribute Efficiency Issues 
• Do the application systems avoid 
duplication? 
Qld: IPA provides for a systematic roll-in 
of referral agencies and concurrence 
agencies. Duplication stUl exists with a 
totaOy separate application required to be 
made for certain uses eg licensed premises. 
IPA provides for only two classes of 
application; those requiring either Code or 
Impact Assessment. 
• How do the systems affect transaction 
costs? 
NSW. The Act seeks to achieve the same 
goal of integration but is hamstmng by too 
many application categories. 
Qld: IPA was meant to be a simpler system 
than the one it replaced however too many 
simple applications are subject to the full 
impact assessment process. In Qld, Local 
Government has a discretion in the setting 
of fees leading to wide-scale variations for 
the same application. 
NSW. The application system is in advance 
of the Qld system in exempting local 
developments from the full notification and 
appeal process. All fees are standardised 
across the State. Potentially major 
information requfrements on lodgement. 
m See Note 5, Ian Pickles at p 25. 
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Efficiency Issues 
Do the systems achieve their goal of 
creating a more flexible, responsive 
application process? 
Qld: The Qld. approach is conceptually 
simpler than the one in NSW. Essential 
problems remain however such as clear 
defimtion in all cases of impact 
assessability. 
NSW: The State process is suffering from 
its age. A through-going review of the 
development classes is required. The 
"Planfirst" program should result in a more 
efficient system than exist in Qld. 
Are all people treated equally by the 
application system? 
Qld: Yes, subject to variations in access 
which may be possessed by different 
applicants. 
NSW: Yes, with the same proviso as in Qld. 
Grants owner consent rights to a larger 
category. 
• Are the values and expectations of the 
public recognised and met? 
Qld: To an extent the Qld system may result 
in a more publicly understandable process 
over time. 
NSW: The system is complex and 
cumbersome resulting in a heavy emphasis 
on bureaucracy and less of a "can do" 
attitude than in Qld. "^ 
• Does the system provide for due process 
for aU affected by it? 
Qld: The Planning and Environment Court 
possesses a declaratory jurisdiction and this 
is accessible by all applicants 
NSW: The declaratory jurisdiction of the 
Land and Environment Court parallels the 
Qld situation. 
Is the system transparent? Qld: In a purely statutory sense, yes. Makes 
provision for non-disclosure of pruicipals. 
NSW: Similar to Qld. Insists on disclosure 
of principals in Form 1. 
Ml See Note 6 at p. 26. 
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Does the system provide for effective 
public accountability. 
Qld: Local Government remains under no 
obligation to comply with statutory- time 
frames. Currently, it is the Local 
government's responsibility to advise the 
applicant conceming referral agency 
involvements though there does not exist 
any statutory compliance mechanism to 
enforce this. 
NSW: No obligation to comply with time 
frames. No obligation to advise on matters 
such as referral agencies. 
2) Relevant Subordinate Characteristics 
• Customer Focus. Qld: Efficiency. Currently, the onus is 
placed on the receiving authority to 
subsequently advise the applicant of all 
relevant matters which the council wll 
consider in the decision making process. 
NSW: Efficiency No formal information 
onus placed on local government. 
Information can be requested at any time. 
Qld: Equity. See observations on broad 
equity issues immediately above. 
NSW: Equity. See immediately above. 
Simplicity' in operation and maintenance. Qld: Efficiency. An increased ability to deal 
with only one agency. Development 
dichotomy in place but some confusion 
exists as to meaning of fundamental terras 
such as "impact assessable". 
NS W:Efficiency. Lays claim to the same 
degree of integration. Complex in operation, 
multi layered approach. Too many 
development categories. 
Old:Equitv. Unremitting, and fundamental 
amendments occurring leading to 
uncertainty. 
NSW: Equity. Complexity of a process 
driven system detracts from its accessibility 
to broad categories of users. 
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FOUR 
INFORMATION AND REFERRAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From the perspective of an applicant the process by which supporting or clarifying 
information is requested and tendered is often perceived to be the heart of an IDAS 
system. ^ It is by this step that the total process can be advanced through public notification 
to, ultimately, a decision. 
Undoubtedly also, it is this step which has often created the greatest uncertainty, the largest 
amoimt of tmremitting aggravation to applicants and which, if improperly managed, has 
often produced an envfronment dominated by constantly burgeoning administtative 
discretion. Indeed the perception of an entire planning system as inefficient or intrinsically 
unfafr is, often, a direct function of the inequities fostered by a badly structured or badly 
managed information and referral system. 
As Fogg has suggested: 
The great mass of discontent lies not in that small portion of the disputed decisions 
that come before an appeal body, but in others which are buried below the surface 
of reported cases. The coimcil servant's exercise of discretion is frequently reversed 
Applicants are generally not personally involved in the formulation of planning schemes. 
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by his committee, and the committee is frequently overtiimed by the council. The 
2 
council's exercise of discretion can be reversed by the Mimster... 
That the consequences of bad management in this area can be quite draconian is in one 
sense remarkable because, m theory, the process need only address two issues and if they 
are addressed directly and in a coordinated fashion then problems and issues should not be 
as compotmded as they often are. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, clarity m this 
area has been difficult to find. Quite often, for example, the potential electoral 
consequences (or perceived consequences) which may flow from the appearance of 
political support for an unpopular proposal (though one which may be supportable on 
appropriate planning grounds) has led planning adminisfrators to second-guess the political 
fallout from their decisions. As a consequence they may often expand the scope of the 
information request to the point where the often rather simple nature of the development 
application is lost sight of in the internal scramble to generate protective walls against 
criticism by local politicians. The same approach, which is essentially to submit a "log-of-
claims" information request, is unfortunately also used by planning adminisfrators, and for 
the same reason, if they feel that a particular application may result in attention from an 
aggressive interest group or an objection from a large and historically litigious corporation. 
Altematively, where the involvement of a local politician ui the decision process is direct 
and unremitting his administtators may be dfrected to adopt this approach. In this situation, 
which is common, the applicant is forced to participate in a type of Javanese shadow 
Fogg, A.S Australian Town Planning Law: Uniformity and Change. (Brisbane, University of Qld 
Press, 1974), p 253. 
The two issues are, "relevant and reasonable" data and "associated or other approvals". 
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tiieafre where the master of the shadows, though ostensibly playmg no active role, is in 
reality creatmg issues and generatmg problems behind the scenes which contuiually 
change the data context within which the application is to be accessed. 
Referring to this most blatant form of political interference, Sfr John Boynton has noted: 
The growth of party politics in local government has mcreased the number of councillors 
who will decide issues on political grounds and irrespective of professional advice; some 
genuinely fail to understand the quasi-judicial aspects of development conttol work.'* 
In short, if the history of planning law in any jurisdiction demonsttates any consistent ttend 
it is that any broad statutory or regulatory power which gives adminisfrators the sole right 
to determine the nature and scope of the information which must be tendered with a 
development application may be used for purposes which are improper and inappropriate 
and which are ultimately deleterious to the efficiency of the total planning regime. 
The task which faces legislators m some jurisdictions therefore is to establish systematic 
statutory and regulatory consttamts which will effectively cfrcumscribe the exercise of 
adminisfrative discretion in this critical area. In a similar fashion the courts, cognisant of 
the problems outlined above, have developed over time a set of principles which operate to 
moderate the worst elements of adminisfrative excess. 
* Boynton, Sir John K "Plamiing Policy- its Formation and Implementation" Journal of Planning and 
Environment Law, Occasional Papers, (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1992) p 6. 
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It was previously suggested that there were only two issues which are involved m this 
portion of an IDAS process, ffrst, an essential requfrement of equity, that the uiformation 
requested should be relevant and should be reasonable having regard to the nature of the 
application. Second, that an efficient method should be established to deal with additional 
approvals which must be obtained to give effect to an application but which exist in 
procedural terms quite outside the formal structure of a land use approval system. 
These two core issues will be considered under the following headings: 
• the statutory and regulatory frameworks applicable to information requests 
• what is a "relevant and reasonable" request 
• the problem of additional approvals 
B. THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 
At the most absttact level the extent of the issues which can validly be the subject matter of 
an information request are established by the evaluation criteria in each Act. Under 
EPAA ^ this is given as follows: 
In determining a development application, a consent authority is to take mto consideration 
such of the following matters as are of relevance to the development; 
(a) the provisions of: 
(i) any envfronmental planning mstrument, and 
EPAA, s 79C(1). These eight heads of consideration replace the 31 specific factors which were 
required to be considered prior to the 1997 amendment Act. 
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(ii) any draft envfronmental plannmg mstrument that is or has been placed on 
public exhibition and details of which have been notified to the consent 
authority' 
and 
(iii) any development control plan, and 
(iv) the regulations (to the extent that they prescribe matters for the purpose of 
this paragraph), 
that apply to the land to which the development application relates, 
(b) the likely impacts of that development, including envfronmental impacts on botii 
the natural and built envfronments, and social and economic impacts m the 
locality, 
(c) the suitability of the site for development, 
(d) any submissions made in accordance with this Act of the regulations, 
(e) the public interest. 
Additionally, these statutory criteria exist in the equally rarefied context of the EPAA 
"Objects Clause"^ which describes the pinpose of the Act as encouraging inter alia; the 
promotion of the economic use of land , the protection of the environment and the 
encouragement of "ecological sustainable development"^ 
Although the moderating phrase in this broad spectrum of considerations is "relevant to the 
development" (the meaning of which will be considered subsequently), the sheer scope of 
* EPAA, s 5. 
' EPAA, s 5(a)(ii). 
* EPAA, s 5(a)(vi). 
' EPAA, s 5(a)(vii). 
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tiiese planning principles is sufficient to generate a capacity, if not an entiiusiastic 
willingness, on the part of administtators to seek additional mformation. 
The Queensland Act contains sunilarly broad reference statements'^ and if anything the 
matters to be taken into account in "advancing this Act's purpose"'' are even more 
mtangible tiian in NSW includuig as they do; to provide for equity between present and 
1 '7 1 ^ 
future generations , to promote ecological sustainability and ensuring the sustainable use 
of renewable resources and the prudent use of non-renewable ones.'"^ 
It would be difficult to find another area of law or adminisfration where the criteria or the 
ambit of assessment is expressed in such broad, and possibly undefinable, terms. 
It is, in fact, at this point that one of the centtal problems of present day planning law is 
confronted, which is the establishment by legislatures of such global, "holistic" terms of 
reference that virtually any matter can, from one perspective or another, be considered as a 
legitimate consideration. It is equivalent, perhaps, to obligmg an administtator in a social 
security department or a social security tribunal on appeal to consider each case in terms of 
the "peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth". 
» 
12 
13 
14 
IPA, s 3.5.5(1). 
IPA, s 1.2.3(1). 
IPA,sl.2.3(l)(a)(iv). 
IPA, s 1.2.1. 
IPA,sl.2.3(l)(b). 
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A penchant for such statements of course may not constitute a problem if they can be 
safely ignored in the day to day process of administtation. As Molesworth has pointed out, 
"Often these objective clauses contained nothing other than motherhood statements with 
which no one ever disagreed so everyone tended to ignore them."'^ If however, as is 
mcreasingly meant to be the case, they are to be used as a practical guide to decision 
making then statutory recognition of this fact in terms of specific implementation 
provisions, benchmark standards and other criteria will have to be developed over time if 
an afready significant degree of administtative discretion is not to be further compounded. 
Returning to the centtal point, one must ask why legislatures believe that such a huge range 
of quite disparate factors should form part of the legitimate administtative purview of this 
the lowest level of government. The answer appears to lie in the fact that all of them have 
their aetiology firmly rooted in 'values' or as Patrick McAuslan suggests, in 'ideology''^. 
Land use planning exists, in this view, at the conjunction of competing and essentially 
ideological conceptions of what the total process should encompass or set out to achieve. 
Lawyers, planners, politicians and laymen tend to sttess a different ideology and argue for 
changes or reforms m the law or new laws in terms of the ideology they espouse and the 
resultant cacophony first ttanslated into law and then continued hi its admuiisfration and 
mterpretation, leads to confusion and disarray.'' 
15 
16 
17 
Moleswoth, Sunon. 'The Integration of Enviromnental Imperatives into Decisionmaking.' (1996) 
National Environmental Law Assoc. 1996 Conference Paper, p 113. 
McAuslan, P The Ideologies of Planning Law. (Oxford, Pergamon, 1980) 
Note 16 at p 2. Quoted in Fogg, A. "Reform of Planning Law: Principles and 
Practice" (1989), Queensland Planning Law Conference p 1. 
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To McAuslan, there are three ideologies operatmg currently; tiie protection of private 
property rights, the public mterest and now, public participation. Undoubtedly the fact that 
land use decision making exists at such a conjunction of attitudes fosters a large degree of 
adminisfrative tunidity which is so often expressed m requests from assessors for more and 
more information on more and more different issues. 
The consequence of this, as indicated, is often that the integrity of the planning regune, 
which depends profoundly on a constructive balance being continually struck between 
competing ideologies, (or between private and so-called "public rights"), is placed under 
threat and calls begin to emerge for a wholesale review or replacement of the confrolling 
statute. 
If the scope of information requests need to be conttolled however the legislatiure's options 
are always going to be limited. They are, for example, most unlikely to remove broad 
statements of planning principle simply because most people can agree which them, they 
cannot reduce the level of public participation in the process because this is seen m the 
1 S 
early twenty-ffrst century as a demonsfrable public good , and they carmot specifically list 
or delimit the scope on such requests because the issues associated with applications will 
vary with geography, topography, local econonucs and a host of other potential variables. 
18 Though neither NSW or Queensland has seen fit to expand pubhc access to the level of the UK 
following the 1986 amendments to the Local Government(Access to Information) Act, 1985. For a 
short summary of these rights see; Heap, Sir Desmond.4n Outline of Planning Law, 9'^  ed.(London, 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1987) pp 187-188. 
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In response, some jurisdictions have set out to create a statutory and regulatory stiiicture 
which, in theory, should operate to place such time constraints on the those compiluig the 
information requests that, it is hoped, most of the problems will be obviated. In practical 
terms, the assessor faced with a hundred or so files each with short time frames within 
which an uiformation request is required to be drafted and submitted to the applicant, may 
not be able to devote the degree of meticulous examination which, it is argued, has often 
led to excess.'^ 
The IPA is the leading example of this 'structural' approach, creating a demanding (if not 
bewildering) series of overlapping time limits within which the IDAS stages must be 
conducted by the assessment manager. 
Before the structure of the information and referral processes established by the respective 
Acts are examined a brief comment should be made conceming the involvement of 
concurrence agencies in both jurisdictions. Because the Queensland government has 
sought to create a conceptually integrated assessment process it follows that the extent of 
participation by concurrence or referral agencies in any specific category of application 
should be described in detail. Whereas m NSW, the various State, regional or local 
planning instruments or the regulations designate which are the applicable concurrence 
19 
20 
21 
Whether the approach has been as cynical as this tends to suggest is, of covirse, open to debate. In 
any event if such a hope exists it is almost certainly naifve. Planning administrators have various 
administrative stratagems which can reduce the pressure on them. 
See Appendices 6, 7. Note however, as mentioned m the previous chapter, there is no statutory 
obligation placed on local authorities, in either system, to comply with these procedural 
requirements. 
Whether IPA actually has succeeded in creating an 'integrated' system will be 
discussed subsequently. 
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agencies given various classes of development^ ,^ tiie Queensland Act, through frs 
regulations, will over time, attempt to provide an exhaustive list of all applicable 
concurrence and advice agencies by application type with at least an honest intention of 
ensuring that all this information is available in one place. 
As indicated, this sfrategic attempt to incorporate the approval or advice functions of non-
land use agencies within the context of a development-consent procedure has not been as 
systematic in NSW (though the 1997 amendments certainly move the process further in the 
IPA direction)^ "* and the nature of the information and referral processes continues to be 
determined in NSW by the categories of application. These, together with their associated 
information processes, are now examined. 
The principal classes of applications under EPAA are as follows: 
26 s 78A(3) Applications 
These were mentioned in passing in Chapter 3. They are EPAA applications which 
also requfre approval under the Local Government Act 1993 and relate to: 
22 
23 
• » 
25 
EPAA, s 79B(1). 
Sch 2 of the IPA Regulations. With over 60 "Approval Processes" to be "roUed-in" this is 
a mammoth undertaking.(Only four, Fire and Rescue, Workplace Health and Safety, Environment 
and Heritage and Main Roads have been "integrated" in the first two years of the Act). 
See {1991) A Australian Environmental Law News p 13. 
The 'process' flow for both IPA and EPAA applications, including the iaformation referral process 
in botii instances, are outlined in Appendices 4-7. 
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i) structures or places of public entertainment 
ii) water supply, sewerage and storm water 
iii) waste management 
iv) public roads 
and, 
v) other activities (as disparate as; "installing a domestic oil heater", 
"mstallmg an amusement device" to "operatmg a mortuary".) 
All the information required under s 81 Local Government Act, together with that 
mandated by local EPIs or other local planning instruments must be attached to the 
application which is forwarded to the consent authority. In most mstances the 
consent authority will be the local council which is given the authority to apply any 
of the provisions of the Local Government Act^ ^ in deciding the matter. Since there 
is no necessary involvement by outside approval bodies these applications are 
essentially "local" in terms of the Act though applications in respect of 
"designated" matters will, in tum, requfre all the application mformation, together 
with the now required EIS, to be forwarded to the Dfrector. 
Applications for Designated Developments^^ 
26 
2? 
2$ 
29 
See Appendix 4, Application #2. 
EPAA, s 78A(4). 
EPAA Regs, cl 50(6). 
See Appendix 4, AppUcation #3. 
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30 
31 
32 
A development can be declared to be designated by eitiier an Envfronmental 
Plannfrig fristrument [EPI] or by the regulations^" and tiie significance of tiie 
designation lies in the fact that such an application must be accompanied by an 
•31 
Environmental Impact Statement [EIS]. 
Part 1 of the Thfrd Schedule of tiie Regulations which lists such developments at 
length is far too extensive to be given here but to indicate the type of application 
which will be caught under this heading the following are mdicative; 
aircraft facilities, mariculture, breweries, concrete works, plastics and rubber 
mdustry, drum reconditioning and poultry farms. The common denonunator is the 
perception that such mdustries may produce significant envfronmental 
consequences. 
As mdicated imder the previous heading, a copy of all the information tendered 
with the application, together with the EIS, must be forwarded to the Director or 
Mmister. Given the perception of risk associated with developments under the thfrd 
schedule such a procedure may well be warranted. Should the Minister form the 
opinion that the development may have a significant effect on regional 
envfronmental matters or, more generally, consider it expedient in the public 
mterest, he/she may dfrect tiie council to refer the whole matter to him/her for 
determination. In effect the matter becomes "state significanf. 
EPAA, s 77A. 
EPAA., s 78A(8)(a). The content of an EIS is given in els 71 & 72. See also s 112. 
EPAA, s 88A(1) 
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Applications for Integrated Developments^"* 
Proposed developments which are captured under this heading are those which 
require development consent and one or more additional approvals under the ten 
Acts specifically listed ranging from the Heritage Act, 1977 to the Water Act, 1912. 
They are the direct equivalent of development applications under IPA which 
requfre concurrence agency approval. 
The only restriction on concurrence agencies in requesting additional information 
within the periods mentioned in cl 60(1) is that the authority must consider the 
additional information to be "necessary to its proper consideration" of the 
application.^^ No such qualifying phrase is used in the Queensland Act^^ though it 
is doubtful, even given this absence, whether there remains any substantive 
difference between the two Acts in respect of the nature, scope or indeed volume of 
additional information which may be requested by concurrence agencies. 
• State Significant Developments. 38 
33 
3<t 
35 
36 
37 
38 
Exactly the same degree of precautionary power is given to the Minister under IPA, s 3.6.1(b) and 
for the same reason viz. the perception of 'state interest'. 
See Appendix 4, Application #4. 
EPAA, s 91(1). 
EPAA Reg, cl 60(1). 
IPA, s 3.3.6(2). 
All developments which are not 'state significant' are classified as 'local developments' by virtue of 
EPAA, s 76A(4). Local developments may be 'designated', 'integrated' or both. See Appendix 4, 
AppUcations 6 and 7. 
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Included under this heading are developments which are declared by State or 
regional envfronmental planning policies to be State Significant, tiiat are designated 
as such by the more ad hoc procedure of gazettmg, or which become such by vfrtue 
of the Minister 'call-in' powers under s 88A.^ ^ 
Developments Requiring Concurrence '^^ 
Similar, in principle, to the IPA category of developments requiring concurrence 
(concurrence is requfred before a consent authority can determine an application) they are 
to be found however not in a consolidated form in the regulations but, as is so often the 
case with EPAA, in the local, regional or State EPIs."*^  
By confrast, m Queensland, such segmentation at the application stage has been replaced 
by a single development application which may issue from the IDAS process in one of two 
forms; as a 'prelimmary approval' or as a 'development permit'"*^ and the nature of the 
information flow is determined, in principle, not by the class of application as in NSW but 
almost exclusively by the nature and extent of mvolvement by referral agencies. 
*' Also EPAA, s 76A(7). 
^ See Appendix 5. 
*^  EPAA Regulations. Definitions. 
*^  IPA, s 3.1.5(1). 
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Having said this however, the question does remain whether there is any mtrinsic 
difference between the two approaches. If, for example, the procedure which is relevant to 
a typical application under IPA (ie. one witiiout Referral or Advice agency mvolvement) 
is compared to a similar situation under EPAA"*^  it is apparent that the only significant 
difference between the two jurisdictions (after allowing for the mandatory tendering of 
mformation at lodgment under EPAA) lies in the duration of the relevant time periods and 
the greater specificity of the Queensland Act generally. In the latter case for example, 
under IPA an applicant is given a clear 12 months in which to respond to an Information 
Request"*^  in conttast to EPAA where the period is variable and at the discretion of the 
Consent Authority.'^ ^ The IPA statutory approach should be preferred to the creation of yet 
another area of adminisfrative discretion. 
Both Acts however fail however to provide any mechanism by which local authorities or 
consent and concurrence authorities can be made to comply with the time periods laid 
down in them. It is indeed extraordinary that while the performance of particular functions 
within set time periods has been uniformly viewed as cenfral to the efficacy of both 
legislative schemes, in no instance has the legislature seen fit to enforce compliance to 
these same time periods. There are, for instance, no specific provisions in either Act or in 
the respective regulations that provide for the situation where the local or other authority 
simply chooses to ignore the statutory periods. Both Acts provide for the applicant to tteat 
*^ See flow chart, Appendix 6. 
** See flow chart. Appendix 7. 
** IPA,s3.2.12(2)(b). 
* EPAA Regs, cl 54(2)(b) ie. a "reasonable period". See Australand P/L v Hornsby Shire Council 
(1998) 98 LGERA 312. 
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the failure of an authority to decide a matter within the "relevant period, prescribed by 
regulations"'*'^  or "by the end of the decision makfrig period""*^  as a "deemed refusal" 
sufficient to lodge an appeal but this "right of last-resort" does little to assuage the hard 
feelings engendered on the part of applicants by the wilfiil failure or refusal of consent 
authorities to comply with the terms of thefr own enabling statute, while insistmg on strict 
compliance by others. 
This failure of political will by both legislatures has the potential to seriously damage the 
integrity of both IDAS systems because the insistence on performance withm stipulated 
times is central to an efficient and fair IDAS process. The question which must be asked 
then is why, in both jurisdictions, this issue has not been addressed. The answer in both 
instances is that compliance with the strict requirements can be enforced but in order to 
achieve this, penalty provisions would need to be incorporated in both Acts and the 
respective legislatures are loath to do this. However, because there is increasing anecdotal 
evidence that authorities are ignoring the statutory time periods, urgent attention should be 
given to drafting such provisions. 
Compliance in this area could be effectively procured by requiring that a certain proportion 
of the application fees paid are to be refunded to applicants if time periods are exceeded. 
For example, 20% of the application fee could become available for refimding for each day 
that the authority is m breach and, should the total fee be exhausted by this process, 
thereafter a set monetary amount could be established by legislation. The same principle 
"' EPAA Regs, ell 13. 
** IPA, Sch 10, definitions. 
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could apply to concurrence agencies that were similarly in breach. With some application 
fees bemg in excess of $50,000 this would represent a very real mcentive to comply 49 
The manner in which additional, non-land use approvals are 'integrated' into the 
development consent process and the role of concurrence agencies will be returned to later 
in this chapter. At this point however, having set out the procedural ground rules through 
which the information flow is processed in both jurisdictions, attention is now given to the 
essential question which is the consttaint ostensibly placed on both sets of adminisfrators 
to only request information which is 'relevant and reasonable'. 
C. WHAT IS A RELEVANT AND REASONABLE INFORMATION REQUEST 
It should be made clear initially that neither statute expresses a qualification on the 
information gathering activity of the consent authority in these terms. 
Clause 60 of the EPAA Regulations, for example, expresses it in the following terms: 
A concurrence authority whose concurrence has been sought may request the 
consent authority to provide it with such additional mformation about the 
proposed development as it considers necessary to its proper consideration of 
the question as to whether concurrence should be granted or refused.^ " 
49 
50 
It is conceded that local authorities could respond to such penalty provisions by deciding such 
matters, in time, and in the negative. This, in tum, would place a premium on tiie speedy listing and 
hearing of appeals. 
This is broader than the previous cl 48(1 )A which required the information requested to be 
"essential". The consent authority's ability to request information is given in cl 54 in the same 
terms. 
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The IPA provision is similarly broad in scope:^^ 
The assessment manager and each concurrence agency may ask the applicant... to give 
further information needed to assess the application. 
That such a request should be relevant and reasonable is consequently a judicial test which 
has been applied by the courts over time. Conceptually it appears to represent a transfer of 
the 'relevant and reasonable' test for development conditions mto the information request 
area. 
However context is important and the courts have been clearly of the view that there 
remain differences in emphasis between development conditions and information requests 
which may allow for greater flexibility m the case of the latter. 
The leading case is Silverton Ltd. v Brisbane City Council . In this instance the developer 
subnutted a proposal for a multi level commercial office project to be constructed in the 
Brisbane CBD. As a commercial office, the proposed development was an 'as of right' use. 
The council submitted an mformation request which asked for an amended layout plan. 
To understand the applicant's response to this request the particular information request 
deserves to be outlined in full. 
Council requested a new layout which provided for: 
'^ s 3.3.6(2). 
" IPA, s 3.5.30(1), EPAA, s 80A(l)(a) , s 80A(4). 
^^  [1983] QPLR 184. 
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• The total gross floor area of the buildmg not to exceed 2.5 tunes the site 
area. 
• The height and number of storeys of the tower part of the development 
reduced to reflect this lower plot ratio. 
• Any part of the development above ground to be set back no less than 6 mettes 
from all property alignments. 
• The development to conform with the requirements of the Building Act with 
regard to light courts and cut-off planes. 
• The total car parking for the development not to exceed one space for each 100 
square mettes of nett lettable area. 
• The public piazza to be provided at grade without any steps or other major 
barriers along the majority of the frontage of the site with Queen Sfreet. 
• Vehicular access to be only from Macrossan Sfreet, directly opposite Diddams 
Lane. 
• Provision of 3.2 mette high clearance over service vehicle manoeuvring area. 
• Provision of pedestrian shelter at the base of the building to both Queen and 
Adelaide Sfreets. 
In fact council, concemed at the possible fraffic effects of the proposed development, had 
requested a complete revision of the developer's plans which would result in a proposed 
buildmg around half the size of that m the origfrial application. The work and expense of 
this, necessitating as it did a completely new architectural brief, would of course be 
considerable. The critical pomt however, which was expressed in the applicant's 
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submission, was that council had requested mformation in respect of a project which had 
not even been applied for. 
The point at issue here is really one of tactics. The council could have carried out its 
assessment on the plans and information supplied in the original application and then 
subsequently have sought to attach the substance of these matters as development 
conditions.^ '* Altematively, council could simply have rejected the proposal as originally 
lodged. In acting in the manner in which they did however, council appeared to be 
sttetching the idea of 'relevance' to the breaking point. 
Although establishing that the information requested must be capable of leading to 
reasonable and relevant conditions being imposed, the court felt it was difficult for an 
applicant to establish this on a constmction summons. Presumably, should this situation 
arise again, the applicant would need to either wait for the development conditions to be 
imposed and then appeal the matter to the Planning and Environment Court or to seek an 
interim declaration from the same court under IPA, s 4.1.21(1). 
The decision therefore was arrived at on somewhat narrow and technical grounds by a 
court outside the planning jurisdiction. Consequently, Silverton may not be authority for 
the more general proposition that consent authorities can essentially ignore the substance 
of an application and request information not on the project the applicant wishes to 
undertake but on the one council wishes they would undertake. 
^* Though this approach would ahnost certainly give rise to a question as to the 'relevance and 
reasonableness' of the development conditions. 
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Admittedly, there will always be 'grey' areas and information is and will contmue to be 
requested by consent authorities which sometimes request major modifications to the 
proposed development.^^ However, these instances generally arise at the margins eg an 
mcrease in the number of car parks, a reduction in the size of typical floors or podium 
levels, or the establishment of a 'vegetation protection line' and they do not relate to the 
totality of the project. ^ ^ There seems little doubt that the behaviour of council m this 
instance can be criticised and that the proper, fair and honest approach would have been to 
simply reject the proposal. The use of an information request by council in order to pursue 
thefr own development agenda is simply not contemplated by statute. 
Silverton is the only direct authority in either jurisdiction on this point which is, m one 
sense, surprising since the issue is cenfral to the integrity of this important aspect of the 
IDAS process. 
There are a number of reasons for this lack of authority. First, the information request 
procedure occurs relatively early in the IDAS process. Applicants are generally reluctant to 
risk antagonising assessment managers by vigorously objecting at this stage. In the main it 
is later in the process after constant inquisition and frequent changes of emphasis that 
exasperation forces some applicants to take a stand.^^ Second, despite the formal procedure 
m 
56 
57 
For a South Australian example see, Eagle Rise Christian Centre Inc v CC Salisbury [2000] 
SAERDC 45. 
For a case which indicates the court's openness to the practical process of negotiation which often 
forms the background to information requests see the judgment of Skoien SJDC in Anthony v 
Brisbane City Council [1996] QPLR 171. 
See, Pickles, Ian. "IDAS: Queensland & NSW Comparisons" (2001) 41/3 Qld Planner, p 23 for 
a practioner's background to these issues. 
151 
outlined m the two Acts, frequent mformal contact does occur between assessment 
managers and applicants and in the course of these meetings or telephone conversations 
CO 
issues of relevance and reasonableness often arise and are settled. 
Ultimately, of course, questions of relevance and reasonableness are for the courts to 
decide having regard to all the cfrcumstances of a particular case. As a general statement 
however the principle outlined in Silverton viz. that a reasonable and relevant information 
request is one which may lead to reasonable and relevant conditions being imposed is 
appropriate to both jurisdictions and worthy of retention. 
D. THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL APPROVALS 
In an important sense the question of multi-layeds approvals which can emanate from a 
variety of sources outside the development consent process per se but which are 
nevertheless condition precedent^ ^ for a development to proceed is one of the cenfral issues 
in modem land use planning. 
Because the ambit of present regulatory systems has expanded to include the protection of 
a large, growing and increasingly disparate collection of community and social values, it is 
inevitable that many areas of specialised or technical oversight will exist outside the 
established land use system. The incorporation of all relevant approval processes into one 
*^ Indeed it is often the informal practices which underlie the statutory processes that enable the IDAS 
system to operate with anything approaching success. Research into the dynamics of these informal 
processes is almost entirely lacking. 
^^  Or indeed conditions subsequent. 
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'seamless' process which, at its heart, is a development consent process (rather than an 
enviromnental, heritage, or licensing process) is the essence of the task undertaken in 
Queensland by IPA and in NSW to a more limited extent as a result of the Environmental 
Planning and Assessment Amendment Act, 1997.^° 
The extent of this task m Queensland can readily be gauged by the following list of 
approval processes contained within other statutes which must, in due course, be integrated 
mto the IPA system. 
Beach Protection Act 
Canals Act 
Child Care Act 
Coastal Protection and Management Act 
Deer Farming Act 
Fisheries Act 
Forestry Act 
Harbours Act 
Land Act 
Liquor Act 
Marine Parks Act 
Meat Industry Act 
Nature Conservation Act 
Pastoral Workers Accommodation Act 
Pettoleum Act 
Queensland Heritage Act 
Soil Conservation Act. 
Stock Act 
Transport Infrastmcture Act 
Transport operations Act 
Water Resources Act 
Water Resources Act 
$0 Inter alia, the 1997 Act amends the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) and integrates building 
approvals and subdivision controls into the development assessment process. There is thus an order 
of magnitude between the goals of IPA and EPAA. 
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The attempt to 'mtegrate' all approval and concurrence processes uito one development 
confrol system which is commenced by a development application has been forced upon 
legislatures by an alleged crisis of confidence in the precursor systems. 
The fact however, that the development approval process takes place within a larger 
adminisfrative context which may be characterised by the frequent necessity to obtain 
numbers of serial^ ^ approvals and concessions from other reference branches of 
government has long been recognised by the courts.^ ^ 
This process, which IPA has been designed to replace, is clearly inefficient and expensive, 
reflecting a historical process by which statutory authorities were piled on other statutory 
authorities with little thought being given to the transaction costs imposed on applicants or 
to the fact that these costs were inevitably passed on to the community. 
The extent to which this perennial problem of serial approvals has unpacted on the 
development control processes in both jurisdictions can best be illusttated by considering 
the example of a development application under both IPA and EPAA. 
The followmg hypothetical development application contams the following elements: 
61 
«2 
m 
Perhaps principally by the development community who naturally maintain an intense interest in a 
cost effective approval process. Such crises of confidence occur on a regular basis in the 
plannmg jurisdiction. 
Serial in the sense that it is a pre-condition of approval from one agency that prior approval had 
been obtained from another agency and so on. 
See Walker v Noosa Shire Council (1983) 2 QdR 86, where the ad hoc nature of the process was 
accepted as an unfortunate inevitability. See also, the judgment of Thomas J in. Makucha v Albert 
Shire Council [1994] QPLR 84 at 88. 
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64 
65 
66 
• A proposal to build 500 M2 of retail space on a site which prior to IPA had 
been Zoned as Residential A. The site is situated on a main road and ingress 
and egress is requfred from this road. 
• It is proposed to mclude within the shoppmg centte a tavern of 180ni2 
• The eastem edge of the site borders a gully area which, though substantially 
overgrown with exotic plants is considered to function as a 'wildlife corridor'. 
• The site is otherwise situated in an established area and in fact it adjoins 
residential dwellings. 
1. The process under IPA.^ '* 
• The applicant will submit a Form 1, 'IDAS Development Application' 
together with a Form 2, 'Application for a Material Change of Use'. 
• The Acknowledgment Notice will advise the applicant that 
^ development approval is requfred for items (i), (ii), (iii) and (v) in 
s.3.2.3(2)(a).^^ 
•^ that the referral agency for the application is the Queensland Ffre 
and Rescue Authority. ^^  
Assumes an 'IPA Compliant Scheme" is in operation. 
Building work, plimibing and drainage, operational works and making a material change of use 
respectively. 
Despite the 'wildlife corridor' issue, the proposed development is not an 'environmentally relevant 
activity' as Usted in Sch 1, Col 1 of the Environmental Protection Regulations 1998. See 
IPA, Sch 8, Pt 1, Item 6. This issue will fall to be considered under local EPPs and the general 
power conferred by EPA, s 3.3.6(2). 
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•^ that parts of the development requfre code assessment and the names 
of the applicable and relevant codes. 
^ that the proposal requfres impact assessment and that there are 
certain public notification requfrements which must be complied 
with. 
There are two material points at this early stage: first, the issue of the liquor licence cannot 
be addressed by the assessment manager because, to date, the Liquor Act 1992 has not 
been 'roUed-into' the IPA framework and secondly, IPA did not, until recently, provide an 
'integrated' framework within which the assessment manager can deal with the issue of 
access to a main road from the proposed development. 
However these two issues will critically determine whether the development can proceed. 
Experience suggests the access issue will tend to be addressed in the Information Request. 
Specifically, the assessment manager will ask for written confirmation from the Transport 
Department that the ingress and egress design is acceptable to that department. IPA does 
make provision for this critical consent to be obtained prior to lodgment of the application 
with the local authority however if this practice has not been adopted the applicant will 
need at this point to make a separate application to the Transport Department. 
*^  All roads in Queensland are designated as either 'local' or 'state controlled' by s 23(1) of the 
Transport Infrastructure Act, 1994. The N.S.W. equivalent is s 7 of the iJoacfe^c?, 1993. 
^ IPA, s 3.3.2(1). 
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The IDAS timetable stops at this point and, dependmg upon the speed with which this 
69 
application is processed it can re-start in anjihing up to twelve months. 
Assuming however that approval is obtained for site access the second issue viz. the 
question of liquor licence approval still remains to be addressed. Here there are two 
problems; first, whether there are pre-conditions which must be satisfied for a liquor 
licence application to be made and secondly and perhaps the more profound question, 
whether a process which is essentially concemed with licensing individuals can ever be 
mtegrated mto a development consent paradigm under which approvals and consents relate 
to land. 
In the first case, the experience of practitioners is that the Queensland Licensing 
Commission is reluctant to accept an application for a licence in respect of a project which 
has not yet received the en globo approval of the local authority. Altematively, if the 
application is accepted it is unlikely to be processed until local authority approval of the 
development is obtained. 
Having ttaversed the IDAS route tmder IPA which will involve detailed responses to the 
information request , the 30 day public notification of the application, the submission 
^ IPA, s 3.2.12(2)(b). 
™ and, strictly, provided it compUes with the requirements of the Act and regulations it must be 
accepted. 
'^  The information requested is, given the nature of the proposed project, likely to include the 
following: a Fauna Report, a Flora Report, an Acoustic Report, a Lighting Report, a Traffic Report 
in addition to other reports eg. drainage. 
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process, the decision stage and perhaps an appeal to the Plamung and Envfronment Court 
the applicant is only now in a position to have his appUcation for a liquor licence formally 
considered. 
This procedure will require the following steps :^ ^ 
• Submission of the application in the approved form 
• Advertising the application once in the Gazette and twice in local newspapers 
• Display a copy of the notice in the approved form on the premises for at least 
28 days '^^  
• Await the outcome of any objections received 
• If the matter is locally contentious, attend a compulsory conference of 
'concemed citizens' 
• Await the decision of the Chief Executive 
• If the decision is in the negative, within 28 days file an appeal m the Tribunal 
Throughout this process an informal system operates which may necessitate the applicant 
providmg a range of additional information to the authority on request. The authority 
however is not cfrcumscribed by any significant statutory time consttaints in making a 
72 
13 
14 
15 
The writer is aware of instances where this process under the previous Planning and Environment 
Act has taken two years. 
Generally, Liquor Act, 1992 s 118. 
The Chief Executive has discretion under s 118(5) to waive publication and display if it has aheady 
taken place for another purpose (ie. a development consent appUcation). This waiver however is 
seldom granted if, as is most often the case, the issue gives rise to even marginal local or sectional 
concem. 
Liquor Act, 1992 s 121(1). 
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decision.^^ Indeed tiiis process alone can resufr in a further 6 months delay after 
development consent has been exttacted from the development consent process proper. 
The in-built redundancy of such a system is clearly illusfrated by the fact that the licensing 
procedure will canvas the same issues of community amenity and will respond in 
essentially the same manner to issues arising from the submission/objection process as the 
preceding consent application. 
The intention of IPA is to put an end to this duplication by 'integrating' all approval 
processes which in due course will mean that the Liquor act will need to be roUed-into the 
IPA framework. This, in tum, gives rise to the second of the issues under this heading viz. 
the tension which appears to exist between an licensing process which, in part, is driven by 
the characteristics of the particular applicant and a land use approval process in which 
nature of the applicant is not a relevant consideration at all. 
It should be clear from this that, in principle, there may not need to be any conflict between 
the two processes provided they are kept separate as is currently the case. It is only when 
an attempt is made to combine the two ie. to convert a personal licence into a condition 
which attaches to land-use and which binds successors in title that thefr conceptual 
disharmony becomes clearly apparent. 
The emphasis on the personal nature of the licence is certauily illusfrated by the Liquor 
Act, s 107(1) dealing with restrictions on the grant of a licence: 
'* Apart from a very notional 'deemed refusal' period. See, Liquor Act, s 31(3) 
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The chief executive may grant an application for a licence or permit only if the chief 
executive is satisfied that the applicant is a fit and proper person to hold the Ucence or 
permit applied for having regard to— 
(a) whether the appUcant demonsttates knowledge and imderstanding of the obligations of 
a licensee or permittee of the relevant kind under this Act; and 
(b) whether the applicant is a person of good repute who does not have a history of 
behaviour that would render the applicant unsuitable to hold the licence or permit 
applied for; and 
(c) whether the appUcant demonsttates a responsible attitude to the management and 
discharge of the applicant's financial obligations. 
The important question at this point is whether the continued existence of 'personal 
licences' of the kind described above or, for example, those issued under Ch 3, Pt 4 of the 
Environmental Protection Act, 1994, can ever sit comfortably in a development and 
planning system of 'once only' approvals. 
Though some debate and indeed concem has been expressed regarding this issue,^^ the IPA 
system does not, at least in principle, render the oversight fimctions of bodies such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency redundant nor remove from the ambit of those 
authorities the right to insist on subsequent modification or improvement in envfronmental 
management practices. 
'^  See, Homel, B "Just a Process Change? The Impact of IDAS on Environmental Protection in 
Queensland" (1999) 16 EPLJ, p 75 and.Bowie, L "Teetiiing 
problems with the integration of the environmental Ucensing system into the development 
assessment process m Queensland" (1998)^ £ZiV; p 29. 
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In this sense the Mmister's assertion m his second readuig speech that standards and 
approvals will remain unchanged is quite correct.'* Implicit m IPA is the fact that the 
jurispmdential system which will now review decisions of concurrence authorities has now 
become the Planning and Environment Court because ultimately, the conditions unposed 
by them are now assessable against the requirement that such conditions must be 'relevant 
70 
to, but not an unreasonable imposition on the development' To object to this outcome is, 
IPA's proponents argue, to object to the intellectual proposition which underlies IPA. It is 
precisely the intent of the Act that bodies charged with the authority to grant essential 
operating approvals should have their activity potentially reviewed by the jurispmdence of 
the planning system. This is close to the heart of the IPA reforms. 
Similarly it is highly unlikely that the Planning and Envfronment Court would seek to 
intervene m a process by which a referral authority may or may not grant a necessary 
licence to an individual. At a practical level it would not be an easy task to draft pleadings 
and to subsequently argue in a planning court that the refusal by such an authority, taken 
after due process and in accordance with its enabling statute, was frrelevant or was an 
unreasonable imposition on the proposed development. 
However, notwithstanding that the issue of a licence may be able to be accommodated 
within the jurispmdential framework of the planning system an additional and potentially 
serious incompatibility remains in respect of the perceived need to make provision for a 
'* The Hon. D.E. McCauley, Minister for Local Government and Planning, Integrated Planning Bill, 
second reading speech, Hansard, 30 October 1997, p 4089. 
'^  IPA, 3.5.30. 
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regular and ex post facto review of licensmg standards which, m reality, can only be 
secured by an appropriate condition being imposed on the development at the approval 
stage. 
This concem reflects the long-standuig rule of planning law which msists on finality in the 
conditions which are to attach to a development approval. The prfriciple, which is 
referred to in both NSW and Queensland planning jurisdictions as 'The Finality Principle' 
has a sttong, though hardly ever articulated, basis in a fimdamental economic reality which 
underpins much of planning law. 
Developers, investors and financiers are called upon to make sometimes very large 
decisions on the basis of known facts and their preference for certainty is no less 
understandable than a court's preference in a commercial litigation for written evidence 
over oral. A large portion of the cost of any proposed project may often lie in necessary 
compliance with development conditions but provided the cost of these conditions can be 
quantified ie. they are capable of being objectively measured before development funding 
is committed, the risks associated with the development can be adequately assessed.*^ 
If however a development condition were to allow for subsequent review of the status of a 
project against categories of building, envfronmental or amenity standards which are not 
yet in existence then investment certainty is difficult to achieve. The effect of a move away 
*" This issue could also be considered under the heading "The Decision Process". It seems appropriate 
however to discuss it at this point. 
*' Which is why the decision of the Qld. Court of Appeal in Mt.Marrow Blue Metal 
Quarries P/L v Moreton Shire Council (1996) lQd.R 347 is essentially correct. 
162 
from the fmality principle could be to create a serious consfrauit on the calculation of 
investment risk with a correspondmg decline in investment activity, 82 
The courts, to date in both jurisdictions, have shown no mdication that they are willmg to 
contemplate such a change. 
In the leading decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal, McBain v Clifton Shire 
Councif^ the Court was called upon to consider a development condition unposed on a 
piggery development which purported to permit an increase in the size of the project in 
stages from 20,000 to 80,000 pigs with such expansion being dependant on a prospective 
assessment of the project's envfronmental impact at each fiiture stage. 
The court had no difficulty in mling the condition invalid: 
In our opmion, the postponement of such decisions from the issue of the conditional 
approval until unspecified future dates clearly offends the finality principle. 
The Court cited a long list of past authorities*"* for this proposition uicludmg the NSW 
decisions, Mison v Randwick Municipal Councif^ and Scott v Woollongong City Council}^ 
82 
83 
S* 
8S 
Nevertheless, the IPOLAA 2001 amendments entrench the move away from finality. Regulations to 
be made in respect of the compUance stage in IPOLAA 2001 are intended to allow for refrospective 
monitoring. 
[1996] QPELR 170. 
At p 374 of the judgment. 
(1991) 23 NSWLR 734. 
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The matter rose agam for consideration, and again m the Queensland Court of Appeal, m 
Mt Marrow Blue Metal Quarries P/L v Moreton Shire Council^'' The issue concemed a 
proposed residential subdivision adjoming an existmg quarry operation and the relevant 
condition which was sought to be attached to the approval was as follows: 
[That a]... buildmg restriction line be amended... where necessary to ensure that 
residential building sites are not subject to noise levels due to the operation of the quarry in 
excess of 40dBA under 2.8 m/s (max) downward (sic) conditions. 
The distinction between this condition and the condition which was imposed m McBain is 
the presence of criteria by which performance can subsequently be measured, the acoustic 
standard and the conditions under which it is to measured being clearly stated. This, 
according to the court, took the issue beyond a strict application of the finality principle as 
exemplified by McBain. Provided therefore the performance standard is certain the issue 
becomes one which is not subject to unconsttained admmisttative discretion but rather to 
an objective analysis. In reaching this decision the court accepted the reasoning of Dixon J. 
m King Gee Clothing Co P/L v Commonwealth.^^ As to the broader principle applicable to 
the interpretation of subordinate legislation Dixon had felt that though there was no general 
OQ 
proposition of law that subordinate or delegated legislation is invalid if uncertain ifi 
86 
87 
88 
89 
(1992) 75 LGRA 112. 
(1996) lQd.R 347. 
(1945) 71 CLR 184. 
Dixon's conclusion does not however sit completely comfortably with Craies conclusion that local 
authority planning by-laws must, to be valid, evidence five characteristics one of which is 
'certainty'. See Craies, William F. Craies on Statute Law, 7* ed.,( London, Sweet and Maxwell, 
1971) pp 325-326. 
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[I]t deserts clear objective standards capable of producing a resuh about which every man 
must agree if he knows the facts and figures and has made his calculations correctly, [ the 
regulation, condition or decision of the approval authority will be uivalid.] 
In this regard the law in both NSW and Queensland is the similar and in both jurisdictions 
the basis for such a judicial approach, for the finality principle itself, is capable of being 
established around the statutory prohibition against unreasonable or irrelevant impositions 
on the development. Additional support for the general principle of finality, though never 
canvassed m detail to date by the courts, could presumably also come from the 
administtative law proposition that unreasonable and uncertain terms may render a matter 
ultta vfres or perhaps, at admittedly a rather esoteric level, that the "width and extenf of 
such a delegation represented an abrogation of the legislative fimction.^^ 
Some space has been devoted to this discussion to illusttate the jurispmdential complexity 
which attends any attempt to enttench development conditions which contain within them 
the right of regulatory or concurrence authorities to determine the rights of proprietors by 
reference to standards or principles which are to be put in place after the project has been 
completed. The contention bemg that the establishment of certam development conditions 
is a condition precedent to investment and equally that it is verging on unreality to suggest 
that an envfronmentally problematical project should not be able to be assessed on a 
regular basis against environmental criteria which may emerge in future years.^^ In the 
'" It is admitted that this argument would be more difficuh to sustain under a State constitution without 
an expUcit, constitutional separation of powers. 
W.H.O. standards, for example, for exposure to certain toxins and insecticides has been reduced 
progressively over the last twenty years as knowledge of their effects has increased. For an 
examination of the contrast between "command and control" environmental permits and 
"continuous assessment" licences see, Wylynko, B "Beyond command and control: environmental 
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latter case, of course, it would be unpossible to express such an assessment regime m 
objective terms sufficient to satisfy the Mt Marrow test. 
The task facing IPA consequently is difficult in the extteme. Either the IPA statute will 
need to be amended to allow for the abridgment of the finality principle m certam mstances 
(ie. envfronmental) with unknown effects on developers and financiers or the present 
system of personal licences will need to be continued and any attempt to 'integrate' the 
two processes abandoned. 
fri NSW this issue does not arise because no formal attempt has been made yet to bring 
issues such as this under the single authority of a planning law jurisdiction. 
Returning to our original example the EPAA approach can be conttasted as follows: 
2* The process under EPAA 
The first task to be undertaken by the applicant is to assess which of five classes of 
development the proposed project will fall into as these classes will determine the nature of 
the information which must be tendered with the application. Form 1. These classes have 
been discussed elsewhere. 
licencing strategies." (1999)16 EPUp 277. One solution may be to estabhsh an 
environment/remediation trust fund which all developers could contribute to. Remediation, using 
funds from this source, could be oversighted by the developer and a private, certified assessor. 
sa See Appendix 4, 5. 
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On examination fr seems reasonably clear that tiie small shoppmg centte falls, m principle, 
within the statutory definition of a designated development because such a development is 
defined as one which requfres development consent "and one or more additional 
approvals"^'^ and the section goes on to specifically include additional approvals under the 
Roads Act 1993.^ *^ However, EPAA, s 91(1) is not conclusive of the issue because certain 
developments which would otherwise fall within the definition are excluded. A 
development, for example, which requires approval under s 138 of the Roads Act is not an 
integrated development if it requires development consent from a council and approval 
under the Roads Act from the same council. Applicants (or council officers to whom the 
query is addressed) must therefor determine whether or not the development falls into this 
category. 
Whether the council is the appropriate roads authority in each instance can be determined 
by examining s 7 of the Roads Act which lists the appropriate authorities for certain roads. 
If, for example, the development involves a freeway, the Road Transport Authority will be 
responsible. If it involves a crown road however the Minister is the appropriate authority. 
To add to the potential for confusion, imder the Roads Act, s 7(3) the Minister is given 
power, by regulation, to declare a specified public authority as the roads authority for a 
particular road or for all public roads within a given geographical area.^ ^ In general terms 
however the local authority is the roads authority for most of the roads in its locality, 
though, in the example being considered, the RTA will be the appropriate approval 
^ EPAA, s 91(1). 
'* Roads Act, 1993, s 138. 
'^  Clause 79(b) of the Roads (General) Regulations, 1994 itemises the roads for which the 
Road Transport Authority is responsible. These roads are detailed on RTA Plan No. 6005 386 SS 
0357 which is held at the Sydney Operations Directorate of the RTA at Blacktown. 
167 
autiiority. In this mstance all plans which detail tiie impact of tiie development of the main 
road together with mgress and egress mformation are requfred to be forwarded dfrectly to 
tiie RTA. 
The secorid issue which arises is the question of the wildlife corridor. There are three 
categories of strategic environmental plan in NSW, known collectively as Envfromnental 
Planning Instruments (E.P.Is) which operate at local, regional and state levels. Sinularly, 
though in a less direct environmental sense, this tri-partite division of responsibility is now, 
theoretically, a part of the IPA framework as a consequence of the provision in the Act for 
Regional Planning Advisory Committees^^ which are charged with the task of gathering 
information on a regional basis and making reports to the Minister. Presumably, 
recommendations contained within such reports may, in tune, become incorporated in local 
or state environmental planning policies. Regional environmental planning instruments in 
the NSW sense do not exist in Qld. However though IPA makes no formal provision for 
them as regional envfronmental instruments, regional policy making does occur in the form 
of broad sttategic plans such as FNQ - 2010. 
96 
97 
IPA, s 2.5.2(1). 
IPA, s 2.5.6. 
For State Planning Policies see IPA, s 2.4.2. For Local Plans see IPA, s 2.1.16(1). It seems 
strange that having set 'ecological sustainablity' as the centre point of the statutory purpose of the 
statute in s 1.2.1 should elect not to incorporate formal environmental planning at the regional level 
if only to demonstrate a certain consistency of approach. Its absence in Queensland is even more 
striking in that the central feature of emerging new administrative arrangements between the 
Commonwealth and the States (See Commonwealth of Australia, National Strategy for Ecologically 
Sustainable Development, Dec. 1992) is the proposed enhanced role for strategic regional planning. 
See also: Gardner, Alex "The administrative framework of land and water management in 
Australia", (1999) \6EPU p 1. 
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With the exception of Designated Developments where the interplay of State and regional 
EPIs is relatively clear, there are no specific guidelines which, in effect, determine the 
application of a particular EPI to a particular development proposal. Though an application 
for a local development^ ^ will necessitate an examination of the Local Envfronmental 
Plan^°° it is also conceivable that regional or even State environmental policies could come 
into play. 
In reality therefore, initial discussions must take place between the applicant and the local 
consent authority in order to 'shortlist' the envfronmental policies agamst which the 
proposal will be considered. ^ °^  The outcome of these discussions will determine the nature 
of the information required to be tendered with the application and given the more or less 
standard content of local environmental policies ui both states, reports on fauna and flora 
will be required as a matter of course. 
Even though a large part of the information supporting a development proposal under 
EPAA is tendered initially, the 'consent authority' in the case of local developments and 
the 'approval body' in the case of integrated developments still, as in Qld, retains the right 
to request additional information. In the case of a local development application, the local 
authority may request this information at any time. The third issue which the applicant 
99 
IM 
IM 
102 
103 
EPAA, s 76(A)(4). 
EPAA, s 70. See also, Regional Plans, s 51 and State Environmental Planning Policies, s 39. 
The PlanFirst programme currently underway in NSW should obviate this problem. 
This requirement is confirmed by EPAA, s 78A(8), and by IPA, Sch 8 s 6 in environmentally 
sensitive areas. 
EPAA reg, cl 54. See also cl 60 in cases involving concurrence agencies. 
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needs to address m NSW is the question of Liquor Act consent for the incorporation of a 
small tavem within the proposed centte. As m Qld at the present tune, the requirements of 
the Liquor Act, 1982 (NSW) play no part m the unfolding IDAS process under EPAA 
which is to say that, as an administtative and quasi-judicial process, it stands alone and is 
not bounded by the jurispmdence of planning law.^ "^^  Consequently, the applicant in this 
instance will need to apply for approval under the Liquor Act subsequent to the grantmg of 
local authority approval under EPAA. Generally this application will take place subsequent 
to the granting of an en globo planning consent under EPAA since s 44 of the Liquor Act 
specifically allows for objections to be taken from the relevant local authority to an 
application for a licence and no applicant would wish to preempt the perhaps more 
unportant planning application by precipitating a response from the local authority before 
the application and supporting information had been submitted. ^ *^^ 
Having said this, the comments above conceming the essential redundancy of the process 
in Queensland^^^ apply equally to NSW where the entfre notification, objection and appeal 
process must commence again though fraversing, with the exception of those issues which 
concem the personal integrity of the applicant, the same issues and the same substantive or 
indeed non-substantive points which have already been assessed, considered, rgected or 
adjudicated in the planning jurisdiction. That two public bodies could potentially decide 
104 
m 
toe 
m 
As in Qld, the NSW Act grants a personal licence (see. Liquor Act, 1982, s 42C) rather than a land 
use consent. 
The same tactical consideration, of course, appUes in Qld. 
See p 87 above. 
See Liquor Act, 1982, ss 44,2A, 104, 17A for representative provisions. 
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the same issue m diametrically opposed maimers has an obvious potential to undermfrie 
public confidence in an adminisfrative system and is to be regretted. 
3. Summary 
As can be seen from the example considered above, the present situation m Queensland 
with respect to uiformation requests can be said to roughly parallel that in NSW and this 
observation will continue to be able to be made until such time as all the multifarious 
approval processes of a modem, interventionist government apparatus are 'rolled' into the 
uitegrated system contemplated by 1PA.^ °* Currently the nature and the volume of 
information is similar as are the time periods required to be met under the acts and the 
interrelation of approval or concurrence bodies outside the immediate consent authority 
with both the applicant and the local authority proceeds, broadly, on a similar statutory 
basis. 
For these reasons it is difficult, if not unfafr, to rate issues such as relative equity and 
efficiency at this stage. Nevertheless two additional pomts which are relevant to both 
jurisdictions should be made. These relate to (i) the nature of the mformal processes which 
underlie the statutory ones and (ii) to the growth of regional planning policy instruments. 
• Any planning statute, and EPAA and IPA are no exceptions, can only attempt 
to establish the broad parameters which will seek to determine the nature of the 
relationship between an applicant and a consent authority over time. In reality however no 
108 See p 82, above, for a list of the planned 'roll-ins'. 
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set of provisions will ever possess sufficient flexibility to enable either party to confidentiy 
predict events other than in very general terms. If a week is a long tune in politics than the 
same observation applies with equal force in planning jurisdictions. 
In reality, the formal information request procedure is underpinned by constant recourse to 
an mformal network particularly by applicants or thefr consultants. Contact at this level 
will take the form of telephone conversations, informal meetings, faxes and e-mails which 
assist both parties to narrow down the essential points of agreement and difference. 
Nothing, of course, is contained in either Act which specifically attempts to manage these 
contacts and indeed such an attempt could seriously impafr the operation of the entfre 
system. It is almost certainly this system which enables the process of local authority 
planning to proceed at all. 
Little, if any, research has been undertaken into how these informal networks operate even 
though they constitute the 'grease' which finally allows the IDAS wheels to tum. The 
followuig general observations however, can be made. 
First, access to these informal networks is not shared equally. For example, consultants 
with long experience in a particular area such as ttaffic management and who have often in 
the past acted for the local authority in other matters have ahnost imrestricted access to 
planning adminisfrators at all levels mcludmg the most senior levels. In fact often their 
authority is so great that junior and less confident planners may avoid decisions which they 
know such a consultant will object to sfrongly and attempt to pass responsibility for such a 
decision to those further up the hierarchy. In confrast a member of the public with no 
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experience m such matters will generally find his contact with the system limited to the 
enquiries desk. 
Second, by operating m the interstices of the statute ie. before a tune period begms to run, 
applicants can often, with senior consultants at their side, have some considerable 
influence on the nature and scope of the information which may ultimately be set down in 
the formal information request. ^ *^^ This is particularly the case in Queensland for two 
reasons: because no information is necessarily requfred to be submitted with the 
application and because the objection or submission period occurs after the information 
request has been drafted, submitted and complied with by the applicant. 
Thfrd, the informal network is frequently utilised by local authorities to 'flag' emerging 
issues such as a consistent pattern of objections being received even before the notification 
period has commenced. In the face of this advice the applicant may often elect to 
unilaterally submit further information or an additional consultant's report which covers 
these issues. This submission occurs, of course, quite outside the statutory framework but 
will be incorporated into the common material available to the decision maker^^°. 
In many cases then a large part of the information process in both jurisdictions may occur 
beneath the surface of the formal framework. That this can lead to mequities as well as 
efficiencies is acknowledged though such inequities are no doubt no greater in degree than 
those which operate in many other areas of social and economic activity. 
"" Within the limits, of course, of a local authority's ability to 'amend' local planning pohcies. See the 
judgment of Quirk DCJ in Telfrid Corporation P/L v Logan City Council [1999] QPEC 14. 
' " PA, Sch 10, definitions and EPAA, s 79C(l)(b). 
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• fri regards to the second issue viz. regional plamung, it may be incorrect to 
suggest, at least absolutely, that the growmg Commonwealth mvolvement in many areas 
which impinge on traditional land use planning arises solely out of an ever expandmg set 
of intemational obligations flowing from the federal government's enthusiastic ratification 
of intemational conventions, though a large part of the impetus for the intervention 
certainly arises in the intemational arena.^ ^^ Of equal importance however has been the 
gradual adoption of an opinion that the interests of efficiency and effectiveness in policy 
terms would be best served by the development of an overlapping set of regional 
environmental, heritage, biodiversity and resource management standards. 
In this view. 
There is little likelihood of a coherent policy emerging from the ttaditional 
compartmentalised approach in which different departments or different levels of 
government each handle different, small parts of the problem. 
It is quite beyond the scope of this work to examine the correctness or otherwise of such an 
assertion beyond remarking, in passing, that it may be an inevitable consequence of the 
scope of intemational agreements which still tend to view the nation state (which, of 
course, is the ratifying party) as the smallest efficient adminisfrative unit together with the 
HI 
112 
These intemational agreements currently include; the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance (1971), the United Nations Convention on Biological diversity (1992), 
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer(1985), the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1974) together with five conventions on 
migratory and endangered species and many others. 
Australia: State of the Environment, 1996, pi 1. (An independent report prepared by the State of the 
Environment Advisory Committee for the Commonwealth Minister of tiie Environment). 
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domestic preoccupation since the early 1970s witii national planning and tiie expansion of 
federal government power at the expense of tiie States throughout the same period. Of 
significance for both jurisdictions is the likelihood that policies designed to create a 
national plannfrig and policy framework for the achievement of biodiversity conservation 
and sustamable agriculture amongst other goals are likely to be increasingly imposed on 
the existing land use planning systems. 
Gardner in fact has afready suggested the follovdng as an appropriate three step 
"integration process."^ ^ ^ 
• all state agencies with natural resource management functions to be merged 
uito one Natural Resources Management Commission (NRMC) which will 
have responsibility for all matters relating to water, flora and fauna. 
• Regional Councils to be established which will comprise the constituent 
cotmcils and which will have sttategic planning functions 
• the NRMC to be given the authority to prepare amendments to local and 
regional land use planning schemes. 
It should be clear from the above that the new, elite focus is on planning at the regional 
level and this focus should, m principle, have a more dfrect unpact m Queensland than in 
NSW. As indicated earlier the IPA merely provides a nodding acceptance of regional 
"^  Gardner, Alex. "The Administrative Framework of Land and Water Management in AustraUa" 
(1999) 16 EPU 212. at p 255. 
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plaiming sttategies and policies. ^ "^^  Presumably more of these policies will emerge over 
time out of the activities of the Regional Planning Committees however tiie administtative 
and legal questions relating to either thefr incorporation in local planning policies or 
altematively their relationship to these policies have yet to be worked out in detail. It is 
clear however that a national programme has the potential to undercut even the vestigial 
references to a regional planning paradigm currently in the Act and that this will, in all 
probability, necessitate a partial review of the Act in due course.^ ^^ 
Fewer problems would be anticipated imder EPAA simply because of the longer standing 
regional focus in that state. The debate in both states will probably take place in terms of 
the content of such nationally-inspired policies and it could be acrimonious indeed given 
the extension of strategic planning to cover issues raised in either the conventions on 
climate change or the ozone layer and the expressed intention by some groups to push for 
direct confrols over agriculture and grazmg.^ ^^ 
Despite a degree of intellectual infatuation with sttategic planning and the move to 
harmonise and consolidate planning policies across broader geographical areas driven by 
issues such as biodiversity, species protection and water quality, which, it is argued, can 
hardly be consttained by local authority boundaries, little or no attention has been paid to 
114 
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MS 
Regional planning xmder IPA is specifically mentioned in ss 1.2.1,1.3.3,2.1.3(1), 2.1.4(1). 
IPA, Ch 2 would require considerable revision. 
See Tribe, J "The Law of the Jungle: regional forest agreements", (1998) 15 EPZJp 136. The author 
of this article is of the opinion that comprehensive management plans are required also for arable 
farming on marginal land, grazing in semi-arid zones and krigation. One wonders whether 
ploughing a field will necessitate a planning permit in due course. Since federal government 
fimdmg, either through the NHT (soon to be renamed the National Heritage Council) or the NCC, is 
likely to be substantial the move to strategic regional planning which will incorporate in a more 
direct manner the content of intemational agreements may be unstoppable. 
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tile effect of another level of planning (or a substantial expansion of the subject-matter of 
regional planning) on the information requfrements which will attend a development 
application in the future. 
The essential question, given the almost certainly ineluctable progression towards regional, 
federal government sponsored planning is whether the information requfrements of the 
total development approval process are likely to be reduced or expanded. The most 
probable result, as mdicated in Chapter 2, is that the volume of information required to 
support an application will increase and, on occasion, substantially mcrease. 
This will not solely reflect a concem with new environmental issues and standards arising 
out of the new regional focus but also at a deeper, perhaps ideological level, the gradual 
shift towards the 'participatory' planning model combined with the increasmg tendency of 
modem westem societies to become 'risk-averse' as the causal cormection between 
economic activity and environmental consequence becomes, seemingly, ever more 
1 1 *? 
complex and diffuse. 
Both jurisdictions will be requfred to come to terms with a much more activist federal 
involvement in broad environmental and heritage issues which will need, in due course, to 
117 The latter observation is reflected in the EPAA "precautionary principle" in Sch 2, cl 8(a) viz.; 
the "lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to 
prevent environmental degradation". Often, of course, there is scientific uncertainty on both sides of 
tiie issue. See Pearhnan CJ's comments in Greenpeace Australia Ltdv Redbank Power Co. P/L 
(1994) 86 LGERA 143 at 154. 
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be expressed in the regional Development Conttol Plans which exist already under 
EPAA *^ or m a similar format emerging in Queensland.^ ^^ 
The obvious necessity which will (or should) be a consequence of this general expansion in 
the scope of information which can be legitimately required by local authorities, is to 
manage the process in a more efficient and equitable maimer. 
There are two essential reforms required. 
• In the first instance EPAA should adopt the IPA principle which, in theory, 
places the onus on the local authority or concurrence body to determme the 
nature and scope of the information which is requfred in any given instance. ^ '^^  
• Second, if standards and data are to expand as a result of new scientific 
knowledge, as a consequence of the 'precautionary principle' in operation, or 
because intemational agreements presuppose a different planning paradigm 
then, as far as possible, planning standards should be as objective as possible.^ ^^ 
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EPAA, s 51(A). 
Queensland examples, either completed or underway, include; Wide Bay 2020, South-East 
Queensland- 2001, Far North Queensland- 2010, Central Queensland- a New Millennium and 
The Townsville-Thuringowa Strategic Plan. 
It goes without saying that accuracy on the part of the local authority is essential since strict 
compliance will be likely to be treated as a 'jurisdictional' issue. See: Timbarra Protection 
Coalition Inc. v Rose Mining N.L. (1999) 102 LGERA 52. 
It is admitted that a tension will always continue to exist between "objectivity" and the 
"precautionary principle". Indeed the precautionary principle is an expression of this tension. 
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In both jurisdictions very many local planning policies, development confrol plans and 
sunilar instruments contain detailed and objective standards which an applicant can 
appraise prior to making an application. ^ ^^  Should we see an expansion in the items which 
will come under review in the future it is essential that this benchmarking process keep 
pace. It is not sufficient that policy should mevitably expand to fill any apparent void 
created by even a degree of incipient concem, it is essential that such policies be reflected 
ui standards which are predicated realistically on the principle that envfronmental issues 
can, in many instances, be managed. 
E. Conclusions 
It should be clear from the above that a direct comparison of the jurisdictions is exttemely 
difficult. Both systems, driven by a political exigency which is, in tum, enervated by the 
reality of public participation will tend to magnify the scope of information requests. This 
is, it seems, an inevitable consequence of the increasingly 'risk-averse' and litigious 
envfronment in which local authorities and other approval bodies are called upon to 
perform their functions. 
Nevertheless, the following concluding comments may be made; 
• In view of the contuiuing increase m the scope of information requests 
the onus of establishing the framework for them should, as in Queensland, rest on the local 
or other approval authority. As indicated earlier in this chapter, equity would seem to rest 
^^^ Specific standards are laid down in a multitude of areas from particulate concentration in sewerage 
effluent, to the required angle of inclination of roofs in certain heritage areas and so on. 
179 
more in a situation where those who requfre mformation are sunilarly obliged to delineate 
what mformation is required. It is admitted tiiat this places a substantial onus on the local 
authority to accurately perform such a task as the consequences of forgettmg to include a 
specific item required by statute or regulations could be both costly and dramatic. This, 
in tum, could lead to a claim by the applicant for negligence imder the relevant sections of 
the Local Government Act 1993 (eg. s 1114). 
The applicant is hardly prejudiced by the existence of such an onus since the jurisdictional 
consequences of his oversight are the same viz. a voidable decision and the obligation on 
the local authority to pay damages in such a circumstance can be seen as simply an 
equitable concomitant to their duty to accurately assess the nature of the information 
requfred in the first place. In this respect the current IPA approach is clearly in advance of 
that currently existing under EPAA. 
• Compliance with statutory time periods is essential if either jurisdiction is to lay 
claun to bemg efficient and as has mdicated neither Act contains a procedure to force local 
authorities to fri fact comply beyond the lapse of time becoming a justification for a 
deemed refusal appeal to the planning court. 
Since there seems little point in establishing such a statutory regime if the essential 
elements are routinely ignored (or even occasionally ignored) an enforcement procedure is 
needed in both jurisdictions. 
'^ ^ Particularly if a planning court found the mistake went to jurisdiction. A recent Brisbane City 
Council out of court settlement recently resulted in compensation of $400,000 being paid to one 
disaffected appUcant. 
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The suggestion, which has now been supported by the Property Council, is to provide for a 
refund of fees to the applicant at a fixed percentage of the total fee paid for each day the 
authority exceeds the statutory limit. In the context of N.C.P. and the stated mtention in 
both jurisdictions to improve efficiency such a provision could, in theory, be justified 
though the political difficulties m the way of such an enactment could never, of course, be 
underestimated. ^ '^* 
• A growing problem is likely to be the probability of significant overlap arising 
between the three planning policy documents ie local, regional and State planning 
instruments. Combined with this will be difficulties created for applicants in the event of 
conflict between planning policies and the criteria adopted by the various instruments. It is 
conceivable that an application for a local development may have no immediate local 
environmental consequences but be perceived by those further up m the planning hierarchy 
19^ 
as potentially contributing to a regional planning problem. For this reason concurrence 
agency requfrements are increasingly being integrated into an IDAS process which 
commences at the local level. 
However the mere fact of uitegration does not in itself solve the problem of a growing 
body of information able to be requested by an ever-growmg number of concurrence 
bodies. There is not a simple answer to this problem which has its genesis in the increasing 
^^ * An altemative proposal would be to automatically refer all such delinquent matters to the Minister 
whose department would assume responsibility for processing them with costs invoiced against the 
Local Authority. 
^ The downstream effect of irrigation for example. 
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information demands of an mcreasingly interventionist state, though its effects are 
probably more keenly felt by applicants with smaller projects and smaller resources than 
by those who can command specific legislation or who are the subject of a Ministerial 
'call-in'. 
Consequently, the provision in IPA for "Referral Assistance" , assuming it works as 
intended, may represent a very useful mechanism to circumvent some of the problems 
1 '77 
indicated above and could well be emulated by EPAA. in due course. 
• There is a growing frend in both jurisdictions, driven one suspects by the court's 
approach to the question of 'finality', to incorporate more specific, objective criteria within 
plamung policies. This is to be encouraged in lieu of vague pronouncements regarding 
'intemational best practice' or a 'mission statement' attitude to compliance on the part of 
the local authority or concurrence agency. An objective standard should indeed be taken as 
an essential ingredient in any policy which requires performance to be measured in an 
attempt to reduce as far as possible the exercise of administtative discretion in critical 
areas. 
• Similarly, the scope and content of reports which are required to be submitted 
should be detailed in the regulations. Under the EPAA regulations the scope of an 
environmental impact statement and the specific issues which need to be addressed is 
I2ft IPA, s 3.3.10. 
^ A de facto system of coordination in NSW however could be said to exist as a consequence of the 
Regional Coordination Program which operates throughout regional NSW and has recently been 
expanded to included the South-West and Eastem suburbs of Sydney. 
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given in some detail. ^ *^ However m Queensland such specificity is not present and the 
Environmental Protection Act, 1994 and tiie 1998 Regulations offer very little assistance in 
concrete terms in determining the scope of either an 'envfronmental evaluation' under s 71 
or of an 'enviromnental management programme' under s 81. 
In general terms the Queensland approach, based in part on the New Zealand and UK 
models, represents a decent attempt to create a new planning paradigm which, it is hoped, 
will be better able to assist applicants to navigate through the information demands of an 
increasingly interventionist state and an increasingly polarised community. 
Although both models are clearly workable, seek to achieve the same ends and attempt to 
establish an equitable basis for development conttol the Queensland approach must be 
preferred if only because the statute reflects a current political commitment to enhancing 
the very qualities of efficiency and equity which are the subject matter of this thesis. 
Despite the rather wide ranging amendments to EPAA in 1997 which resulted in a more 
'mtegrated' Act than its predecessor it remains essentially the end product of incremental 
change since its inception and it is showing its age. Whether, in due course, the 
Queensland Act will be taken as a model for a future thoroughgoing review of the NSW 
Act remains to be seen. 
12g EPAA Regs, Sch 2. 
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Information and Referral: Summary of Equity and Efficiency Issues. 
In the case of Applications questions of equity and efficiency overlap with an 
inequity often fostering an inefficiency and an inefficiency often resulting in an 
inequity. For this reason, in the following table, both issues are considered together. 
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^ffSbute •' • ' \ 
Expansion in the scope of the information 
request beyond that necessarily required by 
the proposed development. 
Overarching political conttol of the process. 
t 
Tension exists in the "private rights" and 
"public rights" debate. 
Compliance with statutory time periods. 
Integrated concurrence agencies. 
-iqapeffiisKi 
Both NSW and Qld suffer from the same 
adminisfrative strategy. There is a clear 
need to delineate uiformation requirements 
more accurately in both jurisdictions. 
Best Practice: Neither. 
Both systems remain susceptible to political 
involvement. A development conttol 
ombudsman together with a flexible FIO 
procedure is needed in both jurisdictions. 
Best Practice: Neither. 
Both systems are at the centre of a largely 
environmentally instigated concem with 
"public rights". 
Both are experiencing difficulties in 
integrating such a concept into traditional 
development control processes. 
Best Practice: Neither. 
Neither system provides a mechanism 
through which adminisfrators are obliged to 
comply with the statutory time periods. 
Best Practice: Neither. 
Both systems provide for systemic referral 
under designated circumstances. The Qld 
system addresses this matter more directly. 
Best Practice: Qld. 
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Serial Applications. 
Information and advice onus on the consent 
agency. 
The content of the information reports 
submitted is detailed. 
Until all roll-ins have been completed in 
Qld, both systems subject some 
applications to serial and duplicate 
applications. 
Best Practice: Neither 
fri Qld this is currently the approach. 
Foreshadowed amendments will remove 
this requirement and the situation should 
parallel tiiat in NSW by mid 2002. 
Best Practice: Neither. 
Report contents are vaguely defined in 
Qld. Contents are more precisely 
defined under the EPAA regulations. 
Best Practice: ^^1^. 
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Standardised application fees. 
Number of application classes. 
Although being addressed, application 
fees vary widely across 125 local fl 
authorities. In contrast, fees are 
standardise by the State in NSW. 
Best Practice: 1>ISW. 
Including exempt and complying 
developments, Qld possesses four 
classes of application. This is under half 
the number in NSW. 
Best Practice: Qld. 
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FIVE 
NOTIFICATION AND PARTICIPATION 
The current fiction is that any ovemight ersatz bagel and lox boardwalk merchant, 
any down to earth commentator or barfly, any busy housewife who gets her 
expertise from newspapers, T.V., radio and telephone, is ipso facto endowed to 
plan m detail a huge mettopolitan complex good for a century. In the absence of 
prompt decisions by experts, no work, no payrolls, no parks, no nothing will move. 
Robert Moses (Chief Planner, New York City)^ 
The belief m the worth and possibility of the rational participation in policy-
makmg by citizens is very much an enlightenment view - that decisions can be 
influenced by bringing the message of social utility to those ui power. Underlying 
this view are certain fundamental conceptions about men and societies - the 
reasonableness of men and the natural harmony of their mterests, an optimistic 
view of human nature that rejects the conservative proposition that people always 
act out of self-interest. 
L. Sandercock.^ 
Quotsd in Ramparts. March, 1975. 
Sandercock, L Public Participation in Planning; report prepared for the Monarto Development 
Commission. (Adelaide, Government Printer, 1975) pl3. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
Of the tiiree levels of government only at tiie local level is a degree of dfrect public 
participation enjoined as a positive public good. The fact that such a process exists, and m 
such relative isolation from the almost exclusively representative forms at the State and 
Federal level, refiects an amalgam of factors, but in particular the intellectual assumptions 
of a educated class which can only infrequently be identified with any broad consensus 
about the desfrability of such a process amongst the mass base of citizens. 
The idea of participation is broader than the confines of planning law and fraverses the 
fields of sociology, politics and democratic theory, fri each of these fields a significant 
body of academic research exists which either seeks to promote the idea, denigrate the idea 
or to use the idea of participation as a platform from which to draw more generalised 
conclusions about the nature of man in society. The bulk of such detailed work however 
remains outside the ambit of planning law per se. 
Nevertheless since both jurisdictions allow for a significant public involvement in the 
IDAS process in terms of the right to lodge objections or submissions or to file an appeal 
some consideration should be given to the problematic nature of this process and to 
question whether, in totality, it contributes to the overall efficiency and equity of the 
In broad terms a major part of the debate is carried on between 'centraUsts" and "de-centralists'' 
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system or mdeed whether efficiency and equity have any relevance at all at this the third 
stage of ID AS. 
In the following therefore an attempt has been made to briefly outline and to comment on 
the benefits and the perceived deficiencies of dfrect citizen participation as suggested by 
writers in the field. 
B. PARTICIPATION: THE BENEFITS 
1. Participation is able to reveal the collective conscience of the citizenry 
This principle is expressed in these terms because beneath the specific benefits which are 
touched upon below there appears to be a more subliminal level where the nature of man, 
the nature of community and the reality of power are intermixed in what could, perhaps 
imcharitably, be described as a cocktail of wish-fiilfilment. At this level of debate for a 
society to be functionally adaptive it should provide a context within which the expression 
of individual human potential can find its widest expression. This is hardly a political 
proposition but rather a sociological, philosophical or indeed a theological one.'* This is 
perhaps the core idea for those who see de-cenfralisation of the political process as 
invariably conferring a range of benefits for society as a whole; a greater sense of 
Which brings to mind Aaron Wildavsky's terse comment that, "planning is not so much a subject 
for the social scientist as for the theologian." Wildavsky, Aaron "If Planning is Everything, Maybe 
its Nothmg" (1973) 4 Policy Sciences p 153. 
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community, greater concem for the rights and welfare of others and, over time, the 
emergence of a greater sense of human and cultural value. Emotionally it often hearkens 
back to a quite erroneous view of the Greek Ecclesia as the finest and highest expression of 
the democratic ideal. In fact such a view of dfrect democracy merely reflects a careless 
disregard for the reality which was often expressed in the proceedings of the Assembly 
where calumny, avarice, jealousy, envy and spite were often given full scope to operate (as 
ui Aeschines' infamous denunciation of Timarchus) and where the welfare of the state 
(though, in numerical terms, hardly more than a 'community') often became subservient to 
the right to use the public processes of democracy for no other purpose than to settle 
private scores.^ The Athenian experience of dfrect democracy is equivocal and, apart from 
its obvious success in resttaining the growth of tyranny over extended periods, some of its 
more flamboyant examples of collective paranoia are similar in underlying motivation and 
raw emotion, if not in significance, to the local amenity or local envfromnental debates that 
now resound throughout most local authorities.^ 
The challenge which has to be taken up by those propounding a 'collective conscience of 
the citizenry" idea is to define "collective conscience" and "citizenry" and this is not easy 
to do once the issues are taken out of the arena of a philosophical idyll and we enter the 
real world of conflicting interests, conflicting claims and colliding prejudices. 
5 There are many examples; the disasterous Sicilian campaign of 415 BC following the Assembly's 
recall of Alcibiades, the persecution and execution of Socrates and the improper use of the ostraka 
generally. 
"Whatever vicarious participation they may enjoy is a far remove from the model of Athenian 
democracy which underlies much of the rhetoric of public interest representation". R. Stewart, "The 
Reformation of American Administrative Law." (1975) 88 Harvard Law Review 1669 at p 1767. 
This debate takes place under a number of rubrics. Essentially the same proposition is treated by 
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Only then at the most rarefied and absttact level could the notion of a collective conscience 
be even contemplated - though it is possible to do so.* Arguably, for example, such a 
collective understanding could be said to exist in respect of the fundamental principles of 
moral conduct or in respect of Finnis' principles of 'practical reasonableness" - that human 
life should be respected or that promises should be kept .^ However beyond such broad 
principles the concept must break down, and does, in the face of a constant round of 
competmg self-mterests. In the real world altruism may be a laudable conception but it 
rarely comes to dominate the agenda at an "objectors meeting". 
Arguably, such a collective facility is more likely to represent an articulation of the hopes, 
fears and msecurities of a group struggling for attention amongst many other competing 
claimants and even if such a consensus could emerge on a specific planning issue^° it is 
unhelpful to depict it in such Durkheimian terms when, in reality, it represents an 
expression of generalised concem based upon aggregated, individual perceptions of land 
value and general amenity. 
Albrecht under the heading of 'Advocacy Planning' which he sees as an attempt to "draw weak 
social groups into the planning process by way of participation and social guidance [my itaUcs]" in 
order to 'activate all society". Albrecht, G Planning as a Social Process: Towards a Normative 
Definition of Planning. (Ann Arbor, University Microfilms Intemational. 1981) Ph.D Thesis, p 155. 
In this fashion Boer can state that"... social ecology would seem to require that citizens develop a 
consciousness of their inherent interconnectedness with the natural realm..." Boer,B "Social 
Ecology and Environmental Law." 1984. 1 E.P.L.J. 233 at p 253. This is no doubt correct however 
such a consciousness is unlikely to evolve in the absence of a demonstrable threat to Ufestyle, 
wealth or health. 
Finnis, J Natural law and natural rights. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980). 
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2. Participation as a means to redistribute power 
Implicit in this proposition is that power and influence tend not to be evenly distributed 
throughout society. This can be readily accepted as one of life's more or less eternal 
verities. It is, after all, such inequality which is at the heart of attempts by Fair Trading and 
Trade Practices legislation to create a 'level playing-field'. However though the underlying 
assumption is clearly correct the acceptance of this rather bald thesis necessitates the 
simultaneous acceptance of two other propositions; first, that higher levels of 
'participation' can redisttibute power and second, that the field of planning is an 
appropriate arena in which to attempt such a task. 
The concem which arises in respect of the ffrst of these propositions is whether the fact of 
participation really represents a valid fransfer of power and influence or whether, in reality, 
such an outcome is often illusory, merely representmg yet another means by which an elite 
can manipulate the system to its benefit. ^ ^ In fact experience, since the early enthusiasm of 
the sixties, has resulted in generally sanguine conclusions. Rather than empowering 
communities or minority or disadvantaged groups the statutory ability to 'participate' in 
the planning process has produced rates of participation which tend to directly reflect 
°^ Such as the construction of a crematorium in a residential area. 
" See Skeffington Committee Report., People and Planning. (London, Report of the Committee on 
Public Participation in Plannmg, H.M.S.O., 1969). 
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levels of education, the ability to organise and the rate of home ownership rather tiian real 
economic need,^ ^ Paradoxically, the adoption of a generally grandiose and value-laden 
group name has often masked the essentially economic goals of such participants at the 
expense of those disadvantaged or politically disenfranchised groups which the concept 
was meant to benefit. In short, often the political and economic beneficiaries of the process 
are those who afready possess a disproportionate share of political access and influence. 
The figure of the lone citizen m bitter contest with City Hall or a rapacious corporation is 
largely a myth. One notable consequence of statutory empowerment has been to replace 
the individual with a much smaller number of organised activists and interest groups. The 
broad generality which is implicit in the positive view of participation (and indeed in the 
pluralist view of the democratic process) is thus often non-existent.^ "^  
The second proposition is that the planning process is the appropriate arena for the 
participatory principle to be acted out. On the face of it, there would appear to be no 
mtrinsic reason why, if participation/>er se is to be accorded a high cultural value, that it 
should begin and essentially end, at the lowest level of government. An argument based 
round the assertion that planning decisions affect the rights of citizens in a more dfrect and 
immediate manner than decisions of State and Federal governments must certainly fail in 
^^ Which is reflected in the higher rates of participation in major cities than in smaller communities. 
Alford, R Bureaucracy and Participation. (Chicago. Rand McNally, 1969) p 160. 
'^  See Pain, N "Third Party Rights. PubUc Participation Under the Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Act 1979. Do the Floodgates Need Opening or Closing?" (March, 1989) EPUpTp 26-35 
at p 27. 
'* .Schultze, William A Urban and Community Politics. (Behnont, Wadsworth, 1974) p 32. 
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tiie face of many conflicting examples. ^ ^ In fact very often the opposite is correct and tiie 
citizen will be much more affected by legislation enacted at the higher levels tiian by the 
unpositions of a local law. And yet "representation" not "participation" remains entrenched 
at these levels. 
A clear example of this dichotomy occurred with the enactment of IPA. One quite 
profound effect of the new Act was the incidental abolition of the legal status of property 
zonings.^ ^ Arguably, the net effect of this paradigm shift has been to substantially diminish 
the certamty that a given property will atttact a capital value within a particular range 
associated with its legally enttenched zoning as was the case under the previous Act. 
However despite such a significant change and the potential for large capital losses to be 
passed on to citizens, and despite the effective abrogation of the right to compensation in 
these instances no legal avenue was ever made available to citizens to enable them to 
challenge these provisions prior to the Act's passing. The conttadiction is obvious. The 
process which gave rise to IPA did not allow the public to halt the administtative or 
legislative process ui respect of it, though the Act specifically grants this right in respect of 
local authority decisions. 
IS 
16 
if 
Taxation, for example. 
EPA, s 2.1.23(1) and (4). Achieved by specifying that a local planning instrument (which has the 
force of law under the Statutory Instruments Act, 1992) cannot regulate development, or the use of, 
premises. Similarly IPA, s 6.1.2(3) bans zoning prohibitions under transitional IDAS. 
The right to compensation only marginally exists in respect of interim applications made under a 
superseded planning scheme and even then with numerous caveats. See IPA, ss 5.4.2. to 5.4.4. 
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One could argue tiiat if dfrect participation of tiie type enshrined m IPA and EPAA is such 
an evident cultural value then, if only to avoid tiie charge of manifest hypocrisy, the State 
and Federal governments should permit citizen initiated referenda. There is however no 
mdication that such a step would be even marginally contemplated by political parties at 
these levels. 
Yet there are no obvious reasons why, if the exercise of a statutory right to participate is 
beneficial to the body politic for any number of alleged reasons at the local level, the same 
benefits should not accrue at higher levels. Altematively, if the 'representative' ethos is 
believed able to provide sufficient safeguard for the public in respect of matters of major 
public policy why should representation be an insufficient guarantee in respect of matters 
1 Q 
of much more minor significance. 
In reality the arguments adduced in support of participation as a mechanism to secure 
greater involvement by the citizenry in the democratic process, though the quest is 
laudable, are thin indeed. Equally, there is no convincing argument why if the process were 
to be so beneficial, it should be restricted to the lowest level of government operations. 
^^  In conventional language if a member of the public dislikes a particular action of the government he 
may elect to not vote for that party at the next election. (Admittedly this would have been difficult in 
respect of IPA since it was supported by both parties.) 
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3. Local Authorities may perform their functions more sensitively 
Towards the end of her report for the Monarto Development Commission, Sandercock 
states; 
[I] fit [participation] can sometunes pressure or persuade public authorities to 
perform thefr duties more sensitively, it is worth a certain amount of expense and delay.^ ^ 
We have now, at this point, come quite a distance from a grand principle of participative 
democracy or even an earnest hope "that every human being, no matter how supposedly 
uneducated he/she might be was capable of making a positive contribution to his 
community." Absent from Sandercock's conclusion are all the factors which supposedly 
work together to create, through participation, a better man or a functionally more efficient 
society. These are to be replaced, it seems, by a new role for participation; to secure 
openness and accountability within the system. Participation's role, in short, is now a more 
subtle, prudential one; to maintain honesty, integrity and (perhaps) ttansparency within the 
planning regime and to act as some sort of bulwark against the arrogance of elected and 
non-elected officialdom. 
19 Note 2, Ch 5. 
°^ O'Brien, T Planning-Becoming-Development; an Australian Assistance Plan Experience. 
(Canberra, Centre for Continuing Education, A.N.U., 1977) p 19. 
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Such aims, of course, can hardly be criticised. The issue which remains is the question of 
cost. How much cost is a community prepared to absorb (because most planning costs are 
passed on to the community) to ensure that their local authority performs their tasks in a 
'sensitive' manner? This is the real focus of the debate which will gather momentum in 
coming years under both IPA and EPAA. 
4. Higher levels of participation lead to increased innovation and adaptiveness 21 
On the face of it this suggestion appears to possess a degree of cogency based around the 
simple proposition that a greater involvement by the public should result in an expansion 
of the data context within which a matter is to be decided and that this, in tum, should 
increase the likelihood that the end result viz. the decision should be 'rational'. The 
perspective from which this principle arises is a sociological one though essentially it is 
another expression of Friedrich Hayek's more general proposition known as the 'synoptic 
delusion'. What Hayek calls a 'delusion' is the belief that in any situation calling for a 
conclusion or decision, all the relevant facts can be known to one mind and that it is 
possible to construct from this knowledge all the particulars of a desfrable social order.^^ 
Consequently, it should be simple to argue that the more mdividuals and interested groups 
contribute to the information gathering process, the more disparate the data context 
^^  Smith, R.W., Public Participation in Planning and Design. (Ann Arbor, University Microfilms 
Intemational. 1978. Ph.D Thesis.) p 22. 
^ In terms of this argument (as distinct from the previous one) the stated benefit 
can be expressed in terms of rationality with 'rationality' variously defined as increasing efficiency, 
competence, fairness or equity. 
23 Hayek, F Law, Legislation and Liberty. Vol 1 ( London.,Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973) p 8. 
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becomes, the more potentially 'rational' tiie ultunate decision should be.^ "^  However even 
the proponents of this principle do not suggest causation in a sfraight Ime and indeed they 
cannot in the face of the fact that much of the relevant information is necessarily derived 
from various expert sources such as planners themselves together with architects, engineers 
and so on. In this context the mere addition of more mputs which are based upon 
perceptions which may be self-serving, biased, sttangely idiosyncratic or simply wrong-
headed may do little to solve the delusion alluded to by Hayek, fri fact it would be at least 
open to argue the converse in many situations. 
In an attempt to get round this problem proponents must, of course, suggest that the 
information which is available from non-expert sources viz. the lay public in fact possesses 
a quality distinct from that of the expert or the scientist and that somehow because of this 
distinctiveness it can become a valid and indeed very worthwhile addition to the data-
context. This they do by postulating, in various forms and using differing terminologies, a 
qualitative differentiation between the various spheres of knowledge. To Coenen there 
are three kinds of knowledge; 'scientific' which is tested and where the results are 
repeatable, 'ordinary' which relates to our common sense perceptions of reality and 
causation and 'interactive' which is knowledge which arises as a consequence of the act of 
24 
25 
Which is a re-statement in effect ofCoase's Theorem (1960) viz. that, given a set of standard 
economic assiraiptions, 'bargaining' tends to produce socially optimal results. 
Boer takes the issue to the point where he can conclude that "... community participation is not just 
a strategy for the implementation of the [environmental] ethic, but quite possibly the strategy for 
implementation." (Authors itaUcs). Boer, B "Social Ecology and Environmental Law" (1984) 1 
E.P.L.J 233 at p 249. 
Coenen, F, Huitema, D and O'Toole, L.J. (eds). Participation and the Quality of Environmental 
Decision making. (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1998). 
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participation itself Friedman^^ suggests two forms of knowledge which are relevant to the 
planning process; 'processed knowledge' which, again, is abstracted from the extemal 
world and which utilises scientific theory and logic and "client' or personal knowledge 
which flows directly from the personal experience of the participants. With the exception 
of the third class of so-called 'interactive knowledge' the categories listed clearly cross 
over and the only point of difference is in the terminology employed. 
The core of the argument nevertheless is that in some way all three (or two) forms can 
represent legitimate inputs into an increasingly pluralistic decision making system. 
Stripped of the terminology, the point both of these writers and others appear to be making 
is that apart from specific scientific knowledge (such as, for example, the angle at which 
sound propagates from motorvehicles) the planning process should also be able to be 
informed by the common sense responses of non-expert participants. Beyond this simple 
point Coenen's thfrd category of knowledge is no doubt quite legitimate. It is certainly 
conceivable that, out of the interaction of experts and lay participants or between lay 
participants inter se, previously uncontemplated factors and issues may arise by a process 
of synthesis and ultimately emerge as qualitatively different perspectives on the problem. 
This is even more conceivable if the action is franslated to a plane which presupposes a 
very high level of citizen involvement and an exceptionally interactive and functionally 
adaptive community. 
^^  Friedman, J "The Public Interest and Community Participation: Toward a Reconstruction of Public 
Philosophy. (1973) 39/1 Journal of the American Institute of Planners pp 2-12. 
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Three caveats however are worthy of mention: first, fr is doubtful if m the vast majority of 
cases much 'interactive' knowledge ever emerges from a process where the participants 
tend to see themselves as adversaries and where there is often little movement from 
initially stated positions, second, it still remains an open question whether the mnovation 
and adaptability of the system is enhanced by the supposed incorporation and application 
of these postulated different categories of knowledge and finally, even if iimovation is 
increased at the margins of an issue the question remains whether the putative benefits of 
such a process (which are admittedly qualitative) outweigh the costs (which have the 
benefit of being quantifiable in terms of time and money). A fourth issue, the question of 
ttansaction cost, is taken up subsequently. 
5. Participation produces higher levels of competence 
Although one of the principal assumptions of this thesis is that the planning process can be 
assessed on the twin bases of efficiency and equity, universal agreement does not exist that 
such criteria are, in reality, appropriate or that they are useful tools for categorising any 
decision which issues from a formal planning process. The starting point for this 
proposition is that since a given planning issue can encompass such a melange of diverse 
factors, and from conceptually disparate areas, to suggest an end decision can accurately 
balance all of them, arriving at a conclusion which, cognitively, can be described as 
efficient and equitable in societal, cultural, normative, economic, envfronmental and now, 
inter-generational terms really amounts to an exercise in wishful thinking. This is the basis 
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for Rittel and Webber's^'' categorisation of planning issues as a "wicked problems". By a 
"wicked problem" tiiey mean an issue to be resolved m which the multiple elements of the 
data set are of the types mentioned above. Here normative factors may represent serious 
and valid elements of the total equation and the weight to be applied to such factors is 
problematical and inherently variable from case to case. Set against these factors and 
operating in the same environment specific ttansaction costs may, in contrast, be readily 
reducible to thefr component parts. 
Rittel and Webber accordingly conclude that since most of the issues which are dealt with 
by planning systems are "wicked" the attribution of terms such as 'efficient' and 
'equitable' to the end product is misleading and uiappropriate. It is this argument which 
leads Renn and others to abandon the efficiency/equity dichotomy and to suggest it be 
replaced by 'competence' and 'fairness'.^^ These writers have difficulty with the 
suggestion of 'optimisation' which they believe is inherent in such terms as 'efficiency' 
and 'equity' and which appears to not sit well with the uiherently sub-optimal outcomes 
which one would expect from a process which is called upon to balance, weigh or juggle 
scientific data on the one hand and the intuitive, emotional or normative orientations of 
participants on the other. 
27 Rittel, H.W.T. and Webber, M.W. "Dilemmas in a general theory of plannmg" (1973) 4/3 
Policy Sciences. 
ii This is, as mentioned in Chapter 1, a perennial issue confronted by the N.C.C. 
^ Renn, O., Webler T. and Wiedermann P. Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation. 
(Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1995) pp 17-34. 
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One difficulty with tiiis perception is the necessary identification of, say, 'efficiency' with 
an optimal end-state which is the perfect outcome of the application of perfect knowledge. 
No such state has ever been known to exist m the social sciences, mcludmg, of course, law 
and economics. In reality, terms such as 'efficiency' are always relativistic and as such are 
as capable of expressing the 'wicked' nature of the problem as the altemative. Indeed they 
may be rather better terms to use because their use at least pouits to the embedded problem 
(perfect knowledge/ perfect outcome). The altemative, which is to replace them with 
euphemisms is very much the worse course of action. Such an approach may be arguable if 
the suggested replacement word leads to an increase in clarity overall however this is open 
to doubt in this instance. 'Competence' may well imply a sub-optimal condition but it also 
carries with it the implication that the search for excellence in planning is such a fruitless 
quest that it can (and should) be replaced by a mere journeyman inclination to 'muddle 
through'. 
In summary the use of such altemative terminology adds little to the analysis of the issues 
and indeed may further confound them. The proposition contamed under this sub-headmg 
can therefore be simply restated as "increased participation may lead to an increase m the 
(relative) efficiency of the planning process." This rather more significant assertion has 
been touched on under the previous heading of 'irmovation and adaptation' and will be 
considered further in the following discussion of the problems which are perceived to flow 
from the right to participate. 
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PARTICIPATION: THE PROBLEMS 
Although, for the reasons given, thefr terminology has not been adopted Renn, Webler and 
Wiedemann, in passing, arrive at a good summary of the difficulties associated with citizen 
participation.^^ Their compilation together with some additional issues raised by Alford^ ^  is 
broadly utilised in the following discussion. 
If participation was universally perceived to be a public good then obviously little debate 
would need to occur conceming its failings. In fact however the benefits which the society 
or the planning process derives from the encouragement of high levels of citizen 
involvement are equivocal. If the participation ethic is not viewed in somewhat absttact 
sociological or socio-political terms but rather as merely one component of the total 
planning process which may lead to more functionally adaptive decisions then ultimately 
the debate should be about costs and benefits. If the total cost of maintaining the statutory 
edifice of participation becomes excessive in terms of cost to the individual applicant, the 
community, the envfronment or the planning process itself then, rather than accepting it as 
an unchallengeable, sacrosanct principle, the inherited system should be modified to 
reduce its dysfunctional affects. In this context the problems and difficulties outlined 
below, together with the perceived benefits, create a conceptual framework within which, 
it is to be hoped, a new balance can be achieved. 
°^ Note 29. 
'* Note 11. 
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1. Participation both facilitates and enlarges the scope of conflict 
It is a common enough experience in life that conflict often expands in a dfrect ratio to the 
number of people who wish to opt mto the process.^^ The potential therefore in the IPA or 
EPAA planning processes for rather high levels of conflict (in both scope and intensity) to 
exist would appear to be immanent in the statutory provisions which outline who can 
object (or, in the current terms, 'submit') to an application, the net effect of which is to 
not exclude anyone from the process. The principle is essentially one of global inclusion. 
The concem which is expressed under this heading does not have its genesis in an 
unpossible desire to remove all conflict from the system. Conflict and the processes by 
which conflict is resolved are necessary and essential aspects of any rational decision 
making model. Rather, the issue concems first, the question of the scale (and perhaps the 
intensity) of conflict which is often the consequence of an open-ended policy of inclusion 
and second, whether, at the end of the day, the majority of development applications 
emerge from the IDAS process enhanced in some particular aspect or altematively 
degraded in terms of their overall conception. In regards to the first issue there can be little 
doubt that much of the antagonism or even outright aggression sometunes displayed in 
response to a development proposal is misplaced or based on fallacious assumptions 
^^  For an insightful analysis of the role of small and large groups in such processes see, Olson, M The 
Rise and Decline of Nations. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982). 
* IPA, s 3.4.9(1) allows 'any person' to make a submission. EPAA, s 79(5) in respect of 'Designated 
Developments' and EPAA. Regulation cl 64(2)(f)(i), in respect of the generic category of 
'advertised developments' (EPAA, s 4(1)) similarly permits 'any person' to make a submission. 
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concemfrig the proposal or is simply nuschievous. However certamly not all responses to 
all proposals can be considered in these terms. In some cases submissions from the public 
do address the planning issues specifically and represent a valid information uiput into the 
system. In some cases, though perhaps rarely, they may even m fact address an issue which 
had not previously been considered either by the planners or in the various expert reports 
compiled for and submitted by the applicant. However in the very large majority of routine 
cases virtually the totality of issues which arise will afready be the subject of a planning 
policy, a D.C.P., or E.P.I.^ '* and these policies will stmcture both the preparation of the 
application by the applicant and the initial and subsequent review of the proposal by the 
plaimer. In other words, in respect of the majority of applications which are routine, the 
opening up of a broad debate which results m the receipt of large numbers of submissions 
on vague amenity grounds or which are based on almost pathological assumptions 
conceming the intentions of the applicant may add little to the quality of the end decision 
(and may even dettact from its quality) but will certainly and demonsttably add to cost and 
create delay. 
Any observer of the process may sometimes be left with the impression that 'after the 
captains and the kings have departed' and after the tumult has died down very little (and 
sometimes nothing) has been the outcome of a costly and vitriolic public participation 
process. One could even suggest m such instances that if the participation process is 
achieving anything it is doing so m areas quite outside planning or even of the project 
supposedly being reviewed; that the notification may result in neighbour meeting 
34 Which, themselves, have aheady gone through a notification and submission process. 
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neighbour for the ffrst or second tune, that an embryonic though ultimately, evanescent 
sense of community may spontaneously arise and that mto some lives an immediacy and 
an exciting astringency may exists for a time. In this sense the applicant may be 
contributmg to some form of fleetmg public good. However if this is often the only 
outcome then it is demonsfrably not a planning outcome and the two matters should not be 
confused, though they often are by local politicians. 
Concem with respect to the second issue should now be obvious. If one exttacts from the 
IDAS equation a relatively small number of integrated applications or state significant 
applications, in short the ones which tends to attract significant media attention, and 
address the vast bulk of local development applications it is doubtful whether the often 
febrile process of public participation genuinely results in a qualitatively better outcomes. 
Although the evidence, to date, is anecdotal discussions which the writer has had planners 
m a number of local authorities would indicate that the largest portion (up to 75% ) of 
routuie applications can and are assessed rather quickly on their merits and that relevant 
development conditions can similarly be agreed to promptly. Furthermore there seems to 
be broad agreement that, m these cases, the supervening notification and submission 
process has a marginal mfluence on whether the application will be approved and a 
marginal effect on the nature of the development conditions imposed. They agree however 
that the administtative costs associated with the review of the submissions and preparing 
subsequent written advises to submitters can be very high. 
35 That is, the outcome is demonstrably better than would have been the case had the application been 
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One conclusion from the above could be that the IDAS process m both jurisdictions could 
be substantially unproved if by some means tiie bulk of tiiese routine matters could be 
made exempt from tiie public submission process. There appear to be moves underway m 
tiiis regard m NSW and these will be discussed elsewhere m this chapter.^ ^ 
2. The Tryanny of Expectations 
Throughout the nineties one recurring theme in what could be loosely called the national or 
'public conversation' has been 'ownership'... as in 'ownership of the process', 'ownership 
of the "outcome"', "ownership of the problem' and so on. In turn, 'ownership' has become 
associated in many instances with the similarly proprietary-sounding term, 'stakeholder'. 
These are frequently combined in the public conversation as ... "the stakeholder should 
have ownership of the process... the problem... the solution". Stripped of thefr 
sociological gloss these statements are attemptmg to express a sunple normative 
proposition viz. that those individuals who are affected by a decision, or 'outcome' ought, 
to be able to view the process which produces that result as morally legitimate. They will 
perceive it to be legitunate, so the theory goes, if the process is able to demonsttably take 
account of (or at least, consider) their views and thefr interests and the most obvious 
3* 
37 
categorisable as "exempt" (IPA) or 'complying' or "local" (EPAA). 
Briefly, the 1999 amendments to EPAA, ( ss 72 and 96 ), enlarge the matters in respect of which 
notification and advertising is not required. 
'PubUc Conversation" is, it seems to me, an appropriate phrase for a number of reasons one of 
which (incidentally) is that such terms gained initial currency in the area of pubhc administration. 
(Though there a signs that H.R. departments m some corporations are now starting to be ape their 
pubUc sector colleagues.) 
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operational means of conveymg this unpression is to mclude all such parties witiiin tiie 
ambit of the negotiating process.^ * 
The philosophy which underlies this general policy of inclusion has been adopted by both 
jurisdictions m the absence of any readily acceptable means by which those who are 
adversely affected by a proposal can be separated out at the application stage from those 
who are not.'^ ^Consequently, and as previously noted, both jurisdictions permit "any 
person" to make a submission m respect of a notifiable proposal and at a sociological level 
such a policy generates a degree of support for the reasons touched on above. Citizens, 
ostensibly at least, become transformed into participants, an intemal administrative process 
may become more ttansparent, an increased variety of ideas may be canvassed and, 
presumably, out of this new vitality decisions should be more rational or more efficient (or 
to use Rerm's phrase, "more competent"). 
While conceding some of the benefits (though not necessarily the co5/-benefits) adduced 
by the proponents'^ ^ it sometimes appears that in their enthusiasm for the idea they lose 
sight of the centtal uitent of IDAS which is to formulate ^planning process first and 
foremost and certainly not, historically at least, to create a socio-political, activist milieu. 
38 
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All these ideas were expressed as positive goals by the 1996 NSW Social Justice Directions 
Statement This is available at: <www.treasury.nsw.gov.au> 
It is ultimately left to the court to apply different 'weights' to submissions. A submission based on 
adverse effect to general amenity will be given more weight if received from a nearby resident than 
from someone in the next suburb. The administrative load associated with processing the 
submissions at the local authority level may however be the same. 
Planners will occasionally concede that sometimes (though it is apparently rare) a novel suggestion 
will be contained in a submission. 
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Though this latter intent is clearly implicfr in tiie drafting of the notification and 
submission provisions of both Acts, currently the ongoing history of public participation m 
both jurisdictions illusttates well that it is indeed a "two-edged sword". At a pragmatic 
level, one of the aims of 'planning' is to produce decisions which can be reasonably 
justified in terms of established policies and difficulties and dissonances will continue to 
recur if, as a process, it can be easily coopted by theorists whose only common starting 
point is often a disenchantment with what they perceive to be the uiequities and limitations 
of representative government. 
With these broad comments in mind the dysfimctional aspects of rising community 
expectations fall mto three categories. First, the operation of a general policy of inclusion, 
together with an unqualified right to object and the co-existence of general appeal rights 
has undeniably created a sense of empowerment in and amongst certain sections of local 
and particularly middle-class, communities. The outworking of this sense of power has 
been a tendency by both planners and local politicians to pay almost ritual obeisance to 
local complaints'*^ which has, over time, acted to increase the size of the geographical area 
over which such groups believe it is legitimate to sustain objections or claims. In short, it 
has become a common-place observation that, over time, many such groups - as a natural 
extension of this sense of empowerment - eventually appear to lay claim to virtual veto-
rights over any development occurring in their expanded area of local interest. Such a 
claim, either expressed overtly or implicit in underlymg community attitudes, is always 
*^ The word 'ritual' is used because in fact there may be little "content" in the response of poUticians 
and planners to the objections when they are forthcoming. 
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gomg to be unsustamable but is a dfrect consequence of the interstitial msertion of a socio-
political aspiration into the fraditional assessment process. 
Second, this participatory ethos at the local level may compromise efficient regulation 
even in the short term. This may occur through the unwillingness of local participants to 
acknowledge the total cost of compliance with an aroused community expectation 
conceming a matter of perhaps margmal local utility. For example, an increase in the size 
of a "vegetation protection zone" [V.P.L.] or the imposition of a more severe 
"development restriction line" may be the outcome not of a valid or rational concem on 
environmental or amenity grounds but rather represent an emotional response to the sudden 
perception that some item, previously happily ignored, now requfres preservation or 
protection. This may be as single-minded as a ttee. In such a cfrcumstance, though a 
satisfactory result could have been achieved in terms of the relevant statutory purposes, by 
not imposing such a condition the local authority may see it, from thefr point of view, as a 
matter of marginal cost and in fact impose the condition. Often this will be depicted by 
participants and local authorities as a "win-win" situation and often it is nothing of the sort. 
It appears to be "wm-win" simply because the costs are imposed on the applicant and local 
politicians sense they have avoided an unfavourable electoral consequence. The hidden 
cost of this exercise, to impose an unnecessary condition, are often unguessed at by local 
planners who, in the main, are unfamiliar with the cumulative effect of changes to site area 
on the end capitalised value of a development. A small change in the boundary of a V.P.L. 
will reduce site area which may directly reduce the area available for car parking. This, in 
tum, (unless dispensation is granted) will reduce the gross floor area, nett lettable area and 
nett income. Further since investment value is calculated on a capitalised retum basis the 
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final expense and capital cost of this supposedly small change can be large indeed. This 
consequential uicrease in cost will, m the normal course of events, be passed on in the form 
of a rental increase. 
Local participation in such an mstance as this, where it is manifested as local 
environmental action, tends to make each case a special case with its own idiosyncratic 
blend of wishful thinking and special pleading. It is accepted that at one level all cases are 
special cases however the difficulty of maintaining and articulating consistent local policy 
and creating a reasonable level of certainty in such a milieu cannot be overestimated. 
Third, the existence of a vociferous group who object sttongly to a proposal on 
environmental or amenity grounds is no guarantee that in the longer term the acceptance by 
an approval body of the objection will improve either of these matters. On the contrary, 
such an acceptance could worsen these conditions over time. For example, the failure to 
approve a small neighbourhood retail centte m an expanding residential area in the face of 
sttenuous objections from nearby residents may lead dfrectly to a greater use of cars as 
residents drive out of the area for convenience shopping, to higher fraffic density in local 
sfreets, to a higher accident rate and so on. While these potential, adverse consequences 
will be put forward by the applicant in its representations to council it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that the preoccupation of most resident action groups and such like is with very 
short term and sectarian issues and that this sits uncomfortably with the manifest need for 
consistent policy and reasonable certainty throughout a local authority area. 
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3. Duplication and Redundancy 
Most developed plaiming jurisdictions in the westem world provide, at a statutory level, 
for an extensive public, consultative process prior to the formal infroduction of a new 
planning scheme or other planning instrument and in many instances this consultative 
process is further reinforced by an extensive round of public hearings. The public, through 
these consultative arrangements, are able to bring thefr opinions and concems to bear on 
the planning process at the important level of policy formulation. This right could be 
described as "Level One Participation". 
A supplementary right to object to specific proposals in terms of the policy positions 
afready adopted by a local authority, or "Level Two Participation", which now co-exists in 
most jurisdictions, could be said, in terms of this argument, to be either redundant because 
the policy refiects the substance of the objection or spurious since the objection enshrines a 
proposition, principle or claim previously rejected in the policy formulation process and 
which involved perhaps high levels of Level One Participation. 
The counter-argument, of course, is that policy-is-policy and refiects a broad level of 
generality whereas a development application possesses a certain unmediate and often 
individualistic specificity. Consequently, m this argument, it is entfrely appropriate for this 
quality to find expression in a fiirther adminisfrative process which permits the expression 
of more individual concems. 
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Bridgmg the gap between these two propositions has proven to be difficufr. Supporters of 
the participatory ethic see any increase in consultation as a positive good for many or all of 
the reasons touched on above, while supporters of the redundancy argument, who tend to 
look at plannmg 'outcomes' m terms of tunely and balanced decision making, can 
justifiably point to the objection/submission process as one of the principal causes of 
expense and delay. 
Although both of the jurisdictions being reviewed here have adopted a ttaditional, indeed 
fulsome, participatory ethic which permits the public to intervene at both Level I and 
Level 2, it is perhaps salutary to note that by no means all planning jurisdictions, even 
today, have adopted such an approach.'*^ 
It is, in any event, difficult to avoid the impression that the short history of the participation 
provisions has sometimes generated a deal of sensitivity to the issue at the political level. 
Though politicians are sometimes prepared to acknowledge the difficulties created by an 
often unwieldily and time-consuming process and the absence of any discernible benefit 
flowing to any party in particular instances, the process has virtually become sacrosanct in 
most jurisdictions. Having therefore uiherited a commitment to the idea (though not 
always an enthusiastic commitment) legislators have, under pressure from planners and 
applicants in both jurisdictions, commenced a slow process by which the ambit of 
^^  Of the 15 current members of the European Commimity only three, Ireland, Luxembourg and the 
U.K. operate an open-access objection system. All other systems place statutory restrictions on the 
right to object. In the cases of Denmark, Spain, Italy and Portugal there is no right to object to 
specific applications. See; The European compendium of spatial planning systems and policies. Vol 
28. (E.U, 1997) p 84. 
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participation will be narrowed and its unpact diluted. The means employed to achieve tiiis 
are various but they mclude the categorisation of applications as exempt, complying, self 
assessable, code assessable or local. This issue will be taken up further after an 
examination and comparison of the notification and participation models in both 
jurisdictions. 
D. NOTIFICATION AND PARTICIPATION: THE IPA AND EPAA 
FRAMEWORKS 
As has been mentioned previously in the discussion under 'Applications' much of the 
statutory and regulatory framework of EPAA is determined by the categories of 
development established by the Act. This leads to unnecessary duplication and 
complication even with respect to an ostensibly simple matter such as indicating to 
applicants the nature and extent of their notification requfrements. EPAA does not 
establish anything like an overarching principle such as the impact and code assessment 
dichotomy imder IPA which would allow it to avoid some of these difficulties. The EPAA 
framework must therefore be tteated in some detail even though it is essentially procedural, 
often duplicative and, at the 'lower' levels of local development applications is blurred by 
the idiosyncratic requirements of local EPIs and DCPs. 
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1. EPAA 
It is only with a certain insensitivity then that the EPAA requfrements can be seduced mto 
something resembling a dichotomy for the purpose of illustration and comparison with 
IPA.'*^ However, with that reservation in mind, the Act can be seen to create two broad 
classes of developments which are notifiable. These are "advertised developments" and 
"designated developments". 
(a) Advertised Developments 
These are defined in the definition s 4.1 as: 
a development.. .other than designated developments, that is identified as 
advertised development by the regulations, an envfromnental plannuig instrument or a 
development conttol plan. 
44 The Regulations in tum, divide 'advertised developments', mitially, into two classes. 
These are; 
*^ This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The format of the Act however is regrettably obscure in 
this area. 
*^ EPAA, Regs els 82-91. 
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State Significant developments which are not 'designated developments' 
and which are referred to in s 76A(7)(b) and (d)'*^These are known as State 
Significant advertised developments. 
and. 
'Integrated developments'"*^ which are not State Sensitive or designated 
developments but which requfre approval imder the Heritage Act 1977, the 
Water Act 1912, or the Pollution Control Actl 970. "^^ These are known as 
nominated integrated developments. 
Although the first category is self explanatory and does not depart from the definition of a 
state significant development in s 76A(7), the second category, in nominating only three of 
the ten Acts which are used by s 91 to categorise a development as 'integrated' essentially 
divides integrated developments into two categories viz. those which are notifiable and 
those which are not. However even this cannot be said with certainty in respect of those 
applications requiring an approval under one or other of the remaining seven Acts because 
such a development could still be requfred to be notified under the terms of a local or 
45 
48 
47 
These are developments that can be carried out under an EPI but which the Minister has gazetted as 
having a state or regional planning significance or which the Minister has exercised his discretion to 
prohibit under s 89. 
See EPAA, s 91. 
Now repealed. 
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regional EPI or DCP."** This group then constitutes a tiifrd category of advertised 
development under the section viz. 
• Other advertised developments. 
fb) Designated Developments 50 
A development may be defined as designated by either the regulations or by an 
Envfronmental Planning fristrument^^ and they are extensively listed in Sch 3 of the 
regulations All such applications must be notified in accordance with the Act and 
CO 
regulations. Adding to the potential complexity, and in addition, any consent authority 
may declare an application in respect of an existing use or a previously approved project 
seeking a modification of conditions to be a Designated Development for the purposes 
(including notification purposes) of the Act.^ "* 
48 
49 
30 
34 
Foreshadowed amendments to EPAA wiU result in the aboUtion of DCPs which will be incorporated 
inheocal plans. Similarly, the rules contained in SEPPs will be iacorporated into the state plan and 
issue-specific REPs into broader regional plans for 14 or 15 proposed regions. 
The principal statutory provision which gives enabling effect to public participation, (s 79A) is 
curious. The second sub-section seemingly creates a fourth residual category which must be 
advertised if required by a DCP. It is ahnost certainly meant to be a catch-aU provision though the 
exclusion of EPIs as a trigger is strange. 
It will be remembered that 'designated developments' are those which must be accompanied by an 
Environmental Impact Statement. See EPAA, s 78A(8)(a). 
EPAA, s 77A and EPAA Regs, els 77-81. 
The Sch 3 listing is not exhaustive however. A consent authority may declare an application in 
respect of an existing use or a previously approved project to be a 'designated development' for the 
purposes of the Act. See EPAA Regs, Sch 3 Pt 2. 
EPAA, s 79(1). 
See EPAA, Regs Sch 3, Pt 2. 
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Advertised and Designated developments thus constitute the two broad, and as mdicated, 
flexible, categories which require public notification. 
In keeping with the 'layered cake' approach of EPAA the formal mechanics of notification 
share a common tiiread but differ in some sttangely minor aspects. Smce an overview is 
necessary if only to provide a basis of comparison with the situation under IPA, and a long 
qualitative description of each category would exhaust the writer and no doubt the reader 
most, though not all, of the salient features have been discussed in the following summary 
which stresses the variations between each category rather than thefr common elements. 
(c) Public Display 
(i) Designated Developments^^ 
• The Consent Authority is requfred to place the application and all supporting 
material (such as the E.I.S m the case of a 'Designated Development') on public 
display for a period not less than 30 days. The 30 day period runs from the day after 
the newspaper notice appears pursuant to s 79(l)(d). 
(ii) State Significant Advertised Development 56 
^^  EPAA, s 79(1). 
^^  EPAA, Regs cl 64(1). 
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• Section 79 of tiie Act also applies to State Significant Developments. In this case 
the Mmister, as the appropriate Consent Authority^^ has responsibility for 
compiling tiie notice of application and performfrig the otiier fimctions required by 
the section. 
(iii) Advertised Developments and other Notifiable Developments 58 
Notice m these instances is to be given in accordance with the Act, the Regulations^ an EPI 
or a relevant DCP.^ ^ 
(d) The Written Notice 
(i) Designated developments 
s 79(1) requires that a detailed written notice must be provided to the following 
persons: 
a) to owners and occupiers of adjoining land. 60 
^^  EPAA, s 76A(9). 
*^ EPAA, s 79A. 
^ EPAA, s 79A(1) and (2). 
• 
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b) to owners and occupiers of land which in the opinion of the consent 
authority may be detrimentally affected by the proposed 
development. 
and. 
c) to any other persons who may be requfred to be notified by the 
regulations. 
(ii) State Significant developments 
s 79 of the Act appHes equally to this class of development with the above three 
classes of persons receiving a written notice.^ ^ 
(iii) Nominated Integrated Developments and other advertised developments 
The regulations, cl 88 restrict the notification requfrement to; 
60 
61 
The contentious issue conceming the meaning of 'adjoining land' has, in both jurisdictions been left 
to the respective plannmg courts and will be dealt with subsequently. 
EPAA, Regs cl 83. 
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a) owners and occupiers of land adjoming the site which is the subject 
of the application, 
and. 
b) to such public authorities (other than concurrence or approval 
authorities) who, in the opinion of the consent authority, may have 
an interest in the application. 
One would have thought that if owners of land which may be detrimentally affected by a 
development involving three of the Acts under s 91 should be advised then at least a 
similar situation should prevail in respect of the other seven Acts. However this is not the 
case. 
(e) The Content of the Notice 
(i) Designated Developments 
• The list of matters which are requfred to be detailed in the Consent Authority's 
notice and on the 'site board' is extensive and include the following: 
62 See. EPAA, s 79(1) and Regs, cl 77-81. 
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• the land description 
• the name of tiie applicant and the approval authority 
• a description of the proposed development 
• a statement that the development is a 'designated development' 
• That the application, other documents and the Environmental Impact Study 
are available for inspection 
• That 'any person' may make a submission during the notice period and that 
if the submission is by way of an objection that the objection must specify 
the grounds of objection 
• If the Designated Development is also "Integrated" a statement to this effect 
including a list of the appropriate approval bodies and the approvals sought 
• A statement that a person who makes an objection may appeal to the Land 
and Envfronment court^ ^ 
(ii) State Significant Developments 
The information content for both the written notice and site advertisements for this class of 
development is detailed in the regulations^ "*. They provide for three exceptions to the 
information requfrements of the previous category viz: 
*^  For appeals to the L&E Court see EPAA, s 98. 
^ EPAA, s 79(l)(b) and Reg els 82-85 
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• tiie notice must now contam a statement that the development is not a 
designated development 
• as indicated by the nature of the category, submissions in respect of the 
development are to be dfrected to the Minister and, 
• that if the proposed development is a "Prohibited Development" under 
EPAA, s 89, the local council can request a Commission of Enquiry be held 
in respect of the matter^ ^ 
(iii) Nominated Integrated and Other advertised Developments 
In this instance the content of the notice^^ varies only in respect of those essential qualities 
which make up the class. Accordingly, it is considered essential that the lay public be 
advised that this is, in fact, an integrated development. 
At this point it is appropriate to pause ie prior to briefly considering the site notice and 
advertising requfrements, and to consider the IPA notice requirements by way of dfrect 
comparison. 
*^  See EPAA, s 119 and s 89(3). 
^ Detailed in EPAA, Reg cl 89. 
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2. IPA 
For the purposes of public notice and public participation generally, the Integrated 
Planning Act, 1997 establishes only two mam classes of development applications viz. 
those which are "impact assessable" and hence "notifiable" and those which are "code 
assessable" and "non-notifiable".^^By this simple expediency IPA avoids the variable 
standards dictated under EPAA which reflect the varying classes of development created 
by that Act. 
It can consequently be stated with reasonable certainty in Queensland that the four 
activities enjoined under the general heading of "public participation" in both jurisdictions, 
viz.public display and mspection, the written notice to nominated parties, the 'site board' 
notice and the advertising requirements are the same across the State and operate 
irrespective of local planning scheme policies or the tjpe of development proposed. 
(a) Public Display 
Though IPA has made the Impact/Code Assessability dichotomy cenfral to the 
development assessment process, all applications of either category must be made 
*^  IPA, s 3.4.2(1). Exempt and Self-Assessable categories are minor in scope and application. 
** IPA, s 6.1.28(1). 
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available to the public for mspection^^ until, generally, the end of the appeal period. Some 
material can be excluded from the ambit of this requfrement such as sensitive security 
mformation however the mtent of the Act is clearly to provide all relevant material to the 
public.^^ 
^) The Written Notice 
One of the Actions requfred to be completed within the 'notification period'^^ is to supply 
a notice to all owners of adjoiiung land. This notice must be m the form approved by the 
Chief Executive Officer''^. IPA is silent, as is EPAA, on the issue of what constitutes 
'adjoiiung land' for this purpose preferring to leave the issue to the appropriate court to 
determine on a case by case basis. However in sharp contrast to EPAA, the Queensland 
Act is also silent on the content of this written notice. It would seem that the content of the 
owners notice under part (c) of this section is the same as that requfred under the preceding 
sub-section which refers to the notice on the land. This effectively limits the notice to a 
short description of the subject land and the proposed project together with a short precis 
of their rights under the Act to make a submission and to uispect the application and 
supporting documents. 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
IPA, s 3.2.8(1). 
The requirement includes all "supporting material" which is extensively defined in IPA, s 3.2.8(3). 
'Notification period' is defined in IPA, s 3.4.5. and is 15 days (or 30 days in the case of 'referral 
coordination') from the day after the last action required to be performed by s 3.4.4(1). See also 
IPA, s 3.4.6(2) and (3). 
IPA, s 3.4.4(l)(a). 
IPA, s 5.8.1. Currently this is Form 7. 
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(c) Summary 
It is appropriate at this stage to compare and confrast the two systems as the additional 
requfrements viz. the site notices and the newspaper advertising follow the same principles 
outlined for public display and the owners notice. '^^  
It should now be clear from the above treatment that the inherent simplicity of the IPA 
notification regime is nowhere matched by EPAA. IPA, of course, has been able to 
accomplish this because it has abandoned a history of categories and other consfraints and 
adopted a totally new IDAS paradigm. EPAA is still consfrained by a legislative and 
regulative structure of increasing age. Even given the category issue however little 
attention seems to have been given in NSW to the reasons which should motivate a 
notification process or to the outcomes which are expected of such a process. Consequently 
it becomes a firm requirement under EPAA that the notice for a state significant 
development must indicate to the adjoining owner that the development is not a designated 
development, or if it is also a prohibited development that certain other events may occur. 
Similarly, of what real and direct significance is it likely to be to a lay owner of an 
adjoining property that the proposed development next door is designated and could also 
be mtegrated? 
''* They are, accordingly, not considered further. The requirements in these regards are however 
detailed in EPAA, Regs Pt 6 and IPA, s 3.4.4(l)(a) and (b). 
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Under these cfrcumstances the question which needs to be asked is who, in reality, is 
benefitmg from the notice requfrements and what level of understanding of the Act is 
casually assumed to exist in and amongst ordinary members of the community? 
The EPAA process is needlessly complex and could doubtlessly be abbreviated without 
necessarily abolishing the overarching development classes created under the Act should it 
be considered essential to retain them. The Queensland system certainly provides for a 
much more efficient over-all system which is easily explained to and understood by those 
affected by a development.^ ^ There are essentially only two things a notification system 
need set out to do; to advise that a particular type of development is proposed and to 
indicate where the application and supporting material can be inspected. IPA manages to 
achieve this efficiently and fairly within the ambit of a framework established by three 
consecutive and relatively short sections. ^^This is in sharp confrast to EPAA which 
manages to achieve considerably less while attempting considerably more. 
Running parallel with the formal statutory requirements detailed above are a range of 
associated legal issues which have inevitably arisen under subsidiary provisions or as a 
consequence of the evolution of various principles of interpretation by the relevant courts. 
Each of these areas will now be discussed in tum and the similarities and dissimilarities of 
approach in each jurisdiction conttasted with the overall intention of exttacting principles 
^^  Applicants are included in this category. 
'^  IPA, ss 3.4.4(1) to 3.4.7. 
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which would seem to best secure an mcrease in tiie efficiency or equity of a plaiming 
regime. 
This discussion will take place under the following headings: 
Notification and Participation as a jurisdictional requfrement. The obligations of the 
applicant 
• What is a properly made submission. The obligations of the submitter 
The administtative and judicial capacity to forgive errors 
The reception of envfronmental submissions 
Fraudulent or deceitfiil submissions 
E NOTIFICATION AND PARTICIPATION AS A JURISDICTIONAL 
REQUIREMENT 
IPA lays out the framework Notification Stage m Ch 3, Pt 1 which as well as estabUshing 
the various forms of notice, thefr content and other procedural matters specifically sets out 
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to describe the purpose of the stage.^^ Accorduigly fr is tiie purpose of notification to give a 
person; 
a) the opportunity to make submissions, mcluding objections, that must be taken hito 
account before an application is decided; and 
h) the opportunity to secure the right of appeal to the court about the assessment 
manager's decision. 
In the context of some of the cases which are to be considered under this heading this 
represents an serious attempt to formally describe the statutory purpose of the stage which 
is unportant since the description of any specific requfrement or set of requfrements as 
mandatory or directory may tum on the court's prior constmction of the Act having regard 
to the intention of the legislature.'^^ 
In contrast neither EPAA nor its regulations contain any similar statement of principle, 
once again reflecting the older stmcture of the Act, and it has been left to tiie courts to mfer 
a statutory purpose more or less in line with the Queensland Act. 
The point at issue here is whether strict compliance with all the notification requfrements 
and with all thefr procedural specificity is an essential prerequisite or condition precedent 
' ' IPA, s 3.4.1. 
* See McRae v Coulter (1986) 7 NSWLR. 644. It is conceded however that the recent decision of the 
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to both the jurisdiction of the court to hear a matter on appeal and the authority of a council 
to decide the matter in the first place. In short, to what extent are these requfrements 
'mandatory' or 'directory' or if the mterpretative principle is now statutory intent, what 
factors will bear upon the issue? Until recently, the highest authority on point arises out of 
earlier Queensland legislation, Scurr v Brisbane City Council which concemed the 
sufficiency or otherwise of the advertised notice of a development application under s 22 
of the then City of Brisbane Town Planning Act. 
The appellants contention was that the reference in the notice to the constmction of a 
'shop' was an altogether insufficient and inadequate description of a proposal which, in 
reality, involved the constmction of an 11,000 m2 Discount Department Store with parking 
for 1100 cars. 
The following principles are derivable from the judgments in this case: 
the adequacy of a notice is properly a matter for the court to decide on 
appeal«° 
HCA inProjectBlue Sky v ABC (1998) 72 ALJR 841 largely torpedoed this distinction with the 
emphasis now rather firmly placed on the intention of the legislature. 
79 
80 
(1973) 133 CLR 242. 
Gibbs J at p 243. 
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81 
m 
83 
• fr is not sufficient for a notice, given a provision which requfres certain 
particulars to be provided, to merely refer to another source from whom 
Q1 
those particulars can be obtained 
a reference to 'particulars of the application' given the obvious policy goals 
of such provision, should not be given a narrow meaning^^ 
• that since the same section required objectors to state the facts and 
cfrcumstances upon which they were relying in support of specific grounds 
of objection it would be unfafr if the applicant could validly provide a bare 
minimum of perhaps even misleading information^^and. 
that ultimately a court may be called upon to categorise such provisions as 
either mandatory or dfrectory respectively requiring either strict or 
substantial compliance with the terms of the provision. In this instance 
however Stephen J could conclude: 
I doubt, however, whether, m the present case, a distinction of any 
substance exists between a mandatory and dfrectory interpretation of the 
Gibbs J at p 243. 
Stephen J at p 252. 
Stephen J at p 254. 
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requfrement that the public notice contain particulars of the application. It 
is well established that a dfrectory interpretation of a stamtory requfrement 
still necessitates, as a condition of validity, that there should be substantial 
compliance with the requfrement... When the requhement is that 
"particulars of the application" should be given by public advertisement 
and when once it is accepted that there must be an advertisement which 
gives some particulars, it is difficult to discern any distinction between a 
strict observance of this requfrement, such as a mandatory interpretation 
would call for, and the substantial observance of it, as called for by a 
dfrectory interpretation.^ 
It is unportant to note however that the court did not mle that all procedural aspects need 
necessarily be strictly complied with in all mstances and m his judgment Stephen J clearly 
leaves open future claims for relief based upon substantial but not strict compliance with 
"some formality of time or procedure".^^ 
The centtal issue at this point is what standard can exist against which an act or series of 
actions can be inferred to be strictly or substantially compliant and in a subsequent 
decision in Victoria v The Commonwealth and Connor, the same judge took the 
opportunity to elaborate on this point. In Stephen J's words the standard is "the general 
object at which the statutory provision aims" or in other words the purpose of the provision 
** Stephen J at p 255. 
^^  at p 256. 
86 (1975) 134 CLR 81. 
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or division or chapter of the Act. This proposition has now been adopted by the High Court 
in Project Blue Sky P/l v ABC ^^  which has, accordingly, effectively abolished the old 
dichotomy. The origin of the IPA "Purpose Provision" in s 3.4.1. should now be clear. 
The ongoing sigruficance of the decision in Scurr lies certainly not in a contention that it 
established a 'mandatory' mle of interpretation in respect of 'notice' provisions which is 
good for all time but rather m the simple proposition that the question of the sufficiency or 
adequacy of a legally requfred action should be weighed m the balance of the policy 
intentions of the provision or indeed the whole statute.^ * Accordingly, Scurr has been 
followed in many subsequent cases and yet has been distinguished in others^^ and smce the 
policy intention which motivates the notice provisions in both acts is the same, it is not 
surprising that the juridical outcomes in both States have also been sunilar. 
The courts in both jurisdictions have a power to remedy or overlook defects which do not 
go to the substance of the notification procedure. In Proprietors ofSP 13318 and 13555 v 
Lavender View Regency P/L v North Sydney Councif^ Talbot J concluded that: 
87 
8S 
89 
90 
(1998) 72 ALJR 841. 
See Kent v Parramatta City Council (1984) 51 LGRA 399. 
'Distinguish' is really an inappropriate description since Scurr certainly allows for the 
mandatory/directory dichotomy to continue. 
(1997) 97 LGERA 337. 
234 
A notice which omits a critical part of the description of the property cannot be regarded as 
a notice which gives the recipient a reasonable opportunity to participate fri the process of 
consideration and determmation of a development application. 
The same principle has been followed m the Queensland decision of Daly DCJ m 
NashvyingP/L v Mulgrave Shire Councif^ and is essentially incorporated in IPA, s 4.1.53 
which allows the court to decide an appeal if the court is satisfied that non-compliance 
with some aspect of the IDAS procedure has not (a) adversely affected the awareness of 
the public of the existence and nature of the application or (b) restricted the rights of the 
public to exercise the rights conferred by the requirements. Faced with a list of notice 
deficiencies in Curac v Shoalhaven City Councif^ Stein J pointed to the broader 
requirements of the notice sections in that though it may be possible to show that no 
prejudice has occurred to the party before the court it carmot be demonsttated that some 
members of the public may not have been disadvantaged.^'* 
There is thus a general cautionary principle operating where the sufficiency of the actions 
taken by the applicant will be weighed ui the balance of the statutory purpose of the notice 
91 
92 
93: 
9* 
[1994] QPLR 392. 
The same discretion is given to the assessment manager to be exercised on the same basis. See IPA, 
s 3.4.8. For a practical example of the operation of this principle under the precursor act see, Quetel 
P/L V Gladstone City Council [1991] QPLR 24. 
(1993) 81 LGERA 124,130. 
See also: Warren v Electricty Commission (NSW) (unreported, L&E Court, October 1990) at 8 & 
34; Willoughby City Council v Minister Administering the National Parks and Wildlife Act [1992] 
LGERA 19; Broomham v Tallaganda Shire Council (unreported, L&E Court, October, 1986) 
Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd v Parkes Developments P/L (1974) 2 NSWLR 590; Auburn 
Municipal Council v EckoldP/L (1974) 34 LGRA 101. 
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and participation sections as a whole. Where there is clearly no compliance tiien fr is of no 
consequence to determme whether substantial compUance is legally sufficient however, 
notwithstanding the fact that in both jurisdictions a rather strict, if not mandatory, approach 
has been adopted to procedural breaches by applicants'^ the possibility still exists for some 
procedural defects to be found to be not fatal to the applicants standing. In Anderson v 
Mareeba Shire Councif^ Daly DCJ finding that an indoor pistol range could properly be 
described for notice purposes as an "indoor recreation centre" went on to comment that it 
was undesirable and unnecessary for the court to read into the legislation a further 
requirement that the notice should assist in the identification of the likely impact of the 
proposal.'^ 
In both jurisdictions the legal issues and concems which have arisen to be decided by the 
courts have done so in the context of predictably similar statutory provisions and have led 
to predictably similar conclusions. Queensland benefits from a specific statement of 
purpose which appears at s 3.4.1. and by a clear statement of guidelmes for the court in 
exercising any residual discretion to infer a 'directory' status to aspects of procedure in s 
4.1.53. In the absence of an efficient statutory regime ui this respect however the NSW 
courts have evolved similar mles which achieve the same ends. 
95 
n 
97 
98 
See judgment of Bignold J in Bell v Minister For Urban Affairs. (1997) 95 LGERA 86,106 and 
the decision of Quirk DCJ in Thiess Contractors P/L v Brisbane City Council and Collex Waste 
Management P/L (Planning and Environment Court Appeal No 3786 of 1999) The strict principle in 
the latter case may have effectively replaced the more (hscretionary standard applied in Crest 
Projects P/L v Cooloola Shire Council [1995] QPLR 323. 
See J.J.Richards and Sons P/L v Ipswich City Council (1995) 86 LGERA 417. 
[1998] QPELR 255, 257. 
See also; RhonwoodP/L v Cairns City Council [ P&E Court, Qld, No 19 of 1999] on sufBciency of 
description. 
236 
On balance however the IPA system is certamly better ordered and stmctured, and more 
concise and clearer. EPAA, as has been remarked often m this tteatment, continues to 
suffer from the inevitable consequences of a common law evolution that has not been not 
paralleled by ongoing statutory amendment. 
The same contrast is evident when we tum from an examination of the applicants to the bi-
polar responsibilities of submitters or objectors. 
F. WHAT IS A PROPERLY MADE SUBMISSION 
As suggested above this portion of perhaps any development assessment process is bi-polar 
requiring a series of formal and legal compliant actions by the applicant to notify and 
participation, however defined, by the party making a submission. If, as has been shown, 
the courts have adopted, on balance, a strict approach to the procedural requfrements 
surroundmg the Act of notification what has been thefr response to similar issues in respect 
of the legally appropriate forms of participation in both jurisdictions?^^ 
The two Acts diverge rather sharply at this point with IPA gomg to considerable lengths in 
an attempt to characterise and define and EPAA leaving many matters in a very open and 
^ See Ireland, C "The Recognition of Jurisdictional Facts in Planning Law." (1999) 4 Local 
Government Law Journal pp 164-168. 
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undefined state mdeed. The respective approaches are a product of the differing statutory 
and regulatory modalities which will now be considered in tum. 
1. Who may submit 
The principal of global inclusion remarked upon earlier operates in both jurisdictions with 
"any person" being entitled to make a submission. ^ °° 
2. What are the characteristics of a valid submission 
On the face on it there should only be two requirements for a valid submission: 1) that it 
should be lodged 'm time' and 2) if it is in the form of an objection that it should state the 
relevant grounds of that objection. Both Acts in fact do adopt these two criteria. However, 
where EPAA leaves much material, and one could suggest too much material, undefined 
IPA goes to elaborate (and perhaps over-elaborate) lengths to create a statutory framework 
which attempts to define everything but which, in the course of so doing, has unfortunately 
left some important matters in a current state of confusion. 
100 IPA, s 3.4.9(1) and EPAA, s 79(5). The only exception under IPA relates to 'concurrence agencies' 
who have the right to refiise the application outri^t. (IPA, s 3.3.18(2)(b)) and who are specifically 
excluded therfore from making a submission. (IPA, s 3.4.9(1). A similar power to refuse an 
application is granted to 'concurrence' agencies under EPAA, s 79B(8) though neither the Act or 
regulations go on to exclude such an agency from either making a submission or, presumably, filing 
an appeal. (See EPAA, s 98(1)) 'Advice Agencies" under IPA, do however possess the right to both 
submit and to appeal. (IPA, ss 3.4.9(1) and 4.1.28(1)) 
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Takmg these issues in tum, once again the EPAA categories of development resulted, prior 
to the recent amendments to the regulations, in varying temporal requirements. This 
situation has now been rationalised. In the case of a designated development the 
submission period (which is noted ui bold type m s 79(1 )(a) but otherwise undefined in the 
Act or regulations) is a period of 30 days.^°^ State Significant developments provide for a 
similar tune period, as do Nommated Integrated developments and other advertised or 
local developments. 
In some conttast under IPA a serious attempt is made to define all terms and to create a 
clear and manageable stmcture. A submission, under IPA, must be received "during the 
notification period" °^^ The notification period, in tum, is defined in s 3.4.5. as not less 
than; (a) where there is no referral coordination, 15 business days after the applicant 
performs the last of the notification actions mentioned in s. 3.4.4.(1) or where the 
application is the subject of referral coordination, 30 business days after the performance 
of the last of the notification actions. Interestingly, in calculating the period, IPA 
specifically excludes any business days between December 20 and January 5 in each year. 
m 
101 
m 
103 
See EPAA, s 79(l)(a). 
IPA, s 3.4.9(1). 
This should finally put an end to the hoary old tradition of erecting site boards and insertiag 
newspaper advertismehts while Austraha is on hoUdays or otherwise at the beach. No such 
prohibition exists under EPAA where, presumably, Christmas-eve erections are still commonplace. 
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Smce both Acts specifically requfre a submission to be lodged with the relevant consent 
authority,^ "'^  and within a specific time frame, mevitably cfrcumstances have arisen where 
for a variety of reasons this requirement has not been met. 
Underlying the statutory provisions and judicial decisions on pomt there exists a broad 
issue of principle. If the policy behind the type of participation ethos which is refiected m 
both Acts is "that adminisfrators take account of each of the wide variety of relevant 
interests differentially affected by possible policy altematives"^^^ or of any number of 
similar rationales acting in concert then, arguably, the imposition of strict mandatory 
requfrements for submissions, either by the statute or by a court, may run counter to the 
intellectual propositions which supposedly justify such participation in the ffrst place. 
There is a clear tension here between the creation of a flexible adminisfrative process and 
the application of prescriptive mles conceming that process. 
Given that submissions, essentially, merely enlarge the data context within which a 
decision can be made then, m one sense, it should not matter if a submission is received 'in 
time' or 'out of time' and if it fails to address a ground for objection then clearly it 
possesses no weight even at the administtative level. In these cfrcumstances, to insist on 
compliance with strict mandatory requfrements and even further to making these 
requfrements a jurisdictional foundation for the making of an adminisfrative decision, quite 
'"* These are exhaustively Usted under IPA in the Sch 10 definition of a 'properly made 
submission', pt (e). 
105 See Stewart, R. "Reform of U.S. Administrative Law." (1975) 85 Harvard Law Review, p 1669 at 
1759. 
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apart from an appellate one, may be misguided. Perhaps it could be argued that an issue of 
equity is mvolved and that if a submission, received considerably out of time, can be used 
as a foundation for an appeal then an applicant could be materially disadvantaged. If this 
were the case then presumably applicants would be severely disadvantaged by the 
existence of a very open-ended access to the declaratory jurisdictions of the respective 
courts.^ °^ There seems however to have been no obvious prejudice to the rights of 
applicants by the existence of such an extensive jurisdiction. 
With this in mind therefore there seems to be no readily apparent set of cfrcumstances 
which should preclude the acceptance of 'any' submission and 'at any time' and no 
genuine reason why such a submission should not form a valid part of the common 
material for assessment or indeed constitute a jurisdictional foundation for a subsequent 
appeal. 
The jurisdiction which comes closest to correctly understandmg this tension between 
mformation and jurisdiction is IPA which attempts, although in a manner which has caused 
some mterim concem, to balance the policy requirements of the broad participatory 
process against a potential inequity to the applicant. IPA sets out to achieve some sort of 
balance ui this area by, on the one hand, permitting submissions, say, which are 'out of 
time', to be received by the assessment manager and to become part of the common 
material but to prevent such a submission from establishing standing for an appeal. That is. 
^°^ IPA, s 4.1.21(1).. "Any person may bring proceedings for a declaration..." These are designated in 
NSW as "Class 4" proceedings under the Land and Environment Court Act 1979„s 20. 
241 
tiie material can be used for assessment only. This is achieved by an overlappmg set of 
provisions which; 
define a properly made submission in some detail 107 
allows the assessment manager to receive a submission even if it is not 
property made,^ °« 
and. 
permits such a submission to form part of the common material for 
assessment purposes;^ °^ 
It seems relatively clear however that such a submission cannot found an appeal. Section 
4.1.28(1) permits a 'submitter' to appeal but 'submitter' is defined in Sch 10 as "a person 
who makes a properly made submission". Consequently, the question resolves itself to 
whether the exercise of an administrative discretion to receive under s 3.4.9(3) can convert 
an improperly made submission into a properly made one for the purpose of s 4.1.28(1).^ ^° 
It will left to the Planning and Environment Court to decide the issue in due course though 
107 
108 
ttSI 
iio 
IPA, Sch 10 definition of "properly made submission." Amongst the criteria listed are that it 
must be received during the notification period and state the grounds, facts and circumstances relied 
upon. 
IPA, s 3.4.9(3). 
IPA, Sch 10 definition of "cotamon material". 
Note that IPA, s 4.1.53 which deals with the power of the court to forgive notification errors does 
not bear upon the issue since the statutory criteria in subsection (a) and (b) clearly relate to the 
notification requirements imposed on applicants. 
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fr is doubtful whether the court will adopt a liberal approach for two reasons: fnst, the 
dichotomy which appears to be created under tiie Act does possess a particular, if peculiar, 
rationality and second, previous decisions of the court under the precursor Act have 
emphasised the courts opuiion that such statutory criteria are mandatory and indeed 
jurisdictional. ^ ^^  
If this mterpretation is correct the IPA effectively allows for the reception of procedurally 
inept submissions as part of the common material for assessment purposes but prevents 
their being used to establish a jurisdictional basis for an appeal. This can only be called a 
compromise position. It would seem more in keeping with the underlying ideology of the 
Act that totally open access should be given to appeal rights as is the case with applications 
for declarations which currently are not subject to any such restriction. 
The second of the substantive qualities which a submission must possess in both 
jurisdictions is that it must specifically address the grounds of the objection. In NSW this 
requfrement is contained in s 79(5) viz: 
During the submission period, any person may make written submissions to the consent 
authority with respect to the development apphcation. A submission by way of objection 
must set out the grounds of the objection. 
I l l State of Queensland V Nanango Shire Council [1999] QPLR 116. 
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The equivalent definition in IPA is contamed m Sch 10, Part (d) which states tiiat a 
"properly made submission" is, inter alia, one which "states the grounds of the submission 
and the facts and cfrcumstances relied on in support of the grounds". 
The, in-principle, issue here is whether m both jurisdictions the courts have tended to adopt 
the old mandatory/directory dichotomy in respect of this second requirement. Two 
decisions, one in NSW and the other in Queensland together confirm that what could be 
called the "content requiremenf' will be viewed by the courts in both jurisdictions on a 
sympathetic and fiexible basis in sharp contrast to the ridged standard imposed on the 
temporal aspect of a submission. 
In Ballina Environmental Society v Ballina Shire Council Bignold J of the Land and 
Envfronment Court was asked to decide whether a letter received from the society 
constituted a 'submission' for the purposes of founding an appeal. The letter, which was 
received in time, simply contained the statement that; 
This society objects most sttongly to the proposals shown in the envfronmental impact 
statement for DA 1991/270. 
The following two paragraphs went on to castigate the local authority for placing the 
application to public notice over the Christmas period. 
112 [1992] LGERA 232. 
244 
In an extensive judgment Bignold J took the opportunity to review the issues of law and 
policy which bore upon the issue. In his opmion the requfrement that an objection need 
state the grounds of the objection had its origin m two things; 
• an attempt to distinguish between submissions in support of a proposal and 
submissions which constitute an objection to a proposal. 
to ensure that the developer, the consent authority and in the case of a 
designated development, the Minister all have the benefit of knowing the 
specific grounds of the objection. 
113 The Judge went on to quote Stephen J in Spurling with approval; 
[T]he restriction of the right to appeal to those who feel aggrieved does emphasise the 
desirability of an objection, which the legislature requfres a responsible authority to 
consider before arriving at any determination of an application, settmg out with some 
clarity the grounds upon which a particular objector conceives himself to be adversely 
affected. 
U3 Spurling v Development Underwriting (Vic) P/L 1 (1973) VR 38. 
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One can accept Stephen J's statement at face value as does the judge in tiiis case as an 
accurate summary of the policy position. However the contention in this case by the 
respondent goes further than the facilitation of an admmisttative process viz. that 
specificity is a pre-condition to jurisdiction. 
Bignold J in this instance, and one suspects his principle is rather broad, rejects this 
suggestion^ ^ '^ : 
The requfrement" he concludes, "for the objector to specify ui the written objection the 
grounds of objection is clearly aprocedural matter and is not a matter of substance... (The 
judges' italics). 
Nevertheless even a procedural matter requfres a requisite degree of substantial compliance 
and this the judge felt had been satisfied by the subsequent submission of a detailed 
response, though some six weeks after the closing date for submissions. The limiting factor 
here presumably is that the material which contains the detail of the objection needs to be 
provided to the consent authority in sufficient time to allow the authority to have the 
benefit of the objection in formulating thefr adminisfrative response to the application. 
Ballina Environmental Society is consequently not absolute authority for the proposition 
that the issue of content is merely dfrectory and that the specific grounds of the objection 
"" Note 112. 
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may be passed over in a submission. Substantial compUance in this mstance requfres two 
factors, the submission of specific grounds and in a relevant time frame. 
A qualitatively different approach to the same issue was adopted in Queensland in State of 
Queensland v Nanango Shire Council.^^^ fri this mstance Rowe DCJ concluded that all 
'objections' should be construed sympathetically. At issue was whether a letter which 
expressed concems but which did not specifically categorise those concems as objections 
could be considered a sufficient jurisdictional foundation for a subsequent appeal. 
On the face of it it is a letter which expresses concems in relation to the application. In 
considering the letter, a Court should look at the whole of the document and ascertain 
whether, on a construction of the whole of the document, there is evidence of an intent to 
object to the application. The document is not to be constmed strictly as a statute, but it is 
to be given a wide construction m order to arrive at its proper meaning. 
Both decisions essentially arrive at the same end point and a ttansition has been made from 
a mandatory approach in respect of time periods to a much more flexible one in the case of 
content in both jurisdictions. 
The question that remains however is why this piece of legerdemain is even requfred and 
one is left with the impression that it is only the language of the statutes which, in the case 
115 (1999)1 QPELR 116. 
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of tune periods, is necessarily mandatory and imperative which precludes the courts from 
adopting a more flexible approach even ui those cases. A larger issue, however, still 
remains. Despite the legislatures policy intention to allow a consent manager the benefit of 
an objection at the administtative level there is no inherent reason why an administtative 
preference should ui any event be converted into a substantive question of legal standing. 
Even the judge in Ballina Environmental Society was prepared to dispense with the idea 
that specificity was necessary to avoid an unfair interference with the proprietary rights of 
an applicant for a development consent. ^^ ^ 
It should be questioned why both Acts need to specify such requfrements as pre-conditions 
for an appeal right and this confusion of means and ends is exemplified by the simple fact 
that once a matter is appealed, submitters in both jurisdictions are not limited to the 
grounds stated in their objections. An altemative framework would place no such 
restrictions on the right to appeal which, since public participation is enshrined in both 
Acts as a preeminent good, should be open to all as it is in cases of declaratory relief and 
117 
subject only to the normal court mles conceming the filing of an appeal. 
116 
117 
at p 241. 
Unlimited third-party appeal rights were canvassed and then rejected in the new Northem Territory 
Planning Act, 1999. In his second reading speech the Mimster gave no reason for their rejection 
beyond the fact that "they didn't work". 
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a. FRAUDULENT AND KNOWINGLY FALSE OBJECTIONS DURING PUBLIC 
SUBMISSION PROCESSES. 
One of the intentions of all good planning legislation is to establish a reasonable basis of 
faimess and equity between competing sides of often contentious issues. This purpose 
however may be defeated or at the very least threatened if one party attempts to abuse or 
subvert a statutory process for its own benefit. 
Although one could point to a number of areas where such subversion may occur such as 
the 'purchase' of compliant expert evidence by applicant appellants, this discussion is 
directed to the abuse of process which occurs when a submitter/objector makes a 
submission which is fraudulent, that is, knowingly false. 
No Austtalian plarming jurisdiction attempts specifically, or indeed by implication, to 
address the consequences of an objection which the objector knows to be false and which 
is calculated to mislead the consent authority and the applicant. ^ ^^  This lack of attention 
reflects either an absence of awareness that such a problem exists which is doubtful in 
view of the prevalence of the practice, or a perception by the legislature that should an 
applicant feel aggrieved enough to seek redress then it should do so outside the specific 
planning jurisdictions and in the general jurisdiction of the courts. Whatever the reason for 
the absence of a statutory remedy the problem of fraudulent submissions continues and 
121 Qld: Integrated Planning Act 1997, s 3.4.9(1); NSW.- Environmental Planning and Assessment 
Act 1979,s 79(5); Vic: Planning and Environment Act 1987, s 57; Tas: Land Use Planning and 
Approvals Act 1993, s 43F(5); S.A.: Development Act 1993 s 38; W.A.: Various Local Planning 
instruments pmTsuant to the Town Planning and Development Act 1928; N.T.: Planning Act 1999, s 
19; ACT: Land(Planning andEnvironmentjAct 1991, s 237. 
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anecdotal evidence is not difficult to fmd. The problem however is not confined to 
planning law; it may arise in any statutory context which allows for a public submission 
process. Smce no Austtalian plannmg legislation provides a mechanism for a remedy and 
since the law ttaditionally abhors a wrong without a remedy, the purpose here is to 
examine what, if any, options may be available to an applicant seeking to recover wasted 
costs from such a submitter. ^ ^^  
In the planning jurisdiction the following examples will illusttate the practice: 
• a submission which asserted that an endangered species was present on the 
proposed development site. The submitter was a university academic and, as it 
ttanspired, the leading Austtalian authority on this particular species. In subsequent 
conversations within the Neighbourhood Action Group he confirmed that the 
species was not present and indeed could never have been present given the littoral 
scmb which covered the site. In his opinion however, which was home out by 
events, he had successftdly held up a decision on the matter by at least three 
months. In this instance two persons were prepared to confirm this statement and 
the subsequent fauna study carried out by another university confirmed in emphatic 
terms that the animal had never inhabited the site. 
119 
a submission that a rare native vine existed on site. The submitter was an amateur 
botanist of mature years. The facts are similar to the ffrst example. In subsequent 
Since no privity exists between submitter and applicant the treatment is limited to remedies in tort. 
4 
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conversations he admitted that the vme had never existed on site and that he had 
made the statement purely to aimoy the applicant and to delay the project. 
a submission that a large site for a proposed major retail project contamed areas of 
significant aboriginal heritage value. The principal submitters were a husband and 
wife who both had an association with the local clan. In an obviously unguarded 
moment while in conversation with the applicant's project manager, the wife 
conceded that neither she, her husband or the clan, "had a clue" whether the site 
contained such areas but that since it was in the traditional clan area it could have. 
An expensive study which was requested by the assessment manager failed to 
locate any ttaces on site, and interviews with members of the local clan were 
ambiguous and inconclusive. 
In the ffrst two instances, independent evidence is available on the critical issue of intent 
and it is acknowledged that, in a majority of cases such dfrect evidence may not be 
available. However even in its absence the persuasiveness of an expert statement which is 
found to be at complete variance to the tmth should not be underestimated. It is also 
conceded that in most instances the majority of applicants will be content with an eventual, 
if delayed, approval. The applicant will absorb the resultant costs of the fraud and will 
suffer the injustice in silence. Developers are, after all, interested in profit not in pursuing 
interesting legal points or indeed in seeking revenge after the battle has been won, though 
they may well be if the battle has been lost Nevertheless an awareness that redress is 
See Crane, W "Fraudulent Objections in Public Submission Processes" (2001-2002) 7 (31) QEPR 
59. 
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possible in tiiese situations cow/i/resttain some of tiie more egregious examples of 
submitter fraud. 
The examples given above contain the followmg elements: 
• a statement which the submitter knows to be false 
• made with the knowledge and intention that the consent authority should 
rely upon it and, as a function of that authority's statutory responsibilities, 
that in all probability the applicant may be called upon to act upon it 
• the consent authority does act upon it 
• the applicant is, in tum, obliged to conduct detail surveys and other studies 
to refute the false statement(s) and thereby suffers immediate and 
consequential loss 
Given these facts two torts are analogous or adaptable. 
1. Deceit^ "^ 
120 See Fleming, J.G. The Law of Torts. 9* ed. (Sydney, Law Book Co, 1998) pp 694-704. 
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Witii the exception of the third example, which could charitably be described as evidencing 
a degree of carelessness or negligence sufficient to take it outside the bounds of an action 
for decefr^ ^^ the fnst two examples seem to satisfy, with two caveats, the requfrements for 
such an action. They exempHfy a knowmgly false statement which has intentionally 
mduced another to act upon it to its detriment. ^ ^^  
The two caveats referred are as follows: 
• 
• 
121 
122 
123 
the submitter's fraudulent representation is in fact made to the consent authority 
and not to the applicant directly. The latter has relied and acted upon the 
ttansmission of the representation by the consent authority as an intermediary. This 
third party factor will not be an obstacle to the applicant's clafrn. Peek v Gurney^^^ 
long ago established that such a misrepresentation need not be made dfrectly to the 
party who has suffered the loss. The aggrieved party in other words can be 
separated from the representor by an intermediary. 
the second caveat concems the issue of reliance. Despite the applicants third party 
status it is necessary in terms of the historical limits of the Action that it rely on the 
representation to its detriment, fri the cases given as illusttations it may be difficult 
to argue that the applicant relied upon the submitters statements to any extent at all. 
This is a charitable interpretation since the third leg of Herschell L.J's classic statement viz. 
"reckless, careless whether it be true or false" could well bring it within a claim for deceit. Derry v 
Peek. (1889) 14 App Cas 337, 374. 
Pasley v Freeman (1789) 100 ER 450. 
(1873) LR. 6 H.L. 377. See also, Lesley Leithead v Barber (1965) 65 SR. NSW and T.J.Larkins and 
Sons V Chelmer Holdings P/L/ and Van deb Broek [1965] Qd.R. 68. 
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Clearly the reliance, if again that is an appropriate description of what has occurred, 
lies with the consent authority. The fact that the applicant may be in a position vis a 
vis the consent authority which is conditioned by various statutory consequences if 
it does not act on the request^ "^* may not constitute the necessary or sufficient 
connection to enable a claim to be successfully brought. 
Consequently, if the ttaditional boundaries of an action for deceit are strictly adhered to by 
a court an applicant may not succeed. Part of my purpose here is to suggest that these 
boundaries should not be so closely applied that such an action would be closed off. 
There are a number of reasons why I believe this should be the case. The law of tort as we 
know it today is an evolutionary constmct which has shown an amazing ability over time 
to adapt an existing remedy or to create an entfrely new one which could effectively 
address emerging problems, changing social concems, new technology and a host of other 
similar factors. That judges have been able to manage such a process, mcrementally and 
over long periods of time is obviously one of the cRoweeening achievements of the 
common law. In general terms the courts have sought and found appropriate remedies for 
wrongs which sometimes were unimaginable to earlier judges. With the insertion of public 
participation and submission processes in much of the recent Federal and state legislation 
we are seeing the rise of a wrong for which the statutes themselves do not contemplate a 
remedy. In such a cfrcumstance or until a statutory remedy becomes available, it is clearly 
^^* in Queensland, for example, this may involve a costs award under s 4.1.23(2)(g) of the Integrated 
Planning Act 1997 for not providing information reasonably requested by an assessment manager. 
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open to the courts to extend the Action for deceit to cover the cfrcumstances outiuied 
above or indeed to create a new tort. 
The Action for deceit could be extended to cover these situations by mcluding within its 
ambit situations where the instigator of the fraud knew or had a reasonably expectation that 
the applicant (who bears the onus of proof in both decision and appeal stages) may be 
called upon by a relevant authority to disprove the allegation and in so doing incur costs. 
Altematively, in cases where a statute does not contemplate a potential wrong, a court 
could elect to create a new tort to cover a fraudulent abuse of a statutory process where the 
abuse is calculated or is reasonably expected to cause another party a pecuniary loss. In 
view of the prevalence of public submission processes and to avoid damaging an otherwise 
laudable legislative intention such a tort would need to be limited to fraudulent or grossly 
negligent submissions. 
In either instance however the plaintiff should be, as he is in the fraditional form of action, 
entitled to immediate and consequential damages, and at the option of the court, reflecting 
the community's condemnation of fraud, to aggravated damages as well. 
2. Injurious Falsehood 
The elements of this tort have been reasonably well established since the tum of the last 
century. 
In order to support an action based upon the by deceiving of other persons so that 
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tiiefr mistaken acts they cause harm to the plaintiff it is necessary for hun to prove that the 
statement complamed of was false, that it was made maliciously- ie. without just cause or 
excuse and that the plamtiff has suffered special damage there from. 
A point to note here is that although Royal Baking Powder concemed an allegation of ttade 
libel, Lord Davey does not make the existence of a ttade relationship between the parties 
an element of the definition. This effectively opens up the Action to encompass the 
mstances given earlier as. A contextual argument based around the fact that the statements 
in the case were more clearly designed to cause dfrect pecuniary loss and therefor that the 
decision should be limited by this fact alone should fail. The anticipated consequence of a 
fraudulent submission in the mind of a submitter is certainly to cause direct and 
consequential financial loss to the third party applicant of equal or greater significance to 
that which was the case in Royal Baking Powder. 
Historically the difficulty with the action as a response to an alleged ttade libel has been 
the necessity of establishing special damage. This requirement has been modified 
somewhat by later decisions however even as a strict requirement it is unlikely to become 
an impediment in the case of a fraudulent submission since the loss will be invariably 
quantifiable ie. anthropological and fauna survey costs etc. Sunilarly, holding costs 
associated with delay are again quite readily quantifiable. 
A claim either framed in deceit or for injurious falsehood and based on a fraudulent 
submission tendered under a statutory process has yet to be decided. However, with the 
^" Davey LJ in The Royal Baking Powder Co. v Wright, Crossley and Co.(1901) 18 RPC 95, 99. Also 
Taylor v Hyde [1918] NZLR 279. 
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mcreasmg prevalence of public submission processes the conduct described here is likely 
to increase. 
In the absence of a specific statutory duty not to supply false mformation maliciously or 
recklessly which is almost certairtiy the most effective way of addressmg the problem, and 
the fact that the costs powers of the specialist courts can only address subnutters qua 
appellants or respondents, aggrieved parties must have a recourse to the general law of tort 
and in particular to the two actions briefly described above. 
Whether the knowledge that such a claim could be made will prove sufficient over time to 
restrain the more malicious and dishonest category of objector and, importantly, can do so 
without affecting those genuine objectors who are merely inaccurate remains to be seen. 
H. PUBLIC ENQUIRIES 
If public participation at the time of plan or scheme formulation could be called Level One 
participation and the submission process in respect of applications a Level Two process 
then the availability of a further public enquiry procedure in respect of some applications 
constitutes a further third level of participation. Elsewhere the Austtalian approach to 
public participation as "fulsome" and indeed it is. 
It is however important, irutially, to distinguish this third level from the mformal processes 
which occur frequently in both jurisdictions. Given an application which raises a set of 
contentious local issues some form of public gathering or meeting will be convened, 
generally by the local councillor. Frequently called "objectors meetings" they bring 
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together the applicant or its representatives, perhaps a number of persons claiming 
specialised knowledge and, of course, members of the general public. Neither Act however 
makes any formal provision for this type of meeting. They occur as part of the sub-text of 
the planning legislation, and are part of the informal processes which are, ui reality, 
essential to the functioning of the formal statutory framework. 
The two jurisdictions differ markedly at this level. Under IPA no specific provision exists 
which clearly permits the establishment of a further level of public enquiry at the 
application stage. ^ '^ ^ This is not however to suggest that such an enqufry could not be held, 
merely that the committee or commission would need to be established under another 
Act. The last observation is made with one caveat which relates to the insertion in the 
Act of the problematical s 3.2.7 subsection 3 which states that the assessment manager may 
ask any person for advice or comment on the application, and, there is no particular way 
[such] advice or comment may be asked for. Arguably this opens up the possibility that a 
local authority could convene a formal public enquiry although it would need to be done 
quickly if the prohibition against extending an IDAS stage is to be complied with. 
By conttast EPAA, ss 119 to 120A makes extensive provision for a third level of 
participation by way of formal public enquiry. In summary, the Minister may direct at any 
time that such an enquiry be held, inter alia, into: 
^^ Indeed no formal provision for public enquiries exists for the making or amending of planning 
scheme policies either. See IPA, Sch 3. 
^^ ' See State Development and Public Works Act 1971.S 15. or for broader ranging enquiries imder 
Ch 3, Div 6 of the Local Government Act 1993. 
12S IPA, s 3.2.7(2) The contrary opinion is that s 3.2.7 stands outside this prohibition. 
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any matter relating to the provision of the Act. 
any environmental plaiming instrument 
any or all of the envfronmental aspects of a proposed development 
This procedure is in addition to the Ministers power to "call-in" a development application 
under s88A.^ 2^ 
The question which arises is why one jurisdiction perceives there to be no need for a public 
enquiry process at all and yet the other is prepared to devote such detail to making 
provision for one. There is no clear answer to the question apart perhaps from the differing 
histories and experiences of the two jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the question remains 
whether such a third level of participation should be imposed in principle. 
Admittedly, it is hoped, such a thfrd level procedure would tend only to be used in special 
cases however it is subject to doubt whether yet another information process, 
superimposed on an extensive process at the application level, could add much to the end 
result. Additionally, if an issue is of such sensitivity that it merits such tteatment then there 
is at least probable, if only on environmental grounds, that the matter will trigger the new 
129 The equivalent power exists under IPA, s 3.6.5. 
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enquiry powers of the Federal government under the Environmental Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. ^ °^ 
In the end the matter is one of policy and principle which should, as indicated earlier, 
reflect a considered balance between the fransaction costs which result from such 
overlapping procedures and the premium a society is prepared to place on broad social and 
environmental considerations. In the final result it is not at all convincmg that such a State 
level procedure should exist at all. 
I. PARTICIPATION AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM 
There exists a reasonable consensus amongst local authority planners that approximately 
75% of all development applications will obtain an approval without difficulty and most 
often this is obvious from the initial reading of the application. 
In the absence of a suitable adminisfrative mechanism all of these uncontentious 
applications would be requfred to comply with the rigorous notification provisions in both 
Acts. Yet having created a public expectation that planning and development matters 
generally should come under the oversight of the public at large rather than merely thefr 
elected representatives, a direct or frontal attack on the existing participation rights was 
"° Inter alia, ss 10,503,5X1. 
'** Which does exist m NSW. 
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clearly out of the question. Both jurisdictions,(along with many others) have responded to 
this adminisfrative and political problem by creating two other classes of development 
which will atfract minimal local authority mvolvement, no submission or objection rights 
and which, perhaps cyiucally, it is hoped will atttact minimal public attention. In 
Queensland the two classes are "exempt" and "self-assessable" developments and in NSW, 
"exempt" and "complying" and, more significantly, some "local developments". 
The stated policy aim in both instances is the same though couched in different terms 
namely, to allow development with minimal environmental impact to proceed v^thout the 
need for a development permit or being made subject to an intensive notification and 
appeal process and to allow small and low impact development to proceed 
efficiently. ^ ^^However, although the intent of both Acts is certainly to provide a 
mechanism to reduce an otherwise intolerable pressure on the approval system the 
statutory frameworks established by the respective Acts, once again, differ markedly. 
As a general statement of principle, if an authority has determined to establish general 
rules of conduct or even more unportantly specific mles of conduct then, in the interests of 
faimess, equity and efficiency those mles should, as far as practicable, be consolidated in 
one readily available and accessible form. There are three ways of making such mles 
accessible: 
"^ Outline of a proposed State policy for exempt and complying development (Policy Document, NSW 
Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, 1997) p 2. 
*** The Act of finding a relevant rule may add significantly to transaction costs. 
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by* 
• incorporating the mles in the statute itself 
• consolidatmg the mles in subordinate legislation, or 
• allowing the mles to be subsequently contained in other miscellaneous 
statutory mstruments such as local laws and envfronmental planning 
instruments 
Within, again, the bounds of practicality, the form to be preferred in terms of faimess and 
efficiency is to provide the mles in the statute and this is, in the main, the approach 
adopted by IPA. The least attractive altemative is certainly the third one and it is this 
approach which has been adopted in NSW. 
J. EXEMPT, SELF-ASSESSABLE AND COMPLYING DEVELOPMENTS 
EPAA, ss 76(1) to (3) authorise the designation of specified developments as "exempt" 
and for this to occur through State, regional or local environmental planning 
mstruments. ^ "^^  This ability is limited to areas which are not "critical habitats", ^ ^^  part of a 
"wildemess area" as defined by the Wilderness Act 1987 or more importantly to 
developments to which Pt 5 of the Act does not apply. 
^^ EPAA, definition of "environmental planning instrument". 
133 
"Critical Habitats" are defined in s 37 of the Threatened Species Act 1995. 
^^ Pt 5 deals with environmental assessment requirements. In the event of conflict with an E.P.I. the 
general duty to consider environmental protection in EPAA, s i l l , would override the E.P.I. In 
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This approach as well as being contrary to general principles of good and efficient 
govemance can only compound the perennial problem of a multiplicity of differing 
policies spread across a multiplicity of local authority areas. When the differences relate 
to matters of sigruficance such as the description of a development as "exempt" or not and 
when no State wide, statutory authority is provided to decide the issue beyond bare 
statements of general principle or SEPP 60, Pt 2, then the opportunity for confusion and 
the incurring of cost is clearly present. ^ '^ ^ 
By contrast, the exempt category is clearly set out under IPA and consequently the 
potential for local variations should be very much reduced. This approach generates a 
degree of administtative certainty (or at least, confidence), enables all parties to identify 
the applicable developments on a State-wide basis and is certainly to be preferred. The 
issue which remains however is whether in either jurisdiction there is any real substance to 
the category and since the intent of the classification, as indicated, is to reduce the 
addition the Minister is able to provide fomial directions to councils on the structure, format and 
content of their LEPs. (EPAA, ss 117 and 71) 
13? 
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NSW currently has over 300 principal local planning instruments and over 5300 amendments. See: 
Plan Making in NSW. (1999, Dept. of Urban Affairs. NSW.) p ix. It is doubtful if the situation in 
Qld is any better. Though at least NSW has begun to deal with the problem in an organized and 
consolidated fashion. 
NSW categorizes policies as SEPPs, REPs and LEPs. In addition there exist DCPs and s 94 
"Contribution Plans". The most extreme example of this "dispersive" approach is in W.A. where 
matters which are considered quite fundamental in other jurisdictions eg. the submission process, 
are contained in local poUcies with Uttle direction firom the principal statute. 
*^® In Pt 3 of Sch 8. Though it is sparse in content with, with exception of State development 
issues, the only substantive exemption being given to "women's shelters." 
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administtative load on the approval system and to frnprove efficiency whether there is, in 
reality, a potential for this to occur. 
1, Exempt Developments under IPA 
Given the set of expectations which this category shares with "self-assessable" 
developments the content of the category is lacking in substance. In broad terms the 
schedule exempts: 
• activities in designated large scale mining operations, (ss 10(a) to (d)) 
• whole categories of developmental works carried on by or on behalf of the state 
(ss 15(c) to (d), and ss 16 to 22) 
and, 
• a small range of agricultural management practices (s 13) 
The residue, which consists of what could be described as the substantive categories of 
exempt development consists merely of the following: ^ "^^ 
• all building work declared under the Standard Builduig Regulation to be exempt 
development. These works are given m R 2 of Sch 5 of the regulations and are 
anything but extensive. The entfre category comprises: 
o the erection of sheds on land used for agricultural purposes 
140 The three categories could all have been made exempt by amendments to other acts. There is no 
paramount reason why the exemption should be provided for under EPA. 
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o the affixmg of mmor attachments (such as basketball hoops) to existmg 
buildings 
o playground equipment or garden fumiture no higher than 3 m 
o repairs to existing buildings 
o the establishment of certain types of housing for persons escaping domestic 
violence [s 12] 
o a limited class of lot reconfigurations 
The schedule in fact merely amount to a statutory recogrution of existing practice. Local 
Authorities have hardly been inundated in the past by applications to erect garden fumiture 
or by farmers seeking to erect a shed. Its contribution therefore to reducing the approval 
load or to overall efficiency could confidently be expected to be minimal. 
2. Exempt developments under EPAA 
Since the categories of development, as indicated earlier, are determined by the local 
authorities^"^^ and included in local environmental plans it is difficult to accurately describe 
the scope of the category under EPAA. The Policy Outlme however lists the followmg as 
mdicative: 
o non-structural alterations 
'^*' Arguably, this strange inclusion represents the only genuine contribution to the category. 
^*^ Within the broad outUne estabUshed by SEPP 60. 
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o home businesses which do not affect amenity 
o ancillary or mcidental developments (with strict provisos) 
o some boundary fences 
o a flagpole 
o certain demolitions within strict guidelines. 
Conditioning these exemptions are seven other mandatory requirements 143 
The observation here is similar to that made conceming the same category under IPA. The 
content of the class is probably more a function of the unwillingness of some and the 
inability of others to seriously review other potential development types for potential 
mclusion in the class. This, in tum, may well reflect a ttaditional mind-set which is more 
disposed to conttol than it is to efficiency. 
In regard to both jurisdictions it is difficult to avoid the conclusion therefore that, if a real 
attempt were to be made to seriously reduce the administtative load on the approval 
system, and to at least mcidentally improve the efficient processing of the balance of 
applications, a much more thoroughgoing examination of this category is warranted. 
^*^ In theory the necessary removal of a tree would be sufficient to remove the development fi-om the 
exempt category. The ensuing controversy has resulted in the inclusion of cl 11 in Pt 3 of SEPP 
60. 
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The other category of development which is designed to achieve the same ends as exempt 
development is known in Queensland as "Self-Assessable" development and in NSW as 
"Complying". 
% Self-Assessable Developments under IPA 
The essential distinction between self-assessable developments and the exempt category 
under IPA is that, in the case of the former, all applicable codes must be complied with.^ '^ '^  
Additionally, and in contrast to the other forms of assessable development, there is no 
requfrement under IPA for such works to be subsequently inspected and approved. 
Compliance is assisted by the existence of a penalty clause which would apply m the event 
that the codes had not be complied with.^ "^ ^ 
Self-assessable developments are defined in Pt 2 of Sch 8 as: 
o all building work declared under the Standard Building Regulation to be self-
assessable development 
and. 
o all building work carried out by or on behalf of the State, a public sector entity 
or a local government, other than exempt development. 
144 
•m 
IPA, s 3.1.4.(3). Subject to the exceptions indicated in Sch 8, these codes can be disregarded is 
the development is exempt. 
EPA, s 4.3.2. 
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Once agam, tiie preparedness of tiie State to remove thefr own activities from the purview 
of the Act while enjoming strict mandatory requfrements for everyone else is stark, though 
disappointingly predictable. The real content of the category, if there is to be any, lies in 
the reference schedule. ^ '*^  Little point would be served by listmg all the items in the five 
brief categories contained m the schedule. Some examples however may suffice by way of 
illusttation. Included as self-assessable developments are; unroofed pergolas, tool sheds, 
some fences, some retaining walls and a limited category of fills and excavations. The 
category is certainly not extensive. 
4^  Complying Developments 
EPAA, s 76A(5) states tiiat: 
An envfronmental planning mstrument may provide that local development that can be 
addressed by specified predetermuied development standards is complying development. 
The ability of local authorities to designate various "local developments" as complying is 
however cfrcumscribed significantly by the subsequent subsection which sets out seven 
reservations on the power. ^ "^^ Notwithstanding this, and in comparison with IPA, the 
^^ Standard Building Regulations, Sch 5, Pt 1. 
" ' EPAA, s 76A(6)(a)-(g). 
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category appears to be somewhat more extensive. ^ "^^ Sunilar to IPA, mspection (either by 
the council or private certifier) is requfred with assessment taking place agamst the 
relevant code(s).^ '^ ^ 
The one factor which exempt, self-assessable and complying developments share across 
the jurisdictions is the avoidance of the public participation requirements contained in 
EPAA, ss 79 and 79A and IPA, s 3.4.1. 
In Queensland however the new Act creates a fiirther and potentially more significant 
category of development than any of the above. This is the class of development which the 
Act describes as "Code Assessable" and which was referred to briefly at the beginning of 
this chapter. The major consequence of the category is to remove subdivisional activity 
from the notification and submission requfrements of the Act. Although such a move had 
been considered m NSW, in its final form SEPP 60 firmly places subdivision m the 
category of developments requiring development consent. ^ °^ 
Despite the decision of the P & E Court in Edwards andJenner v Douglas Shire ^^^ which 
has the effect of making even code assessable elements notifiable is there is an "impact 
assessable" portion of the total development, there is certainly scope to increase the 
'^** Schedule 1 pt 5 includes, for example, some swimming pools and limited changes 
of use. 
^^ EPAA, s 85 and Regs, Pt 6A, Div 1 to 3. 
'^ ° Pt 4, cl 13. This effectively brings the application under Div 1, Pt 4 of EPAA. 
'^' [1999] QPELR 335. See also IPA Implementation Note No 20 at p 2 and IPA, s 3.4.2. 
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category over time. If combined with greater use of private certification, an uicrease m the 
use of code assessment could result m a significant reduction in the existing administtative 
burden placed on local authorities and, accorduigly, to an improvement in general 
efficiency. 
K, CONCLUSIONS 
Both jurisdictions, for a complex of social and political reasons referred to earlier, actively 
solicit public participation in the development assessment process and have very similar 
stmctures and procedures in place to achieve this aim. However, the public submission 
process is a two-edged sword. If too many applications for development approval are 
forced mto a statutory program of notification and objection which, by its nature will 
always be administtatively cumbersome, the outcome may be a stagnant, inflexible and 
ultimately inefficient system which is particularly unfafr to applicants. In short the 
essential balance of faimess and equity will have been lost. 
The task, which both jurisdictions acknowledge implicitly, is to remove as many of the 
relatively routine matters as possible from the ambit of the participation provisions^^^ and, 
to this point, both States have created enough useful categories in respect of which these 
provisions do not apply. The next step should be to carry out a fundamental reassessment 
of development types with the intent of expanding the content of these categories. 
152 SEPP 60 and IPA in general clearly evidence this intention. 
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Legislators are justified in proceedfrig with caution as tiie mmor debate concemfrig "home 
busmesses" illusttates. However, their concems could be ameliorated by the mclusion m 
both statutes of an appropriate "opt-in" clause. Such a provision would acknowledge the 
development as exempt, self-assessable or complymg/7er se but nevertheless requfre 
notification and participation in certain closely defined cfrcumstances. 
To avoid the wholesale recourse to such a procedure by local politicians faced with any 
discernible level of opposition to a development, the power to ttansfer under the clause 
should reside solely with the planning courts in both states. 
As in the previous chapter an attempt to absolutely differentiate between issues with 
equitable as distinct from efficiency effects would be an arbifrary undertaking^^ . 
L COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT TABLES 
The following comparison in tabular form therefore seeks to assess various issues under 
this heading on the combined grounds. 
^^^ Under Pt 4 of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 and IPA, s 4.1.21. 
'^ Bearing in mind the reservations expressed also by Rittel and Webber. See Note 27. 
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Attribute 
Notification requirements are consolidated 
and easily ascertainable. 
• 
'• 
Are notification requfrements complex or 
simple to comprehend? 
The Act defined the purpose behind the 
notification provisions as a guide to the 
courts. 
Equity/Efficiency 
Qld: Clear requfrement are established in 
the Act applicable to all Impact Assessable 
developments. 
NSW: Varying requirements exist 
dependant upon the categories of 
development. 
Best Practice: QLD. 
QLD: Requfrements are simple in 
conception and implementation. 
NSW: The overall scheme is unduly 
complex and lacking in a consistent 
rationale. 
Best Practice: QLD. 
Qld: Yes. IPA, s 3.4.1. 
NSW: No. 
Best Practice: Qld. 
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Notice requirements are relaxed in respect 
of simpler applications. 
Statutory redress is available for damage 
suffered as a result of a fraudulent 
submission. 
An additional Public Enquiry requirement 
may be imposed in addition to the standard 
notification and submission processes. 
Categories of development which are 
exempt from notification requirements are 
clearly designated. 
QID: No, a full notification and submission 
process must be undertaken if the 
application is Impact Assessable^ 
irrespective of the scale of the proposed 
development. ^ ^^  
NSW: Many local developments are exempt 
from notification requirements. 
Best Practice: NSW. 
Qld: No. 
NSW: No. 
Best Practice: Neither. 
Qld: Not under IPA though processes exist 
under other Acts. 
NSW: Available under EPAA. 
Best Practice: Qld. 
Qld: Clearly set out in IPA, Part 3, 
Schedule 8. 
NSW: The categories can vary dependant 
upon LEPPs, REPPs and SEPP 60. 
Best Practice: Qld. ,,, , 
155 Though Code Assessable developments are, in principle, exempt. 
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SIX 
THE DECISION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The penultimate result of all the processes described to this point (the appeal process 
remains in both jurisdictions) is a plaiming decision arrived at by the local authority 
or, as will be indicated later, by the responsible minister. 
Considerations of equity and efficiency exist at the margins of the statutory 
procedures and, as is always the case when large numbers of consent and concurrence 
authorities exist in any jurisdiction, the knowledge, training and commitment of the 
staff who are making or participating in making the decision is of critical importance. 
It is this human dimension that is so often an essential factor in the equation and, to 
date, it has received little attention beyond sometimes acerbic observations by 
planning court judges.^ 
This section will deal with the following principle issues on a comparative basis: 
• what timing consttaints exist on consent authorities in which to reach a 
decision and accordingly what rights accme to applicants should these 
statutory time periods be exceeded 
• what material is available to the consent authority for use in assessing an 
application 
I See BOMA v Sydney City Council (1984) 53 LGRA 54 and Jesberg v Hervey Bay Council 
[1989] QPLR 190. 
• 
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what rights are possessed by applicants to stop the decision process and to 
make representations conceming anticipated conditions 
what conditions can validly be uicorporated in a decision 
• the "Finality Principle" 
• can local authorities make decisions, which are conttary to LEPPs, REPPs, 
SEPPs in NSW or their equivalents in Queensland 
• what is the effect, if any, of a decision taken outside the statutory time 
periods 
• what are the currency periods for development approvals or permits 
• ministerial "call-ins" 
• appeal rights 
B. STATUTORY TIMING CONSTRAINTS 
As mentioned previously, there are no statutory penalties applicable to local 
authorities who exceed the decision periods contained in either Act. This effectively 
places the onus on the applicant in both jurisdictions to tteat the matter as a "deemed 
refusal" and to appeal to the relevant court. 
Nevertheless, statutory time periods do exist. In the case of NSW, an application is 
taken to be refused under cl 70B (and for the purposes of s 82(1)) ; 
a) in the case of "local developments" after 40 days 
^ EPAA, s 82(1) details the factors which are to be taken into account concerning the impact of 
an activity on the environment under Pt 5 of the Act. 
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or, 
b) m the case of designated, integrated or any other application requfrmg 
concurrence agency approval, 60 days. 
As is often the case under EPAA however, the above can only be said to be a guide to 
the general propositions.^ It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed 
commentary on every section in the Act or clause in the Regulations which bear upon 
this issue. Suffice it to say however that the NSW statute and regulations appear to be 
unnecessarily complex and abstmse. 
In contrast, the position under IPA is at least comparatively simpler. The assessment 
manager must decide the application within 20 business days after the decision stage 
starts."^  Also, in Qld, the assessment manager may unilaterally extend the decision 
period by a further 20 days^ with fiirther extensions being available should the 
applicant agree.^ Importantly, the applicant may stop the decision making process at 
any time for up to three months to enable him or her to make representations to a 
referral agency on conditions. 
If a decision has not been forthcoming during the statutory periods then in both 
jurisdictions the onus is placed on the applicant to move the matter to the relevant 
Exceptions to the general propositions are contained in EPAA, Regs, Pt 6 Div 11. 
For when the decision stage starts under IPA see ss 3.5.1(1), (2). 
cf. EPAA Regs cl 107. 
s 
6 
T 
IPA, s 3.5.7(1). 
EPA s 3.3.5.7(4), 
IPA, s 3.5.9(1). 
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court by appealmg on a "deemed refusal' basis.* Local authorities in both jurisdictions 
often respond to a contentious application i.e. one which either has or is likely to 
result in a significant number of objections, by agreeing, across party lines often, to 
defer a decision until after the next election. Sometimes such deferrals start occurring 
up to 12 months prior to the election date. The mequity here is obvious, though it is 
one shared equally by NSW and Qld. Under such cfrcumstances, (which reflect the 
reality of local government politics), the applicant who may be incurring sigiuficant 
holding costs or who may be reaching the end of a conditional confract period, is 
forced to begin incurring legal costs in order to move the matter on.^ It is difficult to 
conceive of a sttategy which could deal effectively with this mherent unfafrness. A 
statutory obligation to decide the matter may sunply result in a decision in the 
negative, which clearly places the applicant in the same position. ^ ° 
C. ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 
Not surprisingly there exists a high degree of commonality between the two 
jurisdictions in regard to the material, which can properly be referred to by the 
assessment manager on the way to making a decision. This commonality is evident in 
the comparative table, which appears below. 
10 
IPA, s 4.1.27(l)(e) and EPAA, s 113. 
See Sydney Morning Herald, "Developers relieved as Debus resists push to strengthen court's 
powers" Linda Morris, 27 April, 2001. 
Sunilarly, a recent proposal from local authorities in NSW (see Note 9) to limit the right of 
appeal to only those applications which have been deemed to have been refused seems 
unlikely to be taken up. Such an iconoclastic change would, with Uttle doubt, resuh m local 
authorities deciding a matter, m time and in the negative, thus effectively aboUshing the right 
to appeal and ousting the jurisdiction of the court. 
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Assessment Criteria. 
Comparative Table. 
Criteria 
Reference to Standard Buildmg 
Regs entrenched? 
Local, regional and state 
EPIs? 
Draft EPIs? 
DCPs? 
DAs on adjacent land? 
The regulations? 
Submissions/Objections? 
The "suitability" of the site for 
development? 
The environment? 
Ecological sustainability? 
The public interest? 
To Advance or have regard to the 
Act's purpose? 
IPA 
Yes" 
Yes 
rs3.5.5(2)(b)l 
Yes 
fs 3.5.6(2)1 
Yes 
[s3.5.5(2)(b)] 
Yes 
[s3.5.5(2)(d) 
Yes 
[s 3.5.5(2)(f) 
Yes 
fs3.5.5(2)(a)^^ 
Not specifically 
Yes 
fss 1.2.1, 1.2.3,3.5.14(1)1 
Yes 
[s 1.2.1] 
No 
Yes 
[ssL2.2(l)(a) and 3.5.5(2)] 
EPAA 
Yes 
(Partially)'^ 
Yes 
rs79C(l)(a)l 
Yes 
rs79C(lXa)(ii)l 
Yes 
fs 79C(a)(iii)] 
No.'^ 
Yes 
rs79(C)(l)(iv)andcl92] 
Yes 
rs79(l)(d)] 
Yes 
\s 79C1 
Yes 
f s 79C1 
Yes 
fs 5(a)(vii)} 
Yes 
[s79(l)(e)l 
Not specificafly. 
With this in mind, consideration is now given to the few areas where differences have 
emerged and which may impinge on the relative faimess of the assessment process. 
This also is an appropriate place to consider the applicability of broad statements of 
principle such as "the effect on the envnomnent" and "ecological sustainability" as 
effective assessment criteria.^^ 
11 
14 
14 
15 
The Standard Building Regulations are entrenched by the Building and Integrated Planning 
Act 1998. There is no power to change these regulations by virtue of EPA, ss 3.1.3(4) and (5). 
EPAA Regs cl 98(1) requires work to be performed in accordance with the Building Code of 
Australia. See EPAA, s 80A(11). If the application relates to the refurbishment, alteration of 
an existing building however (cl 94) the obligation on the consent authority is merely to "take 
into consideration whether it would be appropriate..." 
Though s 79C(l)(c) which directs the consent authority, in broad terms, to consider "the 
suitability of the site for the development" could be stretched to cover this groimd. 
The section refers to the definition of "common material" in Sch 10. Briefly, all the 
material received in the first three stages of IDAS is relevant to the decision making process. 
For a detailed examination of EPAA assessment criteria see: Stefani White. "Integrated 
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1. The suitability of the site for development 
This criterion does not exist under the Qld legislation though, in broad terms, it could 
be subsumed under the more general issue of amenity. In NSW, as indicated by the 
above table, it warrants separate consideration and has given rise to its own body of 
case law. 
The section in question viz. s 79C(l)(b) grants an additional discretion to both the 
assessment manager and Land and Envirorunent Court which is perhaps regrettable if 
the whole issue of administrative discretion is viewed suspiciously as it may well be 
in the absence of specific yardsticks and benchmark standards which operate to 
qualify that discretion. Nevertheless, it has to be said that such discretions are most 
unlikely to ever disappear from plaiming regimes and considerations such as this in 
actual fact relate to the core issues in any development application. The NSW Court 
of Appeal has recently adopted a novel approach to "site suitability" as a criterion. In 
Zhang V Canterbury City Council, ^ ^ which concemed the sitmg of a brothel within the 
200 metre radius stipulated by the relevant DCP, the Court held that m order to assess 
"suitability" it may sometimes be appropriate to grant approval for a "probationary 
period". In fact this is an mteresting way to qualify an otherwise unrestrained exercise 
of discretion. The Full Court went on to say: 
Development Assessment and Certification of Compliance Functions in New South Wales'' 
(Sydney, Law Book Company, 1998), at pp 65-74. 
16 [2001] NSWCA 167. 
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Where...tiie nature of tiie development apphcation is for the 'use' of existing 
premises [my italics] .. .a probationary period or trial period may be an appropriate 
exercise of the statutory discretion. 
Admittedly recourse to a probationary period could in reality only apply to the limited 
situation correctly identified by the court in Zhang viz. where an existing premises is 
mtended to be used. Nevertheless it does amoimt to a creative judicial approach to this 
particular fact situation. 
The question remains whether the Planning and Environment Court in Qld cottid 
adopt a similar approach. On the face of it, and accepting that there is no specific 
reference to such a criterion in Qld, the conceptually sinular issue of "ameruty" could 
be handled in a sunilar way by a Qld court. IPA, in s 4.l.54(2)(c) grants the court the 
power to "set aside the decision appealed against and make a decision replacing the 
decision set aside". There are however no cases on point in Qld. 
The approach in Zhang is certainly one which is best able to generate a high degree of 
faimess in the short term at least. Where however the issue does not concem the use 
of an existing premises but rather the erection of a new one the courts in both 
jurisdictions are, by necessity, forced back on an examination of probabilities and 
possibilities assisted, it is hoped, by as much expert evidence as may be available. 
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2. The public interest 
It is unfortunate that such an illusive conception as the public mterest should find its 
way mto a set of otherwise reasonably specific assessment criteria. It has the potential 
to generate high degrees of administration, judicial and ministerial discretion that is at 
odds with a professed desire on the part of legislators to create a fair and equitable 
system. It is in a very real sense an indefinable concept though one which has 
historically preoccupied the political wings of state and local government. In one 
sense it is contentless. As James Buchanan has remarked " The grail-like search for 
some public interest apart from, and independent of, the separate interests of the 
individual participants in social choice is a familiar activity to be found among both 
the theorists and practitioners of modem democracy". 
The concept has not found its way into IPA^* though, once again, it is difficult to 
delineate a precise boundary between it and the traditional planning concept of 
ameruty. 
NSW courts have naturally been faced with the sometime necessity of ascribmg some 
content to the idea of the public interest m an understandable attempt to avoid an 
17 
18 
LBuchanan and Tullock, G. The Calculus of Consent In "The Collected Works of James 
Buchanan". Vol 3. (Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 1999) p 12 
The IVIinister in Qld is given power under s 3.6.1. to declare that a development involves a 
"State Interest" but he is constrained somewhat by having to subsequently state specifically 
the nature of the state interest and his reasons. (IPA, s 3.6.2(2)) It does not therefore equate 
directly to the rather more amorphous concept of the public interest. The pubhc interest did 
however exist under the previous Qld Act (s 4.3). 
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exercise of unfettered and perhaps unjustifiable discretion which was once described 
by Dixon J in the followmg terms: 
Indeed, the expression "in the public interest" when used m a statute, classically 
unports a discretionary value judgment to be made with reference to undefined 
factual matters, confined only... [By the scope and subject matter of the statutory 
enactment]^' 
A considerable body of case law has developed in NSW just around the relevance and 
applicability of this concept, a jurisprudential phenomenon that Qld has avoided at 
least in these specific terms. (The issue of amenity remains). In an obvious endeavour 
to ascribe content to the "public interest" the NSW courts have adopted two 
approaches. 
First, and in the absence of a defirution of the public interest, they have directly 
equated the concept with the more familiar one of amenity. Consequently, in Liu, 
Lonza and Beauty Holdings v Fairfield City Councif^ the Court held that the public 
interest cannot simply or directly be equated with a sectional or mdividual perception 
of morality. The Court in this instance viewed the public mterest as dfrectly 
equivalent to the more fraditional planning conception of amenity. As Ratcliff 
comments; "It seems unlikely that the change of words [to include the "public 
19 
20 
21 
Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492 at 505. 
(unreported, LEC, 23 December, 1996). 
The equation with amenity does not guarantee success for an applicant. See 
Southside Business Centre P/L v Rochdale City Council [Unreported, LEC, 2 September, 
1998) per Pearlman J. where though submitted on a pubUc interest ground, the development 
was rejected on the groimds of amenity. 
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interest"] will unpact greatly on the Court's view that a coimcil must prove a 
significant, detrimental social unpact to prevent development consent beuig granted 
for a brotiiel".^ ^ 
Second, when faced with a more homogeneous fact situation the courts have correctly 
referred to the objective issues without any sigiuficant direct reference to the public 
interest criterion. In Shoalhaven City Council v Lovell which concemed an 
application to subdivide land which was under the flight path of a nearby afrbase, the 
Court of Appeal held that the "public interest" certainly mcluded measures to reduce 
the risk to the public of aircraft crashes and aircraft noise.^ "* 
The question must remain whether the incorporation of a public interest test possesses 
any immediate efficacy whatsoever or whether it is by its very nature and its obvious 
overlap with the idea of amenity, redundant? A number of situations can be thought 
of where it may be useful such as in the case of an application to site a bottle shop two 
doors from an alcohol rehabilitation clinic. Such an application may well not fall 
within the purview of a DCP and may not directly affect the amenity of an area. In 
such an instance the public interest test may be relevant. In the absence of such a 
concept the Qld authorities and the courts would have to fall back upon the use of the 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Ian Ratcliff. "NO Sex Please: We're Local Councils" (1999) 4 Local Government Law 
Journal, p 150 at 159. 
(1996) 137 FLR 58. 
For a High Court consideration of the pubhc interest test see O'Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 
168 CLR 210 at 216. 
There is one clear instance where the concept is not redimdant. In 7/7 York St P/L v 
Pro.Strata Plan No 1612. [1999] NSWSC 1045 , Hodgson CJ in Equity remarked that it would 
be "perverse" of a court not to find an act which is illegal to be against the pubhc interest. 
This, admittedly, represents a very small sub-set. For fiirther judicial consideration see 
Katakourinos vRoufir [1999] NSWSWC 1045 and Byron Shire Council, v Greenfields 
Mountain P/L [1999] LGERA 445. 
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IDAS common material (which presumably would include a submission from the 
operators of the rehabilitation clmic) or even the defiiution of "ecological 
sustainability" in s 1.3.3. which m sub-section (c) mcludes a reference to ".. .the 
cultural, economic, physical and social wellbeing of people and commuiuties". 
Neither the use of the public interest or amenity in any of the situations illusfrated 
above bear directly upon issues of faimess or equity though it would have to be said 
that the use, particularly of the public interest test, at a ministerial level could well do 
so and that it could be abused. There is, in essence, little difference between the Qld 
and NSW approaches despite the varying terminology and since the issue relates 
dfrectly to one of the traditional grounds of assessment in any planning system, no 
change is envisaged. 
3. The environment and ecological sustainability 
These two related concepts, on the one hand an increasingly holistic perception of the 
environment and on the other the content and structure of ecological and 
environmental sustainability as policy determinants, have risen to prominence as 
Dovers points out largely since the 1987 World Commission on Envfronment and 
Development Report, Our Common Future. The Commission defined "sustainable 
Development" as: 
^^  WCED. Our Common Future. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987) Quoted in Dovers, S 
"The Rise and Fall of the NSESD, or not?" (1999) 4 Australian Environmental Law News, p 
30. 
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[d]evelopment that meets the needs of the present without compromismg the ability 
of future generations to meet theh own needs. It contams withm it two key concepts: 
(1) the concept of "needs", in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to 
which overriding priority should be given; and 
(2) the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization 
on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs.^' 
Both concepts now appear as significant base criteria in both IPA and EPAA and it is 
appropriate to briefly summarize their scope in both Acts as a basis to subsequently 
examine their emphasis and thefr use as overall assessment criteria. By far the clearest 
exposition of both concepts appears in IPA, "Ecological Sustainability" is defined in s 
1.3.3. as a balance that integrates-
(a) protection of ecological processes and natural systems at local, regional. State and 
wider levels; and 
(b) economic development; and 
(c) maintainence of the cultural, economic, physical and social wellbemg of people 
and communities. 
In tum, and for the purposes of s 1.3.3, s 1.3.6. provides a descriptive summary of 
how ecological processes and other natural systems are protected viz. if: 
(a) 
(i) the life supporting capacities of air ecosystems, soil and water are conserved, 
enhanced or restored for present and future generations; and 
"^^  World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1987) atp87. 
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(ii) biological diversity is protected; and 
(b) economic development occurs if there are diverse, efficient, resilient and strong 
economies (including local, regional and State economies) enabling communities to meet 
their present needs while not compromising the ability of future generations to meet then-
needs; and 
(c) the cultural, economic, physical and social well being of people and communities is 
mamtauied if-
(i) well-serviced communities with affordable, efficient, safe and sustainable 
development are created and mamtamed; and 
(ii) areas and places of special aesthetic, architectural, cultural, historic, 
scientific, social or sphitual significance are conserved or enhanced; and 
(iii) mtegrated networks of pleasant and safe public areas for aesthetic enjoyment 
and cultural, recreational or social mteraction are provided. 
It is difficult to imagine a more extensive survey of the constituent elements. As 
Samson suggests there are three broad areas covered by the idea, ecological 
sustainability, social sustainability and economic sustainability and certainly the 
extensive IPA definition covers all these grounds. The difficulty, of course, will be to 
flesh out what are essentially intuitive terms with reasonably precise legal 
terminology and prescriptions. This task could occupy the P and E Court for many 
years to come. 
Characteristically, EPAA lacks a consolidated freatment of the topic. It does, of 
course, exist in the Act but is spread throughout a number of sections. 
*^ Sampson, P (1995) The Concept of Sustainable Development 
< http://www4.gve.ch/gci/DigitalForum/: Green Cross Intemational> 
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The environment is defined in the definition section as "all aspects of the 
surroundings of human beings, whether affecting any human as an individual or in his 
or her social groupings". Supplementary treatment is also provided in ss 78A,l 12, 
79C (b), 5, 5A and m tiie regulations Pt 14 Div 1?^ 
It is clear however that the Qld. Parliamentary Counsel went to considerable lengths 
to provide as exhausting a description of the constituent elements as possible, though 
Phillipa England can still express reservations about whether planning law in Qld is 
any "greener" than before.^ *' 
The risk with such en-globo criteria is that on the one hand they can mean anything 
and on the other very little. A statement of broad based criteria which in fact 
canvasses virtually the entfre scope of human activity on this planet is of very little 
relevance or applicability in an assessment process which is designed to generate 
efficiency, effectiveness and equity if benchmark standards do not exist and the 
supporting science is either unavailable or equivocal. The core issue here is that 
environmental matters are management matters, a fact which regrettably appears lost 
in some darker green quarters. 
For this reason the precautionary principle may serve a useful purpose in those 
situations where, fri the face of evidence which can pomt in both directions, a 
'^ Subsidiary definitions which relate to the Threatened Species Conservation Act, 1995, define 
"ecological community", "endangered ecological community", "endangered population", and 
"endangered species". 
* England, P " Toolbox or Tightrope?" (1999) 16 EPU at p 139. 
^^  A principle which is acknowledged specifically in IPA, s 1.2.1(c). 
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conservative approach should be adopted. As Dryzek suggests^^ "scientific 
uncertamty is no excuse for maction on an environmental problem." Nevertheless, as 
stated in Begley v Pine Rivers S. C ^ ^ there are limits to the application of such a 
principle. As Fogg has quite correctly pointed out with reference to this case, "two tail 
feathers do not a vital habitat make!" 
It is quite beyond the scope of this work to provide a detailed exanunation of the 
envfronment and ecological criteria beyond what has afready been mentioned. Suffice 
it to say, for some time to come courts will continue to avoid precise definitions 
though using the new terminology throughout their judgments.'^ '^  The essential point 
however is how these concepts can be applied in an equitable and unemotional 
manner in mdividual cases. As Deville and Harding point out with reference to the 
precautionary principle, how the rhetoric of the prmciple can be operationalised is one 
of the challenges of the first decade of the 21^ ^ century.^ ^ 
The "rhetoric" however does appear to be beconung more instrumentalised and 
certainly both planning jurisdictions being considered here have moved considerably 
since the Brundtland Report of 1987 or even the Earth Summit at Rio which spelt out 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Dryzeck J.S. The Politics of the Earth. ( Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997) Quoted in 
McGowan-Jackson, R Business Response to Sustainable Development. (Environmental 
Management Centre, University of Queensland, 2000). 
[1995] QPLR 134. 
See for example. Bannister Quest P/L v AFMA. (1997) 819 FRA. 14 August, 1997. and 
Tuna Boat Owners Ass of SA. v D.A.C. andAnor. [2000] SASC238. 
Deville, A & Harding, R eds. Applying the Precautionary Principle. (Sydney, Federation 
Press, 1997) at p 21. Also, Stein J " Are decision-makers too cautious with the precautionary 
principle?" (2000) 17/1 EPU p 3. See also Crane, W "Merit Review and Sustamabihty under 
the Integrated Planning Act 1997" (2001-2002) 7 (34) QEPR 138 at 154. 
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a set of internationally agreed principles to promote sustainable development. It 
seems sfrange therefore that EPAA does not contam a defmition of sustamable 
development.'^ ^ However, irrespective of the absence of a defiiution in the principle 
Act, it has now been clearly established that ecological sustainability is properly 
considered as an assessment criteria by the courts. Equally, the precautionary 
principle has been incorporated in the Lntergovernmental Agreement on the 
Environment and has been applied consistently by the courts. 
The concem of this writer is that the potential exists for such disparate assessment 
criteria to be used ui an unjustified and unfair maimer by activists in specific local 
authorities or by tribunals who lack the depth of experience of the judiciary. The 
recipient of such treatment, which may include a list of unreasonable requests for 
reports, impractical development setback lines, and many other items will be the 
development community. Some local authorities are already quite notorious in this 
regard. This comment applies equally to both States. However with a good deal of 
common sense and a perception of balance by both sides an accommodation should be 
able to be found. 
36 
37 
38 
39 
Some courts, in fact, are now viewing such concepts as developing norms of intemational law. 
See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 dxA Nicholls v 
Director General of National Parks and Wildlife (1994) 84 LGERA 397. The Federal EPBC 
Act is only the latest expression of this trend. For an overview see. Henningham, BUI. "A 
Question of Balance" 2000 6(2) local Government Law Journal, p 95. 
Though it is defined in the Local Government Act, 1993. 
See the judgment of Lloyd J in Cartens v Pittwater Council (unreported, LGEC, No 
10093/99). 
See Leatch V National Parks and Wildlife Service (1993) 1 LGERA 270 
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D. THE APPLICANT'S RIGHTS TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS DURING 
THE DECISION PROCESS 
In the real world of planning and assessment of development proposals there can 
never be a sfraight line IDAS process which runs smoothly and without uitermption. 
The assessment process is exogenous, not endogenous. Issues arise which call for new 
reports or perhaps merely an explanation by letter or phone. 
Clearly the IDAS system needs to make allowance for this reality but, in fact, only the 
Qld Act does so, though even then with some degree of confusion. The principle 
section under IPA is s 3.5.9(1) which grants to the applicant the right to stop the 
decision making process for a period of up to three months in order to make 
representations to a referral agency. Additionally, the applicant, in the event of a 
conflict or disagreement between two or more referral agencies can ask the chief 
executive to mediate or decide the matter. This, in tum, stops the decision process for 
up to three months. "^^ For some reason however a similar right has not been reserved 
under IPA in the much more usual case where an applicant wishes to suspend the 
decision period in order to make further representations to the assessment manager. 
IPA, s 3.5.7(4) which one would have expected to be drafted to cover this situation 
grants the right to ask for a further extension to the assessment manager but no similar 
right is granted directly to the applicant. 
40 IPA, s 3.5.10(1). 
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This is a paradoxical situation; tiie applicant can, as of right, request a suspension ui 
the case of referral agencies but not m the case of the authority which may be more 
directly involved. 
In NSW under EPAA s 82A, the applicant is given the right to request a review of the 
decision, but only after the decision has been made and even then in tightly confrolled 
circumstances. Similarly, the EPAA Regulations cl 54 and cl 60 respectively grant the 
consent authority or a concurrence agency the right to request additional information 
m a "reasonable" timeframe but do not grant the applicant the right to stop the process 
for a period. 
Both Acts are defective in this regard, though EPAA rather more so than IPA. The 
essential question is however whether the applicant should be given such a statiitory 
right at all."*^  In my opinion the applicant should and for the following reasons: 
1) In all instances the applicant has paid the statutory fees which 
are, in some cases, very substantial. 
2) A successful application may lead to substantial employment 
and general economic benefit to the community. 
3) Given an ability to stop the process and to make representations 
to the consent or assessment manager there are three possible 
outcomes: 
a) The assessment manager rejects the representations. 
b) The representations are accepted; or. 
41 The writer concedes that informal processes often take care of such issues particularly where 
there are no statutory penalties which apply to local authorities who exceed the decision 
periods under the Act. 
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c) A more likely outcome, a mediated agreement is reached 
between the parties which may well result in a better 
project. 
Since both Acts go to great lengths to ensure public notification and participation it is 
more than a little unfafr to deny an applicant a statutory right to stop the decision 
process in order to make such representations. 
E. DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS 
Once again the purpose of this section is not to provide an exhaustive commentary on 
all aspects of the law relating to development conditions in both States but rather to 
examine some of the principal issues that commonly occur under this heading and 
whether, in essence, the two jurisdictions have varying approaches. 
With this in mind the following issues will be dealt with: 
> do the statutes and regulations in both states specifically 
authorise or prohibit certain development conditions 
> relevance and reasonableness of conditions 
> are the Newsbury and Wednesbury tests'^ '^  applicable ui both 
states 
> the issue of "finality" hi both jurisdictions 
42 [1981] AC 578 and (1948) 1KB 123 respectively. 
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> what remedies are available m the event that a condition was 
effectively forced upon an applicant by extortion or undue 
influence 
1. General statutory provisions which authorise or prohibit certain 
conditions 
IPA is quite specific in its attempt to outline the general conditions that may and may 
not be imposed with s 3.5.31(1) laying down three general propositions:"*^ 
a) a condition may place a limit on how long a lawful use 
may continue or works remain in place. 
b) a development may not start until certain other 
developments, permits or uses have been completed. 
c) to require a development to be completed by a certain 
time and to require a security deposit in respect of it. 
Section 3.5.32(1) deals with the converse situation ie conditions which cannot be 
imposed. These are: 
a) Conditions must be consistent with earlier development approvals still 
in effect for the development.'*'* 
43 Hart, Wendy "Statutory Test for LawfiUness of Conditions in Local Government" 1997 117 
Qld Lawyer. 
44 For a discussion with respect to preUminary approvals see Young, T "How Should 
Prelimmary Approvals be Conditioned-the Legal Test" (1999) 16/6 EPU si p 514. 
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b) They must not require a monetary contribution for the establishment or 
• c 45 
mamtenance of commumty infrastructure. 
c) They must not require works to be carried out otherwise than by the 
applicant.'*^ 
d) Fmally, a development condition may not now impose an access 
restriction strip."*^ 
As indicated earlier, these are very general restrictions and reflect a past history of 
abuse in Queensland. There are no direct equivalents in NSW though it is doubtful 
whether sunilar problems may not have arisen in that State ui the past. 
On the contrary, in NSW the provisions of the Act and the regulations which relate 
dfrectly to development conditions are, in the manner of EPAA generally, spread 
across a large number of areas, are subject to constant and unremitting qualifications 
and consequently do not lend themselves to many direct comparisons. Nevertheless, 
and without canvassing the much more general issues of "relevance" and 
"reasonableness" of development conditions which will be dealt with in the next 
section, there are some broad concurrences. 
45 
46 
47 
There are, however, major limitations on this principle imder s 3.5.35(1). 
IPA, ss 3.5.32(l)(b) and (c) reflect the strenuous objection by the development community 
over some 30 years to the wholesale imposition of such requirements by some local authorities 
in Queensland. Those familiar with the history will remember that one local authority and one 
mayor in particular were notorious in this regard. 
Such strips were possible under the previous Act and they effectively excluded many 
development sites from appropriate and reasonable access to adjoining streets. The 
development community again vehemently opposed them over a long period. They presented 
a difBculty since the strip became registered on the title after rezoning. To remove it required 
an entirely new rezoning together with its gazettal. 
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EPAA deals with the miposition of conditions under s 80A(1)-(11) with the last 
subsection indicating that a development consent may be made subject to such 
conditions as are prescribed by the regulations. In reality however, again with the 
exception of the very specific instance illustrated in EPAA, cl 96, the substantive 
aspects are contained in the aforementioned s 80A. 
Beyond this section, the most relevant is s 94(1) which allows a condition which 
makes an application subject to: 
a) dedication of land, free of cost; and, 
b) the payment of a monetary contribution. 
These two provisions are not totally in confra-distinction to the IPA provisos detailed 
in s 3.5.35(l)-(5) and, in fact, m the absence of a judicial decision, the exercise of 
local adminisfrative discretion under IPA could result in their almost total 
convergence. IPA, however, at least possesses the rather new procedure of "bench-
mark development sequencing" which could establish more or less objective criteria 
for the consideration of a development proposal (and particularly a residential sub-
division) within an overall sfrategic infrastructure framework detailed in an existmg 
plan.'' 
Although the above is by no means an exhaustive analysis of the propositions, they 
should suffice to mdicate the more specific heads of tentative agreement between the 
two jurisdictions. Of the two jurisdictions, once agam and at the risk of appearing 
48 IPA, s 3.5.35(2A)(b) cf EPAA s 80A(4) and (6). 
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parochial, the IPA summary is to be preferred. It does contam specific prohibitions 
which arrest an otherwise imbridled discretion by the executive and places the 
applicant in a statutory position where the applicant can rest upon a statutory duty 
unposed upon the local consent authorities at least in respect of some matters which, 
as indicated, have long been of concem to the development community. EPAA 
remains imbedded in a more historical tiadition which, one suspects, is more 
concemed with protecting the discretionary rights of the local authorities than 
necessarily and dfrectly addressmg wrongs. In terms, therefore, of equity and faimess 
to the applicant it must be said to lag behind. 
2. Relevance and reasonableness 
The two principles to be examined here are the question of "relevance" and the 
question of "reasonableness". Both overlap to some (but not to every extent) and the 
question of "reasonableness" or, more particularly, "unreasonableness" can 
sometimes assume a life of its own. The task here is to examine how both tests are 
applied in both jurisdictions. 
At a purely statutory level both are acknowledged. Under IPA,'*^  a condition must: 
(a) be relevant to, but not an unreasonable imposition on, the development 
or use of premises as a consequence of the development; or 
(b) be reasonably requfred ui respect of the development or use of 
premises as a consequence of the development. 
49 IPA, s 3.5.30(1) 
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Subsection (2) of s 3.5.30 also stresses, m essence, that tiiese principles override all 
local laws and policies. The above provisions merely reflect, in summary form, the 
common law on this issue which has been developed by the planning courts over a 
long period of time and under the current Act and previous Acts. They provide a 
framework however under IPA which is not available under EPAA. The latter Act 
relies directly on the outcome of judicial decisions on the matter which will be 
discussed next. 
Nevertheless a comment should be made conceming the fact that IPA is prepared to 
outlme them as general principles for the obvious benefit of applicants and, to a lesser 
extent the courts, while NSW passes over them in silence. Once again the matter 
resolves itself to a question of the rights of stakeholders, particularly applicants. In 
perhaps 85 percent of cases applicants are not sophisticated practioners hi the field. A 
statement of principle in the Act can only contribute to a general sense of faimess and 
at least give the appearance of equanimity. To bury the issue, or indeed not to discuss 
it dfrectly °^ places the onus on the securing of professional advice which contributes 
to cost and the overall inefficiency of the system. 
Both jurisdictions, as indicated, place considerable emphasis in this area on decisions 
of their respective planning courts and it is these lines of authority that will be 
considered now. 
^° There are isolated references to "reasonableness" in EPAA but nothiug is available as a 
consolidated principle. 
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The general propositions contained in IPA,s 3.5.30, referred to above, have been 
extensively defined and developed by the courts m both jurisdictions. There are 
however difficulties. Arguably, the two issues fall into three areas of consideration 
viz. 
a) the relevance of the unposed condition to the specific 
development. 
b) the reasonableness of the condition expressed within the 
parameters of a specific development; and 
c) the reasonableness of the condition expressed in terms of an 
"administrative" act or in Brennan J's terms, "the courts power 
to cure "administrative injustice".^ ^ 
Unfortunately, the courts have, on occasion, merged to the various factors and the 
result has been a degree of confusion as to which test is, in fact, being applied m 
specific instances. 
The following will take each of the issues in tum as they have been considered by 
courts in both jurisdictions. 
fg^  Relevance 
en 
The leading Qld case is Proctor v Brisbane City Council which firmly established 
that "relevance" was a criterion which the courts can address and do so independently 
^^  Attorney General for NSWv Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 36. 
^ (1993) 81 LGERA 398 (Court of Appeal). 
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of the ancillary question of "reasonableness". Relying on the High Court decision m 
Lloyd V Robinson,^^ Proctor defined relevance as "falling within the proper limits of a 
local government's functions under the Act, as imposed to maintam proper standards 
in local development or in some other legitimate sense". ^ "^  The Proctor decision can 
and does have a broad application. In Warradale Holdings P/L v Caloundra City 
Council ^ Brabazon DCJ was asked to rule on whether a Development Confrol Plan 
gazetted after the lodgement of a development application could be used as a relevant 
instrument to impose conditions. His Honour held that it was a relevant instrument 
and could be considered. 
The same judge went even further than this in Ryan v Maroochy Shire Council.^'^ The 
question here concemed a draft plan that, on the evidence given, was so locally 
confroversial that it was not at all certain it would be adopted. Clearly such a state is a 
long way from a DCP that had been gazetted. Nevertheless, the judge found that even 
this draft was a relevant instrument upon which development conditions could be 
based. 
fri no sense therefore is the issue of relevance one that necessarily or invariably will 
benefit an applicant merely because it forms part of thefr submissions. The general 
rules and the specific instances where they are called into play exist independently in 
the sense of a dialectical relationship. It is for the courts to provide the necessary 
^^  (1962) 107 CLR 142. 
*^ Note 52 at 404. 
" [1998] QPELR. 503. 
56 [1998] QPELR 184. 
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syntiiesis. For example in Hammond v Albert Shire Councif, Newton DCJ found that 
a condition requiring the developer to set aside a portion of his site for the local 
authority was not a relevant condition since there was no necessary nexus between the 
site and the condition. Newton DCJ's reference to the concept of "nexus" is 
illusfrative of good and careful thinking, though the idea of nexus is hardly referred to 
m many other judgments.^^ It adds an additional conceptual framework within which 
general conditions can and should be considered. ^ ^ In another mstance however, ui 
Laver v Albert Shire Councif ° the same judge found that a condition requiring the 
applicant to set aside a portion of his site for a possible railway line was a relevant 
condition to attach. Sunilarly the right of a local authority to consider the traffic 
requfrements of an entfre neighbourhood and not simply those generated by the 
proposed development is a relevant consideration which could be reflected in an 
appropriate condition.^ ^ 
Associated with the idea of relevance in the general sense referred to above is what 
has become known as the ffrst Newbury principle. The difficulty with the Newbury 
test(s) is that, and as will be indicated later, the test(s) overlap between the question of 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
[1997] QPELR 314. 
For a NSW example where Cowdroy AJ similarly introduced the concept of "nexus" see: 
Greenfields Constructions (NSW) P/L v Byron Shire Council [1998] NSWLEC 245. 
For additional instances where conditions were found to be irrelevant see Pacific Exchange 
Corporation P/Uv Gold Coast City Council [1997] QPLR 129 dSid Bargara Park P/L v 
Burnett Shire Council [1996] QPELR 133. 
[1997] QPELR 94. 
Patrick and Hansen v Thuringa City Council [1998] QPELR 307. 
Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 578. 
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relevance and the question of reasonableness and it is often unclear from the 
judgments in what sense the court is applying the principle. 
Newbury is a 1981 decision of the House of Lords however there is earlier authority 
along similar (though less developed lines) from the High Court of Ausfralia in Allen 
Commercial Constructions P/L v North Sydney Municipal Council ^. Here the Court 
held that the power to apply conditions does not grant: 
[a]n unlimited discretion as to the conditions which may be unposed, but as 
conferring a power to impose conditions which are reasonably capable of being 
related to the purpose for which the authority is being exercised... 
The judgment in Newbury admittedly is rather more articulated.^^ In finding that a 
council requirement to remove certain hangers did not fairly and reasonably relate to 
the development, Lord Lane (at 627) went on to observe that: 
For conditions attached to the grant of a planning permission to be uitra vires 
and valid the conditions imposed must be for a planning purpose and not for any 
ulterior one and they must fahly and reasonably relate to the development permitted. 
Also they must not be so imreasonable that no reasonable planning authority could 
have imposed them. 
63 
64 
65 
In Silverwater Estate P/L v Auburn Council [2001] NSWLEC 60 which deah with the 
imposition of 74 separate conditions, the judge, Talbot J merely referred to Newbury and it 
does not appear in his reasons for judgment. 
(1970) 123 CLR 490 at 499. 
Though two of the Newbury principles had already been enunciated by Lord 
Denning MR in an earlier decision, PYX Granite Co v Minister of Housing and Local 
Government [1958] QB 554 at 572. 
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fri summary three principles are derivable and all three have found application ui 
NSW and QLD planning courts. Conditions must: 
1) be for a planning purpose and for no ulterior motive 
2) fafrly and reasonably relate to the development; and 
3) be reasonable and issue from a reasonable authority 
The second of the general principles of interpretation of development conditions is the 
question of thefr specific reasonableness.^^ 
(b) Specific Reasonableness of a given condition 
Both jurisdictions at the judicial level have accepted that a specific condition, to be 
intra vires and hence valid, must be reasonable having regard to the nature of the 
proposed development. Whether a condition meets or does not meet this requfrement 
is thus totally a matter for judicial discretion. 
In a recent decision in NSW, Carr v Minister ft}r Land and Water Conservation 
Pearhnan J held that it was not unreasonable to impose conditions on a project even 
though the project was unlikely to proceed. It is hard to argue against this proposition 
since one wonders why the matter was taken to appeal or the application not 
withdrawn if it was unlikely to proceed. 
^ "Reasonableness" here is not to be confused with "reasonableness" in the 
Wednesbury sense. 
67 [2000] NSWLEC 89. 
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Similarly, m Markasis v Mosman Municipal Councif^ Lloyd J in dealmg with tiie 
reasonableness of a condition which required the applicant to install a system to 
convey water not sunply from his site but from a nearby sfreet, and after reciting 
essentially Lord Lane's judgment in Newbury found that the condition did fafrly relate 
to the development. Interestingly, his Honour went on to remark that the three 
Newbury test were cumulative and that to establish a valid claim under the heading of 
Newbury all three grounds must be satisfied. In this instance the judge found the 
appellant had failed on the last two grounds though he had, presumably, established 
the ffrst ground. There is no indication in the Newbury decision itself of an intention 
to make the groimds cumulative and it is difficult to discover other authority for such 
a proposition in NSW or in Qld. Certainly it seems to run counter to the intention of 
the principle itself which is to generate justice, to constrain bureaucratic discretion 
somewhat and to establish an equitable basis for an approval. It remains to be seen 
whether other courts will take up this concept. 
Two examples, both from NSW should suffice to establish that, on occasion, the 
second Newbury principle does work for the benefit of applicants. In Greenfields 
Constructions (NSW) P/L v Byron Shire Councif^ Cowdroy AJ mled that it was 
unreasonable for a council to allocate costs to the entfrety of a residential development 
at the initial stage when the development was to proceed in discrete stages. Sunilarly, 
in McConaghy Developments P/L v Tamworth City Councif^ it was held that a 
** [1998] NSWLEC 223. 
<*' See Note 58. 
'^ [1996] NSWLEC 44. 
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council condition requiring the developer to create additional car spaces was 
unreasonable because the reason behind the condition was the cotmcil's own decision 
to remove its car spaces elsewhere in the city. 
Further examples of the principle in operation can obviously be provided but to no 
real purpose. For a Qld example of the same principles being applied see Sunseeker 
71 
Cruises P/L v Cairns City Council. 
(c) Administrative reasonableness 
This, the third leg of Newbury, in fact pre-dates the decision in that case. It is, in 
reality, a principle of administrative law that has made a relatively easy fransition to 
planning law. It derives from the oft-quoted words of Lord Greene MR mAssociated 
Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation: 
It is true to say that if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no 
reasonable authority would ever have come to it, then the courts can mterfere. 
A High Court authority on point is Parramatta City Council v Pestrell where in 
almost identical words the court concluded: 
[a]n opinion will nevertheless not be valid if it is so unreasonable that no reasonable 
council could have formed it.. .'''^ 
71 
72 
73 
[1996] QPELR 5. 
(1948) 1KB 123 at 139. 
(1972) 128 CLR 305 at 327. 
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Agam, the Wednesbury pruiciple has found expression m plannmg decisions in both 
jurisdictions.^^ It is common ground, as mdeed it must be given High Court decisions 
on pomt. There are accordingly, two High Court decisions worth considering. 
Ffrst, Minister fi^r Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd.^^ In this instance Mason J 
initially considered the essence of the matter as a "failure to take into account a 
relevant consideration" At p 41 however his Honour had shifted grotmd somewhat 
and described the test as whether the decision was " manifestly unreasonable". At this 
point it would almost appear that the Australian approach to the doctrine was 
deviating somewhat from the classic English one. 
It remained for Brennan J mAttorney Generalft)r NSWv Quin to restate the 
doctrine though with a note of caution to the courts in its application. In his words: 
There is one limitation to the courts power to cure "admmistrative injustice", 
Wednesbury unreasonableness which may appear to open the gates to judicial review 
of the merits of a decision or action taken within power. Properly applied Wednesbury 
unreasonableness leaves the merits of a decision or action unaffected unless the 
decision or action is such as to amount to an abuse of power. Acting on the implied 
mtention of the legislature that a power be exercised reasonably the court holds 
74 
75 
76 
77 
The High Court in this decision quoted Bankstown Municipal Council v Fripp (1919) 26 CLR 
385 at 403. A reading of this case suggests that it is no authority for any such proposition at 
all. 
In Qld see Sabdoran P/L v Hervey Bay Town Council (1983) 2 QdR 172 and in NSW, Weal v 
Bathurst City Council [1999] NSWLEC 132. 
[1986] CLR24 at 34-39. 
(1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-38. 
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mvalid a purported exercise of power which is so unreasonable that no reasonable 
repository of the power could have taken the impugned decision or action. 
Mason J then went on to say that the ability of the courts to exercise the Wednesbury 
power is "extremely confined' 78 
The Newbury and Wednesbury principles have been considered across both 
jurisdictions for a number of reasons that are salient. Ffrst, the intention of this work is 
not merely to point out differences between the two jurisdictions but also to illusfrate 
the similarities between them. In the issues raised above, though the statutes are quite 
different in thefr degree of specificity concerning questions of relevance and 
reasonableness, the planning courts in both States have adopted precisely the same 
judicial interpretations. This, in itself, speaks volumes for the ability of the common 
law to refine a statutory principle even if that principle is merely expressed at a 
seminal level. Second, the two principles are of critical importance as they establish a 
mbric against which the courts can frame a response to local authority imposed 
conditions. Thfrd, local authority conditions can and do create some of the greatest 
difficulties for applicants and the ability to have the courts assess such conditions 
impartially and on the basis of principles that even less sophisticated appellants can 
understand and articulate is essential. 
Finally, some mention should be made conceming the recording of development 
conditions. Development conditions under IPA do not simply "run" with the 
78 at 36. 
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development permit they now are "attached" to the land^^ and the conditions buid "the 
fin 
owners, the owners m successors m title and any occupier of the land". Given the 
sometimes dilatory nature of Local Government follow up to ensure that conditions 
fil 
have been complied with, this is quite an exttaordinary proposition. Indeed the only 
way in which a permanent record could be kept and which would be unmediately 
available to successors in title is if the conditions were noted on the title certificate 
itself. It is highly improbable that this can be done in many instances, for example in 
the Silverwater Estate case mentioned previously the court had had to deal with 74 
go 
separate development conditions. An additional problem may occur if subsequent to 
the approval an applicant successfully applies to the Planning and Environment Court 
for a modification of conditions. The situation under EPAA is quite different. 
Although local councils are requfred by the regulations to maintain detailed records of 
on 
approved developments they are specifically authorised to impose a condition that 
the approval "is granted only to the applicant and does not attach to or run with the 
land to which it applies".^ "* 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
IPA, s 3.5.28. 
This is in addition to a fiirther requirement imder s 3.5.27 which places an additional onus on 
the consent authority to note any conditions inconsistent with a planning scheme on the 
scheme itself. 
The Act itself makes no suggestion as to how this will occur. 
The probable outcome of this requirement will, no doubt, be a degree of concem in the Land 
Titles Office. 
See EPAA, Regs, els 264-267. 
EPAA, s 78A(6)(a). 
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The Qld proposition may, over tune, be found to be ahnost impossible to admmister 
and it is worthy of note that afready a "Consultation Draft" has been prepared which 
will totally revamp Pt 4 of the Act. 
F. THE FINALITY PRINCIPLE AND THE ISSUE OF UNCERTAINTY 
Two points must be made at the outset. Ffrst, that these principles, although canvassed 
for example in Pioneer, related to qualitatively different issues that were cenfral to 
that decision and other decisions previously discussed.^ ^ Second, no attempt has been 
made to separate these principles because, in reality, both are sub-sets of each other. 
That is to say, decisions can be mled void by the courts in both jurisdictions on the 
basis that the decision was "uncertam" and m many instances the associated difficulty 
that the court will find with the decision (or condition) is that because of its inherent 
uncertainty it could not be reduced to "finality". 
In part because of the reasons given in previous chapters viz. the need for certainty on 
the part of the development community to enable them to assess aggregate risks of 
given projects and the economic benefits which are assumed to flow from an 
employment creating project, "finality" has always assumed a respectable, indeed 
fraditional, place m plannmg law. 
In what has been described elsewhere in this work as the "new envfronmental law" 
however changes in emphasis are becoming evident. Though both principles continue 
to be argued in courts and often successfully, the courts appear to be becoming more 
85 Essentially they relate to piecemeal applications. 
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cognisant of Barwick CJ's words m Upper Hunter County District Council v 
Australian Chilling and Freezing Co Ltd^^ where he commented that in its application 
to a specific instance "no narrow or pedantic approach is warranted". 
One broad reason for the courts now having to adopt a less "pedantic" approach is the 
ineluctable intmsion of environmental monitoring into the approval process and, with 
this intmsion, the continual problem of "threshold" levels that exist (and, in all 
probability will always exist) in the envfronmental sciences. With the incorporation of 
environmental principles as the centtal issues within planning law (ESD, precaution, 
inter-generational equity) it is becoming increasingly problematical how conditions 
and decisions on development applications which have associated with them any type 
of envfronmental issue can possibly ever be "final" in the ttaditional sense. This, it 
must be said, is not simply a major issue for the courts but also for industry at the 
corporate policy and strategic planning level. 
Clearly if emission threshold levels are to be substantially reduced in respect of say a 
chemical plant which had been constmcted in line with a pre-existing but now 
abrogated threshold level for emissions, the cost to that industry in re-engineering 
major portions of plant may be so substantial that production could be rendered 
uneconomic. Such instances have afready occurred. Similarly, if a decision is taken at 
a corporate level to constmct such a plant under the new law the afready difficult issue 
of what discount rate to choose to assess capital returns over extended time periods 
86 (1968) 118 CLR 429 at 437. 
*' See Bowie, Leanne "EPA/IPA- Teething problems with the mtegration of the environmental 
licensing system mto the development assessment processes in Queensland" 1998 AELN vol 3 
& 4 at p 29. 
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becomes even more complex. These then are tiie broader issues. Consideration is now 
given to how these common law principles'^ in regard to fmality are applied m both 
jurisdictions. 
In many instances a court can deal with the finality/uncertainty issues relatively easily 
because fundamental aspects of a development may remain unaffected or because the 
uncertainty relates to rather simple issues such as the constmction of a sentence or the 
meaning of particular words. In Singleton Shire Council v Errol David Upward the 
applicant argued that a condition which required him to "(contribute) towards 50% of 
the costs" of a certain road was uncertain and lacking in finality. Sheahan J in finding 
for the applicant concluded that: a) The condition failed to identify who is to be the 
arbiter of the work requfred to meet the standard identified m the condition and b) the 
condition failed to identify who is to be the arbiter of the 50 percent cost which will 
satisfy the condition. Consequently the condition was void as lacking finality. 
Similarly, in Bradley William Edwards v Dumaresq Shire Council ^^ an application to 
constmct a private afrstrip was ruled so uncertain and imprecise in specific details that 
the local authority was unable to give the matters proper consideration in terms of 
s 90(1) of EPAA. (as it then was). In Weal v Bathurst City Council ^^ the court was 
quickly able to conclude that merely because, m notified form, the consent called for a 
89 
90 
91 
There is no direct statutory recognition of them in either Act. (Though it previously did exist 
in EPAA ass 91(3 A)). 
[1998] NSWLEC 118. 
[1994] NSWLEC 2. 
[1999] NSWLEC 132. 
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deferred commencement date was an msufficient grotmd to establish a claim that it 
was lacking m fmality. 
At a more fundamental level of legal principle the leading authority is Mison v 
Randwick Municipal Councif^ which was quoted extensively in the subsequent 
decision by Stein J in Rosemount Estates P/L v The Minister of Urban Affairs and 
Plannin^^. Stein J reiterated the essential requfrements needed to justify a finality 
claun by quoting the judgment of Clarke JA (at 354) ui Mison viz: 
Where a consent has been granted in terms which leave open for later 
decision a particular aspect of the planned development the question may arise 
whether consent is final. This will not necessarily be the case. Where, however, the 
question does arise there may be cases where the answer is clear. In other instances 
questions of degree may be mvolved. It is neither possible nor desirable to attempt to 
lay down a criterion to be applied in every case m determining whether a consent is 
final. What must be decided is whether the consent finally determines the application. 
Importantly, Stein J went on to say: 
Where a consent leaves for later decision an important aspect of the 
development and the decision on that aspect could alter the proposed development in 
a fundamental respect it is difficult to see how the consent could be regarded as final. 
92 (1991) 73 LGRA 349. 
^ [1996] NSWLEC 59. 
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In rejectmg the application m Rosemount Estates and after considering the 
nature of the conditions imposed Stein J. was able to conclude that they did 
not offend the principle established in Mison. 
Consequently, in Scott v Wollongong City Councif^ Samuels JA was able to apply the 
corollary of the Mison principle i.e. that where the conditions complained of are, in 
reality, "ancillary to the core purpose" of the development then they should be 
approached with caution, even though they may leave final details to be settled. The 
principle has by no means gone away since then and it was applied quite strictly by 
Pearlman J in Glowpace P/L v South Sydney City Councif^ 
The Queensland authorities on point have previously been canvassed in Chapter 3. 
Recent Queensland decisions which have adopted the same cognitive approach of the 
LEC. (and which accept Mison as the correct statement of principle) include Mitchell 
Ogilvie V Brisbane City Councif^ and Queensland Investment Corporation v 
Toowoomba City Council. 
However, Mison will need to be modified in both jurisdictions for the reasons given 
earlier. With increasing Federal government intervention m the IDAS process 
generally, with the inevitable application of minimum emission standards and changes 
94 
95 
96 
97 
(1992) 75 LGRA 112 at 119 
[2000] NSWLEC 220. See also, FAI Property Services v Lake Macquarie City Council 
[1993] NSWLEC 30. 
[2000] QPEC 55 (21 June 2000) 
[2000] QPEC 36 (2 June 2000) 
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in tiireshold levels it will become very difficult hadeed to mauitain the traditional 
planning view of fmality. 
This mtervention suggests that grave issues of equity will need to be addressed by 
both jurisdictions. Is it open to the legislature to demand the right to msist on a 
continuing future statutory right to change essential conditions of the original 
approval without, for example, providing compensation to the owner of the land? Is it 
at all possible in this global system to sustain an exttemely tight regulatory regime in 
one economy that may be adjacent to another with very loose regulatory conditions? 
Answers, or even partial answers, to these questions will have to be forthcoming 
shortly but they are certainly not available to the development and financial 
community at present. 
G. CAN CONDITIONS BE IMPOSED WHICH ARE IN CONFLICT WITH 
EXISTING STRATEGIC, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANS AND OTHER 
PLANS 
At this point in time with no case law available referrable to the new Act and with 
only four Queensland local authorities so far having made the fransition to a full IPA 
compliant scheme only some general observations can be made. Under the previous 
Act one would have to agree with David NichoU's conclusion that the status of 
planning schemes of various types was heading sttongly away from the view that they 
were essentially formulations of plarmmgpolicy to a highly prescriptive, substantive 
law approach. The high pouit of this strict approach occurred in the Court of Appeal 
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decision m HA. Bacharach P/L v Caboolture Shire Council a case m which this 
writer was involved. The court in this instance was clearly of the opmion that the 
highly prescriptive words used in the sttategic plan were to be taken not merely as a 
policy statement but were to be tteated, essentially, as strict law despite the Local 
Authority acknowledging that demographics of the area had so changed over time that 
the particular clauses m the plan were unworkable. This decision was followed by a 
fiirther, confirmatory, decision by Kiefel J in HA. Bacharach P/L v Minister for 
Housing^^ and, as a consequence, by the mid-90s, the development community were 
beginning to look with dread at sfrategic plans. 
Although it is somewhat difficult to merge the various sections by which IPA has 
managed to address this situation, it can be now confidently asserted that prescriptive 
mles has disappeared from the new Act and that policies and plans will now be taken 
as reflections of policy only, and further, of policy which can be departed from 
provided certain tests which have been discussed elsewhere in this work are complied 
witii.^ °^  
These sections are as follows: 
NichoUs, David "Case Law and Trends" \nLost in the Wilderness-Planning Law and Policy 
Update (Conference Proceedings, CLE/QELA, 25 October 1994) at 58-65. 
9!9 
ICffl 
101 
(1992) 80 LGERA 230. 
(1994) 85 LGERA 134. 
A proposition which has been re-confirmed in Jezreel v Brisbane City Council [2001] QPELR 
92. 
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i) s 3.5.14 (witii reference to "unpact assessment") which 
authorises the assessment manager to make a decision which is 
in conflict with a planning scheme if there are "sufficient 
planning grounds to justify the decision 
ii) s 3.5.27 which instincts the assessment manager to note 
approvals which are inconsistent with a planning scheme on tiie 
scheme itself. 
iii) s 3.5.35 which tteats the issue of infrastmcture costs in the 
context of a development which is inconsistent with some 
aspect of a planning scheme. 
iv) s 2.1.23 which confirms that although planning instruments 
are statutory instruments under the Statutory Instruments Act 
1992 and have the force of law they are not able to "prohibit 
development on or the use of premises" and nor can scheme 
policies " regulate development on or the use of premises". The 
effect of this provision is not only to abolish the zoning system 
but also to remove the prescriptive element almost totally. 
v) In respect of conditions that the Act will not allow to be 
imposed, the P A test for conditions does now not even 
102 The Assessment manager may not however "compromise the achievement of the desired 
environmental outcomes for the planning scheme area. A similar discretion is given to him in 
respect of code assessment (s 3.1.13) though the Building Act, 1975 is entrenched 
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expressly address the issues of planning schemes and 
• • 103 
associated policies. 
The net effect of these sections operating together is to define the whole question as 
one of policy, not law. 
No such reservations are expressed in respect of State planning policies which by 
virtue of s 2.4.1 are also statutory instruments. With no reservations however they 
effectively bind the local authorities as law. 
While Qld has abandoned sfrategic plans, DCPs and other local planning instruments 
as law and relegated them to a subsidiary though, arguably, no less effective role as 
policy guides for decisions and conditions, NSW has continued with a more 
traditional approach and under EPAA they have, in principle, prescriptive legal 
effect. ^ "^^  The role of local, regional and State environmental planning policies 
(together with D.C.Ps) is detailed in exhaustive fashion in Pt 3, Divs 1-5 of EPAA and 
less extensively in the regulations. The essential point, in the absence of the definitive 
statement conceming their status that appears in IPA, is that all such mstruments are 
gazetted and consequently form part of the overall regulatory framework of EPAA. ^ °^  
103 
104 
105 
See Gore, D "Development Conditions" QELA 1997 Seminar atp 87. 
In principle, because though the "policy" emphasis is certainly not as prominent as in 
Qld some non-prescriptive flexibility is generated through the operation of EPAA, ss 76A(1), 
28, and 34. In addition the State Environmental Planning PoUcy No. 1-Development 
Standards, Clause 3 states that "This PoUcy provides flexibUity in the appUcation of planning 
controls in circumstances where strict compliance with those standards would, in any 
particular case, be unreasonable or unnecessary or tend to hinder the attainment of the objects 
specified in s 5(i) and (ii) of the Act. 
See particularly, EPAA, ss 24,28(2), 26(l)(b), 31, 34(2), 35,36(2) and s 80(l)(b) 
316 
Additionally, the Act establishes a hierarchy to relate tiie various mstruments in terms 
of overall compliance provisions. ^ °^  
Given thefr arguably more prescriptive nature it is not surprising that decisions of the 
LEC are similarly strict with the Court, at ffrst mstance and on appeal, considering 
compliance with plans a necessary pre-condition to a valid decision. Three recent 
decisions illusttate this. In Currey v Sutherland Shire Council Stein JA held that a 
clause m a DCP was, in fact, a prohibition which established a legal precondition to 
the exercise of the council's decision-making powers. The decision in Currey 
followed an earlier 1996 decision by the same judge in Clifford v Wyong Shire 
Council^^ and has been applied by the Court of Appeal m Franklins Ltd v Penrith 
City Council^^^ where in a unanimous decision Stein JA again confirmed that 
"Council failed to appreciate that it had a mandatory obligation to consider and be 
satisfied of compliance ..." [with clauses in a relevant DCP]. 
The two jurisdictions have consequently fundamentally different approaches to the 
issue and, in terms of the criteria being addressed in this work, the Qld position is to 
be preferred. One does not need to adopt as a starting pouit a position of principle . 
that planning should be about "places" to be amenable to the idea that "places" can 
change, and change quickly. Bacharach is a classic example of a sfrategic plan being 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
See s 51A(3), s 72. DCPs come under the same umbrella. 
Though see Note 103. 
[1998] LGERA 365. (On appeal firom Pearhnan J) 
(1996) 89 LGELRA 240. 
[1999] NSWCA 134 
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left behmd m the midst of a massive expansion of residential activity on the outskfrts 
of Brisbane. 
In such situations (and there are an abundance of examples in both states) the 
requfrement should be for flexibility at the planning and approval level. The 
miposition of prescriptive rules by the courts, which reflect historical conditions, does 
not assist the development of this flexibility; it retards the ability of the system to 
adjust quickly to change at a non-sttategic level i.e. at the level of an individual 
application. 
In short, the imposition of an over-legalistic approach may often not result in good 
planning outcomes but in bad and backward thinking ones. It may effectively prevent 
or intolerably delay the response of the development community to fast-changing 
demographics and can create a climate of uncertainty and inefficiency which is unfafr 
to participants at all levels. 
H. THE EFFECT OF DECISIONS TAKEN OUTSIDE OF STATUTORY TIME 
PERIODS 
Section 3.5.15 of IPA which requfres an assessment manager to give a written notice 
of a decision to the applicant within five business days of making the decision, makes 
no reference to the statutory time periods discussed earlier. This mdicates that a 
decision taken outside these periods is nevertheless a valid decision provided that a 
submitter or the applicant has not afready lodged an appeal.^ ^^ Earlier case law under 
the superseded Act continues therefore to be relevant. Deriving originally from the 
111 IPA, s 3.5.19. 
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decision of Lord Denning m James v Secretary of State for Wales, ^^^ it is clear tiiat the 
time periods are directory not mandatory. ^ '^^  The only decision which runs counter to 
this line of authorities is that of McPherson J m Veivers v Cordingly^^'^ m which he 
drew a distinction between decisions which attract public submission rights and those 
which don't. In essence this is a distinction between code and impact assessment 
under the new Act. In the opinion of this judge if no public rights were involved a 
valid decision could still be made even if the applicant had filed an appeal. Though 
cited in later decisions^^^ Veivers has not subsequently been applied or followed. 
Despite the extensive tteatment given to various time periods in Part 6, Division 11 of 
the EPAA regulations, nothing in the regulations specifically addresses the validity of 
consent authority decisions taken out of time. However taken in the context of the 
discretion given to consent authorities under EPAA, s 63(3) and the availability of 
deemed refusal rights under s 82(1)^ ^^ (which ties the statutory time periods only to 
appeal rights under s 97) the NSW position would appear to be indistuiguishable from 
that applying in Qld. Similarly, the NSW position conceming the right of a consent 
authority to decide an issue in respect of which an appeal has been lodged reflects the 
117 
Qld approach and mdeed this principle has found acceptance m other areas of law. 
112 
113 
114 
[1968] AC 409. 
See Good-Mix Concrete P/L v Brisbane City Council (1975) 30 LGRA 326, Taylor v Gold 
Coast City Council (1978) 36 LGRA 336, Birch Carroll & Coyle Ltdv Mulgrave Shire 
CoM«a7(1980)l APA263. 
(1988) 67 LGRA 61. 
"^ SeG,Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Wellcome International P/L (1998) 81 FCR 475. 
See also, EPAA, Regs, cl 113. Also EPAA, s 97(1). 116 
117 See, CampbeU, Enid "Revocation and Variation of Administrative Decisions." 1996 22 
Monash University Law Review pp 54-56 and Re Sarina & Secretary, Department of Social 
Security (1988) 14 ALD 437. 
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The approach of both jurisdictions m these matters is fundamentally correct. The 
applicant is able to either force tiie timmg of an issue on appeal witiiout havmg that 
right undercut by an ad hoc ability on the part of the consent authority to make 
decisions in the interim and, should the applicant and consent authority be able to 
arrive at a satisfactory outcome before the matter is decided on appeal, the applicant 
can obviously withdraw the appeal. 
I. CURRENCY PERIODS 
Given the greater complexity of the NSW Act it is refreshing to see that, on the 
question of currency periods, EPAA's freatment is both more succinct and more 
generous than the situation in Qld. 
In the case of "complying developments" the currency period is 5 years^ ^^ but this 
period will not run out if some work is "physically commenced" on the land. The 
balance of application types are dealt with in s 95 and once again the general term is 
five years. Even though s 95(2) grants a general discretion to a consent authority to 
vary the currency periods the subsequent sub-section places at least some restrictions 
on their right to do this in some specific cases. This discretion is further 
conditioned by s 95A which grants the applicant the right to apply for an extension of 
'^* Note however that currency periods in Queensland wUl be affected by IPOLAA 2001. 
"^ EPAA, s 86A. 
'^ ° Adopting the greater specificity of EPAA, s 95(4) this mcludes "building, engineering or 
construction" work. 
'2' See judgment of Bignold imH&A Kemal P/L v Hurstville City Council [1998] NSWLEC 
48. 
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tiie currency period if the consent authority had reduced the lapsing period to less than 
five years. ^ ^^  The exercise of this autiiority is discretionary however and tiiis, together 
with the use of the words, "if satisfied that that the applicant has shown good cause" 
has led to a body of case law developmg.^ '^^  
In a recent decision of Pearlman J in CSR Ltd v Fairfield City Council andAnor^^ the 
judge observed that: 
It would not be appropriate to lunit the scope of so wide an expression 
as "show good cause" nor would it be appropriate to define the limits of the 
discretion vested m the council to grant or refuse an extension under s 95A. But 
two things are clear... Firstly, the considerations which a council should take 
mto account hi exercishig its discretion as to whether to grant an extension are 
plaiming considerations. Secondly, the exercise of the discretion under s 95 A 
does not mvolve a re-consideration of whether the consent should have been 
granted in the first place. 
10^ 
Bignold J m Nick Giannaras and Ors v The Council of the City ofQueanbeyan had 
previously indicated that in his opinion a thfrd factor should also operate viz. that 
"good cause" in any given case must, in some manner, relate to considerations that 
176 
involve the implementation of the development consent. 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
See EPAA, s 95A(1). 
Appeal rights on this specific issue are preserved by EPAA, s 95A(3). 
[2001] NSWLEC 118. 
[1992] NSWLEC 97. 
For other dimensions of the "lapsing" issue in NSW see Australand Holdings Ltdv Hornsby 
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In confrast, under IPA, although a similar right exists to request an extension of a 
currency period^^^ no criteria are laid down in reference to which the assessment or 
concurrence agencies are obliged to consider the application. "Good cause" as a 
statutory framework does not exist, though it is doubtful if this will prevent the P & E 
Court from deciding the issue on grounds similar to those which apply currently in 
NSW or on general administtative law principles of procedural faimess, due process 
and natural justice (as part of its general declaratory jurisdiction). 
The currency periods under IPA are marginally less generous than in NSW. In the 
case of a material change of use the period is four years from the approval date, or if 
the approval either states or implies a lapsing period then that stated or implied period. 
In the case of a development requiring code assessment only, the period is reduced 
to two years or, once again, to the period stated or implied in the approval. However, 
if the application is for a "reconfiguration" of a lot (sub-division), *^ ^ which mvolves 
"operational works" this period is increased to 4 years or to the period "stated or 
implied". 
There is, as yet, no case law under the new Act though given the general vagueness of 
the Act's freatment of the issue the case law that developed under the previous Act is 
Shire Council [1998] NSWLEC 42; CJ Attardv Blue Mountains City Council [1993] 
NSWLEC 15 and Detala P/L v Byron Shire Council [2000] NSWLEC 63. 
127 IPA, s 3.5.22. 
IPA, s 3.5.21(4)(b) 
^^ ' Which is otherwise code assessable. 
See IPA, si.3.5. 
128 
130 
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likely to remain apposite, fri Ure v Noosa Shire CounciP^ Qufrk DCJ adopted a very 
strict approach to the constmction of that statute's right to request an extension which 
followed from a similarly strict constmction by the Court of Appeal in Friends of 
Stradbroke Is Assoc Inc v Sandunes P/L. 
It is difficult to assess the relative faimess and efficiency of these two regimes. If we 
can concede that there is little difference between the two jurisdictions in terms of the 
actual currency periods then two questions are relevant. First, is a five or four year 
currency period sufficient and generally equitableper se and secondly, whether the 
absence of reference criteria in IPA, relevant to the assessment of an application, is 
prejudicial to the applicant. 
In the ffrst instance currency periods of the order of four or five years must be 
regarded as sufficient, and indeed reasonable, in most development contexts with the 
possible exception, on occasion, of some large-scale residential sub-divisions which 
are proposed beyond the edges of current utility infrastmcture (or, in Qld, which 
clearly are not consistent with the councils "benchmark developmenf framework ). 
The statutory periods, particularly in NSW are sufficiently bolstered by the ability to 
apply for an extension and the ability to appeal a decision as discussed above. In the 
second instance the Qld Act is degraded somewhat by the lack of clear reference 
assessment criteria which is sttange in view the constant sub-text in the Act which 
^^^ [2000] QPEC 57 
132 [1998] QCA 374. See also Kewlands P/L v Logan City Council [1998] QPELR 44. 
^^^ Reasons of space have prevented a discussion of "benchmark development sequences". To 
date, no one in the field has raised the question but is it possible that, in Qld, we have interred 
"Strategic plans" in a field of "policy" only to see its ghost arise as a benchmark development 
sequences? (And then to see the concept disappear, only a few years later, as a result of 
IPOLAA 2001). 
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demands the incorporation of objective standards. Even the wide terms of the NSW 
Act are better able to equip thefr consent authorities to consider this issue and 
certainly have allowed the Land and Envfronment Court a broader discretion to 
elaborate. 
J. MINISTERIAL CALL-INS 
The right of the relevant Minister(s) to make a unilateral executive decision in respect 
of a project has, in both jurisdictions, sometunes been exercised badly and sometunes 
disgracefully. The intellectual justification for the existence of unappealable executive 
rights is, in both jurisdictions, given as "the State interesf'.^ ^"^ 
The IPA "Explanatory Guide" attempts to justify it as follows: 
The State has a valid and dfrect interest in IDAS. Accordmgly, it is 
appropriate that the State has the necessary powers under the Act to allow it to 
act on matters of genuine State interest. If those powers did not exist, the State 
would be forced to operate outside the Act and the system created, and enact 
specific legislation to deal with matters of State interest. This approach is 
potentially clumsy, confusing and costly for all parties. It also cuts dfrectly 
across the intent of IDAS and the Act as a whole. 
The entfre justification reflects the intellectual desperation that obviously went mto 
composing it. It is, in fact, a wonderful example of muddled thinking and muddled 
^^* See IPA, s 3.6.5 and EPAA, s 88A. 
'^ * Qld Department of Local Government and Planning at p 118 
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logic and if consideration is given to actual history of the procedure ie as it actually 
has been used in the past, it emerges as a political justification for the exercise of 
imfettered power rather than any genuuie commitment to the principles of the Act. 
Specifically the justification can be criticised on the following grounds: 
1) What the "State Interesf has meant in the past has been 
executive approval of projects such as Toowong Shopping 
Centte, Iwasaki Resort, Robma Shopping Centte, a coterie of 
service stations and such like. Hardly what many of us would 
describe as coming within any sensible defiiution of State 
interest. (It is mteresting, in passing, to note that the Iwasaki 
resort subsequently went into receivership, the developers of 
Toowong went into receivership and the purchaser of Toowong 
recently recorded, on sale, a capital loss of nearly $30 million 
on its frivestment). Not only were they not of State mterest, 
they were, in the main, bad ideas! 
2) The departmental guide seems to imply that the only recourse 
in matters of State interest would be separate i.e. specific, 
legislation. In fact, the most frequently used tactic of the 
Minister was not to create special legislation but to simply take 
the matter outside the normal IDAS process under the old Act 
and to rezone. 
136 IPOLAA 2001 increases ministerial power by granting him/her the right to caU-in an 
appUcation to change or cancel a development condition. See IPOLAA 2001, Ch 3, Pt 8, Div 
3. 
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3) It is lackmg in verisunilitude to set up a sttaw man viz. tiie need 
to have recourse to special legislation, when that was not the 
preferred Mmisterial option m any event. 
4) The suggestion that these powers have been incorporated in the 
Act because the department wishes to preserve the integrity of 
the IDAS system is galling. To tum the words of the 
Explanatory Guide against itself, "the intent of this section of 
the Acf' is to "cut directly across the intent of IDAS". 
As indicated, the cenfral conception is that of the "State Interest" which is defined in 
IPA, Sch 10 as: 
(a) an interest that, in the Minister's opmion, affects an economic or 
envfronmental interest of the State or region; or 
(b) an interest ui ensuring there is an efficient, effective and 
accountable planning and development system. 
Once again, a few points are worth noting about this definition: a) the use of this 
power in the past has manifestly resulted in the creation of a less accountable planning 
system, not a fafrer or more accountable one and, b) quite literally any proposal, if 
considered in the shadow of executive expediency, can "affect the economic or 
environmental mterests of the State or region". In the context of political sensu largo, 
or "politics m the large sense", it is merely a question of perspective. In short, the 
discretion to call-in is very wide mdeed. Mmisterial IDAS powers are detailed m R 6, 
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Div 1 of IPA and, smce the purpose of this work is not to provide a commentary but 
rather to isolate those provisions which create the possibility of inefficiency or 
uiequity, the following IPA propositions appear to me to be of doubtful mtegrity (in 
the sense of the overall, intellectual integrity of IDAS): 
1) no appeal rights exist in respect of the Minister's decision 
2) even if an appeal has been made before the matter is called in the 
appeal is of no further effect^ ^^  
The whole set of propositions, which taken together constitute Ministerial IDAS 
powers can only be understood in a political context. ^ ^^  Havmg established an, 
ostensibly, fafr system (or one which makes claims to faimess), the exercise of such 
unfettered executive power is certainly antithetical to the stated participatory ethos of 
the Act and almost indecently hypocritical in other respects. As examples; who should 
bear the appeal costs of a matter called in at that stage; why should submitters be 
excluded from the process, ^ "^^ and since, historically most Ministerial action results in 
approval, does not the continued existence of such a procedure call into question the 
access that some corporations and fridividuals have to political decision makers and 
ultimately justify the charge that it is an elitist system designed to benefit the few? 
137 
138 
139 
140 
IPA, s 3.6.7(l)(e). 
The late stage at which a matter can be caUed in has been justifiably criticised by Meurling 
(QELA 1997 Seminar Papers) at p 72. 
Which is certainly indicated by the terms of IPA, s 3.6.9(3) under which the Minister must 
table a report to parUament containing specified details. 
See Barry v Minister for Environment and Planning [unreported, 7/12/83, LEC, 7 December 
1983) McCleUand CJ, No40098 of 1981] 
327 
It can be said that the same considerations, and the same concems, apply m NSW but 
to a slightly less extent. The Mmister is given the same broad power under EPAA, s 
88A, to form an "opinion" that a matter is of State or regional significance and to 
become "the consent authority for the development application". ^ "^^ He has additional 
power to determine the application "despite any other provision of this Act or an 
envfronmental planning mstrument". ^ "^^ Interestmgly however, although s 119(i) 
indicates that the Minister may direct that a commission of enquiry be held, if the 
local authority "requests" that such an enquiry be held^ '*^  then a public enquiry must 
be held in accordance with s 119. This, in itself, is an interesting, indeed welcome, 
reservation on Ministerial discretion (without necessarily derogating from the 
Minister's power to make his or her own decision) that has no parallel in Qld. 
Nevertheless, s 89A goes on to make it clear, as in Qld, that neither applicants nor 
objectors have any rights of appeal once the decision is taken. 
The ultimate question is whether such a Ministerial decision can be overthrown by a 
court on administtative law grounds such as natural justice, due process or manifest 
unreasonableness. The principal authorities derive from NSW and give little 
encouragement to those applicants (or objectors) who may be tempted to proceed 
along these lines. The leadmg decision in the planning arena, rather than the broader 
area of administrative law, is Medway and Emery v The Minister for Planning and 
Others. ^ '^ On the basis of this decision of Talbot J and many others where it has been 
141 
142 
143 
144 
EPAA, s 88A(2)(a). 
EPAA, s 89(2)(c). 
EPAA, s 89(3). 
[1992] NSWLEC 100. See also, Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 
75, Parramatta City Council v Hale (1982) 47 LGRA 319, Sommerville v Dalby (1990) 69 
LGBA 422, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs vPeko-Wallsend Ltd il9S6) 163 CLR 24 at 40. 
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cited or followed, the principles which courts will seek to apply should any such claim 
be made are as follows: 
a) knowledge and opinion is not lunited to that of the Minister but 
it also includes the department. 
b) the court will view its role m reviewmg the exercise of 
administrative discretion as limited and the courts role is not to 
substitute its decision for the decision of the Minister. 
a. There is no requfrement to afford natural justice at the point of making a 
determination under s 88A (previously s lOl(l)). 
b.Ministerial rights are directed at the interests of the wider community, 
not towards the rights and expectations of individuals. 
The remaining principle which could (and would be pleadecf) is Wednesbury 
imreasonableness. Unfortunately the authority given to Ministers m both States is so 
wide that a challenge to the validity of a Ministerial decision on this ground is most 
unlikely to be successful. In essence. Ministerial decisions in both jurisdictions are 
unappealable even on administtative law grounds. ^ "^^ 
It is difficult to assess the likely impact of Ministerial call-ms on the efficiency of the 
total IDAS process. Arguably the process may be more efficient since it disposes of 
the tiresome obligation (which is happily imposed on others) to consult with the 
public and to comply with the entire panoply of regulations which accompany any 
conventional application. In this respect, as a process, it may have more in common 
*'^^ See, Bradbury, Alan "Duty to Observe Procedural Faimess m the NSW Planning System." 
(1995) 12 EPU p 440 and Pearson, L and Lipman, Z "Fast-Tracking Mining Projects in 
NSW" (1996) 13 EPUp 402. 
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witii plannmg, as it is known and practiced, m some of the countries to our immediate 
north. Its use however carries with it grave concems in terms of its equitable and fair 
tteatment of other participants and its ultunate distam for the land and envfronment 
courts.^ "^ ^ As indicated in the opening remarks, its use has, on far too many occasions, 
been disgraceful. It is, in summary, an unjustified and unnecessary procedure which 
should be abolished in all jurisdictions. 
K. APPEAL RIGHTS 
The right to take a matter on appeal is, in most cases, the final step in the IDAS 
cham^" '^ and since at this level some differences do exist between the two jurisdictions 
a short tteatment of appeal rights is merited. 
Both jurisdictions grant the right to appeal a decision to three distinct classes: to 
applicants, to submitters/objectors and finally to advice agencies. Under EPAA, 
applicants may, within 12 months, institute an appeal ^'^^ against a refusal of thefr 
development application with the same 12 months period being applicable to appeals 
146 
147 
148 
149 
In a private conversation with Brennan C J (then recently retired) the judge acknowledged the 
reservations which the High Court has always had in overturning decisions of speciaUst courts 
in the planning field. A problem, which, as he pointed out, the court could usually avoid at the 
"leave to appeal" stage. The minister and his senior officers have no such reservations. 
Though "purists" might argue that is an entirely separate jurisdictional issue outside of IDAS. 
Reasons of space dictate that the coverage be limited to "appeal rights" rather than appeal 
processes and the considerable jurisprudence which has developed around many ancillary 
issues. 
EPAA, s 97(1). Applicants, however, have no right of appeal against a determination if thek 
proposal involves a state significant development and a Commission of Enquiry has been 
held. A party's rights however under s 123 are preserved. 
330 
uistituted on a deemed refusal basis.^ ^° Applicants may also appeal against the 
conditions of an approval and a "deferred commencement" requfrement. 151 
Objectors are given a right to participate m the hearing by virtue of s 97(4) provided 
they lodge the appeal within 28 days after the decision notice is given. In theory the 
principle appeal cannot proceed until the objector application has been heard, 
1 ^0 
however in reality the two matters will be heard together. Similarly, referral 
agencies have 28 days to lodge an appeal against a local authority decision. 
One salient difference between the two jurisdictions is that, under EPAA, objector 
appeals are lunited to designated developments (including designated developments 
which are also integrated developments). ^ "^^  Objectors have no rights of appeal against 
decisions on local development applications that, in many instances, constitute the 
bulk of the matters which, at the neighbourhood level, give rise to such grievance and 
contention. One consequence of such a policy would be to substantially reduce court 
lists and the writer has been advised by the NSW department that this, in fact, is why 
such rights are not granted. This, in itself, is remarkable and reflects the never-ending 
capacity of governments to juggle, rationalise or simply ignore competing values. The 
participatory ethos is, as has been shown, embedded in EPAA at many levels, yet 
when an issue such as the extent of potential litigation becomes a matter of concem, 
what had previously been considered a fimdamental right is happily dispensed with. 
^^° EPAA, s 82(1). 
^^ ' EPAA, ss 80A(2), 97(2) and 97(3) respectively. 
' " EPAA, ss 97(6) and 99. 
^" EPAA, ss 97(5) and 98. 
154 EPAA, s 98(1). 
331 
Arguably, the mfrumisation of litigation by this means leads to an overall 
unprovement ui the efficiency of the IDAS system, and even tiiough this writer, m 
other portions of this work, has hardly given unquafrfied support to an often over-
emphasised participatory ethos it must be conceded that, m this instance, efficiency 
comes into direct collision with the question of equity. 
To avoid the charge of manifest hypocrisy the Department of Urban Development and 
Planning should, somewhere, amid the copious amount of material produced by the 
Deiiartment, supply an intellectual, rather than a mere pragmatic, justification for such 
a decisive abrogation of what is, ostensibly, a matter of fundamental planning value. 
One will however search in vain. Nor, does the writer resile from the fact that he finds 
it difficult to argue for the retention of appeal rights in this area preferring to come 
down on the side of efficiency. This is not to say that a case cannot be argued on a 
comparative basis. That is to say, it is unfafr that citizens of NSW are denied a right 
which is preserved in Queensland. 
As indicated above, IPA allocates appeal rights to the same three classes. The 
applicant's^^^ rights are guaranteed by s 4.1.27 which grants a right of appeal^^^ m the 
following cfrcumstances: for a refiisal, or part refusal, of an application, against a 
condition attaching to the approval, to the granting of a preluninary approval when a 
permit was applied for, against the length of the currency period and to appeal on a 
deemed refusal basis. 
^^^ IPA defines "appUcant" in two ways (see Sch 10) depending on its use in the context of 
appeal rights or the formal IDAS stages. 
'^ * But, in sharp contrast to the EPAA, the appeal must be lodged within 20 busmess days of the 
decision notice being given. A 20 day period is common to aU three classes. 
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Submitters (objectors) appeal rights are restricted only to those aspects of an 
application which mvolve a "public notification" requirement i.e. mvolve, at some 
point, impact assessment.^^^ With that qualification however submitters can lodge an 
appeal against the granting of the approval, or any condition attaching to the approval 
1 ^fi 
or the length of the currency period stated in the approval. One further qualification 
exists which has been discussed previously viz. that to be a submitter for the purposes 
of s 4.1,28(1), the submitter must have made a "properly made submission".^^^ 
Consequently, even an mcompetent submission received by the assessment manager 
is insufficient to establish a jurisdictional claim for the party to be heard in the 
Planning and Environment Court. 
Advice agencies also are granted the right to appeal within the limits of thefr own 
jurisdiction provided the application involves impact assessment and provided the 
agency had advised the consent authority to tteat its response as a submission for an 
appeal.^^° 
"Local Developments" in Queensland are subsumed under the general category of 
those which are impact assessable and those which are code assessable. If they are 
unpact assessable, even if they are intrinsically "local", then a decision can be taken 
on appeal by a submitter. Paradoxically, though the right to appeal considerably 
157 
158 
159 
160 
IPA, SS 4.1.28(5) and 6.1.28(2) 
IPA, s 6.1.28(1). 
IPA, Sch 10 defimitions. 
IPA, s 4.1.29(1). Concurrence Agencies may be joined in an action by an appeUant but cannot 
appeal in their own right, their power of veto making such a provision redimdant. Arguably, a 
fourth category exists pursuant to s 4.1.30, however the group referred to in this section will in 
most cases paraUel the submitter category. 
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sttengtiiens the negotiating power of, say, nearby residents tiie P & E Court does not 
appear to be overwhelmed with submitter appeals. There are two reasons for this. Ffrst 
the cost of mounting an appeal is considerable and second, some submitters simply 
use their power to successfully extort sometunes considerable sums of money from 
the applicant in retum for an agreement not to appeal.^ ^^ In this sense the Queensland 
position, which grants undiluted appeal rights in respect of local developments, can 
become quite iniquitous and result in a gross inequity to applicants. On this question 
of principle therefore the writer supports the NSW position. 
L. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this summary is not to re-canvass the issues and the conclusions with 
respect to equity, efficiency and faimess already reached in this chapter but to attempt 
a short overview of the fimdamental ethical and efficiency concems which underpin 
this central procediure in the IDAS system. Perhaps nowhere else in the Acts is the 
tension between the specific and the general, between an application and a general 
statement of assessment criteria or overarching principle, as evident. 
Both Acts still allow for too greater a degree of adminisfrative discretion. The use of 
vague concepts as the "public interesf and "site suitability" add to an afready multi-
layered body of assessment criteria contained within both the Acts and the regulations 
and it has, of necessity, been left to the courts to apply thefr own tests m an attempt to 
ensure that the potentially adverse affects of this confusion are mitigated. 
'*' The writer is not famiUar with anything in the planning Uterature which addresses this issue. 
Very large sums have been paid out in this manner and given the reality of human nature it 
seems imlikely to disappear. 
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It is however easy to criticise the current state of relative confusion that exists 
amongst applicants and planners (and not only planners m the private sector) and 
rather more difficult to suggest approaches which may have the affect of mcreasing 
the overall efficiency of the system, and of enhancmg the possibility that outcomes 
will be fair (or fafrer) for participants. 
Some suggestions are however outlined in the following paragraphs: 
• Iconoclastic suggestions from sectors of the bureaucracy that the appeal 
process should be limited only to those appeals which are filed on a "deemed 
refusal" basis should, of course, be rejected and rejected out of hand. 
• The variety of criteria against which an application is to be assessed needs to 
be enumerated precisely as has, in part, been done in IPA. 
• The temptation which has now become almost irresistible to some planners to 
adopt what is conventionally known as a "holistic" approach should be 
moderated, if necessary by statute, to ensure that other countervailing 
principles must also be weighed in the balance. These principles would 
recognise the simple fact that a "holistic" approach is, in reality, more an 
emotional state than an objective reality and that management principles may 
often be more applicable to a problem than a commitment to a certamly 
unattainable dream that we can marshal all the facts which would allow us to 
make totally reliable predictions. 
• Following on from the "managemenf issue mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, some statutory reservations must be stated as to the role of ecology. 
At present, with the cenfrality afforded to very general statements of 
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ecological ideology, the intellectual framework within which the decision 
process must proceed is becoming eroded. Indeed, the cognate meaning of 
many of the words used to describe these central propositions is coining under 
serious doubt. Are, m short, these propositions mere statements of some 
vague, and ultimately undefinable, principle or are they meant to be genuine 
"operational" tools. At present we do not know and if planning itself is not to 
be, ultimately, about an impossible "everything" this issue must be addressed. 
Criteria of assessment should, as far as possible, be referrable to objective 
standards and benchmark criteria not to free-ranging administtative discretion 
which is the enemy of efficiency and often deleterious to equity and faimess. 
The compensation provisions of both Acts must be upgraded to ensure that if a 
condition or decision affects the private right to use land then the community, 
who presumably are the beneficiaries, must pay fair compensation. 
A sunilar compensatory mechanism must be put into place for those adversely 
affected by adminisfrative directions conceming threshold emission and so on 
which, in planning terms, reflects the gradual erosion of the "finality" 
principle. 
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In tabular form the overlappmg issues of eqiuty and efficiency are summarised in the 
following table. 
M. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT TABLES 
Attribute 
Compliance by Local Authorities with 
statutory time periods is enforced. 
Assessment criteria provide an objective 
basis for a decision. 
Applicants have the right to stop the 
assessment process to make 
representations. 
Clear statutory guidelines exist in respect 
of conditions which can or cannot be 
imposed. 
Equity/Efficiency 
Qld: No 
NSW: No 
Best Practice: Neither 
Qld: A wide range of subjective criteria 
are applicable. 
NSW: Inclusion of public interest test 
allows further scope for executive 
discretion. 
Best Practice: NQithsT 
Qld: Yes, for up to three months. 
NSW: No 
Best Practice: Qld 
Qld: Clear guidelines imder IPA 
NSW: Guidelines are unclear. 
Best Practice: Qld. 
337 
Statutory insistence that conditions be 
relevant and reasonable. 
Approvals and conditions attach to the 
land. 
Compensation is available to those 
affected by subsequent change in 
approval conditions or licensing 
standards. 
EPIs, DCPs etc are policy documents not 
legal ones. 
Currency periods for approvals are 
reasonable. 
Qld: Clear statement of this principle in 
the Act. 
NSW: Isolated references but no 
consolidated statement. 
Best Practice: Qld. 
Qld: Yes. 
NSW: Local Authorities given some 
discretion to make approvals personal to 
the applicant. 
Best Practice: Qld. 
Qld: No 
NSW: No ' 
Best Practice: ^Qi^Qx 
Qld: All planning instruments, with the ; 
exception of State Planning policies, are 
policy documents. 
NSW: Plans are, in the main, more 
prescriptive. 
Best Practice: Qld. 
Qld: In general four years. 
NSW: In general five years. 
Best Practice: Both. 
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Ministerial call-in procedure is subject to 
statutory constraint. 
Qld: No statutory restrictions are 
imposed. 
NSW: Some reservation if a Local 
authority requests a public enquiry. 
Best Practice: NSW. 
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SEVEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The search for a development confrol system which is both efficient and equitable 
can, in conventional terms, be likened to a quest for the Holy Grail. The task is beset 
on all sides by a constantly changing intellectual climate, rapidly changing social and 
economic expectations and by political realities which often belie the quasi-judicial 
nature of the process. Perfection is, consequently, either an unattainable ideal or an 
evanescent phenomenon which can often pass without notice. In reality, because of 
the matters referred to, no development conttol system can probably ever function at 
an optimal level. It can, however, set itself the task of pursuing incremental 
improvement even within an existing legislative framework. 
The intent of this chapter therefore is to suggest, in overview, those elements of an 
efficient and equitable system which could realistically be incorporated into an 
existing legislative stmcture or development control paradigm. 
Chapter 1 
(1) The Hilmer recommendations, together with pioneering work in public choice 
economics by James Buchanan and constitutional theory by Friedrich Heyek, 
enables questions to be asked about the fundamental, historical assumptions 
behind the legitimate role of the state. 
340 
(2) When such a questioning is directed at a development conttol system fr 
permits us to ask why the grantmg of a development permit should remain as a 
monopoly activity of Local Government. 
(3) There are two reasons for the continued enttenchment of this monopoly 
power: 
i) it allows a local authority access to a considerable and constant flow of 
fees for applications of various types; and 
ii) it enables local politicians to intervene in the development conttol 
process for overt or covert political reasons. 
(4) In terms of the overall integrity of the system however neither factor is 
persuasive and neither factor possesses sufficient legitimacy to justify the 
dysfunctional effect on efficiency and equity of the sometimes unremitting 
involvement by politicians. 
(5) Currently private certification is only available in both jurisdictions when the 
application is assessable on an objective basis against, principally but not 
exclusively, the standard Building Code and it is not available when an 
application, or part of an application, is, in IPA terms, impact assessable. 
(6) Local Authorities contend that private certification should not be extended to 
unpact assessable developments because they impact on communities and the 
protection of communities (in all its manifestations) is the prerogative of politics. 
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(7) The counter-argument, and the one which is supported here, is that frequently 
the political dunension comes uito play in the defence of purely pragmatic 
political ends and that it is, m many cases, not a genuine reflection of a broader 
fiduciary perspective on the issues which is granted solely to elected politicians. 
(8) Furthermore, the costs associated with such political intervention are often 
very large indeed and these costs are passed on to the community in terms of 
increased development costs, increased rentals, increased prices and often slower 
rates of economic growth and higher rates of unemployment. 
(9) The proposal put forward here is that a deregulated approval process, which is 
able to operate in tandem with the local political system yet not be a part of it, is 
an achievable objective for all but the most significant local developments. 
(10) In order to achieve this the following machinery matters would need to be 
addressed: 
Appropriate qualifications in planning, urban design and law 
would need to be possessed by those parties seeking conttacts 
with the Local Authority. 
Initial probationary conttacts could be offered m respect of 
designated geographical areas. After the probationary period 
longer term conttacts could be made available. 
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A formal liaison system instituted to coordinate tiie activity of 
private assessment or approval conttactors with the Local 
Authority. 
A pmdential oversight function to be given to a separate 
department within the appropriate anti-cormption body in each 
State. 
• The Local Authority would be granted a call-in function similar 
to that available to the State planning minister. Should such a 
procedure be used by the Local Authority it should 
automatically trigger a public enquiry and detailed reasons for 
the call-in should be made publicly available. 
• Each decision of a private practitioner to be ratified by the 
Local Authority. The decision then becomes the decision of the 
Local authority, all appeal rights are preserved and the Local 
Authority becomes the responding party m any proceedings. 
(11) The objective of this proposal is to remove as many local development 
applications as possible from the ambit of the ttaditional local government 
approval system. 
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(12) Such a system is perfectly in accord witii the prmciples of NCP and indeed is a 
rather perfect expression of those principles. 
(13) The protection of community values obviously mvolves a cost to someone. As 
indicated above, these costs are sometimes hidden as an increase in rent or a 
reduction in employment opportunities. Often however they are more direct such 
as the consequential loss associated with an adminisfrative designation.^ 
Governments in Ausfralia have ttaditionally avoided the issue of issue of 
compensation for those whose income has been adversely affected by an 
administrative decision. In the USA however such an activity by government is 
properly and more decently described as a 'taking'. 
(14) A much more earnest attempt must be made in both jurisdictions to address 
the issue of compensation for those affected by a policy decision of a Local 
Authority. The principle is a clear one: if the community benefits from the 
abridgement of the proprietary rights of other mdividuals, then the community 
should pay. 
(15) The necessity for a harmonised system of development confrol (as distinct 
from a uniform one) has become increasingly recognised across all jurisdictions. 
Despite the federal government's recent foray into the area through the EPBC Act, 
the DAS remains a valuable body through which reform proposals can be 
discussed and hnplemented. It is hoped that the Commonwealth will remain 
committed to the role of the DAS m the post-EPBC context. 
Such as a 'character housing' designation for a residential area, a heritage Usting or a 
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(16) Wherever practicable administrative discretion, subjectivity and intuition 
should be replaced by objective criteria and benchmark standards. This principle 
should apply as equally to the performance of a State development control system 
as a whole as it does in the area of development conditions. The various Property 
Council reports referred to in Chapter 1 which describe appropriate performance 
indicators represent a valuable contribution. 
Chapter 2 
(17) The intervention of the federal government through the EPBC Act could result 
in significant duplication as approvals are sought in a genuinely two-tiered 
system. 
(18) In terms of the overall efficiency and equity of a development conttol system, 
such duplication has little to recommend it even in terms of the putative goals of 
the legislation and it is certainly contrary to the spirit of both the DAF and COAG. 
(19) It is considered essential that assessment and approval bilaterals be quickly 
negotiated with the States on a basis which reflects the States' genuine 
commitment to essentially the same goals. That the States' commitment to these 
goals is implicitly ignored m the EPBC is to be regretted. 
vegetation protection order. 
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(20) In the short to medium term the outcome of this overiay of federal criteria 
must be considered problematical. It is based rather starkly in the cmde 
assumption that State government mechanisms including State Environmental 
Protection Agencies either lack tiie will or tiie expertise to tackle environmental 
issues head-on. 
Chapter 3 
(21) The application is the ffrst step in the development conttol process and it is 
noteworthy that sharp dissimilarities exist between NSW and Qld. The core 
difference is undoubtedly the information requirement which is loaded into this 
stage in NSW and which is in rather stark contrast to the minimal requirements 
which exist in Qld. 
(22) The NSW approach confuses means and ends. There is no mtrinsic reason 
why an application on lodgment shoitid requfre detailed statutory information 
when an efficient regulatory regime could franspose that requfrement to the 
following stage when the consent autiiority has at least had an opportunity to 
examine the proposal in principle. 
(23) An application, after all, is merely an application and every statutory means 
should be used to ensure that the validity of an application is guaranteed. The best 
way to achieve this is to insist on minimum requirements. 
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(24) EPAA m reality creates this difficulty by the confiismg array of development 
categories each with specific, and fr often appears, historical ancillary procedural 
(notification) and other (information) reqiurements. 
(25) The NSW Act, despite recent amendments is a product of 1970s thinking and 
it requfres urgent review. 
(26) The Qld Act, which reflects the cognitive approach developed in the United 
Kingdom and carried forward in New Zealand is far preferable to the present 
NSW situation. It is at least intellectually consistent and understandable despite 
the hopefully short-term concem as to the precise meaning of the term "material 
change of use". The adoption of a similar cognitive framework in NSW must 
surely be inevitable. 
(27) Both jurisdictions must also address the status of exempt, self-assessable and 
complying developments whose status in both Acts remains diffuse, undefined 
and relatively contentless. 
(28) An expansion in the context of these development categories could, together 
with private certification and approval, single-handedly remove most of the 
administtative pressure from the system. This, in tum, would (or should) allow 
Local Authority planners to in fact plan.^ 
The concept of "benchmark development sequences" though they are open to criticism on 
libertarian or public choice grounds, was at least an acknowledgement thatplanning was 
fundamental to development control. Their abolition by IPOLAA 2001 is regrettable and 
perhaps, ominous. 
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(29) The board issue relatmg to appHcants is tiie question of the uiformation onus, 
ie whose responsibility should fr be to accurately determine the nature and scope 
of tiie information which must be lodged with the application. The present IPA 
regime effectively places that onus on the Local Authority however the 
foreshadowed amendments to the Act will see this obligation removed by late 
2002. It was an aspect of IPA that was sfrenuously objected to by Local 
Authorities, in part because of the potential liability for negligence under the 
Local Government Act 1993. 
(30) The likely removal of this obligation represents a substantial watering down of 
IPA and erodes the more principled base of the original Act. 
(31) In terms of principle, the responsibility to accurately detail the information 
requfrements relevant to each specific application should rest firmly on the Local 
Authority. Apart from the rather broad canvass of the statutes and regulations, the 
use of adminisfrative discretion to conjure up requfrements, and indeed new 
requirements on a continuing basis, is antithetical to the efficiency and equity to 
any IDAS system. 
(32) Additionally, in an era where the necessity to comply with over-riding federal 
requirements now exists, the information requirements emanating from Local 
Government, State concurrence authorities and Envfronment Ausfralia are likely 
to vary in the detail and the emphasis given to various factors. 
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(33) To place an applicant m a situation where he or she may have to second guess 
these matters is unfair and mireasonable and tiie fact that a certain class of 
applicant may be able to manoeuvre through them using a network of informal 
contacts known to thefr plannfrig consultant only adds to the unfaimess. 
(34) Both Acts, reflecting pressure from the Local Authorities, are unwilling to 
confront this issue at the present time, though with the likely compounding of 
mformation requfrements in the future, it is almost certainly an issue which will 
need to be revisited on a principled basis. 
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(35) Applicants in both jurisdictions suffer from the same adminisfrative propensity 
to request sometimes voluminous information beyond that which is relevant to the 
nature or extent of a proposed development. There are obvious reasons for this 
log-of-claims sttatagem, though these hardly relate to a commitment by such an 
administtation to enhancing the overall efficiency of the system. 
(36) Rather, they reflect a culture of self-preservation and an energetic resolve to 
avoid criticism at all costs. This clearly places an unfafr burden on applicants, is 
wasteful of both public and private resources and reinforces the continuing 
inequity of the use of public power to impose unfafr, imreasonable and sometimes 
nonsensical obligations on private citizens. 
(37) Associated with an initial and excessive information request is the recourse to 
contfriual and supplementary requests for details which can occur at any tune 
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tiirough to the decision date. Both jurisdictions suffer from this phenomenon 
which, it must be said, occurs m complacent disregard of any or all statutory tune 
frames. 
(38) It has to be said that there is little that can be done m a practical sense to 
redress this wrong. Though a commitment to the provision of objective standards 
and to a precise delineation of the necessary content of submitted reports would 
assist, the ability of administrators to work around the system will undoubtedly 
continue irrespective of the existence of legislative strictures. 
(39) The involvement of politicians in purely planning matters is as inevitable as it 
is regrettable, being a consequence of the uneasy msertion of a quasi-judicial 
process into a stmcture which can be, at heart, more concemed with the reality of 
re-election. 
(40) Though such interference can never be removed from the system, it could be 
moderated if four initiatives were inttoduced: 
• private certification and approval should be expanded 
• a development ombudsman, accessible only to applicants, is a 
genuine necessity given the capacity of adminisfrators to work 
around the system 
• a flexible FOI process would certainly assist applicants and 
objectors, though it has to be said that political interference tends to 
occur on the edges of planning issues and it is not by any means an 
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uifrequent occurrence for Local Authority planners to be dismissed 
from a meeting but for the meetmg to continue between the 
applicant or objector and the politician. In short, many aspects of 
the ongouig relationships between politicians and their planners 
will always remain undocumented. 
• the integration of all development approval systems into one 
seamless process is the stated intention in both jurisdictions and it 
must be considered as an essential prerequisite in any jurisdiction 
which maintains a claim to efficiency and equity. 
(41) In the final result, an interventionist state will thrive provided it maintains a 
monopoly on the power to "permif' and this power, in tum, is dependent upon the 
right to demand information. Accordingly, even an effective integration of all 
approval processes (there are 65 in Qld and no doubt a similar number in NSW) is 
unlikely to reduce the volume of information demanded by the system in 
aggregate. 
(42) To effect meaningful reform in this area, implementation of the ffrst proposal 
referred to in paragraph (40) is essential.^ 
Chapter 5 
(43) The direct financial cost of admmistering each of the development confrol 
systems considered in this thesis is substantially mcreased by the miposition of 
^ At-the very least a debate conceming the monopoly power of the state in land use matters is 
caUed for, even if the state's monopoly approval power were to remain unaffected. 
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mandatory notification and participation procedures. The mdfrect costs of the 
same processes, particularly in regard to applicants, can only be guessed at. 
(44) It is because these ttansaction costs are potentially so large that some space 
was devoted to analysing the supposed justification for the procedure which 
ranges across many disciplines, including, inter alia, psychology, sociology and 
political theory. 
(45) In the end, all attempted justifications lack cogency, or more accurately, they 
lack the degree of intellectual integrity which one is entitled to expect from a 
proposition which, if implemented, would impose significant cost burdens on the 
system and on particular users of the system. 
(46) In fact there is little justification beyond an ideological commitment to 
feeling-good-together for the entfre notification and participation process. It is 
consequently regrettable that both jurisdictions (though Qld is the worst offender 
in this regard) should persist with a process which has grown like topsy on the 
basis of an intellectual paradigm which derives dfrectly from the flower-power 
culture of Berkeley in the late 1960s. 
(47) The reasons for the conclusion in the above paragraph are canvassed in detail 
in the thesis, but they resolve to two: 
• the cost implications clearly outweigh the putative and in the main 
illusory benefits, and 
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• both jurisdictions permit open access to the declaratory jurisdiction 
of thefr respective planning courts. NSW operates a sunilar open 
standing policy m respect of appeal rights and the same approach 
should be adopted in Qld. 
(48) In the current clunate, a proposal to entirely abolish the procedure must be 
considered iconoclastic, however justifiable that conclusion may be. In the 
shorter term, the more politically atttactive altemative would be to expand the 
exempt, self-assessable or complying categories with a view to raising the non-
participation group of applications to around 85 percent of the total. 
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(49) Suggestions from sectors of the bureaucracy that the appeal process 
should be limited only to those appeals which are filed on a "deemed refusal" 
basis should, of course, be rejected and rejected out of hand. 
(50) The variety of criteria against which an application is to be assessed 
needs to be enumerated precisely as has, in part, been done in IPA. 
(51) The temptation, which has now become almost irresistible to some 
planners, to adopt what is conventionally known as a "holistic" approach should 
be moderated, if necessary by statute, to ensure that other coimtervailing 
principles must also be weighed in the balance. These another principles would 
recognise the sunple fact tiiat a "holistic" approach is, m reality, more an 
emotional state than an objective reality and that management principles may 
often be more applicable to a problem tiian a commitment to a certainly 
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unattamable dream that we can marshal all the facts which would allow us to 
make totally reliable predictions. 
(52) Following on from the "management" issue mentioned m the previous 
paragraph, some statutory reservations must be stated as to the role of ecology. At 
present, with the centtality afforded to very general statements of ecological 
ideology, the intellectual framework within which the decision making process 
must proceed is becoming eroded. Indeed, the cognate meaning of many of the 
words used to describe these central propositions is coming under serious doubt. 
Are, in short, these propositions mere statements of some vague, and ultimately 
undefinable, principle or are they meant to be genuine "operational" tools. At 
present we do not know and if planning itself is not to be, ultimately, about an 
unpossible "everything" this issue must be addressed. 
(53) Criteria of assessment should, as far as possible, be referrable to 
objective standards and benchmark criteria not to free-ranging administrative 
discretion which is the enemy of efficiency and often deleterious to equity and 
fafrness. 
(54) A compensatory mechanism must be put into place for those adversely 
affected by administtative dfrections conceming threshold levels and so on which, 
in planning terms, reflects the gradual erosion of the "finality" principle. 
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Other Intemational Environmental Agreements. 
1982 
1992 
1993 
1950 
1970 
1972 
2000 
2000 
World Charter for Nature 
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities 
Damaging to the Environment 
Intemational Convention for the Protection of Birds. 
BENELUX Convention Conceming Hunting and Protection of Birds. 
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. 
Framework Agreement for the Conservation of the living Resoxirces of the 
High Seas of the South Pacific. 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly IVIigratory Fish 
Stocks in the Westem and Central Pacific Ocean 
Australian Wodd Heritage Sites. 
The Tasmanian WUdemess. (41.58-43.67S/145.42-146.92E) 
The Lord Howe Island Group. (31.65S/159.05E) 
i\ustra]ian Central Eastem Rainforest Reserves. (28-37S/150-154E) 
Wet Tropics of Qld. (15.65-19.28S/144.97-146.45E) 
Ulum-Kata Tuta National Park (25.30S/131.OOE) 
Shark Bay. (24.73-27.27S/112.82-114.28E) 
Eraser Island. (25.25S/153.17E) 
Riversleigh/Naracoorte Mammal Fossil Sites. (19.02S/138.67E)/(36.95S/140.83E) 
Heard and McDonald Islands 
Macquarie Island. (54.50S/158.93E) 
The Greater Blue Mountains Area. (33.70S/150.OOE) 
The Great Bamer Reef (24.50-10.68S/142.50-154.OOE) 
Kakadu National Park. (13.OOS/132.50E) 
Willandra Lakes Region. (33 .00S/144.00E) 
Other Intemational Agreements/Principles on Sustainable Development. 
The Forest Principles (1992) 
Desertification 
The Rio Declaration 
The Kyoto Protocol 
Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context (1991) 
Reflecting a global consensus on the sustainable use of global 
forests. 
United Nations Document 
A set of principles that attempt to balance the need for 
economic development, the protection of the environment 
and the specific needs of undeveloped countries. 
Currendy in abeyance. 
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APPENDIX 2 
ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION & BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 
ASSESSMENT BILATERAL 
DRAFT 
This draft bilateral agreement is not endorsed by the State of New 
South Wales 
AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
AUSTRALIA AND THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
UNDER SECTION 45 OF THE COMMONWEALTH ENVIRONMENT 
PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 
RELATING TO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT 
Aim 
1. The agreement aims to minimise duplication of environmental impact assessment 
processes, sttengthen intergovernmental co-operation and promote a 
partnership approach to envfronmental protection and biodiversity conservation. In 
particular, this agreement provides for the accreditation of the New South 
Wales environmental impact assessment processes (set out in Schedule I) to ensure an 
integrated and coordinated approach for actions requiring approval 
from both the Commonwealth (under the Commonwealth Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999) and the State of New South Wales. 
This agreement will therefore enable the Commonwealth to rely primarily on the New 
South Wales assessment process set out in Schedule 1 in assessing 
actions under the Envfronment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. 
2. The specific objects of this agreement are to contribute to: 
a.protecting the environment; 
b.promoting the conservation and ecologically sustamable use of natural resources; 
censuring an efficient, timely, and effective process for environmental assessment 
and approval of actions; and 
d.minimising duplication in environmental assessment of projects in respect of 
matters of national envfronmental significance through Commonwealth 
accreditation of New South Wales processes. 
Parties to the agreement 
3. The parties to this agreement are the State of New South Wales and the 
Commonwealth of Ausfralia. 
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Term of agreement 
4. This agreement will come into force on [date]. 
5. The agreement will expire on [five years after commencement]. 
Nature of the agreement 
6. This agreement is a bilateral agreement made under section 45 of the 
Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. 
7. The parties note that, with the exception of clause 10, assessment means assessment 
of the impacts on matters of national environmental significance 
only. 
8. The parties note that any breach of the agreement will not give rise to any right of 
action, other than as prescribed in the Commonwealth Envfronment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, against the party in breach. 
Effect of this agreement 
9. Certain actions do not require assessment under the Commonwealth Envfronment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 
9.1 Pursuant to subsection 47(1) of the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, it is declared that an action does not 
requfre assessment under Part 8 of the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 if the action is assessed in the 
manner described in Schedule 1 to this agreement. 
9.2 Clause 9.1 applies to actions which are taken wholly within the State of New 
South Wales. In relation to actions taken in more than one jurisdiction 
(mcluding New South Wales), the parties agree to consult and use thefr best 
endeavours to reach agreement with other affected jurisdictions on an 
appropriate assessment process, such as that set out in Schedule 1. 
9.3 Consistent with section 49 of the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, the parties note that the provisions of 
this bilateral agreement do not have any effect in relation to an action in a 
Commonwealth area or an action by the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth 
agency. However, the parties further note that discussions will take place between the 
Commonwealth and New South Wales in relation to implementing 
Attachment 3 of the COAG Heads of Agreement on Commonwealth/State Roles and 
Responsibilities for the Envfronment ("Compliance Avith State 
Environment and Planning Laws"), Following those discussions, the parties intend to 
amend this agreement, as necessary, so that it will apply to actions m a 
Commonwealth area, and actions taken by the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth 
agency, where it is agreed that those actions will be subject to State 
envfronment and planning laws. 
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10. New South Wales to ensure that unpacts on matters that are not of national 
envfronmental significance are assessed 
10.1 This clause applies to an action that: 
a.is a confrolled action (as determined by the Commonwealth Envfronment 
Minister) taken or proposed to be taken in New South Wales; and 
b.does not require assessment under Part 8 of the Commonwealth Envfronment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 because of this 
agreement and section 83 of the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999; and 
c.is an action: 
I .taken or proposed to be taken by a constitutional corporation; 
2,taken by a person for the purposes of ttade or commerce..between Austtalia and 
another country, between two States, between a State or 
Territory, or between two Territories; or 
3.whose regulation is appropriate and adapted to give effect to Ausfralia's 
obUgations under an agreement witti one or more other countries. 
10.2 The Commonwealth undertakes that the written notice referred to in clause 12.2 
will mdicate: 
a.whether the Commonwealth believes that the action covered by the notice is an 
action to which this clause applies; and 
b.if so, which of paragraphs (i)-(iii) in clause 10.1(c) applies to the action. 
10.3 The State of New South Wales undertakes to ensure that the envfronmental 
impacts that the action has, will have, or is likely to have (other than the 
relevant impacts) are assessed to the greatest extent practicable. 
10.4 The State of New South Wales notes that the Commonwealth Envfronment 
Mmister may not decide whether to approve an action covered by section 
130(IC) until a written notice described in section 130(1B) of the EPBC Act has been 
received from the State. The written notice must state that the impacts 
referred to in clause 10.3 have been assessed to the greatest extent practicable and 
explaui how they have been assessed. The State of New South Wales 
undertakes to use its best endeavours to provide such a written notice m relation to 
actions covered by section 130(1C). 
Procedures to be followed 
11. New South Wales to use best endeavours to ensure that actions are referred 
I l.l The parties will work cooperatively to ensure that proponents are aware of thefr 
obligations under the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, and will use thefr best endeavours to encourage 
proponents to refer actions that are proposed to take place m the State 
of New South Wales that may requfre approval under the Commonwealth 
Envfronment Protection and Bio(frversity Conservation Act 1999 to the 
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Commonwealth Envfronment Minister. 
11.2 The parties agree to develop adminisfrative arrangements which will streamlme 
the referral process for proponents. Where possible the parties will 
develop admmisttative arrangements which will allow proponents to sunultaneously 
satisfy both Commonwealth and State requfrements. In this respect, the 
parties note that section 69 of the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 - which provides that a State or agency of 
a State that is aware of a proposed action may refer the action to the Commonwealth 
Envfronment Minister - may, m appropriate cases, provide a mechanism 
for sfreamlining the referral process. 
11.3 Subject to sections 69, 70 and 71 of the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, the parties recognise that final 
responsibility for referring actions which may require approval from the 
Commonwealth Envfronment Minister under the Commonwealth Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 lies with the person proposing to 
take the action. In making the undertakings set out m this clause, the 
parties do not accept any responsibility for the actions of proponents who may or may 
not choose to refer actions. 
12. Commonwealth to inform New South Wales of decision about whether a proposed 
action is a conttolled action 
12.1 This clause applies to an action or proposed action that is: 
a.referred to the Commonwealth Environment Minister under the Commonwealth 
Envfronment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999; and 
b.proposed to be taken ui New South Wales. 
12.2 The Commonwealth undertakes that the Commonwealth Environment Minister 
will give written notice of his or her decision whether the action is a 
conttolled action to the New South Wales Minister within ten business days of 
making the decision. 
13. Confirmation by New South Wales that an accredited process will apply 
13.1 This clause applies where: 
a.the State of New South Wales receives a written notice from the Commonwealth 
Environment Minister that an action proposed to take place m New 
South Wales is a confrolled action; and 
b.the action does not require assessment under Part 8 of the Commonwealth 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 if assessed 
m the manner specified m Schedule 1 to this agreement. 
13.2 The State of New South Wales undertakes that withui ten business days of 
receiving the written notice referred to ui clause 12.2, the New South Wales 
Mfrdster will indicate in a written notice given to the Commonwealth Envfronment 
Minister whether the action will be assessed m the manner specified ui 
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Schedule I to this agreement. 
13.3 If the New South Wales Muiister asks the Commonwealth Envfronment Minister 
under section 79 of the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 to reconsider the decision that the action is a 
confrolled action, then the ten day period referred to m subclause 13.2 
begins on the day that the State receives the notice described m subsection 79(3) of 
the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999. This notice, amongst other things, informs the State of the 
outcome of the Commonwealth Environment Minister's reconsideration. 
14. Assessment documentation 
14.1 When the Consent Authority or Determining Authority in respect of an action is 
a council (as defined ui the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 
1979), the State of New South Wales will ensure that the assessment is managed in 
accordance with guidelines agreed between Envfronment Australia and 
the New South Wales Department of Urban Affafrs and Planning for the purposes of 
this clause. 
14.2 The State of New South Wales undertakes that when an action is assessed in the 
manner specified in Schedule 1 to this agreement it will: 
a.provide a copy of the Assessment Report or the Inquiry Report to the 
Commonwealth Environment Minister as soon as possible after the Report is 
prepared; and 
b.provide copies of any other assessment documentation relevant to matters of 
national environmental significance to the Commonwealth Environment 
Minister as soon as reasonably practicable (and in any event not more than ten 
business days) after the date on which the Assessment Report or 
Inquiry Report is provided to the Minister. 
14.3 The State of New South Wales may, when it provides the Assessment Report or 
Inquiry Report or the other assessment documentation referred to in 
clause 14.2, also provide additional information on social and economic matters if 
such information will be relevant to the Commonwealth Envfronment 
Mmister's decision whether to approve the action under section 136 of the 
Commonwealth's Envfronment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. 
15. Additional information 
If, in deciding whether to approve the taking of an action assessed under this 
agreement, the Commonwealth Envfronment Minister uses any information 
described in paragraph I36(2)(e) of the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, the Commonwealth Environment 
Minister undertakes to provide a copy of this information to the New South Wales 
Minister. The mtention of this clause is to give the State of New South 
Wales an opportunity to comment on the accuracy of this information before the 
Commonwealth Envfronment Minister decides whether to approve the taking 
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of tiie action, subject to the requfrements of section 130 of tiie Commonwealtii 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 relatmg to the 
tune period within which the Commonwealth Environment Minister must decide 
whether to approve the action. 
16. Monitoring compliance with conditions 
16.1 This clause applies where an action: 
a.is taken in New South Wales; and 
b.requfres the approval of the Commonwealth Envfronment Minister under Part 9 of 
the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999; and 
c.requires approval (however described) imder New South Wales legislation. 
16.2 The parties agree to cooperate in monitoring compliance with conditions 
attached to approvals, with the aim of reducing duplication. To this end the 
parties agree: 
a.that each party will inform the other of any conditions attached to the approval(s) 
to take the action; and 
b.that best endeavours will be used to put cooperative arrangements m place for 
monitoring compliance with conditions on any project which is approved 
by both parties. The aim of these arrangements is to ensure that reporting 
requirements for the proponent, and other monitoring efforts such as site 
inspections, are not duplicated. 
17. Enforcing conditions on approvals 
The parties agree to inform one another before commencing action to prosecute a 
person for breaching conditions of an approval for an action which has 
been approved by both parties, where the conditions relate to, or affect, a matter of 
national envfronmental significance. 
18. Conditions attached to an approval 
The parties recognise the desirability of avoiding, to the extent practicable, attaching 
inconsistent conditions to approvals for an action under the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 and New South 
Wales legislation. To this end, the parties: 
a.note the provisions of section 134 of the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, which include a requfrement 
for the Commonwealth Environment Minister to consider any relevant State 
conditions when deciding whether to attach a condition to an approval, and 
b.agree to inform one another before varymg the conditions attached to an approval 
for an action which has been approved by both parties, where the 
condition relates to, or affects, a matter of national envfronmental significance. 
The parties also agree to advise one another of any such variation 
after it has been made. 
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19. Admmisfrative procedures 
The parties agree to jointly develop admmisfrative procedures to ensure that the 
requfrements of this agreement are administered efficiently in accordance 
with their separate legal requfrements. The parties note that the adminisfrative 
procedures will provide for consultation on draft assessment documentation, 
including draft assessment reports. The administtative procedures will also include 
guidelines on the exchange of any information about assessments 
between Envfronment Austtalia and the Department of Urban Affairs and Planning. 
Maintaining the agreement 
20. Monitoring compliance with the agreement 
The parties recognise that, under the Commonwealth Auditor-General Act 1997, the 
Commonwealth Auditor-General may audit the operation of the 
Commonwealth public sector (as defined m section 18 of that Act) in relation to this 
agreement, including whether the Commonwealth is meeting its 
obligations under the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 by relying on New South Wales processes accredited 
under this agreement. 
21. Reviewing the agreement 
21.1 The parties note that section 65 of the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 requfres the Commonwealth 
Envfronment Minister to cause a review of the operation of this agreement to be 
carried out, and give a copy of the report of the review to the New South 
Wales Mmister. 
21.2 The parties agree that: 
a.the review of this agreement under section 65 will be carried out jointly by 
Envfronment Austtalia and the Department of Urban Affafrs and Planning; 
b.the review will evaluate the operation of the agreement against the object of the 
agreement; 
c.the views of key stakeholders will be sought as part of the review; 
d.the review will commence at least eight months before the agreement is due to 
expfre, and will be completed at least three months before the 
agreement expfres; and 
e.the report of the review will be ttansmitted jointly to the Ministers. 
22. Cancelling or suspending the agreement 
22.1 The parties note that sections 57 - 64 of the Commonwealth Envfronment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 provide that the 
Commonwealth Envfronment Minister may cancel or suspend all or part of this 
agreement (either generally or ui relation to actions m specified classes) under 
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certain cfrcumstances. Sections 57 - 64 of the Commonwealth Envfronment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 also set out a process for 
consulting on the cancellation or suspension of all or part of this agreement. 
22.2 In accordance with section 63 of the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 the Commonwealth Environment 
Minister must cancel or suspend all or part of this agreement at the request of the New 
South Wales Minister, but only if the request is made in accordance 
with the agreement. 
22.3 The parties agree that a request to cancel or suspend all or part of this agreement 
is made in accordance with this agreement if: 
a.the request is made on the grounds that the New South Wales Minister is not 
satisfied that the Commonwealth has complied or will comply with the 
agreement; or 
b.the request is made on the grounds that the New South Wales Minister is not 
satisfied that the object of the agreement is being achieved; and 
c.before making the request, the New South Wales Minister has informed the 
Commonwealth Environment Minister in writing of the reason(s) for 
requesting the suspension and allowed a period of at least twenty business days for 
the Commonwealth Environment Minister to respond. 
Exchange of information 
23. Each party agrees to promptly comply with any reasonable request from the other 
party to supply information relating to the management or 
adminisfration of assessments covered by this agreement. 
24. The parties agree that they may each use data within the confrol of the relevant 
departments of government of the other party for the purposes of 
meeting thefr respective responsibilities relating to the agreement or the assessment of 
envfromnental impacts under thefr respective Acts, and to make data 
available to the other. The parties agree that data will remain the property of the 
owner and its use will be subject to such licence conditions as may be 
agreed. The parties agree that, subject to clauses 28 and 30, data will not be used or 
communicated to any other person without the permission of the 
owner. 
Conflict resolution 
25. In the event that any dispute arises under this agreement, the parties will settle it 
by dfrect negotiation using tiieir best endeavours, acting in a spirit of 
cooperation. The parties agree that m the event of a dispute, discussions auned at 
resolution will normally take place at officials level in the ffrst instance. 
This clause does not purport to lunit the rights and obligations of each party under 
relevant sections of the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (mcluding those sections dealuig with cancelling 
and suspending bilateral agreements). 
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26. The parties will notify and consult each other on matters that come to thefr 
attention that may frnprove the operation of this agreement. 
Relevant plans and agreements 
27. The parties note that a number of agreements and plans may be relevant to 
assessments under this agreement. The parties undertake that, when 
actions are assessed under this agreement, relevant agreements and plans will be taken 
mto account as necessary. The parties agree that where the 
assessment covers impacts on: 
a. World Heritage values of a World Heritage property, any management plan for the 
property is relevant, 
b.the ecological character of a Ramsar wetland property, any management plan for 
the wetland is relevant, 
c.a listed threatened species or ecological community, any recovery plan for the 
species or community, and any threat abatement plan for a process that 
threatens the species or community is relevant, 
d.a listed migratory species, any wildlife conservation plan for the species is 
relevant. 
Freedom of information legislation 
28. If a party receives any request, mcluding under Freedom of Information 
legislation, for any documents originating from another party which are not 
otherwise publicly available, the parties will consult on the release of those 
documents. 
29. The parties recognise the need for expeditious consultation on such requests so 
that statutory obligations can be met without delay. 
Public Access to Assessment Documentation 
30. The State of New South Wales agrees that documentation relating to the 
assessment of each action which is assessed in the manner specified in 
Schedule I will be available to the public, except where corresponding information 
would not have been available to the public if the action had been 
assessed by the Commonwealth under the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. 
Advertising 
31. The State of New South Wales will, in giving effect to the requirements in 
Schedule I relating to advertising, make special allowances, as appropriate, to 
ensure affected groups with particular communication needs have an adequate 
opportunity to comment on actions assessed in the manner specified ui 
Schedule I. 
Interpretation 
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32. A reference in this agreement to the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, the New South Wales Environmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 or the New South Wales Threatened Species 
Conservation Act 1995 is a reference to the relevant Acts as m force at the 
date of this agreement. If any of the Acts are subsequently amended m a manner that 
affects the operation of tiiis agreement, the parties will seek to agree 
as soon as practicable on whether it is necessary to make another bilateral agreement 
varying or replacing this agreement. 
33. A reference in this agreement to an Act mcludes a reference to any regulations and 
instruments under that Act. 
34. A reference m this agreement to the impacts of an action (or the relevant unpacts 
of an action), includes a reference to any impacts (or relevant impacts, 
as the case may be) of that action outside of the State of New South Wales. . 
35. Unless the confrary intention appears, the terms used in this agreement have the 
same meaning as in the Commonwealth Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. 
36. Assessment documentation means any formal report, study, agreement, 
submission or correspondence prepared by or received as part of the formal 
assessment processes set out in Schedule I. This includes draft reports or studies 
which would normally be publicly available under the assessment 
process. 
37. Assessment Report means the report prepared in accordance with Part A (clause 
5), Part B (clause 5), Part C (clause 5) or Part D (clause 6) of 
Schedule I. 
38. Commonwealth Environment Minister means the Minister administering the 
Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 and includes a delegate of the Minister. 
39. Consent Authority has the same meaning as in the New South Wales 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. 
40. Determining Authority has the same meaning as in the New South Wales 
Envfronmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. 
41. Dfrector has the same meaning as in the New South Wales Envfronmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979. 
42. EIS means and Envfronmental Impact Statement prepared under the 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (and mcludes an Environmental 
Impact Statement that includes a Species Impact Statement). 
43. EPA Regulations means the Envfronmental Plannfrig and Assessment Regulations 
1994, 
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44. friqufry Report means the findings and recommendations of a Commission of 
Inqufry held m accordance with Part A (clause 4), Part B (clause 4) or Part 
C (clause 4) of the Schedule to this agreement, 
45. New South Wales Mmister means the Mmister administering the New South 
Wales Environmental Plannmg and Assessment Act 1979 and mcludes a 
delegate of the Minister. 
46. Statement of Envfronmental Effects means a Statement of Envfronmental Effects 
(uicludmg a Statement of Envfronmental Effects that includes a 
Species Impact Statement) that is: 
a,prepared for the purposes of Form I to the EPA Regulations, and 
b,prepared m accordance with Part C of Schedule 1 to this agreement. 
47. Species Impact Statement means a Species Impact Statement prepared in 
accordance with Division 2 of Part 6 of the Threatened Species 
Conservation Act 1995, or in accordance with Subdivision 2 of Division 6 of Part 7A 
of the Fisheries Management Act 1994. 
SCHEDULE 1 
Preamble 
Subsection 47(1) of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 provides that a bilateral agreement may declare that actions need 
not be assessed under Part 8 of that Act if the actions have been 'assessed in a 
specified manner'. 
Clause 9.1 of this bilateral agreement declares that an action does not require 
assessment under Part 8 of the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 if it is assessed in the manner specified in this 
Schedule. 
The Specified Manner of Assessment 
For the purposes of clause 9.1 of this bilateral agreement, an action is assessed in the 
manner specified m this Schedule if: 
a.the action is assessed in accordance with the requfrements set out below in: 
1 .Part A, or 
2.Part B, or 
3.Part C,or 
b.the action is assessed m accordance with the requfrements set out below in Part D 
and the only confrolling provisions for the action are sections 18 or 
18A of the Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999. 
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For the purposes of regulations made under section 50 of the Envfronment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, the manner of assessment 
specified in this Schedule provides for the following assessment approaches: 
a.preparation of an Envfronmental Impact Statement under Part 4 of the 
Envfronmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (see Part A below) - this 
assessment approach corresponds to assessment by environmental unpact 
statement under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999; and 
b.preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement under Part 5 of the 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (see Part B below) - this 
assessment approach corresponds to assessment by envfronmental impact 
statement under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999; and 
c.preparation of a Statement of Envfronmental Effects under Part 4 of the 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (see Part C below) - this 
assessment approach corresponds to assessment by environmental impact 
statement under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999; and 
d.preparation of a Species Impact Statement under Division 2 of Part 6 of the 
Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 or Subdivision 2 of Division 6 
of Part 7 A of the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (see Part E below) - this 
assessment approach corresponds to assessment on preliminary 
documentation under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999. 
Part A - Assessment by Environmental Impact Statement under Part 4 of the 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 
1. Law under which the assessment has been carried out 
The action is designated development as defined in section 77A of the Environmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979, and an environmental impact 
statement is prepared under Part 4 of the Envfronmental Planning and Assessment Act 
1979. 
2. Guidelines for assessment 
2.1 The envfronmental impact statement: 
a.contains the matters referred to in guidelines established by the Dfrector, and in 
force in relation to the action, under regulation 54 A of the 
Envfronmental Planning and Assessment Regulations; and 
b.meets the requirements of the Dfrector (if any), specified in accordance with 
regulation 55 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulations, 
in relation to the form and content of the environmental impact statement. 
2.2 The guidelines and the Director's requfrements (if any) ensure that the assessment: 
367 
a.contams an assessment of all relevant unpacts that the action has, will have or is 
likely to have; 
b.contains enough information about the action and its relevant impacts to allow the 
Commonwealth Environment Minister to make an mformed decision 
whether or not to approve the action under the Commonwealth Envfronment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999; and 
c.addresses the matters (if any) prescribed under subsection 102(2) of the 
Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 for assessment by environmental impact statement under that Act. 
2.3 The Dfrector publishes draft requirements for the preparation of the environmental 
impact statement, and seeks public comment on the draft 
requirements before the requfrements are finalised, if: 
a.the Dfrector believes it is necessary or desfrable to seek public comment because 
the issues to be addressed in the assessment will be complex or 
there will be a high level of public interest in the issues; or 
b.the Commonwealth Environment Minister has requested the publication of draft 
requfrements. 
3. Inviting public comment 
The envfronmental impact statement is released for public comment, and the public is 
given at least 28 days to provide comments to the Consent Authority 
on the action or on the environmental impact statement. During this period (the public 
comment period): 
a.copies of the envfronmental impact statement are available for public inspection; 
and 
b.copies of the envfronmental impact statement are available for purchase. 
Before the public comment period begins, notice is given by public advertisement of 
the availability of copies of the envfronmental unpact statement and the 
opportunity for the public to provide comments. 
4. Responding to public comments 
4.1 If an inquiry is not held under Division 2 of Part 6 of the Envfronmental Planning 
and Assessment Act 1979 in respect of the action, the proponent 
prepares: 
a.a revised environmental impact statement; or 
b.a supplement to the envfronmental impact statement; taking into account the 
public submissions (if any) relating to the relevant impacts of tiie action 
which are received during the period referred to in clause 3. 
The revised EIS, or the supplement to the envfronmental impact statement, is 
submitted to the Dfrector or the Consent Authority. 
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4.2 If an inqufry is held under Division 2 of Part 6 of the Environmental Plannmg and 
Assessment Act 1979 m respect of tiie action, the Commission of Inqufry 
considers: 
a.the envfronmental impact statement; and 
b.any comments provided by the public during the public comment period; and 
c.information provided by the proponent which addresses, to the greatest extent 
practicable, the comments provided by the public. 
4.3 Clause 4.2 applies only if both of the following conditions are satisfied in relation 
to the mquiry: 
a.the New South Wales Minister issues dfrections to the Commission of Inquiry 
which ensure that: 
1 .the inqufry assesses all relevant unpacts that the action has, will have or is 
likely to have; and 
2.the Inquiry Report contains enough information about the action and its 
relevant impacts to allow the Commonwealth Environment Minister to 
make an informed decision whether or not to approve the action under the 
Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999; and 
b.the Commission of Inquiry prepares an Inquiry Report and submits a copy of the 
Report to the Commonwealth Environment Minister. 
5. Assessment Reports and Inquiry Reports 
5.1 If an inquiry is not held in accordance with clause 4 in respect of the action, the 
Dfrector or the Consent Authority prepares an Assessment Report on the 
proposed action and submits it to the Commonwealth Envfronment Minister. 
5.2 In preparing the Assessment Report, the Dfrector or the Consent Authority takes 
into accoimt: 
a.the envfronmental impact statement; and 
b.any comments provided by the public during the public comment period; and 
c.the revised envfronmental unpact statement, or the supplement to the 
envfronmental impact statement, provided in accordance with clause 4. 
5.3 The Assessment Report or Inquiry Report (as the case may be) includes: 
a.a description of: 
1 .the action; and 
2.the places affected by the action; and 
3.any matters of national envfronmental significance that are likely to be affected 
by the action; and 
b.a summary of the relevant unpacts of the action; and 
c.a description of feasible mitigation measures, changes to the action or procedures 
to prevent or minimise envfronmental impacts on relevant matters of 
national envfronmental significance proposed by the proponent or suggested in 
public submissions; and 
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d,to tiie extent practicable, a description of any feasible alternatives to the action 
that have been identified through the assessment process, and thefr 
likely impact on matters of national environmental significance; and 
e,a statement of conditions for approval of the action that may be unposed to 
address identified unpacts on matters of national environmental 
significance; and 
fa statement of State or Territory approval requfrements and conditions that apply, 
or are proposed to apply, to the action when the report is prepared, 
including a description of the monitoring, enforcement and review procedures that 
apply, or are proposed to apply, to the action, 
6. Inviting public comment 
6.1 When the public is mvited to comment m accordance with clauses 2 or 3, the 
invitation is published in newspapers cfrculating generally in each State and 
Territory. 
6.2 The advertisements advise the nature of the proposal, its location(s), the matters of 
national envfronmental significance to be covered by the 
assessment, how the relevant documents may be obtained, and the deadline for public 
comments. 
7 Local Government as Consent Authority 
If the Consent Authority for an action is a council (as defined in the Envfronmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979), the New South Wales Department of 
Urban Affair and Planning provides to Environment Austtalia a 
written notice certifying that the action has been assessed in accordance with the 
requfrements set out in this Part of Schedule 1 and that the Assessment 
Report adequately addresses the matters in clause 5.3 of Part A of this Schedule. 
Part B - Assessment by Envfronmental Impact Statement under Part 5 of the 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 
1. Law under which the assessment has been carried out 
An environmental impact statement is prepared under Part 5 of the Environmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 in respect of the action. 
2. Guidelines for assessment 
2.1 The environmental impact statement: 
a.contains the matters referred to in guidelmes established by the Director, and in 
force in relation to the action, under regulation 84 of the 
Envfronmental Planning and Assessment Regulations; and 
b.meets the requfrements of the Dfrector (if any), specified in accordance with 
regulation 85 of the Environmental Plannfrig and Assessment Regulations, 
m relation to the form and content of the envfronmental impact statement. 
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2.2 The guidelines and the Dfrector's requirements (if any) ensure tiiat the assessment: 
a.contains an assessment of all relevant unpacts that the action has, will have or is 
likely to have; 
b.contains enough information about the action and its relevant unpacts to allow the 
Commonwealth Environment Muiister to make an informed decision 
whether or not to approve the action under the Commonwealth Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999; and 
c.addresses the matters (if any) prescribed under subsection 102(2) of the 
Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 for assessment by environmental impact statement under that Act, 
2,3 The Director publishes draft requirements for the preparation of the 
environmental impact statement, and seeks public comment on the draft 
requirements before the requirements are finalised, if: 
a,the Dfrector believes it is necessary or desfrable to seek public comment 
because the issues to be addressed in the assessment will be complex 
or there will be a high level of public interest in the issues; or 
b.the Commonwealth Environment Minister has requested the publication of 
draft requirements. 
3. Inviting public comment 
The environmental impact statement is released for public comment, and the 
public is given at least 28 days to provide comments to the Determining 
Authority on the action or on the envfronmental impact statement. During this 
period (the public comment period): 
a.copies of the environmental unpact statement are available for public 
inspection; and 
b.copies of the environmental impact statement are available for purchase. 
Before the public comment period begins, notice is given by public advertisement 
of the availability of copies of the environmental impact statement 
and the opportunity for the public to provide comments. 
4 Responding to public comments 
4.1 If an inqufry is not held under Division 2 of Part 6 of the Envfronmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 hi respect of the action, the proponent 
prepares: 
a.a revised environmental impact statement; or 
b.a supplement to the environmental impact statement; taking mto account the 
public submissions (if any) relating to the relevant impacts of the 
action which are received during the period referred to m clause 3. 
The revised envfronmental impact statement, or the supplement to the 
environmental impact statement, is submitted to the Dfrector or the Determining 
Authority, 
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4.2 If an uiquiry is held under Division 2 of Part 6 of the Envfronmental Planning 
and Assessment Act 1979 in respect of the action, the Commission of 
Inqufry considers: 
a.the envfronmental unpact statement; and 
b.any comments provided by the public during the public comment period; and 
cinformation provided by the proponent which addresses, to the greatest extent 
practicable, the comments provided by the public, 
4.3 Clause 4,2 applies only if both of the following conditions are satisfied m 
relation to the mqufry: 
a,the New South Wales Minister issues directions to the Commission of Inquiry 
which ensure that: 
1 ,the inquiry assesses all relevant impacts that the action has, will have or is 
likely to have; and 
2,the Inqufry Report contains enough information about the action and its 
relevant impacts to allow the Commonwealth Environment Minister 
to make an informed decision whether or not to approve the action under the 
Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999; and 
b,the Commission of Inquiry prepares an Inquiry Report and submits a copy of 
the Report to the Commonwealth Envfronment Minister. 
5 Assessment Report 
5.1 If an inquiry is not held in accordance with clause 4 in respect of the action, the 
Director or the Determining Authority prepares an Assessment 
Report on the proposed action and submits it to the Commonwealth Envfronment 
Minister. 
5.2 In preparing the Assessment Report, the Director or the Determining Authority 
takes mto account: 
(a)the environmental impact statement; and 
(b)any comments provided by the public during the public comment period; and 
(c)the revised envfronmental impact statement, or the supplement to the 
environmental impact statement, provided in accordance with clause 4. 
5.3 The Assessment Report or the Inquiry Report (as the case may be) includes: 
(a)a description of: 
(i) the action; and 
(ii) the places affected by the action; and 
(iii) any matters of national envfronmental significance that are likely to be 
affected by the action; and 
(b)a summary of the relevant unpacts of the action; and 
(c)a description of feasible mitigation measures, changes to the action or 
procedures to prevent or minimise envfronmental unpacts on relevant matters 
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of national envfronmental significance proposed by the proponent or suggested m 
public submissions; and 
(d)to tiie extent practicable, a description of any feasible alternatives to the action 
that have been identified tiirough the assessment process, and thefr 
likely unpact on matters of national envfronmental significance; and 
(e)a statement of conditions for approval of the action that may be imposed to 
address identified impacts on matters of national environmental 
significance; and 
(f)a statement of State or Territory approval requfrements and conditions that 
apply, or are proposed to apply, to the action when the report is 
prepared, including a description of the monitoring, enforcement and review 
procedures that apply, or are proposed to apply, to the action. 
6 Invitmg public comment 
6.1 When the public is mvited to comment in accordance with clauses 2 or 3, the 
invitation is published in newspapers cfrculating generally in each 
State and Territory. 
6.2 The advertisements advise the nature of the proposal, its location(s), the 
matters of national envfronmental significance to be covered by the 
assessment, how the relevant documents may be obtained, and the deadline for 
public comments. 
7 Local Government as Determining Authority 
If the Determining Authority for an action is a council (as defined in the 
Envfronmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979), the New South Wales 
Department of Urban Affair and Planning provides to Envfronment Ausfralia a 
written notice certifying that the action has been assessed m accordance with the 
requfrements set out in this Part of Schedule I and that the 
Assessment Report adequately addresses the matters in item 5.3. 
Part C - Assessment by Statement of Envfronmental Effects under the 
Environmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 
1 Law under which the assessment has been carried out 
The action is advertised development as defined in section 4 of the Envfronmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979, and a Statement of 
Envfronmental Effects is prepared for the purposes of Part 4 of the Environmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979. 
2 Requfrements for assessment 
2.1 The Consent Authority or the Dfrector prepares requfrements governing the 
form and content of the Statement of Envfronmental Effects, and these 
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requfrements ensure that the assessment: 
(a)assesses all relevant unpacts tiiat the action has, will have or is likely to have; 
(b)contams enough mformation about the action and its relevant unpacts to allow 
the Commonwealth Envfronment Muiister to make an mformed 
decision whether or not to approve the action under the Commonwealth 
Envfronment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999; and 
(c)addresses the matters (if any) prescribed under subsection 102(2) of the 
Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 for assessment by envfronmental impact statement under that Act. 
2,2 Before finalising requfrements for the purposes of clause 2,1 above, the 
Consent Authority or the Dfrector publishes draft requfrements for the 
Statement of Envfronmental Effects, and seeks public comment on the draft 
requfrements, if: 
(a)the Consent Authority or the Dfrector believes it is necessary or desfraT l^e to 
seek public comment because the issues to be addressed in the 
assessment will be complex or there will be a high level of public interest in the 
issues; or 
(b)the Commonwealth Environment Minister has requested the publication of draft 
requirements, 
3 Preparing a statement of envfronmental effects and inviting public comment 
The Statement of Envfronmental Effects is prepared in accordance with the 
requfrements established imder clause 2 above and is released for public 
comment. The public is given at least 28 days to provide comments to the 
Consent Authority on the action or on the Statement of Envfronmental Effects, 
During this period (the public comment period): 
(a)copies of the Statement of Environmental Effects are available for public 
uispection; and 
(b)copies of the Statement of Envfronmental Effects are available for purchase. 
Before the public comment period begins, notice is given by public advertisement 
of the availability of copies of the Statement of Envfronmental Effects 
and the opportunity for the public to provide comments. 
4 Responding to public comments 
4.1 If an inquiry is not held under Division 2 of Part 6 of the Envfronmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 m respect of the action, the proponent 
prepares: 
(a)a revised Statement of Envfronmental Effects; or 
(b)a supplement to the Statement of Envfronmental Effects; taking into accoimt the 
public submissions (if any) relatmg to the relevant unpacts of the 
action which are received during the period referred to in clause 3. 
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The revised Statement of Envfronmental Effects, or the supplement to the 
Statement of Envfronmental Effects, is submitted to the Dfrector or the 
Determining Authority, 
4.2 If an inqufry is held under Division 2 of Part 6 of the Envfronmental Planning 
and Assessment Act 1979 in respect of the action, the Commission of 
Inquiry considers: 
(a)the Statement of Environmental Effects; and 
(b)any comments provided by the public during the public comment period; and 
(c)iiiformation provided by the proponent which addresses, to the greatest extent 
practicable, the comments provided by the public. 
4.3 Clause 4.2 applies only if both of the followuig conditions are satisfied m 
relation to the inquiry: 
(a)the New South Wales Minister issues dfrections to the Commission of Inqufry 
which ensure that: 
(i)the inquiry assesses all relevant impacts that the action has, will have or is 
likely to have; and 
(ii)the Inquiry Report contains enough information about the action and its 
relevant impacts to allow the Commonwealth Environment Minister to 
make an informed decision whether or not to approve the action under the 
Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999; and 
(b)the Commission of Inquiry prepares an Inquiry Report and submits a copy of 
the Report to the Commonwealth Envfronment Minister. 
5 Assessment Report 
5.1 If an inquiry is not held in accordance with clause 4 in respect of the action, the 
Dfrector or the Consent Authority prepares an Assessment Report 
on the proposed action and submits it to the Commonwealth Envfronment 
Muiister. 
5.2 In preparing the Assessment Report, the Dfrector or the Consent Authority 
takes mto accoimt: 
(a)the Statement of Envfronmental Effects; and 
(b)any comments provided by the public during the public comment period; and 
(c)the revised Statement of Environmental Effects, or the supplement to the 
Statement of Envfronmental Effects, provided ui accordance with clause 4. 
5.3 The Assessment Report or the Inquiry Report (as the case may be) includes: 
(a)a description of: 
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(i)the action; and 
(ii)the places affected by the action; and 
(iii)any matters of national envfronmental significance that are likely to be 
affected by the action; and 
(b)a summary of the relevant impacts of the action; and 
(c)a description of feasible mitigation measures, changes to the action or 
procedures to prevent or minimise environmental unpacts on relevant matters 
of national envfronmental significance proposed by the proponent or suggested in 
public submissions; and 
(d)to the extent practicable, a description of any feasible alternatives to the action 
that have been identified through the assessment process, and thefr 
likely impact on matters of national envfronmental significance; and 
(e)a statement of conditions for approval of the action that may be unposed to 
address identified impacts on matters of national envfronmental 
significance; and 
(f)a statement of State or Territory approval requirements and conditions that 
apply, or are proposed to apply, to the action when the report is 
prepared, including a description of the monitoring, enforcement and review 
procedures that apply, or are proposed to apply, to the action, 
6 Inviting public comment 
6.1 When the public is invited to comment in accordance with clauses 2 or 3, the 
invitation is published m newspapers circulating generally in each 
State and Territory, 
6.2 The advertisements advise the nature of the proposal, its location(s), the 
matters of national envfronmental significance to be covered by the 
assessment, how the relevant documents may be obtained, and the deadline for 
public comments, 
7 Local Government as Consent Authority 
If the Consent Authority for an action is a council (as defined in the Envfronmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979), the New South Wales 
Department of Urban Affafr and Planning provides to Envfronment Austtalia a 
written notice certifying that the action has been assessed in accordance 
with the requfrements set out in this Part of Schedule 1 and that the Assessment 
Report adequately addresses the matters in item 5.3. 
Part D - Assessment by Species Impact Statement under the Threatened Species 
Conservation Act 1995 or the Fisheries Management Act 1994 
1 Actions to which this Part applies 
1.1 This Part of the Schedule applies to an action if: 
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(a)the only conttolling provisions for tiie action are sections 18 or 18A of the 
Commonwealth Envfronment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999;and 
(b)the action has not been assessed in accordance with the requirements set out m 
Part A, Part B or Part C of this Schedule. 
1.2 In addition, this Part of the Schedule applies to an action only if: 
(a)the Commonwealth Envfronment Mmister has given to the New South Wales 
Mmister the written notice referred to in clause 12,2 of this agreement; 
and 
(b)the Commonwealth Environment Minister has not mdicated in that notice that 
this Part does not apply to the action, 
2, Law under which the assessment has been carried out 
The action is assessed by a Species Impact Statement prepared m accordance with 
Division 2 of Part 6 of the Threatened Species Conservation Act 
1995, or in accordance with Subdivision 2 of Division 6 of Part 7 A of the Fisheries 
Management Act 1994, 
3 Content of Species Impact Statement 
The Species Impact Statement: 
(a)contains an assessment of all relevant impacts that the action has, will have or is 
likely to have; 
(b)contains enough information about the action and its relevant impacts to allow 
the Commonwealth Envfronment Minister to make an informed 
decision whether or not to approve the action under the Commonwealth 
Envfronment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999; and 
(c)if the action is likely to impact on a listed threatened species or listed threatened 
ecological community that is also included in a list kept under the 
New South Wales Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995, contains the 
information referred to in section 110 of the New South Wales Threatened 
Species Conservation Act 1995 ui relation to the listed threatened species or 
ecological community; and 
(d)if the action is likely to unpact on a listed threatened species or listed threatened 
ecological community that is also included in a list kept under the 
New South Wales Fisheries Management Act 1994, contams the mformation 
referred to in section 22 IK of the New South Wales Fisheries 
Management Act 1994 in relation to the listed threatened species or ecological 
community. 
4. Public Comment on the Species Impact Statement 
The Species Impact Statement is released for public comment. The public is given 
at least 28 days to provide comments to the Director General of 
National Parks or the Dfrector General of Fisheries on the action or on the Species 
Impact Statement. During tiiis period (the public comment period): 
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(a)copies of tiie Species frnpact Statement are available for public inspection; and 
(b)copies of the Species Impact Statement are available for purchase. 
Before the public comment period begms, notice is given by public advertisement 
of the availability of copies of tiie Species Impact Statement and the 
opportunity for the public to provide comments. 
5 Responding to Public Comment 
The proponent provides to the Director General of National Parks or the Director 
General of Fisheries any additional information, or changes to the 
Species Impact Statement, needed to take into account the public comments 
received during the public comment period. 
6. Assessment Report 
6.1 The Dfrector General of National Parks or the Dfrector General of Fisheries 
prepares an Assessment Report on the action and submits it to the 
Commonwealth Envfronment Minister. 
6.2 In preparing the Assessment Report, the Dfrector General of National Parks or 
the Director General of Fisheries takes into account: 
(a)the Species Impact Statement; 
(b)any comments provided by the public during the public comment period; and 
(c)any additional uiformation, or changes to the Species Impact Statement, 
provided by the proponent under clause 5. 
6.3 The Assessment Report includes: 
(a)a description of: 
(i)the action; and 
(ii)the places affected by the action; and 
(b)a summary of the relevant unpacts of the action; and 
(c)a description of feasible mitigation measures, changes to the action or 
procedures, which have been proposed by the proponent or suggested in 
public submissions, and which are mtended to prevent or minimise unpacts on 
listed threatened species and listed threatened ecological communities; 
and 
(d)to the extent practicable, a description of any feasible alternatives to the action 
that have been identified through the assessment process, and thefr 
likely impact on listed threatened species and listed threatened ecological 
communities; and 
(e)a statement of conditions for approval of the action that may be imposed to 
address identified impacts on listed threatened species and listed 
threatened ecological communities; and 
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(f)a statement of State or Territory approval requfrements and conditions that 
apply, or are proposed to apply, to the action when the report is 
prepared, mcluding a description of tiie monitormg, enforcement and review 
procedures that apply, or are proposed to apply, to the action. 
7 Inviting public comment 
7.1 When the public is invited to comment in accordance with clause 4, the 
invitation is published: 
(a)on a website approved by New South Wales National Parks and Wildlife 
Service and linked to the Environment Australia website or 
(b)in newspapers cfrculating generally in each State and Territory. 
7.2 The advertisements advise the nature of the proposal, its location(s), the 
matters of national envfronmental significance to be covered by the 
assessment, how the relevant documents may be obtained, and the deadline for 
public comments. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Definition of Owner 
[Local Government Act 1993, sch 9] 
'Owner" 
(a) in relation to Crown land, means the Crown and includes; 
(i) a lessee of land from the Crown; and 
(ii) a person to whom the Crown has lawfully contracted to 
sell the land but in respect of which the purchase price 
or other consideration for the sale has not yet been 
received by the Crown; and 
(b) in relation to land other than Crown land includes; 
(i) every person who, jointly or severally, whether at law 
or equity, is entitled to the land for an estate of freehold 
in possession; and 
(ii) every such person who is entitled to receive, or is in 
receipt of, or if the land were to be let to a tenant would 
be entitled to receive, the rents and profits of the land, 
whether as beneficial owner, trustee, mortgagee in 
possession, or otherwise; and 
(iii) in the case of land that is the subject of a strata scheme 
under the Strata Titles Act, 1973 or a leasehold strata 
scheme under the Strata Titles (leasehold) act 1986, the 
body corporate under that scheme; and 
(iv) in the case of land that is a community, precinct or 
neighbourhood parcel within the meaning of the 
Community Land Development Act 1989, the 
association for the parcel: and 
(v) every other person who by this Act is taken to be the 
owner; and 
(c) in relation to land subject to a mining lease under the Mining act 1992, the 
holder of the lease; and 
(d) in Part 2 of Chapter 7, in relation to a building, means the owner of the 
building or the owner of the land on which the building is erected. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Environmental Plannins and Assessment Act 1979 
Information submission on Lodgment. 
Application #1 
An application which relates to a wildemess area under the Wilderness Act, 1987. 
Applicant 
Prior Approval under the 
Wilderness Act. 
\ i ^ 
EPA, s 78A(7) 
Minister 
Application Consent Authority 
Application #2 
In respect of matters mentioned in EPA, s 78 A. 
E All Info. Required 1 
[ by s 81, Local I 
s. y 
_v_ 
1 Local Planning | 
1 Instruments 1 
.^ J J 
\ 
Application ^ 
w 
Consent 
Authority 
Application #3 
An application for a 'Designated Development' 
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E.I.S. or 
Statement of 
Environmental 
Effects. 
Z^ 
Local, 
Regional, 
State 
E.P.I.S 
All other Form 
1. 
requirements. 
Application 
Consent 
Authority 
/ Copy. 
Application 
and EIS. cl 
\^ 48A(6) 
Minister/ 
Director 
Application #4 
An application for 'Integrated Development' 
Consent 
Authority 
AppUcation 
and all 
supporting 
information 
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Application #5 
An application for a 'Designated Development' which is also an 'Integrated Development'. 
Consent 
Authority 
Approval 
Body 
Minister/ 
Director 
Application #6. 
An application for a 'State Significant' development. 
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Application 
Consent 
Authority 
I State or 
[ Regional 
S Environment 
I Significance 
I s.88A(l) 
Ministerial 
"Call-In" 
Consent 
Authority 
Application Delivered to 
Minister within 7 days. 
s 88A(2)(b) 
Minister = 
Consent 
Authority 
s 76A(9) 
Public Enquiry, 
s l l 9 
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Application #7 
Application for a 'State Significant" development which is also an 'Integrated 
development'. 
Application 
Minister 
as 
Consent 
Authority 
Dispute 
Resolution 
by Premier 
s 9 2 , s l 2 1 
APPENDIX 5 
Environmental Plannins and Assessment Act. 1979 
Information Requests (with Concurrence Agencies)^ 
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AppUcation ^ 
w 
Consent 
Authority 
Consent 
Authority 
^ " ' I® 
Information 
Request 
Applicant 
"Information 
Request" 
Specified 
"reasonable 
period" 
iUdi^'j„iim^jm'mmammm 
Concurrence 
Agency 
Various periods. 
See cl 60(1) 
Consent 
Authority 
Concurrence 
Agency 
^ A similar procedure applies to appUcations which mvolve 'approval bodies' i.e. 'integrated 
developments' EPAA Regs, cl 53 
APPENDIX 6 
Jnteerated Plannins Act 1997 
Information Request Preocedure 
(without Concurrence or Referral Agencies)* 
* Assumes an IPA compliant scheme. 
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AppUcant 
AppUcant 
"Acknowledgement 
Notice" 
# 
t 
Open-ended 
Extensions with 
agreement of 
applicant, 
[s 3.3.6(8)1 
"Information 
Request" 
10 day extension 
of Information 
Request 
Is 3.3.6(6)1 
Assessment 
Manager. 
J Within 10 business days. 
I [s 3.2.3(l)(a)] 
' Within 10 business days. 
i [s3.3.6(4)(a)] 
Subsequent Stages are 
>| delayed.[s 3.4.3(3)] 
AppUcant 
Mormation 
supplied within 12 
months or by 
a^eement 
fs3.2.12r2)n))l 
^ Assessment Manager. 
APPENDIX 7 
AppUcation 
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Environmental Plannins and Assessment Act 1979 
{Typical Information Request Procedure) 
I Form 1. Plus all required 
-i Information. (EIS, SIS) 
[ s78A(8) 
Consent 
Authority 
AppUcant 
Within a 
specified 
"Reasonable 
Period" 
cl 54(2)(b) 
>'-'MWnrWMW'Ml 
I "Information 
Request" 
\ 
May 
request 
info at 
any time. 
cl54 
Consent 
Authority 
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